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This  book  is  due  at  the  LOUIS  R.  WILSON  LIBRARY  on  the 
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ALSACE-LORRAINE 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2012  with  funding  from 

University  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hil 


http://archive.org/details/alsacelorrainepaOOphil 


Structural  Map  of  France  showing  Boundaries  in  1870  and  in  1914 


The  young  folded  mountains  (Pyrenees,  Alps)  are  indicated  by  one  type  of  shading,  the  plateau 
regions,  built  up  of  old,  hard  rocks,  by  another.     The  unshaded  areas  are  regions  of  unfolded, 
younger  rocks,  whose  dip  is  for  the  most  part  slight.    The  area  annexed  by  Germany  from 
France  in  1871  is  dotted  lightly.     (In  part  after  Barrt.) 


ALSACE-LORRAINE 

PAST,  PRESENT,  AND  FUTURE 


BY 

COLEMAN  PHILLIPSON 

M.A.,  LL.D.,  Litt.D. 

OF  THE  INNER  TEMPLE,  BARRISTER-AT-LAW 


WITH     FOUR    MAPS 


NEW   YORK 

E.    P.   DUTTON    AND   COMPANY 

68 1    FIFTH  AVENUE 

1918 


DEDICATED 

TO 

THE  RIGHT  HON.  SIR  FREDERICK  SMITH,  BART. 
K.C.,  M.P. 

HIS  MAJESTY'S  ATTORNEY-GENERAL 


r- 

U 
r 


PREFACE 

The  object  of  the  present  work  is  to  consider  the 
problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine — how  it  arose  in  the 
past,  what  its  present  aspects  are,  and  what  appears 
to  be  its  most  desirable  solution  for  the  future. 

To  carry  out  this  object  I  have  adopted  the  follow- 
ing plan.  First  the  salient  features  of  the  question 
are  indicated  ;  then  follow  a  description  of  the  pro- 
vinces and  of  their  economic  position,  and  a  brief 
historical  outline  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  help  us 
to  look  at  the  entire  problem  dispassionately,  and  in 
due  perspective,  in  view  of  the  various  contending 
claims  advanced.  Next  I  deal  with  the  annexation 
in  1871,  the  fateful  Franco-German  negotiations,  the 
regulation  of  numerous  matters  arising  out  of  the 
transfer  of  the  territory,  the  German  view  of  the 
acquisition,  the  proposals  made  as  to  the  status  of 
the  acquired  provinces,  and  how  their  germanisation 
was  to  be  effected.  This  is  followed  by  an  account 
of  the  solemn  and  moving  protests  of  1871  ;  and  a 
critical  analysis  of  the  German  claims  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  the  alleged  grounds  of  annexation — 
historical  association,  nationality  and  race,  language, 
necessity  (political,  economic,  and  military),  conquest 
and  confirmation  thereof  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort. 
Here  are  examined,  too,  the  common  assertions  that 
the  latter  treaty  was  necessarily  abrogated  on  the 
commencement  of  hostilities  in  19 14,  and  that  the 
forcible  acquisition  of  the  provinces  by  France  would 


8  PREFACE 

be  only  a  restoration,  and  not  a  conquest.  Then  I 
set  forth  the  German  regime  in  Alsace-Lorraine  from 
187 1  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  the 
methods  adopted  to  bring  about  the  entwelschung 
of  the  Reichsland,  and  the  factors  retarding  such 
a  consummation;  the  strivings  and  aspirations  of 
the  Alsace-Lorrainers,  the  rise  and  growth  of  the  na- 
tionalist movement,  the  views  and  feelings  in  France, 
the  revanche  ideal,  its  obsolescence,  and  recent  recru- 
descence. Finally,  I  consider  the  numerous  solutions 
that  have  from  time  to  time  been  suggested  or 
demanded  (as  the  case  may  be),  e.g.  reannexation  to 
France,  the  establishment  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  an 
autonomous  State  within  the  framework  of  the  German 
Empire,  the  creation  of  an  independent  neutralised 
State,  partition  schemes,  and  readjustments  of  boun- 
daries ;  also  the  Franco-German  coal  and  iron  problem, 
and  the  question  of  a  plebiscite.  I  point  out  the 
difficulties  and  advantages  of  the  various  proposals, 
and  show  which  is  the  best  in  the  interests  of  justice 
and  international  peace  and  amity. 

In  the  investigation  of  all  these  matters  I  have  done 
my  utmost  on  the  one  hand  to  be  concise  and  clear, 
and  on  the  other  to  preserve  throughout  an  attitude 
— if  I  may  say  so — of  judicial  impartiality.  "  Tribuere 
suum  cuique  "  :  it  is  ever  the  wisest  policy  to  follow 
this  principle,  even  if  it  involves  giving  the  devil  his 
due. 

Coleman  Phillipson. 


4,  Elm  Court,  Temple, 
April  13,  1918. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


Preface         7 

References 15 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY  :     THE    QUESTION    OF   ALSACE-LORRAINE 

STATED 

Alsace-Lorraine  long  a  bone  of  contention — Forcible  annexation  in  1871 — 
How  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  has  arisen — How  it  differs  from 
the  Near  Eastern  Question — Other  States  concerned — Different  aspects 
of  the  question — German  view  that  there  is  no  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine — Relation  to  the  present  war — The  "  challenge-cup  of  Europe  " 
— Desiderata  in  the  solution  of  the  question — Difficulties  involved 
in  the  solution — Justice  and  right  the  fundamental  consideration 

PP-  19-33 


CHAPTER  II 

DESCRIPTION  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE,  AND  ITS  ECONOMIC 

POSITION 

Area  and  configuration — Minerals  ;  climate  ;  population — Characteristics  of 
the  people — Language — Religion — Industries — Agriculture — Exports  and 
imports — Transport  and  communication  ;  public  works — Budget — 
Public  instruction — Great  progress  under  German  rule         .     pp.  34-48 

9 


io  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  III 

HISTORICAL   OUTLINE 

Roman  occupation — Germanic  invasions — Union  with  the  German  Empire. 
(a)  Lorraine  :  Middle  Ages — Relations  with  France — Certain  annexa- 
tions to  France — The  Three  Bishoprics — Cession  to  France,  (b)  Alsace  : 
Middle  Ages — Part  of  Germany  till  the  seventeenth  century — The  Thirty 
Years  War — Treaty  of  Westphalia  (1648) — Position  of  Strassburg — 
The  French  Revolution, ;  Union  with  France       .  .  .     pp.  49-60 


CHAPTER  IV 

ANNEXATION    OF   ALSACE-LORRAINE    IN    1871 

(a)  Military  events  leading  to  peace  negotiations  :  Outbreak  of  the  war  of 
1870 — Neutrality  of  the  Powers — German  successes — Annexation  pro- 
claimed— Capitulation  of  Metz — Siege  of  Paris — National  Assembly  at 
Bordeaux;  peace  signed,  (b)  Negotiations  and  Arrangements  as  to 
A  Isace-Lorraine  :  Protests  against  announced  annexation — Bismarck's 
fear  of  European  intervention — He  secures  Russian  support — His  doubt 
as  to  territorial  demands ;  military  view — Demands  made  at  Versailles 
— German  resolve  as  to  annexation — Bismarck's  concession — The  Pre- 
liminaries of  Versailles — Negotiations  at  Brussels — Difficulties  of  the 
French  plenipotentiaries — Negotiations  transferred  to  Frankfort — The 
French  plenipotentiaries — Treaty  of  Frankfort — Belfort — Germans 
affect  to  be  disappointed — The  boundary  commission — Rights  of  in- 
habitants of  ceded  territory — Regulation  of  various  other  matters 

pp.  61-85 


CHAPTER   V 

PROPOSALS  AS  TO  THE  FATE  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE 
AFTER  ITS  CONQUEST — BISMARCK'S  VIEW  OF  THE 
TASK   OF   ASSIMILATION 

Protests  in  Germany  against  the  annexation — German  policy  as  to  the 
annexed  territory — View  as  to  neutralisation — View  as  to  plebiscite — 
Division  of  the  territory  suggested — Autonomy  suggested- — Alsace- 
Lorraine  made  a  Reichsland — Bismarck's  view  as  to  German  assimila- 
tion— His  doubts  about  Metz  .....         pp.  86-97 


CONTENTS  ii 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    PROTESTS    OF   1871    AGAINST   THE   ANNEXATION 

Declaration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  deputies — Submitted  to  the  National  As- 
sembly— Various  other  protests — Debates  in  the  Assembly  on  the 
proposed  cession — Vote  on  the  Preliminaries — Further  protest  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  deputies — Demand  from  Germany — Effects  of  the  annexation 

pp.  98-1 1 1 


CHAPTER  VII 

GERMAN  CLAIMS  TO  ALSACE  -  LORRAINE  —  ALLEGED 
GROUNDS  OF  ANNEXATION  :  (a)  HISTORICAL 
GROUNDS  ;     NATIONALITY  AND   RACE  \     LANGUAGE 

Historical  grounds  :  Ranke's  view — Mommsen's  view — Treitschke's  view — 
Early  treaties — Appeal  to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire — Difficulties  in 
such  contentions.  Racial  grounds :  Names  as  a  criterion — Claim 
untenable — Treitschke's  arrogant  pretensions.  Claim  on  ground  of 
language  :  Early  struggles  between  languages — German  dialect  becomes 
predominant — Position  of  the  pays  messin.  Principle  of  nationality — 
Attachment   of   Alsace   to   France — Principle   of   public  right 

pp.  112   131 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GERMAN  CLAIMS  TO  ALSACE  -  LORRAINE  —  ALLEGED 
GROUNDS  OF  ANNEXATION  :  (b)  NECESSITY  \ 
CONQUEST  AS  CONFIRMED  BY  THE  TREATY  OF 
FRANKFORT 

Claim  on  ground  of  necessity.  Economic  necessity :  Outlet  for  overcrowded 
Germany  ? — Natural  deficiencies  of  Germany.  Political  necessity : 
German  unity  and  the  Reichsland.  Military  necessity :  Frontier 
security — Mommsen  on  Metz.  Conquest  as  confirmed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  :  Prussia's  territorial  ambitions — Bismarck's  admission 
in  1862 — German  views  as  to  "  right  of  conquest  " — Recent  growth  of 
opinion  as  to  conquest — Ground  of  illegitimacy  of  conquest — When 
conquest  justified — International  law  as  it  existed  in  187 1.  Binding 
force  of  Treaty  of  Frankfort — Supersession  of  one  treaty  by  another 

PP.  132-154 


12  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 

GERMAN   REGIME   IN   ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Military  occupation,  1870-71 — Status  from  February  1871  to  June  1871 — 
Dictatorship,  1871-3  —  The  imperial  constitution  applied,  1874 — 
Territorial  Delegacy  established,  1874 — Council  of  State  established, 
1879 — Application  of  the  regime — Repressive  measures — New  con- 
stitution, 1 91 1 — Why  autonomy  refused — Precautions  of  Germany  on 
outbreak  of  the  present  war — Why  thorough  germanisation  not  effected 
— The  German  official  classes — The  German  immigrants — Pan-ger- 
manism— German  methods  compared  with  French    .  .     pp.  155-183 

CHAPTER  X 

VIEWS    AND    ASPIRATIONS     OF    ALSACE-LORRAINE — THE 
NATIONALIST   MOVEMENT 

Protest  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  deputies  in  the  Reichstag,  1874 — Why  auto- 
nomist movement  began — Aim  in  social  and  intellectual  life  of  the 
people — Method  of  the  nationalist  leaders — Differentiation  between 
autonomists  and  protesters — Socialist  party  ;  anti-clerical  campaign — 
Democrats  leave  the  Catholic  party — National  Union  formed,  19 10  ; 
its  programme — Manifesto  against  the  Constitution  of  191 1 — "  Home 
rule  "  demanded,  1913 — Before  present  war,  memory  of  1871  fading 
in  Alsace-Lorraine — Did  Alsace-Lorraine  desire  reunion  with  France  ? 
— Noisseville  affair  ;  Saverne  affair — Attitude  of  the  people  towards 
France  and  Germany — Distinctive  personality  of  Alsace-Lorraine — 
The  new  generation  and  France — Doubtful  indications  as  to  feelings 
and  desires  of  the  people — Attitude  of  Alsace-Lorrainers  at  outbreak  of 
the  war — Declarations  of  the  two  Chambers,   1917 — Conclusions 

pp.  184-213 

CHAPTER  XI 

VIEWS  AND  FEELINGS  IN  FRANCE  AS  TO  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Three  phases  of  French  feeling  —  Revanche  ideal — Evanescence  of  re- 
vanche ideal:  contributory  causes — Pacific  policy  of  French  demo- 
cracy—  Why  revanche  ideas  were  passing  away — Disturbing  currents 
in  France  since  1871 — France  and  the  question  of  nationalities — Recent 
national  policy  of  France — Von  Billow's  view  of  the  French  temper — 
French  views  after  outbreak  of  the  war — British  view — Why  France 
determined  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine — Whether  recovery  would  be 
"  restoration  "  or  conquest — Status  of  Alsace-Lorrainers  in  France 
during  the  war     ........       pp.  2 14-234 


CONTENTS  13 


CHAPTER  XII 

SOLUTIONS   SUGGESTED  :      (a)    REANNEXATION   TO 
FRANCE 

Reannexation  followed  by  referendum  suggested — German  pronouncements 
as  to  Alsace-Lorraine  —  Forcible  reannexation  not  a  true  solution ; 
inherent  difficulty — Various  other  difficulties  :  Frontier — Grouping  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  within  political  framework  of  France — The  language 
question — The  legal  system — The  industrial  organisation — The  com- 
mercial system — Fiscal  legislation — The  religious  question — The  edu- 
cational system — Position  of  immigrants  and  the  younger  generation — 
The  previous  nationalist  movement — Other  difficulties.  Interregnum 
suggested  for  smoothing  over  difficulties   ....      pp.  235-250 

CHAPTER  XIII 

REANNEXATION  AND  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  COAL  AND 
IRON  PROBLEM 

Commercial  basis  of  the  war — German  declarations  in  1915  as  to  economic 
needs — Coal  and  iron  in  modern  war — German  need  of  coal  and  iron 
— German  demands  as  to  Briey  and  Longwy — Coal  resources  of  France 
and  Germany — Iron  ore  in  Lorraine — Iron  resources  of  Germany- — 
Effect  of  depriving  Germany  of  the  Lorraine  ore     .  .     pp.  251-264 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SOLUTIONS    SUGGESTED  I      (b)    AUTONOMY    WITHIN    THE 
GERMAN   EMPIRE 

The  nationalist  ideal— Alsace-Lorraine  can  no  longer  remain  a  Reichsland 
— German  view  in  1898 — Swiss  view — French  views — Recent  German 
opinion — German  Socialist  view,  191 7 — Form  of  autonomous  govern- 
ment— Position  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  an  autonomous  State — Autonomy 
followed  by  plebiscite  suggested      .....      pp.  263-270 


CHAPTER  XV 

SOLUTIONS    SUGGESTED  I      (c)    ALSACE-LORRAINE    AS    AN 
INDEPENDENT   STATE 

Proposed  neutralisation — Suggested  in  1870 — German  objections — Popula- 
tion to  be  consulted — Resolution  of  League  of  Peace,  1S84 — Form  of 
independent  government — Various  matters  for  adjustment — Advantages 
of   creating   an  independent   Alsace-Lorraine  :     Meeting   the   wishes   of 


14  CONTENTS 


the  people — Revanche  obviated — Fusion  of  Germanic  and  Gallic  ele- 
ments— Military  service  difficulties  removed — Bond  of  union  between 
France  and  Germany— Would  be  a  "  buffer  "  State.  Future  inter- 
national co-operation  and  treaties     .....    pp.  271-284 


CHAPTER  XVI 

SOLUTIONS   SUGGESTED  I      (d)    PARTITION  ;     ALTERATION 
OF   BOUNDARIES,    ETC. 

Partition  proposals — Language  as  a  basis — Suggested  union  of  Alsace  with 
Baden — Division  among  German  States — Frontier  rearrangement — 
The  pays  messin  to  France  and  the  rest  neutralised — Alsace-Lorraine 
as  part  of  a  Rhenish- Alpine  Confederation — Boundary  readjustment — 
Arbitration  of  the  Pope  suggested — Difficulties  in  these  proposals : 
Division  on  basis  of  speech — Division  on  basis  of  sentiment — Division 
between  German  States — Lorraine  as  an  independent  State — Suggested 
confederation.  The  Rhine  as  a  Franco-German  boundary — Criticism 
of  the  view  as  to  a  Rhine  frontier — Desideratum  in  fixing  frontiers 

pp.  285-301 

CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    QUESTION    OF   A    PLEBISCITE 

Plebiscite  for  Alsace-Lorraine  necessary — Examples  of  plebiscites — Cases 
of  annexation  without  a  plebiscite — Anglo-American  practice — Juristic 
opinion — Grounds  of  support  of  plebiscite — Grounds  of  objection  to 
plebiscite — Each  case  to  be  considered  on  its  merits — Alsace-Lorraine 
a  suitable  case — Prevailing  views  as  to  self-determination  of  peoples — 
Alsace-Lorraine  desirous  to  decide  its  own  fate — Alsace-Lorraine  ever 
against  war  as  a  solution — Opposition  to  plebiscite  by  France,  Ger- 
many, and  leading  Alsatians — Criticism  of  objections — A  real  difficulty: 
presence  of  immigrants  and  absence  of  emigrants — Compromise  neces- 
sary— Organisation  of  plebiscite — Persons  who  should  vote — Probable 
result — Essential  condition  for  the  future  ....   pp.  302-318 

Index    .......      pp.  319-328 

LIST  OF   MAPS1 

Structural  Map  of  France  showing  Boundaries  in  1870  and  1914     Frontispiece 
Sketch-map  of  Alsace  and  Eastern  Lorraine.  .  .  .  .  -35 

Geological  Sketch-map  of  Alsace-Lorraine     ......  253 

The  Ramparts  of  Paris       .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .299 

1  For  the  use  of  these  maps  indebtedness  is  acknowledged  to  the  Royal  Scottish  Geographical 
Society,  and  to  Miss  M.  I.  Newbigin,  the  editor  of  its  magazine. 


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D.  S.   Jordan,  "  Alsace-Lorraine  :    a  study  in  conquest ;    1913  " 

(Indianopolis,  1917). 

F.  Klein,  "  L'Eveque  de  Metz:   Vie  de  Mgr.  Dupont  des  Loges  " 

(Paris,  1899). 
P.  Laband,  "  Das  Staatsrecht  des  Deutschen  Reiches."     3  vols. 
(Freiburg  i.  B.,  1876-82.) 

G.  de  Lamberty,  "  Memoires  pour  servir  a  l'histoire   du  XVIII" 

siecle,"  etc.     14  vols.  (Amsterdam,  1734-40). 
A.  Lasson,  "Das  Culturideal  und  der  Krieg  "  (Berlin,  1868). 

"  Princip  und  Zukunft  des  Volkerrechts  "  (Berlin,  1871). 

L.  de  Launay,  "  Le  probleme  franc o-allemand  du  f  er  "  ;  in  Revue 

des  Deux  Monies,  July  15,  1916. 
A.  Laussedat,  "La  delimitation  de  la  frontiere  franco- allemande " 

(Paris,  1901). 


REFERENCES  17 

H.  et  A.  Lichtenberger,  "  La  question  d' Alsace-Lorraine  "  (Paris, 

I9I5)- 
J.  Longuet,  "  Alsace-Lorraine  "  ;  in  The  Nation,  January  5  and  12, 

1918. 
O.   Lorenz,   "  Kaiser  Wilhelm  und  die  Begriindung  des  Reichs, 

1866-1871  "   (Jena,  1902). 
L.  W.  Lyde,  "Some  frontiers  of  to-morrow"  (London,  1915). 
M.  Maass,   "  Was  soil  mit  Elsass-Lothringen  werden  "   (Leipzig, 

1884). 
G.  May,  "  Le  Traite  de  Francfort  "  (Paris,  1909). 
"  La  lutte  pour  le  francais  en  Lorraine  avant  1870."    Annales 

de  l'Est  publiees  par  la  Faculte  des  Lettres  de  l'Universite  de 

Nancy  (Paris  :  Nancy,  1912). 

E.  Milhaud,  "  La  democratic  socialiste  allemande  "  (Paris,  1903). 
T.  Mommsen,  "  Letters  on  the  war  between  France  and  Germany." 

Eng.  trans.  (London,  1871). 
G.  Monod,  "  Allemands  et  francais  "  (Paris,  1892). 

F.  Naumann,  "  Central  Europe."     Eng.  trans.  (London,  1916). 
M.    I.   Newbigin,    "The   Problem   of  Alsace-Lorraine";    in    The 

Scottish  Geographical  Magazine,  March  and  April,  1918  (vol. 
xxxiv.). 
J.    Novicow,    "  L' Alsace-Lorraine :     Obstacle   a  l'expansion   alle- 
mande "  (Paris,  1913). 

F.  A.  Ogg,  "  The  Governments  of  Europe  "  (New  York,  1913). 
H.  Oncken,  "  The  German  Empire"  ;  in  Cambridge  Modern  History, 

vol.  xii.,  chap.  vi.  (Cambridge,  1910). 

General  Palat,  "  L'alliance  franco-allemande  ou  la  guerre  "  (Paris, 
1914). 

"  Patiens,"  "  L'Alsace-Lorraine  devant  l'Europe  "  (Paris,  1894). 

C.  Pfister,  "  La  limite  de  la  langue  francaise  et  de  la  langue  alle- 
mande en  Alsace-Lorraine  "  (Paris,  1890). 

C.  Phillipson,  "  Termination  of  war  and  treaties  of  peace  "  (Lon- 
don, 1916). 

C.  Phillipson  and  N.  Buxton,  "  The  question  of  the  Bosphorus 
and  Dardanelles  "  (London,  1917). 

G.  Rasch,   "  Die   Preussen  in  Elsass   und  Lothringen "    (Braun- 

schweig, 1874).     French  trans.  (Paris,  1876). 
M.  Sembat,  "  Faites  un  roi,  sinon  faites  la  paix  "  (Paris,  1913). 
H.  von  Treitschke,  "  Was  fordern  wir  von  Frankreich  "   (Berlin, 

1870).     Eng.  trans,  in  "  Germany  France,  Russia,  and  Islam  " 

(London,  1915). 
2 


18  REFERENCES 

J.  Valfrey,  "  Histoire  du  traite  de  Francfort  et  de  la  liberation 
du  territoire  fran9ais  "  (Paris,  1874). 

Villefort,  "  Recueil  des  traites,  conventions,  lois,  decrets  et  autres 
actes  relatifs  a  la  paix  avec  rAllemagne."  5  vols.  (Paris, 
1872-9). 

A.  Wagner,  "  Elsass  und  Lothringen  und  ihre  Wiedergewinnung 
fiir  Deutschland  "  (Leipzig,  1870). 

H.  Welschinger,  "Bismarck"  (Paris,  1900). 

"  La   guerre   de   1870.     Causes   et   responsabilites "    (Paris, 

1910). 

"  La  protestation  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine  les  17  fevrier  et  ier  mars 

1871  a  Bordeaux  "  (Paris,  1914). 

L'Abbe  E.  Wetterle,  "  Ce  qu'etait  l'Alsace-Lorraine  et  ce  qu'elle 
sera  "   (Paris,  1915). 

S.  Whitman  (Ed.),  "  Conversations  with  Prince  Bismarck."  Col- 
lected by  H.  von  Poschinger  (London  ;   New  York,  1900). 

J.  Zeller,  "  Origines  de  l'Allemagne  et  de  l'Empire  Germanique  " 
(Paris,  1872). 

"  Die  Bevolkerang  Elsass-Lothringens  "   (Strasburg,  1908). 

"  La  neutrality  de  l'Alsace-Lorraine."  Compte  rendu  de  1' Assem- 
bled generate  des  membres  de  la  Ligue  internationale  de  la 
paix  et  de  la  liberte.  Tenue  a  Geneve  le  7  sept.  1884 
(Bale,  1884). 

"  Parliamentary  Papers,"  vol.  70  (1870). 


ALSACE-LORRAINE 


CHAPTER   I 

INTRODUCTORY  :     THE    QUESTION    OF   ALSACE-LORRAINE 

STATED 

Alsace-Lorraine  long  a  bone  of  contention — Forcible  annexation  in  1871 — 
How  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  has  arisen — How  it  differs  from 
the  Near  Eastern  Question — Other  States  concerned — Different  aspects 
of  the  question — German  view  that  there  is  no  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine — Relation  to  the  present  war — The  "  challenge-cup  of  Europe  " 
— Desiderata  in  the  solution  of  the  question — Difficulties  involved 
in  the  solution — Justice  and  right  the  fundamental  consideration. 

From  very  early  times  Alsace-Lorraine  was  a  bone  of 
contention  between  rival  races  and  rival  sovereigns. 
In  the  numerous  conflicts  of  the  contending  Aisace- 
parties,  the  lands  and  possessions  of  these  Lorraine 
unhappy  provinces  were  repeatedly  subjected  bone  of 
to  destruction  or  pillage,  and  the  population  contention- 
to  all  the  violence  of  warfare,  with  the  inevitable 
result  that  the  social,  intellectual,  and  industrial 
development  of  the  country — rich  as  it  is  in  natural 
resources  and  favoured  in  its  geographical  position 
and  configuration — has  been  seriously  hampered. 
Thanks  to  such  salient  features  and  barriers  as  the 
Rhine  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Vosges  Mountains  on 
the  other,  the  Alsace-Lorraine  territory  has  consti- 
tuted a  border-country  separating  ever  hostile  and 
seemingly  incompatible  peoples  ;    and  its  extent  and 

19 


20  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

boundaries  have  frequently  changed  with  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  war  and  the  succession  of  its  rulers. 

At  one  time  it  extended  in  the  north  to  the  sea  ;  at 
another  time  it  stretched  in  the  east  to  the  Rhine  ; 
sometimes,  again,  it  comprised  in  the  west 
areas?*  areas  and  towns  now  forming  an  integral 
part  of  France.  At  certain  periods  it  was 
divided  up  into  a  duchy,  counties,  and  free  towns  ; 
and  its  earlier  history — when  it  possessed  neither 
a  distinctive  name  nor  a  clearly  defined  area— is 
to  be  found,  not  in  indigenous  records,  but  in  the 
chronicles  of  various  foreign  countries,  such  as  France 
and  Germany,  Flanders  and  Burgundy.  In  later 
times  it  witnessed  the  increasing  and  fateful  rivalry  of 
the  French  and  the  Germanic  races,  and  the  sanguinary 
struggles  between  them,  resulting  in  the  annexation 
of  its  territory  in  187 1  to  Germany. 

Now  this  annexation  was  a  forcible  one  ;  it  was  a 
consequence  of  German  victories  in  the  field,  and  of 

cibie  a  signa-l  military  humiliation  on  the  part  of 
annexation  the  French  ;  and  it  was  effected  without 
consulting  the  inhabitants  of  the  conquered 
territory.  The  latter — a  progressive,  cultured,  and 
a  traditionally  freedom-loving  people — repeatedly  pro- 
tested against  their  violent  dissociation  from  France  ; 
and  the  great  majority  of  them  being  unable  to  aban- 
don their  homes  and  property  and  so  remain  French, 
in  pursuance  of  the  right  of  option  conceded  to 
them,  were  compelled  against  their  will  and  against 
their  instincts  and  aspirations  to  assume  German 
nationality  and  submit  to  the  new,  trying,  uncon- 
genial, oppressive  regime  of  German  domination, 
which  inflicted  all  the  burdens  of  subjecthood,  but 
withheld  many  of  the  most  important  rights  and 
privileges  of  citizenship. 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  21 

Moreover,  so  far  as  France  was  concerned,  she  was 
obliged  to  submit  to  the  annexation,  and  her  consent 
thereto,  formally  recorded  in  the  Preliminaries  How  the 
of  Versailles  and  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  was  question 
given  involuntarily — it  was  extracted  from  Lorraine 
her  by  reason  of  superior  physical  force  ;  and  has  ansen- 
so  she  has  thenceforth  felt  that  the  arrangement 
made  in  187 1  was  not,  and  could  not  be,  a  definitive 
solution,  and  she  has  long  hoped  for  an  opportunity 
of  recovering  the  conquered  territories,  and  of  ful- 
filling the  vows  of  revanche.  On  the  other  hand, 
Germany  has  repeatedly  declared  that  she  is  prepared 
to  shed  the  last1  drop  of  her  blood  rather  than  relin- 
quish the  provinces  ;  and  she  lays  claim  to  them  on 
various  grounds  (which  will  be  examined  later). 
Thus  has  arisen  another  sinister  stumbling-block  for 
Europe — the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

In  a  previous  publication  x  it  was  pointed  out  that 
one  of  the  most  important  and  most  urgent  questions 
of  modern  European  politics  is  that  of  the  Difference 
Straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles  ;  theNeS 
that  this  constitutes  the  fundamental  basis       Eastern 

.  .  Question 

of  the  Near  Eastern  Question — a  problem  and  the 
which  for  several  generations  Europe  has  Lorraine 
endeavoured  to  solve  by  "  all  the  arts  of  Question, 
diplomacy,  all  the  devices  of  political  combinations, 
and  all  the  violence  of  wars  "  ;  that  this  unsolved 
question  has  produced,  with  ever-increasing  intensity, 
the  dangerous  misunderstanding  and  ill-feeling  due 
to  tortuous  diplomacy,  international  jealousy  and 
friction,  unhealthy  rivalry ;  and  that  numerous 
devastating  wars  have  inevitably  resulted  therefrom. 
The  difference  between  the  Near  Eastern  Question 

1   The  Question  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles.     By  Coleman  Phillipson 
and  Noel  Buxton.     (London,  191 7.) 


22  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

and  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question  (which  may  be 
termed  the  Western  Question)  lies  in  the  fact  that 
the  former  involves  directly  and  intrinsically  the 
conflicting  interests  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe 
and  their  incompatibility,  not  only  amongst  them- 
selves, but  with  a  non-Christian  Empire,  whose  regime, 
government,  and  institutions  are  entirely  out  of 
harmony  with  those  of  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  are  a 
serious  obstacle  to  the  development  and  application 
of  European  public  law  and  to  the  promotion  of 
international  relationships  conformably  to  such  law. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question  is, 
in  itself,  less  comprehensive  in  its  scope  and  purport, 
and  involves  primarily,  if  not  exclusively,  first,  the 
conflicting  interests  between  two  powerful  neighbour- 
ing States,  so  different  in  civilisation,  culture,  and 
ideals,  and  secondly — this  being  the  particularly 
distinctive  differentia — the  claims  of  a  clearly  defined 
territory  with  a  population  sharing  in  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  rival  nations,  but  clearly  differing 
from  both  in  regard  to  many  other  important  qualities. 
But,  owing  to  the  geographical  solidarity  of  Europe 
and  to  the  political  and  economic  nexus  of  its  nations — 
other  states  indeed  of  the  nations  of  the  world  generally 
concerned.  — ^he  question  unavoidably  affects  countries 
other  than  those  immediately  concerned.  It  is  there- 
fore nowadays  well-nigh  impossible  to  "  localise  "  a 
conflict  between  two  countries,  and  confine  its  results 
to  the  contending  parties ;  their  conflict  becomes 
indirectly  a  conflict  also  with  third  parties,  who  thus 
adquire  the  right  to  have  a  say  in  the  matter.  More- 
over, the  principal  disputants,  fearing  the  growing 
power  of  each  other,  seek,  in  pursuance  of  a  precarious 
and  factitious  diplomatic  policy,  to  ally  themselves 
with  other  Powers,  in  order  to  secure  sympathy  and 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  23 

material  support  in  the  event  of  an  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities. Thus  the  quarrel  primarily  between  two 
States  drags  in  other  States,  which  necessarily  become 
parties  thereto.  Thus  with  the  object  of  maintaining 
the  existing  equilibrium  threatened  by  the  military 
preparations  and  accumulation  of  armaments  by  this 
or  that  Power,  combinations  are  brought  about,  and 
are  virtually  transformed  into  armed  camps,  whicih 
are  a  hindrance  to  the  social  and  commercial  develop- 
ment of  nations,  and  to  the  realisation  of  an  enlightened 
domestic  policy.  All  this  has  happened  as  a  result 
of  the  Franco-German  hostility  consequent  on  the 
annexation  of  the  two  French  provinces  in  187 1  ; 
and  so  not  only  States  in  their  collective  and  repre- 
sentative capacity,  but  also  citizens  and  subjects  in 
their  individual  capacity  have  been,  and  are,  affected 
by  this  territorial  conquest.  The  masses  of  the 
populations  of  the  world  have  ever  been  obliged  to 
pay  their  blood  and  treasure  as  the  price  for  the 
misguided  aims  and  overweening  ambitions  of  fanatical 
cliques  and  inflammatory  sections  of  their  fellow- 
citizens.  It  comes  to  pass,  therefore,  that  each  one 
of  us  is  indirectly  concerned  in,  because  each  is 
prejudicially  affected  by,  such  a  political  blunder  as 
the  seizure  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  Germany,  which 
has  engendered  a  veritable  European  nightmare.  As 
a  recent  Russian  writer  Observes  :  "...  La  question 
de  T  Alsace-Lorraine  innue  directement  sur  le  train 
ordinaire  de  notre  vie  quotidienne  par  l'impot  du 
sang  et  l'impot  de  1' argent."  l 

The  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  arose  in 
1871  and  has  subsisted  to  this  day,  has  not  always 
possessed  the  same  character  and  presented  the  same 

1  J.  Novicow,  L' Alsace-Lorraine  :   Obstacle  a  I'expansion  allemande  (Paris, 
1913).  P-  4- 


24  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

aspects  ;  nor  has  it  always  been  maintained  in  the 
same  acute  form,  and  regarded  as  involving  the 
Different  same  implications.  At  the  time  of  the 
aspects  of      annexation   of  the   provinces,   the   question 

the  question.  ,  j         ,  -,  ,    ,  .     , 

was  easier  to  understand  and  to  appreciate  ; 
here  was  a  conqueror,  there  was  a  defeated  country 
at  the  mercy  of  the  victor,  who  exacted  the  abandon- 
ment of  a  large  slice  of  territory,  the  inhabitants  of 
which  repeatedly  protested  against  the  violent  dis- 
sociation from  their  mother-country.  The  question, 
then,  in  the  eyes  of  France,  appertained  to  what  she 
regarded  as  an  illegitimate  act  of  conquest,  especially 
so  when  consummated  without  regard  to  the  wishes 
of  the  local  population.  Neutral  statesmen,  such  as 
Gladstone,1  also  felt  that  the  predominating  factor 
of  the  compulsory  cession  was  not  the  alleged  right 
of  conquest  on  the  part  of  Germany,  or  the  inalienable 
right  of  property  on  the  part  of  France,  but  the 
attachment  of  the  population  of  the  wrested  provinces 
to  France  and  their  refusal  to  change  their  nation- 
ality and  to  be  dragged  into  an  alien  civilisation. 
In  the  eyes  of  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  no  Alsace- 
Lorraine  question  ever  came  into  being ;  for  she 
held  that  she  was  entitled,  in  virtue  of  her  military 
victories,  to  gain  possession  of  the  territory,  which 
she  claimed  to  be  necessary  for  her  security,  and 
that  such  possession  was  specifically  recognised  and 
definitively  sanctified  by  the  Preliminaries  of  Ver- 
sailles and  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort — solemn  treaties 
between  the  contending  parties,  who  contemplated 
and  expressly  stipulated  their  perpetual  validity. 
Accordingly,  the  majority  of  people  now  look  upon 
the  question  as  one  that  merely  relates  to  a  clearly 

1  Lord  Morley,  Life  of  William  Ewart  Gladstone  (London,  1903).     3  vols.  ; 
vol.  li.  p.  347. 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  25 

defined  province,  which  once  belonged  to  Germany, 
was  afterwards  taken  from  her  by  France,  was  re- 
annexed  by  Germany  in  187 1,  and  is  now  claimed 
again  by  France.  The  issue,  however,  is  not  so 
simple  ;  for,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  subsequent  chapters, 
in  the  interval  between  1871  and,  say,  1914,  various 
important  changes  have  taken  place,  first,  in  regard 
to  the  attitude  of  France,  secondly,  in  the  attitude 
of  Germany,  thirdly,  in  the  aspirations  and  tendencies 
of  the  Alsace-Lorrainers,  and  in  the  development  of 
their  country,  and  lastly,  in  the  economic  and  indus- 
trial evolution  of  modern  Europe — all  of  which  changes 
cannot  but  have  affected  the  situation  as  it  existed 
in  1871  and  in  the  few  years  immediately  following, 
as  well  as  the  original  contentions  of  the  principal 
parties  concerned,  together  with  the  claims  of  other 
States.  Now,  again,  since  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
War  in  August  19 14,  further  changes  have  been  intro- 
duced, notably  in  regard  to  the  claims  of  France 
and  the  view  of  her  principal  ally,  Great  Britain  ; 
also  in  the  offer  of  a  new  policy  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many towards  Alsace-Lorraine,  hitherto  constituted 
as  a  Reichsland  (imperial  territory).  All  these  con- 
siderations must  be  carefully  taken  into  account  in 
order  to  gain  a  clear  conception  of  this  Western 
question  as  it  exists  to-day,  and  as  it  has  existed  for 
two  generations. 

Whenever  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  has 
been  raised  since  1871,  the  Germans — not  only  their 
Conservative  and  Pan-Germanist  parties,  but  German 
also  the  more  liberal  sections  of  the  people  there  is  no 
— have  emphatically  and  indignantly  de-  queJJsace- 
clared  that  there  was  no  such  question  at  Lorraine. 
all.  Thus,  such  a  philosophical  and  anti-militarist 
writer  as  Professor  Paulsen  observed  in  1907  that  the 


26  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

question  of  the  annexed  provinces  cannot  constitute 
a  subject  of  discussion  between  France  and  Germany.1 
Germans  have  repeatedly  asserted  that  the  final 
annexation  in  1871,  confirmed  by  solemn  treaties, 
made  future  transactions  on  the  subject  impossible. 
On  the  contrary,  Frenchmen  have  reiterated  the 
claim  that  there  is  and  has  been  all  along  a  question 
French  reply  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  by  reason  of  the  violent 
'  thereto.  dismemberment  in  187 1,  the  repeated  protests 
of  France  and  the  annexed  population,  the  oppression 
of  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  under  German  domination, 
and  the  imprescriptible  right  of  peoples  to  dispose 
of  their  own  destiny.  The  latter  point  has  recently 
been  emphasised  in  the  manifesto  of  the  French 
Socialist  party  (December  1915).  Europe,  too,  has 
in  general  recognised  the  existence  of  the  question, 
and  has  realised  that  the  failure  to  effect  a  settlement 
satisfactory  to  all  parties  is  fraught  with  serious 
dangers  menacing  the  public  peace.  This  being  so, 
it  must  necessarily  be  concluded  that  the  question 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  despite  the  profuse  German  dis- 
claimers, must  also  exist  for  Germany,  whether  she 
likes  it  or  not.  Indeed,  to  maintain  that  there  was 
no  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  May  10,  1871, 
is  either  "  insolent  arrogance  or  myopia."  i  In  point 
of  fact,  Germany  was  not  insensible  of  its  existence. 
We  may  recall  that  when  the  Hague  Conference  of 
1899  entered  on  the  discussion  of  a  general  treaty 
of  arbitration,  fears  were  aroused  in  Germany  as  to 
whether  her  adhesion  to  such  a  convention  would 
necessitate  her  submitting  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ques- 
tion to  an  international  tribunal.  Again,  the  German 
Emperor,  realising  the  tension  and  strained  relation- 

1  La  paix  par  le  droit  (February  1907).  a  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  43. 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  27 

ships  with  France  owing  to  this  very  question,  em- 
phasised at  a  dinner  at  Berlin,  January  2,  1908,  that 
the  German  people  must  remain  united  in  view  of 
an  approaching  conflict.  An  attitude  of  this  kirid 
shows  a  recognition  of  the  existence  of  the  question — 
at  all  eVents,  in  the  sense  that  in  France  at  least 
the  transaction  of  1871  was  not  arid  could  not  be 
regarded  as  final  and  closed. 

In  these  circumstances,  admitting  the  existence 
of  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  can  it  be  said 
that  it  was  the  cause  of  the  present  war  ?  Was  the 
Here  we  have  to  discriminate  between  the  queAisace- 
direct    and    immediate    causes    of   the    war, Lorraine  Je 

'  cause  or  the 

and  the  indirect  and  more  distant  causes,  present  war? 
We  may  say  that  it  was  not  the  direct  and  immediate 
cause  of  the  war,  inasmuch  as  before  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  the  relations  between  France  and  Ger- 
many were  peaceable  and  normal,  and  the  incidents 
that  gave  rise  to  the  conflict  between  Austria  and 
Serbia  did  not  particularly  concern  France.  But 
the  moment  France  felt  compelled  to  commence 
hostilities  against  Germany,  the  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  before  was  relegated  to  the  margin  of 
consciousness  in  French  minds,  was  rapidly  transferred 
to  the  focus  of  consciousness,  and  its  solution,  implying 
a  reversal  of  the  act  of  187 1,  became  an  essential 
object  of  France's  war.  France  did  not,  then,  take 
up  arms  for  the  purpose  of  regaining  possession  of 
the  lost  provinces  ;  but  as  soon  as  she  entered  the 
war  it  was  felt  that  her  former  territories  constituted 
an  important  part  of  the  stakes. 

Looking  at  the  events  from  a  broader  point  of 
view,  it  may  be  said  with  truth  and  accuracy  that 
the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  a  proximate  cause 
of  the  war,  seeing  that  its  origin  lies  in  the  forcible 


28  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

annexation  of  French  territory  and  the  humiliation 
inflicted  on  a  great  and  proud  country  which  could 
Asa  not   for   several  generations   entirely    forget 

causHfthe  sucn  a  bitter  experience.  The  result  of  this 
present  war.  was  the  establishment  of  political  com- 
binations in  Europe,  mutually  distrustful  and  sus- 
picious, highly  susceptible  in  case  of  the  smallest 
friction,  ready  to  take  offence  and  respond  with 
threats  at  the  first  emergency.  Thus  European 
politics  was  ever  in  a  state  of  tension,  and  it  needed 
but  a  spark  to  set  ablaze  the  whole  dangerous  structure 
resting  on  such  an  unstable  foundation.  And  the 
main  cause  of  this  condition  of  European  politics 
was,  at  bottom,  the  irreconcilable  character  of  the 
relationships  between  France  and  Germany,  rendering 
impossible  a  friendly  alliance  and  frank  entente  be- 
tween them. 

Another  contributory  cause  is  itself  a  result  of 
Germany's  victory  in  1870-71,  and  her  annexation 
German  °^  Alsace-Lorraine — viz.  her  territorial  lust 
territorial  and  aggressiveness,  and  her  assumption 
aggressive-  of  an  arrogant  hegemony  on  the  Continent, 
ness.  This     aggressiveness    has    been    condemned 

even  in  Germany.  Thus  Herr  Walther  Schucking, 
professor  of  international  law  at  the  University  of 
Marburg,  writing  in  1908,  said  that  nowhere  can  one 
see  more  clearly  than  in  German  conduct  in  Alsace 
how  disastrous  for  the  German  popular  mind  the 
influence  of  Bismarck  has  been  in  certain  respects. 
Though  it  seems  impious  to  say  so,  the  writer  observes, 
yet  it  must  be  said.  Bismarck  was  a  genius  from 
the  point  of  view  of  action,  but  not  from  the  point 
of  view  of  thought.  The  German  watchword  should 
be  "  less  Bismarck  and  more  Schiller."  Germany 
ought  to  shake  off  her  aggressive  nationalism,  which 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  29 

is  contrary  to  her  true  genius.1  In  this  sense,  then, 
the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  the  virtual  cause 
of  the  war.  As  Dr.  Fried,  a  distinguished  German 
pacifist,  remarked  recently  in  a  Swiss  paper  s  :  "  Al- 
sace-Lorraine is,  after  all,  the  cause  of  the  war.  The 
fight  for  the  two  provinces  had  determined  European 
politics,  during  the  past  half-century,  culminating 
in  the  present  war."  Similarly,  Mr.  Asquith  observed 
at  Liverpool,  October  n,  19 17  :  "  It  is  this  act  of 
crude  and  short-sighted  spoliation  which  was  the 
root  and  source  of  the  unrest,  of  the  unstable  equili- 
brium, of  the  competition  in  armaments,  which  have 
afflicted  Europe  during  the  life- time  of  two  generations, 
and  which  have  culminated  in  the  most  terrible  war 
in  history."  3  At  all  events,  whether  Alsace-Lorraine 
is  the  cause  of  the  present  war  or  not,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  on  the 
question  during  the  course  of  the  hostilities  was  the 
main  reason  for  continuing  this  widespread  and 
sanguinary  conflict.  Thus,  Baron  von  Kuhlmann, 
the  German  Foreign  Secretary,  said  in  the  Reichstag, 
October  9,  19 17  :  "  After  a  very  thorough  investiga- 
tion of  the  whole  situation,  according  to  information 
derived  from  most  diverse  sources,  I  am  convinced 
that  the  great  question  around  which  the  struggle  of 
the  nations  centres,  and  for  which  they  are  shedding 
their  blood,  is  not,  in  the  first  instance,  the  Belgian 
question.  The  question  for  which  Europe  is  being 
turned  more  and  more  into  a  heap  of  ruins  is  the 
question  of  the  future  of  Alsace-Lorraine." 

Having  regard  to  such  considerations  and  to  the 
fact  that  secular  contests  have  centred  round  Alsace- 

1  Friedenswarte,  February  1908  ;    cited  by  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  378. 

2  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung  (a  Swiss  independent  paper),  June  24,  1917. 

3  Daily  Chronicle,  October  12,  1917. 


30  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Lorraine,    those  provinces  have  sometimes  been  de- 
scribed— not,    however,    without    an    appearance    of 
The  **  chai   nipPancv — as  "  the  challenge-cup  of  Europe."   I 
ienge-cup  ^  Were    it   not   for  the    destruction   and    de- 

urope.  vas.j.ation,  ^g  Waste  of  treasure  and  loss  of 
lives  that  these  contests  have  brought  with  them,  the 
phrase  might  well  be  admitted  as  being  aptly  descrip- 
tive of  the  part  played  by  these  unhappy  provinces. 
Sometimes  Belgium,  sometimes  the  Balkan  peninsula  v 
has  been  designated  the  cockpit  of  Europe.  This 
designation  may  just  as  appropriately  be  applied  to 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Romans,  Gauls,  Huns,  Germans, 
French,  Austrians,  Hungarians,  Spaniards,  Swedes, 
have  fought  on  the  blood-soaked  soil  of  this  small 
country.  The  old  Chronicles  of  Thann  relate  how 
the  land  was  devastated  in  the  Thirty  Years  War. 
In  the  seventeenth  century  Alsace  was  a  great  battle- 
field of  religion.  The  battles  of  the  Franco-German 
war  of  1870-71  were  fought  principally  in  Lorraine. 
And  now,  once  again,  a  conflict — the  greatest  of  all 
— rages  in  these  provinces,  where  the  destiny  of  many 
a  nation  will  probably  be  decided. 

Whatever  settlement  is  eventually  arrived  at,  it 
must  realise  at  least  two  desiderata :  first,  it  must 
Desiderata  take  account  of  the  principle  of  nationality 
Sorfo/lhe  which  concerns  mainly  Alsace-Lorraine,  to- 
question.  gether  with  France  and  Germany,  as  the 
great  protagonists  struggling,  the  one  to  regain  her 
"  lost  children,"  the  other  to  retain  what  she  conceives 
to  be  now  an  integral  part  of  herself ;  secondly,  it 
must  establish  and  assure  Franco-German  peace  and 
friendship,  as  the  vital  condition  indispensable  for 
securing  the  real  pacification  of  Europe,  and  indeed 
of  the  world.  So  long  as  Alsatian  disaffection  con- 
tinues,  the   resentment    of  France  and   her  nurture 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  31 

of  revanche  ideas  will  remain.  So  long  as  Franco- 
German  concealed  or  manifest  hostility  continues,  the 
crushing  burden  of  European  armament,  military 
expenditure,  and  bleeding  of  the  populations,  will 
subsist,  and  industry  and  commerce,  social  reform 
and  education,  will  suffer  an  incalculable  injury.  If 
these  suggested  desiderata  are  realised,  then  Alsace- 
Lorraine  may  well  serve  as  a  conciliatory  connecting- 
link,  as  a  felicitous  bond  of  union  between  the  long 
hostile  French  and  German  pedples.  As  M.  Leon 
Boll,  the  editor  of  the  Strassburg  Journal  d* Alsace- 
Lorraine,  said  not  long  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  :  "  Let  us  make  of  Alsace-Lorraine  the 
melting-pot  in  which  shall  be  blended  the  double- 
distilled  civilisation  of  Germanism  and  Latinism."  1 

To  arrive  at  a  solution  satisfactory  to  all  parties  is 
now  all  the  more  difficult  inasmuch  as  economic  con- 
siderations at  present  play  a  predominating  Difficulties 
part.     Formerly  the  importance  of  possess-  involved  in 

.  1  T  .  -ill  i  the  solution. 

rng  Alsace-Lorraine  was  conceived  to  depend 
primarily  on  the  exigencies  of  military  strategy  and 
territorial  security.  Now  the  mineral  wealth  and 
the  fertile  soil  of  the  Reichslstnd,  coupled  with  its 
advantageous  position — in  the  very  midst  of  a  great 
net-work  of  communications  radiating  in  eVery  direc- 
tion— are  thought  to  be  the  main  factors  that  stimulate 
the  desire  of  the  contending  parties  to  possess  it. 
The  Pan-Germanists  are  fully  convinced  that  to  be 
deprived  of  the  provinces  would  be  tantamount  to 
destroying  the  fondly  cherished  ideal  of  securing  the 
economic  and  political  domination  of  the  Continent. 
Similarly,  France,  now  less  mindful  than  formerly 
of   the   strategic   significance   of   the   provinces,    less 

1  G.   Bourdon,    L'Enigme    allemande    (Paris,    191 3).       English    translation 
(London,    1914)  ;     French  edition,   p.   417;     English  edition,   p.   316. 


32  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

susceptible  also  to  the  old  vows  of  revanche  (at 
least,  apart  from  their  recent  resuscitation  during 
the  present  war),  attaches  all  the  greater  importance 
to  the  economic  side  of  the  question  ;  she  feels  that 
the  unrestricted  possession  of  the  natural  resources  of 
the  provinces  would  contribute  substantially  to  her 
commercial  and  industrial  development,  and  to  her 
national  power  and  welfare.  Nevertheless,  it  is  now 
thought  in  some  quarters  that  it  is  not  the  actual 
economic  value  of  the  provinces  that  intensifies  the 
difficulty  of  the  question,  but  the  fact  that  their  pos- 
session is  now  considered  by  the  leading  belligerents 
as  symbolising  the  issue  of  the  war  ;  that  is  to  say, 
that  whoever  keeps  them  will  be  accounted  the  victor. 
Thus,  Dr.  Fried,  writing  in  June  19 17,  points  out  that, 
having  regard  to  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  disputed 
territory,  common  sense  would  suggest  that  the  prize 
sought  is  not  worth  the  struggle  ;  since  the  enormous 
losses  in  life,  property,  and  treasure  suffered  by  each 
of  the  contending  parties  already  exceed  on  the  one 
hand  the  total  value  of  the  provinces,  and  on  the 
other  the  total  number  of  their  inhabitants  ;  so  that 
the  actual  value  of  the  object  aimed  at  is  no  longer 
the  main  consideration.  "  The  fight  for  these  few 
square  miles  has  now  assumed  the  terrible  meaning 
that  their  final  possession  at  the  end  of  the  war  is 
regarded  as  the  certificate  of  victory  .  .  .  even  if  the 
so-called  victor  is  only  another  loser."  1  Outside 
France  and  Germany,  it  is  felt  generally  that  European 
equilibrium  and  peace  are  jeopardised  so  long  as 
France  is  far  outstripped  by  Germany  in  material 
property,  and — as  a  corollary — in  the  growth  of 
population,  and  therefore  in  national  power  and 
fighting  strength  ;    and  that  the  possession  of  these 

1  Neue  Z&rcher  Zeitung,  June  24,  191 7. 


THE    PROBLEM   STATED  33 

rich  provinces  has  contributed  considerably  to  bringing 
about  this  difference. 

All  these  difficulties  and  conflicting  interests,  then, 
must  be  adjusted  in  the  ultimate  settlement  of  the 
question.  And,  finally,  the  moral  principle  Justicethe 
of  international  justice,  which  in  the  eyes  fundamental 
of  many  takes  precedence  of  strategic  and  pom ' 

economic  interests,  must  be  vindicated  therein,  so  as 
to  recognise  the  dominion  of  public  morality  and 
public  law  over  the  society  of  nations,  and  the  sub- 
ordination of  might  to  right.  For  when  one  con- 
templates the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  im- 
partially and  dispassionately  as  possible,  one  cannot 
help  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  to  do  justice  to 
these  disputed  provinces  and  to  their  aggrieved  people 
is  far  more  important  than  to  satisfy  the  economic  and 
military  demands  of  Germany  or  France,  or  to  make 
amends  for  the  humiliation  of  187 1  by  facilitating 
the  consummation  of  an  oscillating  or  adventitious 
revanche. 

Having  thus  set  forth  the  essential  significance  of, 
arid  the  various  implications  involved  in,  the  question 
before  us,  we  have  now  to  inquire  into  the  diverse 
relevant  matters  for  the  purpose  of  grasping  the  real 
issue  and  arriving  at  what  seems  to  be  the  best  solution. 


CHAPTER   II 

DESCRIPTION  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE,  AND  ITS  ECONOMIC 

POSITION 

Area  and  configuration — Minerals  ;  climate  ;  population — Characteristics  of 
the  people — Language — -Religion — -Industries — Agriculture — Exports  and 
imports — Transport  and  communication  ;  public  works — Budget — 
Public  instruction — Great  progress  under  German  rule. 

Alsace-Lorraine  is  bounded  on  the  south  by  Switzer- 
land ;  on  the  east  by  Baden,  from  which  it  is  separated 
by  the  Rhine  ;  on  the  north  and  north-east  by  the 
Bavarian  Palatinate,  the  Prussian  Rhine  Province, 
and  Luxemburg  ;    on  the  west  by  France. 

The  area  of  the  provinces  as  ceded  in  187 1  is  5,605 
square  miles,  that  is  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  area 
Area  of  °^  England  and  Wales,  or  a  little  less  than 
Alsace-  the  area  of  Yorkshire.  The  total  area 
acquired  by  Germany  constituted  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  former  Alsace,  together  with  about 
one-fifth  of  the  former  Lorraine  ;  the  annexed  area 
of  Alsace  alone  being  3,344  square  miles.  The  maxi- 
mum length  of  Alsace-Lorraine  from  north  to  south 
is  145  miles,  the  maximum  breadth  from  east  to 
west  is  105  miles,  and  the  minimum  breadth,  at  the 
line  drawn  through  Schlettstadt,  is  24  miles. 

The  configuration  of  the  country  is  varied  and 
beautiful.1     There    are   mountains  and  hills,  valleys, 

1  As  to  the  surface  and  soils  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  see  an  article  by  Miss  M. 
I.  Newbigin,  in  The  Scottish  Geographical  Magazine,  vol.  xxxiv  (1918),  pp.  121 
seq. 

34 


Sketch-map  of  Alsace  and  Eastern  Lorraine. 

The  oblique  shading  indicates  the  more  elevated  areas,  while  the  patches  of  vertical  shading   show, 

quite  diagrammatically,  the  chief  deposits   of  loess.     Scale   about  1:1,500,000.      boundary 

in  1914.      -i -t -t -i    boundary  in  1870.     {In  part  after  Barri.) 


DESCRIPTION  37 

rivers,  plains,  tablelands,  lakes,  forests ;  the  hills  being 
well  wooded  with  fir,  beech,  and  oak.  The  salient 
physical  features  may  be  divided  roughly  configura- 
into    three    classes :    mountain    land,    plain,  tion- 

and  plateau.  First,  the  mountain  land  occupies  the 
western  half  of  Alsace,  and  consists  of  the  Vosges 
range,  which  runs  in  a  northerly  direction  from  the 
gap  or  pass  of  Belfort  (trouee  de  Belfort).  A  con- 
spicuous peak  of  the  Vosges  is  the  Ballon  d' Alsace, 
4,085  feet  high.  Secondly,  between  the  Vosges  range 
and  its  sharp  eastern  slopes  and  the  Rhine  lies  a 
plain  of  remarkable  fertility  occupying  the  eastern 
portion  of  Alsace.  Thirdly,  in  the  north-west  there 
is  a  great  undulating  plateau,  which  descends  gradually 
in  the  west  to  the  valley  of  the  Moselle,  and  is  nearly 
co-extensive  with  Lorraine.  From  the  Vosges  chain 
beautiful  valleys  descend  into  the  plain,  each  watered 
by  its  own  stream,  and  all  of  them  draining  into  the 
111 — the  only  river  of  importance  ;  the  latter  falls 
into  the  Rhine  near  Strassburg  after  a  course  of 
more  than  100  miles,  and  is  navigable  below  Colmar. 
Among  the  smaller  streams  may  be  mentioned  the 
Doller,  the  Thur,  the  Lauch,  the  Fecht,  the  Weisse, 
the  Lieprette,  the  Bruche,  and  the  Zorn. 

The  provinces  possess  not  only  a  rich  soil — one  of 
the  most  fertile  in  central  Europe — but  also 

,  1  !,•■  -,  Minerals. 

great  mineral    wealth :     coal,   iron,    copper, 
lead,  potash,  petroleum,  rock-salt,  silver. 

The  climate  is  temperate,  the  temperature  varying 
according  to  altitude.     The  mean  annual  temperature 
of  Strassburg  is  49-8°  F.,  of  Metz,  48-2°  F. 
The  rainfall  at  Strassburg  is  26|  in.,  Metz, 
27J  in.     (The  mean  annual  temperature  of  London 
is  50 '4°,  and  the  rainfall  from  20 J  to  27 J  in.) 

The  population   of  Alsace-Lorraine  was,   in   1877, 


38  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

1,548,900  ;  in  1912,  1,886,800  ;  in  1914,  about 
Population.  1,900,000.  The  changes  and  fluctuations  in 
the  total  number,  due  to  the  emigration  of  natives 
and  the  immigration  of  Germans,  will  be  considered 
in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

The  native  Alsatians  are  neither  French  nor  German 

in    character,    temperament,    and    ideals ;     they    are 

.   .    Alsatians,   sharing  certain  characteristics  of 

Charactens-  '  ° 

tics  of  the  the  rival  nations,  and  differing  markedly 
peope.  from  both  in  many  other  qualities.  There 
is  more  friction  between  the  Germans  and  the  Alsatians 
than  between  the  Germans  and  the  Lorrainers  ;  the 
latter  being  for  the  most  part  engaged  in  mines, 
iron-works,  and  factories,  and  being  mainly  concerned 
with  questions  of  industry  and  capital.  The  Alsatians 
are  an  optimistic,  merry,  religious,  industrious  people, 
lacking  in  enthusiasm  generally,  but  with  democratic 
and  republican  leanings.  They  are  very  practically- 
minded,  and  set  great  store  by  material  well-being. 
In  the  eyes  of  many  Germans  they  have  something 
of  the  Sancho  Panza  type  in  them.  The  Alsatian 
peasantry  do  not  regard  with  favour  the  ubiquitous 
dispensations  of  paternalism  ;  neither  they  nor  the 
agricultural  workers  of  Lorraine  are  deeply  concerned 
with  the  broad  questions  of  politics  ;  both  classes 
alike  would  desire  the  burdens  of  taxation  to  diminish, 
and,  above  all,  they  would  like  to  be  let  alone 
to  jog  along  in  their  own  quiet,  cheerful,  simple 
manner.1 

Both  French  and  German  are  spoken  by  the  educated 
classes  in  the  towns.     Apart  from  these,  the 

Language.  .  ,   r  , 

great  majority  of  Alsatians  speak  a  Germanic 
dialect.     In  some  of  the  Vosges  valleys  French  pre- 

1  As  to  the  feelings  and   aspirations  of   the  people,   see  further   infra, 
chap.  x. 


DESCRIPTION  39 

dominates  or  is  spoken  as  the  mother-tongue  by  a 
considerable  proportion  of  the  inhabitants.  Along 
the  Moselle  French  yields  to  German  ;  similarly  on 
the  banks  of  the  Sarre  and  in  the  environs  of  the 
confluence  of  the  two  rivers  Nied.  In  1890  it  was 
calculated  that  the  French-speaking  inhabitants  of 
Alsace  numbered  53,000  ;  whilst  there  were  1,000,000 
who  spoke  German  or  a  Germanic  patois.1  French 
is  the  mother-tongue  of  a  small  portion  of  annexed 
Lorraine,  notably  in  Metz  and  district  (the  pays 
messin).  The  Teutonic  dialect  of  the  north-east  of 
Lorraine  is  somewhat  like  that  of  Luxemburg.  Some 
of  the  recent  census  returns2  (December  1,  1905) 
may  be  given  as  examples  to  show  the  linguistic 
diversity.  In  the  district  of  Sarrebourg  there  were, 
in  Saint-Quirin,  798  French,  221  German  ;  in  Abre- 
schwiller,  887  French,  627  German ;  Lorquin,  610 
French,  149  German ;  Heming,  316  French,  209 
German.  In  the  district  of  Chateau-Salins,  there 
were  in  the  canton  of  Dieuze  7,062  French,  4,657 
German  ;  Vic,  6,362  French,  801  German  ;  Chateau- 
Salins,  8,868  French,  1,321  German  ;  Delme,  7,970 
French,  574  German  ;  Albestroff,  1,831  French,  6,921 
German. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that,  after  187 1,  German  became 
the  official  language  of  the  country,  and  had  to  be 
used  exclusively  in  all  official  assemblies,  such  as 
general  councils,  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Delegacy  (the 
Landesausschuss),  etc.  ;  and  from  January  1,  1888, 
its  use   was  made   obligatory  in   all  courts   of  law. 

1  Cf.  C  Pfister,  La  limite  de  la  langue  francaise  et  de  la  langue  allemande 
en  Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,   1890),  p.   14. 

3  Published  by  the  official  statistical  bureau  :  Die  Bevolkerung  Elsass- 
Lothringens  (Strassburg,  1908)  ;  cited  by  G.  May,  La  lutte  pour  le  jrancais  en 
Lorraine  avant  1870.  Annales  de  I'Est  publiees  par  la  Faculte  des  Lettres  de 
VUniversiU  de  Nancy  (Paris  :    Nancy,  1912),  p.  21. 


40  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Moreover,  the  teaching  of  French  in  schools  was  con- 
siderably reduced.1 

About  three-quarters  of  the  population  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  are  Roman  Catholics.  Thus,  according  to 
Religion,  the  returns  of  1904,  there  were  1,310,391 
Roman  Catholics,  372,078  Protestants,  and  32,370 
Jews.  In  1905,  out  of  a  total  civilian  population  of 
1,733,455,  there  were  1,348,648  Roman  Catholics, 
amounting  to  78  per  cent.  Lorraine  is  proportionately 
more  Roman  Catholic  than  Alsace.  In  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, unlike  France,  there  is  no  separation  between 
Church  and  State.  Since  187 1  it  has  remained  under 
the  regime  of  the  French  Concordat 2  concluded 
between  Napoleon,  as  First  Consul,  and  the  Pope, 
July  15,  1801,  whereby  Roman  Catholicism  was 
allowed  to  be  practised  freely  and  publicly  in  France, 
subject  to  such  regulations  as  the  French  Government 
might  consider  necessary  to  make  in  the  interest 
of  public  order.  The  First  Consul  was  empowered 
to  nominate  the  bishops,  and  the  Pope  to  confer 
canonical  institution ;  whilst  the  bishops  acquired 
the  right  of  presentation  to  parochial  cures,  subject 
to  the  approval  of  the  Government.  Within  certain 
limits  Catholics  were  entitled  to  establish  ecclesiastical 
endowments.  The  Concordat  was  supplemented  by 
the  Organic  Articles  (April  8,  1802),  which  dealt  with 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Holy  See,  ecclesiastical  dis- 
cipline, areas  of  provinces,  dioceses,  and  parishes, 
liturgy,  catechism,  dogma,  and  salaries.3  The  pro- 
fessors in  the  seminaries  were  obliged  to  subscribe 
to   the   Gallican   Declaration   made   in   1682   by   the 

1  The  question  of  language,   race,   etc.,  is  dealt  with  more  fully,   infra, 
chap.  vii. 

2  As  to  the  Concordat  of  1801,  see  J.  E.  C  Bodley,  The  Church  in  France 
(London,  1906),  pp.  30  seq.,  35  seq. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


DESCRIPTION  41 

French  clergy,  and  to  teach  its  doctrine.  Sunday 
was  proclaimed  the  official  day  of  rest.1  Special  laws 
have  improved  the  position  of  ministers  of  religion, 
and  the  founding  of  various  religious  associations  has 
been  sanctioned.  Elementary  schools  have  retained 
their  confessional  character  ;  religious  instruction  is 
given  by  the  teachers,  and  the  Catholic  clergy  have 
the  right  of  inspection,  and  the  right  to  sit  on  the 
local  council  (the  Ortsschulvorstand) ,  which  controls 
public  education.  In  other  schools,  religious  teaching 
is  obligatory  and  is  given  by  the  clergy.  The  eccle- 
siastical budget  amounted  in  1910  to  about  5,000,000 
marks,  from  which  Protestant  ministers,  as  well  as 
Catholic,  were  paid.  The  influence  of  the  State  on 
the  Lutheran  Church  is  greater  than  on  the  Catholic 
Church,  inasmuch  as  the  Government  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  nominates  the  president  of  the  "  Directoire  " 
and  the  "  Conservatoire,"  which  are  the  two  highest 
authorities  of  the  Lutheran  Church. 

According  to  a  recent  estimate 2  the  occupa- 
tions of  the  people  are  apportioned  as  follows  :   ccupa  lons" 

Industries  .  730,952  (of  whom  222,931  are  women) 

Agriculture       .   551,654  (     „  294,051  „         ) 

Commerce    and 

trade    .         .  221,393  (     „  H5>344         »         ) 

The  principal  industries  are  spinning  and  weaving. 
Textile  goods  (cotton,  linen,  woollen) — the  amount 
produced    in    Alsace-Lorraine    alone     being    ,  , 

*  "  »  i  i    ■         Industries. 

equal  to  a  quarter  01  the  total  produced  in 

the  whole  of  France — are  manufactured  at  Miilhausen 

(the  Manchester  of  Alsace)  and  Colmar,  together  with 

1  J.  E.  C  Bodley,  op.  cil.,  p.  42. 

2  L'abbe  E.  Wetterle,  Ce  qu'itait  V Alsace-Lorraine  et  ce  qu'elle  sera  (Paris, 
1915).  PP-  227  seq. 


42  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Munster,  Logelbach,  Winzenheim,  Turkheim,  as  well 
as  in  all  the  valleys  of  the  Vosges  ;  e.g.  in  the  valley 
of  the  Doller  (Massevaux  and  other  villages),  of  the 
Thur  (Wesserling,  St.  Amarin,  Thann,  Moosch,  Cernay, 
Wilier),  of  the  Lauch  (Guebviller  and  adjacent  villages), 
of  the  Lieprette  (Ste.  Marie-aux-Mines  and  adjacent 
districts) .  Other  industries  are  dyeing  ;  tanning  and 
leather  goods  manufacture  (Strassburg  ;  and  Masse- 
vaux in  the  Doller  Valley)  ;  the  manufacture  of  silk, 
lace,  machinery,  glass,  china  ware  (in  Lorraine),  house 
furniture,  clocks,  paper,  and  tobacco  (at  Strassburg). 

Further,  mining  and  metallurgy  employ  a  large 
number  of  people,  the  principal  minerals  being  coal, 
iron  (in  Lorraine),  potash,  petroleum,  and  argenti- 
ferous lead.  The  question  of  coal  and  iron  will  be 
considered  later  separately1  ;  for  the  present  it  will 
suffice  to  state  that  in  19 12,  the  coal  extracted  amounted 
to  3,538,951  tonnes  (1  tonne  =  "9842  ton),  of  the 
value  of  39,000,000  marks  ;  and  in  19 13  (the  last 
normal  year)  the  iron  mines  of  annexed  Lorraine 
produced  21,135,000  tonnes  of  ore,2  of  the  value  of 
nearly  56,000,000  marks. 

In  1872  the  total  yield  of  coal  and  iron  from  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  mines  was  1,000,000  tonnes ;  so 
that  in  a  period  of  forty  years  under  the  German 
regime  the  output  has  become  twenty-five  times  as 
large.  In  1872  some  1,500  workmen  were  employed 
in  the  furnaces,  and  turned  out  200,000  tonnes  of 
pig-iron  ;  in  1910  there  were  6,500  workmen,  who 
produced  2,700,000  tonnes  of  pig-iron  (3,800,000  in 
1913).  The  production  of  steel  increased  as  follows  : 
in  1872,  180,000  tonnes  ;    in  1910,  1,300,000  tonnes  ; 

1  See  chap.  xiii. 

2  Comite  des  Forges  de  France.  Circulaire  No.  655,  p.  13  ;  quoted  by 
M.  Alfassa,  Le  fer  et  le  charbon  lorrains  (Paris,  1916). 


DESCRIPTION  43 

in  1913,  2,300,000  tonnes.1  With  regard  to  potash, 
we  may  refer  to  a  statement  made  in  the  spring  of 
19 1 6  by  the  Rhenish  Westfthalian  Gazette,  which  is 
subsidised  by  Krupp's  :  "  In  Upper  Alsace  there  are 
rich  deposits  of  potash.  If  this  region  belonged  to 
France,  the  German  world-monopoly  of  potash,  which 
lays  the  foreigner  and  especially  the  United  States 
under  tribute  to  this  country,  would  be  lost,  and 
France  would  gain  a  notable  source  of  wealth  and 
also  the  means  of  providing  her  munitions.  She 
would  then  control  a  powerful  weapon  in  waging  war 
against  us.  So  important  indeed  are  these  potash 
deposits  in  munition-making  that  Germany  has  had 
to  limit  and  control  their  export."  The  value  of  this 
mine  is  calculated  at  several  thousand  millions  of 
francs.  As  to  petroleum,  the  same  paper  says : 
"  We  have  at  Pechelbronn  in  Alsace  the  only  large 
petroleum  well  in  Germany,  especially  since  the 
field  of  the  Hanover  Wietze  district  has  greatly  dimin- 
ished. Thanks  to  Pechelbronn,  Alsace  has  during 
the  present  war  considerably  assisted  our  economic 
resistance  by  supplying  us  with  petroleum,  benzine, 
and  lubricating  oils." 

Agriculture  is  in  a  prosperous  condition.  The 
system  of  small  holdings,  favoured  by  the  Civil  Code, 
is  established  ;  of  cultivated  land  of  881,569 
hectares  (1  acre  =  '405  hectare),  there  are 
244,988  holdings.  The  slopes  of  the  Vosges  are 
covered  with  extensive  and  fruitful  vineyards  ;  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Colmar  one  of  the  best  wines  is 
produced.  Recently  viticulture  has  undergone  an 
enormous  development.  The  average  production  of 
wine  is  600,000  hectolitres  (1  hectolitre  =  22*01  gallons), 

1  Cf.  H.  and  A.  Lichtenberger,  La  Question  d' Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  1915), 
pp.  101  seq. 


44  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  the  value  of  about  22,000,000  marks  ;  this  amount 
constitutes  a  third  of  the  total  production  of  wine 
in  Germany.  The  annual  production  of  beer  reaches 
1,274,000  hectolitres,  and  that  of  alcohol  14,857 
hectolitres.1  Amongst  the  more  important  agri- 
cultural products  may  be  mentioned  wheat,  barley, 
rye,  oats  ;  pulse  ;  potatoes  ;  tobacco  ;  hops  ;  hemp, 
flax  ;  beet  (for  sugar)  ;  dairy  produce,  notably 
cheese  ;  fruit ;  timber.  Forestry  employs  many 
people  ;  the  forest  land  is  extensive,  nearly  one-third 
of  which  belongs  to  the  State,  more  than  one-third 
to  the  communes,  and  the  rest  to  private  owners. 
The  provinces  are  rich  in  horses,  cattle,  sheep,  pigs, 
goats,  hares,  geese,  ducks,  and  chickens. 

As  for  the  exports  and  imports  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
we  find  that  Germany  takes  by  far  the  most  important 
place.  Thus  in  1909  the  provinces  exported 
knpor2.and  10,248,604  tons  of  merchandise,  of  which 
80  per  cent,  went  to  Germany  ;  and  of  the 
imports,  too,  about  80  per  cent,  came  from  Germany. 
The  remaining  20  per  cent.,  both  of  exports  and 
imports,  was  divided  between  Belgium,  France,  and 
Switzerland  ;  that  is,  Belgium  (and  not  France)  came 
next  to  Germany. 

The  means  of  transport  and  communication  have 
developed  enormously  under  German  organisation. 
Trans  ort  Watercourses — canals  and  rivers,  especially 
and  com-  the  Rhine — have  been  greatly  improved  ; 
mumcaion.  ^e  traffic  of  the  port  of  Strassburg  has 
increased  considerably.  In  1872  there  were  768 
kilometres  of  railway  lines,  and  9,000  employees. 
There  are  now  over  2,000  kilometres  of  railways,  which 
are  valued  at  about  a  milliard  francs  (£40,000,000), 
and  which  carried  in  1909  47,000,000  passengers  and 

1  Wetterle,  loc.  cit. 


DESCRIPTION  45 

2,611,000,000  kilometric  tonnes  of  goods  1  ;  and  the 
number  of  persons  employed  in  1900  was  31,000. 
The  gross  receipts  for  1912  amounted  to  140,000,000 
marks.  The  railway  system  was  bought  in  1871  by 
France  from  the  Eastern  Company  for  325,000,000 
francs,  and  was  ceded  to  Germany  in  reduction  of  the 
war  indemnity.  The  postal,  telegraphic,  and  tele- 
phonic services  have  also  been  rapidly  extended  in 
recent  years.  In  1871  there  were  only  192  post 
offices,  57  telegraph  offices,  and  600  employees ; 
whilst  in  1909  there  were  1,560  post  offices,  1,329  tele- 
graph offices,  and  1,295  telephone  offices,  employing 
8,000  persons,  and  despatching  441,000,000  letters 
and  packets,  13,000,000  parcels,  and  2,000,000 
telegrams.2 

The  establishment  of  public  works  for  purposes  of 
irrigation,  canalisation,  etc.,  has  added  Public 
largely  to  the  value  of  the  plant  of  the  works, 
country,  and  on  which  a  sum  of  about  48,000,000 
marks  was  spent  between  1871  and  1904. 

The  expenditure  of  the  State  in  the  provinces 
amounted  in  1872  to  31,000,000  marks,  in  1880  to 
47,000,000  marks,  and  in  1912  to  76,000,000 
marks  ;  that  is,  it  has  increased,  during  the 
forty  years  of  German  administration,  from  20  marks 
per  head  of  the  population  to  38  marks  per  head. 
The  expenditure  of  the  communes  has  in  this  interval 
grown  in  greater  proportion — from  14,500,000  marks 
to  55,500,000  marks,  that  is,  from  9  marks  per  head 
to  29  marks  per  head.  Similarly,  the  debt  of  the 
State  has  increased  from  3,000,000  marks  to  44,500,000 
marks  (that  is,  from  2*44  m.  per  head  to  22  m.  per 
head),   and  that  of  the  comrriunes  from  15,000,000 

1  H.  and  A.  Lichtenberger,  La  Question  d' Alsace-Lorraine,  p.  98. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  99. 


46  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

marks  to  180,000,000  marks  (that  is,  from  about 
10  m.  per  head  to  96  m.  per  head).1 

Both  the  expenditure  and  the  debt — as  is  admitted 
even  by  critics  strongly  opposed  to  the  German 
occupation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  2 — were  necessary  and 
fully  justified  ;  a  bold  financial  policy  was  needed 
for  the  purposes  of  public  organisation  and  economic 
development.  The  merits  of  German  administration 
— activity,  method,  precision — are  recognised  by  the 
Alsatians,  though  they  have  sometimes  felt  that  the 
governing  authorities  might  haVe  been  a  little  more 
economical  in  the  use  of  public  money,  especially 
in  regard  to  the  high  salaries  paid  to  officials,  who  for 
the  most  part  are  Germans.  Impartial  judges,  how- 
ever, will  agree  that  in  order  to  secure  competent  and 
efficient  officials  it  is  indispensable  to  offer  them 
adequate,  indeed,  attractive,  salaries ;  so  that  the 
Alsatian  reproach  of  "  dispendieuse  megalomanie  "  3 
is  not  merited,  at  all  events  in  this  respect.  A  com- 
ment of  striking  significance  here  is  that  in  1872 
the  deposits  in  the  savings  banks  of  the  provinces 
amounted  to  7,500,000  marks,  whilst  in  recent  years 
they  attained  a  total  of  178,000,000  marks.  Further, 
it  is  admitted  that  the  schemes  and  incidence  of 
taxation  have  changed  for  the  better  since  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  territory.4 

Public  instruction  of  all  grades  is  admirably  organ- 
ised and  adequately  endowed.6  In  regard  to  ele- 
Pubiic  mentary  education,  there  are  3,846  schools, 
instruction.  with  4,138  masters  and  4,053  mistresses  and 
320,000  scholars.  For  secondary  instruction,  which 
requires  a  budget  of  2,000,000  to  3,000,000  marks, 

1  Wetterle,  loc.  cit.  ;    Lichtenberger,  op.  tit.,  p.  105. 

2  E.g.  Lichtenberger,  ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  107.  *  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  294.  *  Ibid.,  p.  100. 


DESCRIPTION  47 

there  are  15  gymnasiums  (grammar-schools)  and  13 
realschulen  (modern  schools),  containing  700  masters 
and  10,000  pupils.  Excellent  provision  is  made  for 
technical  and  professional  training  ;  the  School  of 
Chemistry  at  Miilhausen  is  an  institute  of  European 
reputation.  Finally,  the  University  of  Strassburg — 
for  which  the  annual  expenditure  is  1,800,000  marks — 
is  one  of  the  finest  and  best  equipped  on  the  Continent ; 
and  its  organisation  is  universally  praised  and  ad- 
mired. In  1872  it  had  47  professors  and  lecturers 
and  220  students,  now  it  has  176  professors  and 
lecturers  and  2,200  students  ;  and  it  contains  a 
library  of  nearly  a  million  volumes.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  various  kinds  of  continuation 
schools  and  technical  institutes  have  greatly  con- 
tributed to  the  commercial  expansion  and  industrial 
prosperity  of  the  Reichsland.  As  MM.  Lichtenberger 
testify :  "  L'enseignement  post-scolaire,  les  ecoles 
d'adultes,  les  ecoles  d'apprentissage,  l'enseignement 
technique  sont  admirablement  organises  en  Alsace 
et  ont  certainement  contribue,  pour  une  bonne  part, 
a  la  prosperite  industrielle  du  pays."  1 

Whatever  disadvantages  were  inherent  in  and 
whatever  hardships 2  resulted  from  the  German  ad- 
ministration, there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  also     ,, 

Great  pro- 

brought  about   great   economic   and  educa-    gress  under 

,  •  1  n  ,  1  •    •  German  rule. 

tional  progress,  as  well  as  true  religious 
liberty.  We  may  sum  up  in  the  words  of  a  well- 
known  French  writer :  "  Under  the  German  rule, 
Alsace-Lorraine  received  an  impulse  which  it  had  not 
known  before  the  annexation.  Schools,  roads,  rail- 
ways, public  places,  monuments,  factories,  large 
shops,  transformed  old  Alsace  and  French  Lorraine. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  115. 

2  That  there  were  many  will  be  seen  in  chap.  ix. 


48  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

After  French  administration,  so  conventional  and 
so  nonchalant,  German  administration,  even  if  still 
somewhat  rough  in  its  methods,  seemed  a  wonderful 
fairy  of  initiative  and  intelligence,  and  the  same 
comparison  between  the  commercial  bourgeoisie  of 
France  and  of  Germany  was  forced  on  us  ;  the  more 
the  one  appeared  conventional  and  timid,  the  more 
the  other  seemed  bold  and  enterprising."  1 

Having  now  considered  the  nature  of  the  question 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  present  position  of  the 
provinces,  it  is  necessary  to  set  forth  the  principal 
historical  facts  in  order  to  appreciate  the  character 
of  the  contending  claims  and  the  issues  involved. 

1  G.  Herve,  L' Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  1913). 


CHAPTER  III 

HISTORICAL   OUTLINE 

Roman  occupation — Germanic  invasions — Union  with  the  German  Empire. 
(a)  Lorraine  :  Middle  Ages — Relations  with  France — Certain  annexa- 
tions to  France — The  Three  Bishoprics — Cession  to  France,  (b)  Alsace: 
Middle  Ages — Part  of  Germany  till  the  seventeenth  century — The  Thirty 
Years  War — Treaty  of  Westphalia  (1648) — Position  of  Strassburg — 
The  French  Revolution  ;   Union  with  France. 

The  regions  of  Alsace-Lorraine  inhabited  by  such 
tribes  as  the  Rauraci  and  Sequani,  formed  part  of 
ancient  Gaul ;  they  extended  from  the  Roman 
Atlantic  to  the  Rhine,  and  were  subjected  occuPation. 
to  the  Roman  dominion  through  the  conquests  of 
Julius  Csesar.  For  five  centuries  they  constituted  a 
colony  of  the  Roman  Empire,  being  included  in  the 
provinces  of  Germania  Superior  and  Maxima  Se- 
quanorum.  The  results  of  the  Roman  occupation, 
e.g.  the  founding  of  towns,  such  as  Strassburg,  Metz, 
Verdun,  Saverne,  and  the  construction  of  roads  and 
monuments,  are  visible  in  various  parts  of  the  country. 
To  the  east  of  the  Rhine  was  a  region  of  forest  land 
inhabited  by  barbarians  who  frequently  crossed  over 
the  river  into  the  adjacent  lands  on  depredatory 
enterprises,  and  with  the  help  of  the  Roman  and 
Gallic  legions  were  driven  back. 

Early  in  the  fifth  century,  however,  the  provinces 
were  more  extensively  ravaged  by  bands  of  Goths, 
Alani,  and  other  Germanic  tribes,  who  Germanic 
broke  in  Successive  waves  over  Gaul  and  invasions- 
the  Roman  Empire.  The  former  Roman  colony  was 
4  49 


50  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

occupied  on  the  south  by  the  Alemanni,  and  in  the 
north  by  the  Franks.  About  a.d.  500  the  Alemanni 
were  overthrown  by  Clovis,  the  Merovingian  king, 
at  the  battle  of  Tolbiac,  and  were  driven  beyond 
the  Rhine,  so  that  the  territories  on  the  left  bank 
passed  under  the  sway  of  the  Franks.  Immediately 
afterwards  followed  the  conversion  to  Christianity  of 
Clovis  and  thousands  of  his  soldiers,  who  were  baptized 
by  Remigius,  Bishop  of  Rheims,  conformably  to  the 
victor's  promise  made  before  the  great  battle.  Many 
of  the  old  names  in  the  conquered  country  were  then 
supplanted  by  new  ones  ;  thus  the  designation  Alsatia 
or  Elsass  came  into  use,  being  derived  from  the  river 
Ell  or  111,  which  falls  into  the  Rhine  at  Strassburg. 

For  some  time  during  the  Merovingian  period  it 
formed  a  duchy  attached  to  the  Austrasian  kingdom, 
Merovingian  with  Mefz  as  the  capital,  and  was  governed 
period.  ^y  ^e  successors  of  Duke  Eticho,  one  of 
whom  was  St.  Odilia,  to  whose  shrine  Alsatians  still 
make  pilgrimages. 

Under  Charlemagne  it  participated  in  the  military 
charie-  expeditions  to  the  interior  of  Germany ; 
magne.  an(j  a|  j^g  death  (a.d.  8  i 4)  the  Frankish 
empire  fell  to  pieces,  and  Alsace-Lorraine,  along  with 
it,  was  divided  into  countships. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Verdun  (a.d.  843),  the  original 
kingdom  of  Lorraine  passed  to  the  Emperor  Lothair  I, 
and  in  a.d.  855  his  second  son,  King  Lothair,  suc- 
ceeded to  it.  It  then  comprised  not  only  the  territory 
that  was  afterwards  designated  Lorraine,  but  also  the 
regions  corresponding  to  what  is  now  Holland  and 
Belgium,  portions  of  Rhenish  Prussia,  of  Switzerland, 
and  of  the  old  province  of  Franche-Comte.  A  cen- 
tury later  the  entire  country  received  the  name  of 
Lotharingia. 


HISTORICAL   OUTLINE  51 

Towards  the  end  of  the  ninth  century,  when  the 
empire  was  divided  between  Charles  the  Bald  and 
Louis    the    German,    Alsace    and    Lorraine  TT  .       ... 

Union  with 

were  united  to  the  German  Empire.  Alsace  German 
was  now  settled  by  Germans  of  Alemannic  imPir< 
stock,  akin  to  those  who  had  colonised  a  great  part 
of  the  territories  now  comprised  in  Baden,  Bavaria, 
and  North  Switzerland  ;  and  Lorraine  was  occupied 
by  Franks  and  Franconians — the  Vosges  or  Wasigen 
Mountains  forming  a  barrier  between  the  German- 
speaking  and  the  Romance-speaking  peoples. 

It  will  now  be  convenient  to  deal  with  Lorraine 
and  Alsace  separately,  as  for  some  centuries  they 
followed  different  destinies. 

(a)  Lorraine 

At  the  beginning  of  the  tenth  century  Lorraine 
was  converted  from  a  countship  into  a  duchy.  In 
a.d.  944  Otto  the  Great  gave  it  to  Conrad  Lorraine . 
the  Red,  Duke  of  Franconia,  and  on  the  Middle 
latter' s  revolt  took  it  away  again  and  as- 
signed it  to  Bruno,  Archbishop  of  Cologne  (a.d.  954). 
Owing  to  the  sedition  of  Lotharingian  nobles,  Bruno 
divided  the  duchy  into  Lower  Lorraine  (given  to  a 
Duke  Godfrey,  who  was  styled  Dux  Ripuariorum) , 
and  Upper  Lorraine  (given  to  Frederick,  Count  of 
Bar,  styled  Dux  Mosellanorum) .  After  numerous 
changes  Lower  Lorraine  was  assigned  by  the  Emperor 
Henry  V  in  1106  to  Godfrey,  Count  of  Louvain,  the 
first  hereditary  Duke  of  Brabant,  and  was  after- 
wards designated  Brabant.  From  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury the  duchy  of  Upper  Lorraine  came  to  be  known 
simply  as  Lorraine.  Among  its  fiefs  were  the  three 
ecclesiastical  lordships  of  Metz,  Toul,  and  Verdun — 


52  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

described  as  the  Three  Bishoprics — which  enjoyed 
almost  complete  independence. 

In  13 1 5  Verdun  and  Toul  placed  themselves  for  a 
short  time  under  the  protection  of  the  King  of  France. 
Relations  Metz,  above  all,  was  on  terms  of  close  friend- 
with  France,  g^jp  with  France,  and  very  cordial  relations 
existed  between  the  pays  messin  and  Louis  XI, 
Charles  VIII,  and  Louis  XII.  When  a  French  king 
was  crowned  at  Rheims,  several  Messins  attended  and 
received  the  honour  of  knighthood  ;  similarly  they 
participated  in  the  solemnities  consequent  on  the 
death  of  a  French  sovereign.  The  French  language 
was  predominant  in  Metz. 

In  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  a  consider- 
able portion  of  Lorraine  territory  was  definitively 
annexed  to  France.  At  this  time  Germany 
annexations  was  much  divided  up,  and  cannot  yet  be 
described  as  constituting  a  nation.1  Metz, 
Toul,  and  Verdun,  which  had  long  shaken  off  the 
dominion  of  the  bishops,  were  governed  as  independent 
republics,  recognising  only  a  nominal  suzerainty  of 
the  Emperor  of  the  Romans.  Charles  V  opposed  the 
spread  of  Protestantism,  and  endeavoured  by  forcible 
measures  to  bring  back  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
princes  and  communities  who  had  adopted  the  re- 
formed religion.  Whereupon  the  Protestant  princes, 
notably  Maurice  of  Saxony,  took  up  arms  and  ap- 
pealed for  protection  to  Henry  II  of  France  (husband 
of  Catherine  de'  Medici).  The  latter  accordingly 
entered  into  alliances  with  the  German  Reformers, 
towards  the  end  of  1551,  raised  an  army  of  36,000 
men  (more  than  half  of  whom  were  German  and 
Swiss   mercenaries),   and   invaded   Lorraine   early   in 

1  Cf.  A.  Eckel,  La  reunion  de  V Alsace  el  de  la  Lorraine  a  la  France  (Vesoul, 
1894)- 


HISTORICAL   OUTLINE  53 

1552.  Toul  readily  surrendered  without  offering  any 
resistance.  In  April  1552,  Metz  was  occupied  by 
Montmorency.  Henry  II  then  crossed  the  Vosges 
into  Alsace,  and  tried  to  take  Strassburg,  but  failed. 
He  took  possession,  however,  of  Hagenau  and  Weissen- 
burg,  and,  after  recrossing  the  Vosges,  occupied 
Verdun. 

Thus,  the  three  Lotharingian  bishoprics,  com- 
prising the  three  towns  and  dependent  territories, 
became  part  of  the  French  dominions.  In  The  Three 
1553  Charles  V  tried  to  retake  Metz,  but  Bishopries, 
after  a  siege  of  two  months  was  compelled  to  retire 
with  heavy  loss,  before  the  resistance  of  Duke  Francis 
of  Guise.  Under  the  Treaty  of  Cateau-Cambresis, 
April  1559,  France  was  obliged  to  surrender  various 
conquests,  but  was  permitted  to  retain  the  Three 
Bishoprics :  "  She  lost  as  many  provinces  as  she 
gained  cities."  The  newly  acquired  territories,  which 
were  already  French  in  language  and  sentiments, 
were  rapidly  assimilated  to  France  in  every  other 
respect,  and  gave  their  new  country  illustrious  sons 
(such  as  Marshal  Fabert  of  Metz)  who  were  ready  to 
sacrifice  themselves  in  its  service. 

The  possession  of  the  Three  Bishoprics  facilitated 
and  promoted  French  relations  with  the  duchy  of 
Lorraine  generally,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  definitive 
acquisition  of  the  latter.  The  Duke  of  Lorraine  was 
in  several  respects  in  a  peculiar  position.  In  the  first 
place,  his  subjects  were  some  of  French  origin  and 
some  of  German  ;  the  people  inhabiting  the  banks 
of  the  Moselle,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Nancy,  Epinal, 
etc.,  spoke  French,  whilst  those  inhabiting  the  banks 
of  the  Sarre,  near  Sarreguemines,  Sarrebourg,  and 
Phalsbourg,  spoke  German.  Secondly,  he  owed  hom- 
age to  the  French  sovereign  for  the  county  of  Bar-le- 


54  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Due,  but  the  remainder  of  his  possessions  acknowledged 
the  suzerainty  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany.  Thus 
the  division  of  his  interests  and  obligations  ajffected 
his  policy.  In  the  reign  of  Duke  Charles  (surnamed 
the  Great),  the  duchy  suffered  much  from  German 
bands  who  passed  through  it  on  their  way  to  help  the 
Protestants  in  France,  as  well  as  from  disturbances 
due  to  the  progress  of  Calvinism.  His  son,  Henry  II 
(the  Good),  expelled  the  invaders. 

Duke  Charles  IV  (or  III),  having  harboured  French 
malcontents,  Louis  XIII  invaded  Lorraine  and  obtained 
French  the  cession  of  several  fortresses  (1631-3). 
invasion,  j^e  duke  then  abdicated  and  withdrew  to 
Germany,  whereupon  the  Parlement  of  Paris  adjudged 
him  guilty  of  rebellion,  and  confiscated  his  estates. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Vincennes  (1661)  he  recovered  the 
duchies  of  Lorraine  and  Bar,  but  ceded  Clermont, 
Sarrebourg,  and  Phalsbourg.  The  following  year  he 
transferred  the  succession  to  the  duchy  to  Louis  XIV 
for  a  life-rent,  but  the  Lorrainers  refused  to  ratify  the 
transaction.  Lorraine  was  then  occupied  by  Marshal 
de  Crequi.  The  ducal  estates  were  not  restored  till 
1697,  when,  under  the  Treaty  of  Ryswick,  Duke  Leopold 
regained  them,  but  was  obliged  to  dismantle  the 
fortresses  of  Lorraine,  and  to  disband  nearly  the 
whole  of  his  army.  During  the  latter' s  reign  great 
progress  was  made  in  the  duchy,  and  French  immi- 
grants were  welcomed. 

After  the  death  of  Leopold,  his  heir,  Francis  III, 
was  betrothed  to  Maria  Theresa,  the  daughter  and 
Cession  to  heiress  of  the  Emperor  Charles  VI.  But 
France.  France  opposed  the  union  of  Lorraine  with 
the  Empire.  By  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  (1735)  the 
duke  exchanged  Lorraine  for  the  duchy  of  Tuscany  ; 
the  former  was  given  to  Stanislaus  Leszczynski,  the 


HISTORICAL    OUTLINE  55 

dethroned  king  of  Poland  and  father-in-law  of  Louis  XV, 
and  on  his  death  (a.d.  1766)  passed  to  the  French 
king  conformably  to  the  stipulations  of  1735.  Thus 
the  acquisition  of  the  territory  was  effected  by  way 
of  a -regular  and  legitimate  cession,  and  not  by  con- 
quest. 

(b)  Alsace 

After  the  death  of  Henry  I,  King  of  the  Germans, 
Alsatia  (or  Elsass)  was  re-established  as  a  duchy,  and 
remained  in  the  possession  of  the  Hohen- 
staufen  House  till  1273,  when  Rudolf  III 
of  Habsburg  was  elected  King  of  the  Romans. 
(The  Imperial  dignity  was  vested  in  the  House  of 
Habsburg  from  1438-1740,  and  from  1745  until  the 
dissolution  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  in  1806.) 
At  the  beginning  of  the  twelfth  century  the  country 
was  divided  into  the  two  landgraviates  of  Upper 
Alsatia  (the  Sundgau)  and  Lower  Alsatia  ;  but,  owing 
to  the  continual  disintegration  of  the  great  duchies 
and  the  multiplication  of  principalities  and  minor 
lordships  in  the  Empire,  the  Emperors  established 
numerous  free  towns  for  the  purpose  of  combating 
the  growing  power  of  the  princes  and  lesser  nobles. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  fifteenth  century  there  were 
some  eighty  Free  Imperial  towns  in  the  Empire,  most 
of  which  were  situated  in  southern  or  western  Germany  ; 
and  the  traditions  of  freedom  in  Alsace  go  back  at 
least  to  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century,  when 
the  League  of  Free  Cities  was  established  (1353),  at 
the  suggestion  of  the  Emperor  Charles  IV,  and  existed 
for  over  two  centuries.  It  included  Hagenau,  Colmar, 
Schlettstadt,  Weissenburg,  Miinster,  Turkheim,  Kaisers- 
berg,  Oberehnheim,  Rosheim,  and  Miilhausen.  Landau 
entered  the  league  in  151 1,  but  in  1523  Miilhausen 


56  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

left  it  to  join  the  Swiss  Confederation.  These  "  free 
towns "  enjoyed  autonomy,  though  not  complete 
independence. 

Till  the  seventeenth  century  Alsace  was  part  of 
Germany  ;  in  the  Middle  Ages  it  was  one  of  the  cradles 
Part  of  °^  German  thought,  civilisation,  art,  and 
Germany      architecture.      In    the  thirteenth  and   four- 

till  scvcn~  • 

teenth  teenth  centuries  the  pious  mystical  fellowship, 
century.  the  «  Gottesfreunde  "  (the  "  Friends  of  God "), 
with  Johannes  Eckhart  and  Johann  Tauler  at  their 
head,  prepared  the  way  for  the  Reformation.  In  the 
earlier  part  of  the  fifteenth  century,  Gutenberg  set  up  his 
printing-press  at  Strassburg  ;  and  Martin  Schongauer, 
the  leading  engraver  and  painter  of  the  early  German 
School,  established  a  school  of  engraving  at  Colmar, 
which  produced  the  "  little  masters  "  of  the  following 
generation  and  a  group  of  Nuremberg  artists.  Nearly 
the  whole  of  Alsace  accepted  the  reformed  doctrines, 
Martin  Bucer  being  their  foremost  champion  in  Strass- 
burg about  1523.  In  1530  the  latter  city  joined  the 
religious  and  political  league  known  as  "  das  christliche 
Biirgerrecht,"  which  Mulhausen  had  entered  the  year 
before  ;  and  through  the  succeeding  period  of  Catholic 
persecutions  and  religious  dissensions  Strassburg  was 
piloted  by  Jacob  Sturm  von  Sturmeck,  who  obtained 
from  the  Emperor  favourable  terms  for  his  native 
city  at  the  termination  of  the  Schmalkaldic  War. 

In  the  Thirty  Years  War,  France  intervened  at  the 
instance  of  several  German  princes.  After  the  defeat 
Thirty  of  Duke  Bernhard  of  S  axe- Weimar  at 
Years  War.  Nordlingen  (1634),  Richelieu  demanded,  as 
the  price  of  his  assistance,  the  Alsatian  fortresses 
held  by  the  former,  and  in  May  1635  declared 
war  against  Spain.  In  1638  Bernhard  crossed  the 
Rhine  near  Basle  at  the  head  of  the  Swedish  army 


HISTORICAL   OUTLINE  57 

(which  he  commanded  after  the  death  of  Gustavus 
Adolphus),  and  took  possession  of  Alsace.  But  in 
the  following  year  he  died,  and  his  army  was  taken 
over  by  France  ;  and  subsequently  the  French,  under 
Conde,  broke  the  Spanish  power  in  the  Netherlands, 
and  under  the  same  leader  and  Turenne  they  rolled 
back  the  leaguers  through  the  Palatinate  and  Bavaria, 
and  gained  a  victory  at  Nordlingen  (1645). 

In  the  ensuing  peace  negotiations  France  claimed 
the  cession  of  Alsace  in  consideration  of  her  inter- 
vention, which  had  saved  Germany  from  the  Treat  . 
despotism  of  the  Austrian  house.  This  claim  Westphalia 
gave  rise  to  disputes,  which  are  reflected  in  4 

the  obscure  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Miinster  (West- 
phalia). The  relevant  provisions  are  contained  in 
Articles  75,  76,  and  89.  Article  75  indicates  the 
extent  of  the  territory  ceded  to  France  by  the  Emperor, 
viz.  the  two  landgraviates  of  Upper  and  Lower  Alsace, 
Sundgau,  and  the  prefecture  of  the  ten  free  imperial 
towns,  except  Strassburg.  Article  76  stipulates  that 
the  said  territories  shall  be  incorporated  into  France 
in  perpetuity,  and  that  neither  any  Emperor  nor  any 
Austrian  prince  shall  ever  lay  claim  to  them.  In  view 
of  this  provision,  which  expressly  confers  on  France 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  ceded  territories, 
Article  89  appears  to  be  ambiguous  and  contradictory. 
The  latter  lays  down  that  the  King  of  France  is  to 
maintain  Alsace  "  in  that  liberty  and  possession  of 
immediacy  towards  the  Roman  Empire  which  it  has 
hitherto  enjoyed"  ("in  ea  libertate  et  possessione 
immedietatis  erga  Imperium  Romanum  qua  hactenus 
gavisse  sunt  ")  ;  and  he  is  not  to  exercise  royal  power, 
but  only  the  rights  which  the  Emperor  possessed. 
Thus  what  is  conferred  by  Article  76  is  apparently 
denied  by  Article  89  ;    but  this  restriction  is  again 


58  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

modified  by  the  subsequent  clause,  which  says  that 
the  present  declaration  is  not  to  be  understood  as 
detracting  from  the  sovereign  power  recognised  above 
("  ita  tamen  ut  prsesenti  hac  declaratione  nihil  de- 
tractum  intelligatur  de  eo  omni  supremi  dominii  jure 
quod  supra  concessum  est").  The  explanation  of 
these  seeming  contradictions  is  that  the  expression 
"  ea  libertate  et  possessione  immedietatis  ergalmperium 
Romanum "  implies  that  the  lay  and  ecclesiastical 
nobles,  together  with  the  Alsatian  towns  concerned, 
enjoyed  such  rights  and  privileges  as  placed  them 
in  a  position  of  relative  independence  with  regard  to 
the  Emperor.  Thus  the  real  purport  of  these  difficult 
clauses  seems  to  be  that  Alsace  is  ceded  to  the  King 
of  France,  who  becomes  its  sovereign  and  agrees  to 
protect  the  said  local  rights  and  privileges.1 

As  to  Strassburg,  which  was  an  imperial  free  city 
and  an  autonomous  republic  bound  by  very  feeble 
Position  of  ties  to  the  Empire,  it  is  not  expressly  men- 
strassburg.  tioned  as  being  ceded  to  France  ;  but  Article 
89  includes  it  among  the  other  imperial  free  cities  in 
the  provision  for  maintaining  the  liberty  and  "  pos- 
session of  immediacy  towards  the  Emperor."  How- 
ever this  may  be,  Louis  XIV  did  not  take  possession 
of  Strassburg  till  1681  (when  it  capitulated  to  the 
French  troops)  ;  though  it  was  thought  the  treaty 
transferred  it  to  him  equally  with  the  other  towns. 
Two  years  before  this,  the  Treaty  of  Nimeguen, 
terminating  the  war  between  the  Emperor  and 
Louis  XIV,  who  tried  to  serze  Holland,  confirmed  the 
annexation  of  Alsace  to  France,  without  making  any 
stipulation  as  to  the  protection  of  local  rights  and 
liberties.  By  the  Treaty  of  Ratisbon  (Regensburg), 
1684,    Strassburg    was    secured    to    France.     Shortly 

1  Cf.  Eckel,  op.  cit. 


HISTORICAL   OUTLINE  59 

afterwards  hostilities  were  renewed,  and  continued 
till  1697,  when  the  Peace  of  Ryswick  was  concluded, 
whereby  the  annexation  of  Strassburg  to  France  was 
definitively  confirmed.  (It  is  of  interest  to  recall  that 
Louis  XIV  thereupon  received  a  congratulatory  com- 
munication from  Frederick  William,  the  Elector  of 
Brandenburg,  who  was  the  direct  ancestor  of  Wil- 
liam II.)  In  1781,  when  the  centenary  of  the  cession 
of  Strassburg  to  France  was  celebrated,  the  mayor 
spoke  of  the  peace  and  happiness  of  the  town  under 
French  rule,  and  of  its  attachment  and  gratitude  to 
its  sovereign :  "Tous  les  citoyens  de  la  ville,  jouissant 
depuis  cent  ans  sous  la  domination  de  la  France  d'une 
tranquillite  et  d'une  felicite  inconnues  a  leurs  ai'eux, 
ont  marque  le  desir  unanime  de  temoigner  publique- 
ment  leur  reconnaissance  et  leurat  tachement."  * 
The  French  Government  respected  the  local  traditions, 
liberties,  and  customs  ;  under  its  mild  regime,  wise 
administration,  and  moderate  taxation  the  city  pros- 
pered ;  the  Protestant  religion  was  tolerated,  but  the 
cathedral  was  restored  to  the  Catholic  worship.  This 
progress,  economic  and  intellectual,  during  the  eigh- 
teenth century  was  not  confined  to  Strassburg  ;  Alsace, 
and  indeed  the  whole  of  France,  shared  in  it.  The 
province  was  at  last  delivered  from  the  invasions, 
ravages,  devastations,  and  bloodshed  to  which  it  had 
for  centuries  been  subjected. 

The  Revolution  of  1789  was  hailed  with  enthusiasm 
in  Alsace.  The  acclaimed  principles  of  liberty,  and 
then  the  victories  of  the  Empire,  aroused  The  French 
in  the  province  a  strong  French  sentiment,  Revolution- 
despite  Germanic  culture,  language,  and  traditions. 
Alsatian  generals  distinguished  themselves,  and  Alsa- 
tian soldiers  gave  their  lives  in  the  service  of  France. 

1   J.  Heimweh,  La  Question  d' Alsace,  p.  97. 


60  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

It  was  in  Strassburg  that  the  Marseillaise  was  composed 
and  first  sung  (1792).  The  abolition  of  feudalism  by 
the  National  Assembly  dissociated  Alsace  funda- 
mentally and  entirely — that  is,  socially  and  economi- 
cally, as  well  as  politically — from  the  still  feudal 
Germany. 

Merlin  of  Douai,  presenting  the  report  of  the  Comite 
Feodal,  October  28,  1790,  observed  :  "  The  Alsatian 
union  with  people  has  united  itself  to  the  French  people 
France.  because  it  willed  to  do  so  ;  it  is  then  its  will 
alone,  and  not  the  Treaty  of  Miinster,  that  has  legi- 
timatised  this  union."  During  the  revolutionary 
disorders  Alsace  might  well  have  found  an  opportunity 
to  liberate  itself  from  France,  had  it  chosen  to  do  so ; 
instead  of  that  it  voluntarily  sealed  the  union  with 
its  blood. 

In  18 1 5  Austria  was  anxious  to  acquire  possession 
again  of  Alsace ;  but,  notwithstanding  the  hatred  and 
fear  long  inspired  by  France,  and  the  obvious 
Austria  in  expediency  of  impeding  her  territorial  ag- 
l8is*  grandisement,  the  Allies  opposed  such  a  pro- 

ject, as  it  was  felt  that  the  provinces  in  question  had 
become  an  integral  part  of  France  and  were  essentially 
French.  •  It  is  a  significant  fact  that,  though  numerous 
nationalist  movements  arose  in  Europe  during  the 
course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  none  appeared  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  until  after  its  annexation  by  Germany. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ANNEXATION    OF    ALSACE-LORRAINE    IN    1871 

(a)  Military  events  leading  to  peace  negotiations  :  Outbreak  of  the  wax  of 
1870 — Neutrality  of  the  Powers — German  successes — Annexation  pro- 
claimed— Capitulation  of  Metz — Siege  of  Paris — National  Assembly  at 
Bordeaux;  peace  signed,  (b)  Negotiations  and  Arrangements  as  to 
Alsace-Lorraine  :  Protests  against  announced  anflgxation — Bismarck's 
fear  of  European  intervention — He  securei~Russian  support — His  doubt 
as  to  territorial  demands ;  military  view — Demands  made  at  Versailles 
— German  resolve  as  to  annexation — Bismarck's  concession — The  Pre- 
liminaries of  Versailles — Negotiations  at  Brussels — difficulties  of  the 
French  plenipotentiaries — Negotiations  transferred  to  Frankfort — The 
French  plenipotentiaries — Treaty  of  Frankfort — Belfort — Germans 
affect  to  be  disappointed— The  boundary  commission — Rights  of  in- 
habitants of  ceded  territory — Regulation  of  various  other  matters. 

(a)  Military  Events  leading  to  Peace 
Negotiations 

On  the  evening  of  July  14,  1870,  when  the  "  Ems 
telegram  "  became  known  in  Paris,  war  was  decided 
on  by  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III  in  Council.  ak 

The  next  morning  it  was  announced  in  the  of  war 
Senate  that  the  Imperial  forces  were  ordered 
to  mobilise,  and  that  the  Government  would  "  take 
measures  to  safeguard  the  interests  and  the  honour  of 
France."  Similar  orders  were  issued  on  the  evening 
of  the  same  day  by  the  King  of  Prussia  to  the  armies 
of  the  North  German  Confederation,  and  mobilisation 
preparations  were  begun  in  South  Germany  imme- 
diately, afterwards  (July  16).  The  efforts  of  Great 
Britain  to  preserve  peace,  by  proposing  recourse  to 
mediation   conformably    to    Protocol   XXIII    of   the 

negotiations  relative  to  the  Treaty   of  Paris,   1856, 

61 


62  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

were  not  successful ;  both  sides  declined  to  entertain 
the  proposal.1 

The  French  formal  declaration  of  war  was  received 
in  Berlin  on  July  19  ;  and  a  few  days  later  Bismarck 
published  (in  The  Times,  July  25)  the  draft  of  a  Franco- 
Prussian  treaty,  proposed  by  Benedetti  in  1866,  that 
Prussia  should  aid  France  to  acquire  Belgium  in  return 
for  French  support  in  regard  to  certain  annexations 
in  northern  Germany.  The  protest  of  the  French 
diplomatist  that  the  projected  treaty  had  been  drawn 
up  at  the  dictation  of  Bismarck  failed  to  allay  the 
excitement  in  England,  where  the  unfortunate  document 
was  regarded  as  evidence  of  a  recrudescence  of  French 
territorial  ambitions.  Accordingly,  Lord  Granville 
without  delay  concluded  treaties  with  the  belligerents 
(signed  at  London,  August  9  and  August  n),  whereby 
each  undertook  to  oppose  jointly  with  England  any 
violation  of  Belgian  territory  on  the  part  of  the  other.2 

Napoleon  had  hoped  to  obtain  the  support  of 
Austria,  Italy,  and  Denmark,  as  Powers  obviously 
Neutrality  °PP0Sed  to  the  Prussian  policy  of  aggrandise- 
of  the  ment ;  but  they,  together  with  Russia,  declared 
their  neutrality.  Thus  France,  besides  being 
militarily  unprepared — every  department  of  her  army 
being  in  a  state  of  hopeless  confusion — found  herself 
diplomatically  isolated ;  and  in  such  unpropitious 
circumstances  the  campaign  opened. 

The  operation  at  Saarbriicken,  August  2,  in  favour 
of  France,  was  followed  by  German  victories  at  Spich- 
German  eren  and  Weissenburg  (August  4),  and  the 
successes,  decisive  defeat  of  Marshal  Macmahon's  army 
at   Worth    (August   6).     After   various   political   and 

1  Cf.  Earl  Granville  to  Lord  Lyons,  etc.,  July  15,  1870  :  Parliamentary 
Papers,  vol.  lxx.  (1870),  p.  57  :  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers  (1869—70), 
vol.  lx.  p.   833. 

2  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  lx.  pp.   10,   13. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  63 

military  changes  were  hastily  effected  in  France,  the 
German  armies  followed  up  their  successes  by  crossing 
the  Vosges  (August  n).  On  August  16-17  ensued 
the  sanguinary  engagements  of  Vionville,  Mars-la- 
Tour,  and  Gravelotte,  and  on  the  19th  the  investment 
of  Bazaine's  army  in  Metz  was  begun.  On  Septem- 
ber 1  the  battle  of  Sedan  ended  in  the  surrender  of 
Napoleon. 

Thus  in  the  short  space  of  one  month  one  of  the 
French  armies  was  destroyed,  another  was  locked  up 
in  Metz,  and  the  Germans  were  free  to  march  upon 
Paris.  It  was  now  that  the  victorious  invaders  had 
determined  that  the  cession  of  the  fortresses  of  Strass- 
burg  and  Metz  with  their  surrounding  territories — i.e. 
Alsace  and  Lorraine — should  be  an  indispensable 
condition  of  peace.  After  Sedan  followed  the  fall  of 
the  Empire,  the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  and 
the  constitution  of  a  Government  of  National  Defence. 
A  second  seat  of  government  was  set  up  at  Tours; 
and,  the  separatist  movements  developing  in  France, 
Gambetta  assumed  the  dictatorship  (October  7),  and 
for  a  time  put  an  end  to  dissension. 

In  the  meantime  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  of 
Eastern  Lorraine  was  proclaimed  after  the  surrender 
(September  28)  of  Strassburg,  the  key  of  Annexation 
Alsace.  A  few  days  before  (September  19),  Proclaimed- 
during  the  investment  of  Paris,  Jules  Favre  had  an 
interview  with  Bismarck  at  Ferrieres  ;  and,  in  reply 
to  the  latter' s  territorial  demands,  the  representative 
of  the  Provisional  Government  declared  that  France 
would  not  cede  an  inch  of  her  territory  or  a  stone  of 
her  fortresses. 

On  September  13  Thiers,  notwithstanding  his 
advanced  age,  had  started  on  a  mission  to  the  Courts 
of  London,   St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Florence  in 


64  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  hope  of  securing  their  mediation,  even  if  only 
for  the  conclusion  of  an  armistice  so  that  the  elections 
might  be  held.  But  the  time  was  ill-chosen,  and  he 
received  little  encouragement. 

After  French  successes  in  the  Loire  Valley,  the 
Germans  occupied  Orleans  on  October  n,  which  they 
capitulation  afterwards  lost.  On  October  27  Bazaine 
of  Metz.  surrendered  at  Metz  ;  and,  after  various 
reverses  of  the  French  in  the  campaign  of  the  Loire, 
Orleans  was  recaptured  by  the  Germans  on  De- 
cember 4,  and  a  panic  throughout  Touraine  was 
thereby  created.  The  seat  of  administration  of  the 
Provisional  Government  was  now  removed  to  Bordeaux. 

In  the  meantime  the  capital  was  undergoing  the 
terrible  trials  of  the  siege  ;  and,  in  these  circumstances, 
Siege  of  added  to  the  fact  that  Bourbaki's  army  was 
Paris.  compelled    to    begin    its    disastrous    retreat, 

Favre  had  an  interview  with  Bismarck  at  Versailles, 
January  23,  1871,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  the 
terms  of  a  general  armistice  and  of  the  capitulation  of 
Paris. 

On  January  28  a  three  weeks'  armistice  was  signed  ; 
in  the  interval  a  National  Assembly  was  to  be  elected 
National  an(^  summoned  for  the  purpose  of  deciding 
Assembly  at  on  the  continuance  or  definitive  cessation  of 
hostilities.  Gambetta  was  for  continuing  the 
war,  and  declined  to  accept  the  authority  of  the  Paris 
Government  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  country  ;  but  his 
policy  gained  few  adherents,  and  he  therefore  resigned. 
On  February  12  the  National  Assembly  was  opened 
at  Bordeaux  ;  the  Provisional  Government  declared 
its  functions  at  an  end  ;  Thiers  was  appointed  head 
of  the  executive  (February  17),  and,  together  with 
Favre  and  Picard,  was  commissioned  to  conclude 
peace. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  65 

The  Preliminaries  of  Versailles  were  signed  on 
February  26,  ratified  by  the  National  Assembly  on 
March  3,  and  the  definitive  Treaty  of  peaCe 
Frankfort  was  concluded  on  May  10,  and  the  signed, 
ratifications  were  exchanged  at  Frankfort  on  May  20. 

(b)  Negotiations  and   Arrangements  as  to 
Alsace-Lorraine 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  in  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember M.  Thiers  sought,  without  success,  the  inter- 
position of  the  British,  Russian,  Austrian,  and  Italian 
Governments,  and  that  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and 
Eastern  Lorraine  was  proclaimed  after  the  capitulation 
of  Strassburg,  which  took  place  on  September  28. 

Subsequently,  the  French  resistance  to  the  invest- 
ment of  the  capital  having  unexpectedly  revived  with 
renewed  vigour  and  determination,  protests 

i_  ,       1  i  •  ,  ,  Protests 

began  to  be  made  m  various  quarters  against        against 
the  German  projected  annexation,  involving,    announced 

r      J  '  °'   annexation. 

as  it  was  thought,  a  repudiation  of  previous 
treaties  ;    and  a  joint  intervention  of  the  Powers  was 
suggested  to  prevent  the  dismemberment  of  France. 
Bismarck  avowed  his  fear  of  such  intervention.     He 
was  anxious  to  end  the  war  speedily — and  particularly 
so,    owing   to   the   continued   large   German 
losses — by  bringing  up  heavy  artillery  against        fear  of 
Paris,  instead  of  attempting  to  reduce  the  inte^™P?an" 
city  by  famine.     "  In  the  Council  of  War/' 
he  observed,1  "  Roon  was  the  only  supporter  of  my 
opinion  that  we  should  lose  no  time  about  ending 
the  war  if  we  wanted  to  make  sure  of  stopping  inter- 
ference from  the  neutrals  and  their  congress.  .  .  .  The 
delay  in    the  decision    caused  me  more  serious  dis- 

1  Bismarck  :    the  Man  and  the   Statesman,   English  translation   (London, 
1898),   pp.    107,    108,,    in. 


66  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

quietude  in  the  political  sphere  from  my  anxiety 
respecting  the  intervention  of  neutrals.  .  .  .  An  inter- 
vention could  only  tend  to  deprive  us  Germans  of  the 
prize  of  victory  by  means  of  a  congress.  This  danger, 
which  troubled  me  day  and  night,  made  me  feel  the 
necessity  of  hastening  the  conclusion  of  peace,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  establish  it  without  the  inter- 
vention of  neutrals." 

However  this  may  be,  amongst  European  statesmen 
Count  von  Beust  appears  to  have  been  the  only  one 
who  made  any  attempt  to  bring  about  a  collective 
intervention  of  the  neutral  Powers.  On  September  28, 
following  on  the  appeal  of  M.  Thiers,  he  sent  a  despatch 
to  that  effect  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  in  London  '  ; 
and  again  on  October  12  he  communicated  with  Count 
Chotek,  the  Austrian  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg, 
suggesting  a  European  intervention  in  order  "  to 
moderate  the  demands  of  the  conqueror  and  soften 
the  bitterness  of  the  sentiments  which  must  crush  the 
vanquished."  2 

But  Bismarck's  diplomatic  skill  in  definitely  securing 
the  good-will  of  Russia  made  such  an  eventuality 
Bismarck  impossible.  Russia  had  for  some  time  been 
RusSan  endeavouring  to  extricate  herself  from  the 
support.  difficult  position  imposed  on  her  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris,  1856,  and  the  Straits  Convention  of  the  same 
date.3  Already  in  1866,  during  the  Austro-Prussian 
War,  King  William  of  Prussia  had  been  assured  of  the 
friendship  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  in  return 
had  manifested  his  sympathy  with  the  determination 
of  Russia  to  bring  about  an  abrogation  of  the  ob- 

1  Count  von  Beust,  Aus  drei  Viertel-J ahrhunderten  (Stuttgart,  1887), 
Pt.  II.,  pp.  361,  395. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  397. 

3  See  C.  Phillipson  and  N.  Buxton,  The  Question  of  the  Bosphorus  and 
Dardanelles   (London,    1917),   pp.   81   stq. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  67 

noxious  clauses  of  the  above-mentioned  treaties.1 
Now,  in  1870,  Bismarck  sent  a  despatch  (dated  Fer- 
rieres,  September  20)  to  Prince  Reuss,  the  Prussian 
minister  in  St.  Petersburg,  declaring  that  King  Wil- 
liam deemed  the  Tsar's  intended  repudiation  of  the 
treaties  to  be  justifiable,  and  that  Prussia,  in  her 
hour  of  victory,  would  do  her  utmost  to  get  not  only 
France,  but  also  the  other  signatory  parties,  to  recog- 
nise the  denunciation.  Soon  afterwards  (October  9) 
Bismarck  made  it  everywhere  known  that  a  close 
entente  existed  between  Prussia  and  Russia  ,*  and 
then  Prince  Gortchakoff  issued  his  famous  circular 
despatch,  dated  October  19-31,  1870,  announcing  his 
Government's  withdrawal  from  the  restrictive  articles 
of  the  Conventions  of  1856.8 

Having  ensured  a  clear  field  for  negotiation,  Bis- 
marck, it  appears,  began  to  feel  some  doubt  as  to  the 
expediency  of  insisting  on  such  large  territorial  His  doubt 
demands  as  had  been  announced  to  France,  territorial 
Even  after  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  demands. 
(January  28),  when  France  was  virtually  at  the  feet  of 
Prussia,  he  is  reported  to  have  been  in  conflict  with 
Moltke  and  the  military  party  who,  in  their  inordinate 
exactions,  were  disposed  to  show  little  consideration 
and  to  brook  no  compromise.  The  German  Emperor 
was  obliged  to  intervene  on  at  least  one  occasion  to 
adjust  these  differences  between  the  diplomatists  on 
the  one  side  and  the  military  leaders  on  the  other. 
For  a  considerable  length  of  time  the  Chancellor 
adhered  to  the  view  that  Germany  ought  not  to  insist 
on  the  cession  of  Metz  and  the  adjacent  territory, 
and  he  did  not  regard  the  military  party's  arguments 
for  annexing  this  locality  as  decisive.  He  thought  it 
would  suffice  to  dismantle  the  fortress,  and  believed 

1  Phillipson  and  Buxton,  op.  cit.,  p.  103  2  Ibid.,  pp.  105  seq. 


68  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

that  security  could  be  assured  by  constructing  another 
strong  place  behind  it. 

"If  they  were  to  give  us  another  milliard,"  he  is 
reported  to  have  said,1  "  we  might  perhaps  leave  Metz, 
T  a  ,  and  build  a  fortress  a  few  miles  farther  back 

Influence  of 

military  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Falkenberg,  or 
towards  Saarbriicken.  ...  I  do  not  want  so 
many  Frenchmen  in  our  house.  It  is  the  same  with 
Belfort,  which  is  entirely  French.  But  the  soldiers 
will  not  hear  of  giving  up  Metz  spoken  of,  and  perhaps 
they  are  right."  The  words  italicised  show,  however, 
that  Bismarck  could  be  prevailed  upon  to  abandon 
his  own  views  in  favour  of  others,  if  he  was  convinced 
that  the  latter  would  more  effectively  serve  the  interests 
of  his  country — regardless  of  whatever  humiliation  or 
burden  might  thereby  be  inflicted  on  any  other  country. 
The  demands  laid  before  M.  Thiers  by  Bismarck 
at  Versailles,  February  21,  1871,  included  the  cession 
Demands  °^  Alsace  and  Metz,  together  with  the  part 
made  at       of  Lorraine  constituting  the  Department  of 

Versailles  • 

the  Moselle,  the  payment  of  a  war  indemnity 
of  6,000,000,000  francs  (which  he  did  not  think  exces- 
sive),2 and  the  occupation  of  French  territory  till 
payment  was  completed.  He  mentioned  also  Nancy, 
"  which  the  Headquarters  Staff  wished  to  keep  "  ; 
and  referred  to  Savoy  and  Nice,  which  France  might 
retrocede  to  Italy.  In  the  long  discussion  that  fol- 
lowed Thiers  with  difficulty  suppressed  his  emotion  ; 
he  declared  that  the  demands  were  monstrous,  that 
the  exorbitant  indemnity  must  have  resulted  from 
the  dreams  of  military  men  and  not  from  the  sober 

1  M  Busch,  Bismarck  :  some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  Eng.  trans. 
3  vols.  (London,  1898),  vol.  i.  pp.  556-7  ;  cf.  Ottokar  Lorenz,  Kaiser, 
Wilhelm  und  die  Begriindung  des  Reichs,  1866-71  (Jena,  1902),  pp.  520  seq. 

2  Cf.  G.  May,  Le  Traite  de  Francfort  (Paris,   1909),  pp.   163  seq. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  69 

calculations  of  financiers  ;  and  he  suggested  to  Bis- 
marck that,  if  he  seriously  insisted  on  such  terms,  he 
had  better  take  upon  himself  the  government  of  France, 
and  that  the  existing  administration  would  retire. 

On  the  following  day  Thiers,  having  come  again 
to  Versailles,  asked  to  see  the  German  Emperor,  in 
the  hope  of  getting  more  favourable  terms  German 
from  him.  But  the  latter  spoke  only  of  res^eeasrto 
the  entrance  of  the  German  troops  into  Paris ;  annexation, 
and  on  other  questions  Bismarck  had  already  taken 
precautions,  for  he  remarked  to  the  French  repre- 
sentative :  "  The  Emperor  does  not  wish  to  speak 
of  business  except  in  the  presence  of  his  ministers." 
M.  Thiers  saw  also  the  Crown  Prince,  on  whom  he 
seems  to  have  had  some  effect :  "  The  old  man," 
says  M.  Hanotaux,  "  broken  with  fatigue  and  emotion, 
speaking  with  eloquence  of  the  war  which  he  had 
wished  to  avert,  of  the  fault  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, of  the  dangers  which  an  ill-advised  peace  would 
cause  to  Europe,  touched  the  sensitive  soul  of  the 
Crown  Prince."  1  He  declared  that  the  abandon- 
ment of  Metz  would  be  intolerable  to  France,  and 
that,  if  such  extravagant  demands  were  persisted  in, 
the  resumption  of  hostilities  would  become  inevitable. 
He  emphasised  that  the  sum  of  the  indemnity  men- 
tioned the  previous  day  should  be  considerably 
reduced,  and  he  opposed  the  entrance  of  German 
troops  into  the  capital.  The  Crown  Prince  appeared 
to  his  entourage  to  be  willing  to  renounce  Metz  ; 
but  his  confidential  friend,  General  von  Blumenthal, 
said  that  "  it  turned  the  heart  in  one's  bod}^  to  renounce 
Metz  and  leave  Paris,  looking  like  a  fool."  2 

1  G.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  English  translation,  4  vols.  (London, 
1903),  vol.  i.  p.   122. 

2  Ibid. 


70  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

The  next   day   (February  23),   the   Emperor,   who 

did  not  take  the  same  view  as  his  son,  having  conferred 

, ,     with  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  exclaimed 

Bismarck  s  ,      ,..        _  ,.  , 

refusal  to  excitedly  that  he  declined  to  discuss  the 
give  way.  qUestion  of  Metz.  In  the  interview  of  Thiers 
and  Favre  with  Bismarck  at  Versailles  the  Chancellor 
was  reminded  that  in  the  preceding  November  he 
had  promised  that  France  would  not  be  dispossessed 
of  Metz.  "  What  was  possible  in  November/'  replied 
Bismarck,  "is  no  longer  possible  to-day,  after  three 
months'  bloodshed  "  ;  and  he  added  that  if  France 
was  not  ready  to  give  up  Metz  an  immediate  rupture 
of  the  negotiations  was  necessary. 

On  February  24  another  conference  was  held,  when 
Thiers  expressed  the  firm  resolve  of  France  not  to 
Bismarck's  cede  both  Metz  and  Belfort.  After  some 
concession.   deliberation    and    consultation   with   Moltke 

and  the  Emperor,  Bismarck  announced  that  he  would 
give  way  in  regard  to  Belfort,  and  that  the  amount 
of  the  indemnity  would  be  reduced  by  a  milliard,  thus 
leaving  a  sum  of  5,000,000,000  francs.1  (It  may  be 
pointed  out  that  the  reduction  in  what  the  French 
called  the  "  ransom"  was  effected  at  the  instance  of 
the  British  Government 2  ;  even  then,  the  remaining 
sum  was  the  largest  pecuniary  indemnity  ever  exacted 
in  the  history  of  war.) 

On  February  26  the  Preliminaries  of  Versailles 
were  signed.3  Then  M.  Thiers  and  M.  Favre  left 
Versailles  for  Paris.     "  Seated  in  the  carriage,"  says 

1  Jules  Favre,  Le  Gouvemement  de  la  Defense  Nationale,  3  vols.  (Paris, 
1871-5),   vol.  iii.   p.    100. 

3  C  Gavard,  Un  Diplomate  a  Londres  :  Lettres  et  Notes,  1871-7  (Paris, 
1895),  pp.  3,  4  ;  C.  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace 
(London,    1916),   pp.  274,  275. 

8  For  the  complete  text  of  the  Preliminaries  see  Phillipson,  Termination 
of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  Appendix  (J),  pp.  380-83. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  71 

M.  Jules  Favre,  "  we  did  not  find  a  word  to  exchange 
during  the  whole  iourney  ;my  heart  was  so        •    .  . 

1  •  rr  1  ii*-      •       1  -1         Prelum  - 

heavy  that  it  suffocated  me.  Motionless,  and  naries  of 
as  it  were  struck  down,  M.  Thiers  gave  way  to  Versailles- 
his  emotion.  From  Versailles  to  Paris  his  eyes  did  not 
cease  to  fill  with  tears.  He  wiped  them  away  without 
saying  a  word,  but  it  was  easy  to  see,  from  the  expres- 
sion of  his  troubled  features,  that  he  was  a  prey  to 
one  of  the  most  ineffable  sorrows  that  it  is  given  to 
man  to  feel."  l 

The  Preliminaries  of  Versailles  disposed  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  Article   I. — France  renounces  in   favour   ct.    ,  .. 

Stipulation 

of  the   German   Empire   all  her  rights   and  as  to  Aisace- 
titles  over  the  territories  situated  on  the  east 
of  the  frontier  hereafter  described. 

"  The  line  of  demarcation  begins  at  the  north-west 
frontier  of  the  canton  of  Cattenom,  towards  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  follows  on  the  south  the 
western  frontiers  of  the  cantons  of  Cattenom  and 
Thionville,  passes  by  the  canton  of  Briey,  along  the 
western  frontiers  of  the  communes  of  Montjois-la- 
Montagne  and  Roncourt,  as  well  as  the  eastern  frontiers 
of  the  communes  of  Marie-aux-Chenes,  St.  Ail,  Habon- 
ville,  reaches  the  frontier  of  the  canton  of  Gooze, 
which  it  crosses  along  the  communal  frontiers  of 
Vionville,  Bouxieres,  and  Onville,  follows  the  south- 
west frontier,  south  of  the  district  of  Metz,  the  western 
frontier  of  the  district  of  Chateau-Salins,  as  far  as 
the  commune  of  Pettoncourt,  taking  in  the  western 
and  southern  frontiers  thereof  to  follow  the  crest  of 
the  mountains  between  Seille  and  Moncel,  as  far  as  the 
frontier  of  the  district  of  Sarreburg,  to  the  south  of 
Garde.     The  demarcation  afterwards  coincides  with  the 

1  Favre,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii.  p.  118. 


72  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

frontier  of  that  district  as  far  as  the  commune  of  Tan- 
conville,  reaching  the  frontier  to  the  north  thereof,  from 
whence  it  follows  the  crest  of  the  mountains  between  the 
sources  of  the  White  Sarre  and  Vezouze,  as  far  as  the 
frontier  of  that  canton  of  Schirmeck,  skirts  the  western 
frontier  of  that  canton,  includes  the  communes  of 
Saales,  Bourg-Bruche,  Colroy-la-Roche,  Plaine,  Ran- 
rupt,  Saulxures,  and  St.  Blaise-la-Roche  of  the  canton 
of  Saales,  and  coincides  with  the  western  frontier  of 
the  departments  of  the  lower  Rhine  and  the  upper 
Rhine,  as  far  as  the  cantons  of  Belfort,  the  southern 
frontier  of  which  it  leaves  not  far  from  Vourvenans, 
to  cross  the  canton  of  Delle  at  the  southern  limits  of 
the  communes  of  Bourogne  and  Froide  Fontaine,  and 
to  reach  the  Swiss  frontier  skirting  the  eastern  frontiers 
of  the  communes  of  Jonchery  and  Delle. 

"  The  German  Empire  shall  possess  these  territories 
in  perpetuity  in  all  sovereignty  and  property.  An  in- 
ternational commission,  composed  of  an  equal  number 
of  representatives  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties, 
shall  be  appointed  immediately  after  the  exchange  of 
the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty  to  trace  on  the 
spot  the  new  frontier,  in  conformity  with  the  preceding 
stipulations. 

' '  This  commission  shall  preside  over  the  division  of 
the  lands  and  funds,  which  have  hitherto  belonged  to 
districts  or  communes  divided  by  the  new  frontiers  ; 
in  case  of  disagreement  in  the  tracing  and  the  measures 
of  execution,  the  members  of  the  commission  shall 
refer  to  their  respective  Governments. 

"The  frontier,  such  as  it  has  just  been  described,  is 
marked  in  green  on  two  identical  copies  of  the  map 
of  the  territory  forming  the  Government  of  Alsace, 
published  at  Berlin  in  September  1870  by  the  geo- 
graphical and  statistical  division  of  the  Staff,  and  a 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  73 

copy  of  which  shall  be  annexed  to  both  copies  of  the 
present  treaty. 

"  Nevertheless,  the  alteration  of  the  above  tracing 
has  been  agreed  to  by  the  two  Contracting  Parties. 
In  the  former  department  of  the  Moselle,  the  villages 
of  Marie-aux-Chenes  near  St.  Privat-la-Montagne,  and 
Vionville  to  the  west  of  Rezonville,  shall  be  ceded 
to  Germany.  In  exchange  therefor  France  shall 
retain  the  town  and  fortifications  of  Belfort,  with  a 
radius  which  shall  be  hereafter  determined  upon."  * 

It  was  stipulated  in  Article  VII  of  the  Preliminaries 
of  Versailles  that  the  opening  of  negotiations  for  the 
definitive  treaty  of  peace  should  take  place  Negotiations 
at  Brussels  immediately  after  the  ratification  at  Brussels- 
of  the  former.  This  formality  was  complied  with  on 
March  2,  1871  ;  but,  owing  to  the  faulty  diplomacy  of 
the  French  Government — obviously  due,  however,  to 
the  internal  disorders  and  to  the  rapid  succession  of 
military  disasters — the  French  plenipotentiaries,  Baron 
Baude,  the  minister  in  Belgium,  and  M.  de  Goulard,  a 
member  of  the  National  Assembly  (who  were  to  be 
assisted  by  two  commissioners),  did  not  reach  Brussels 
before  March  19  and  24  respectively.  The  German 
delegates  were  Herr  von  Balan,  the  minister  in 
Belgium,  and  Count  von  Arnim,  the  minister  at  the 
Papal  Court,  to  whom  were  added  representatives  from 
the  kingdoms  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  and  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Baden. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  peace  plenipotentiaries  took 
place  on  March  28,  when  various  preliminary  and 
formal  matters,  such  as  the  exchange  and  Difficulties  of 
verification  of  the  delegates'  full  powers,  thep£,eSo*! 
were  transacted.  The  next  meeting  revealed  tentiaries. 
the  exceptional  difficulties  that  would  be  met  with 

1  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  iii.  (1875),  pp.  1913,  1914. 


74  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

in  the  course  of  the  negotiation,  owing  to  the  attitude, 
methods,  and  tactics  adopted  by  the  German  repre- 
sentatives. The  writer  may  be  permitted  to  quote  on 
this  point  what  he  has  said  in  a  recent  publica- 
tion 1  :  "  The  German  plenipotentiaries  were  deter- 
mined to  exact  the  last  ounce  that  could  be  squeezed 
out  of  the  Preliminaries ;  indeed,  they  were  not 
always  very  scrupulous  as  to  whether  their  various 
exactions  were  juridically  and  equitably  compatible 
with  those  Preliminaries.  They  were  opposed  to  all 
suggestions  that  savoured  of  compromise,  and  refused 
to  make  any  concessions  even  in  details.  They  dis- 
regarded the  customary  procedure,  whereby  differences 
of  view  and  partial  agreements  are  recorded  in  the 
proces-verbaux  or  the  protocols  ;  they  had  recourse 
to  the  latter  only  when  they  succeeded  in  enforcing 
agreement  or  acquiescence  in  regard  to  the  definite 
and  final  drafting  of  an  article.  They  seem  to  have 
adopted,  too,  the  practice  of  producing  a  number  of 
propositions  on  diverse  subjects  at  the  same  time, 
regardless  of  order,  system,  or  intelligible  classifica- 
tion ;  such  a  course  could  not  but  increase  the  diffi- 
culties with  which  the  French  delegates  had  to  contend. 
Throughout  the  discussions  the  French  negotiators 
were  no  match  for  their  opponents.  Several  reasons 
may  be  given  for  this  inequality.  In  the  first  place, 
the  latter  had  the  moral  and  physical  support  of  their 
military  victories  ;  their  troops  were  still  on  French 
territory,  and  might,  at  the  word  of  command,  renew 
their  havoc  against  a  vanquished  and  well-nigh  helpless 
nation.  Their  verbal  arguments  had  therefore  the 
sanction  of  force  behind  them.  They  were  in  a 
position  to  dictate  terms,  and  not  in  the  humour  to 
submit  to  suggested  amendments  thereto.     They  more 

1  C  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  137,  138. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  75 

than  once  threatened  to  break  ojff  negotiations.  .  .  . 
Secondly,  the  French  delegates  were  intrinsically 
inferior  ;  they  had  had  little  diplomatic  experience, 
and  were  manifestly  deficient  in  those  qualities  that 
are  indispensable  in  the  work  of  negotiation — dexterity, 
penetration,  decision.1  Thirdly,  they  found  them- 
selves at  a  great  disadvantage,  in  that  they  had 
received  no  instructions  from  their  Government,  pre- 
occupied as  it  was  with  the  internal  disorders  of 
France."  2  It  appears,  indeed,  that  they  had  received 
only  one  precise  instruction,  viz.  to  demand  a  plebiscite 
for  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine.3 

In  these  untoward  circumstances  the  discussions  at 
Brussels  continued  throughout  April,  without  arriving 
at  definite  conclusions.    The  German  Govern-  „     t.  .. 

Negotiations 

ment  became  more  and  more  impatient  and  transferred 
embittered:  for  it  believed  that  the  French 
representatives  had  deliberately  resorted  to  dila- 
tory tactics  in  order  to  bring  about  a  modification 
of  the  Preliminaries  of  Versailles — indeed,  Bismarck 
made  an  open  charge  to  that  effect  in  the  Reichstag 
(April  24).  On  May  4  the  negotiations  at  Brussels 
were  broken  off ;  and  Bismarck  and  Favre  agreed 
to  meet  personally  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main  on 
May  6. 

The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  ac- 
companied by  M.  de  Goulard  and  M.  Pouyer-Quertier, 
the  Minister  of  Finance  ;   the  German  Chan-  _    _ 

.  The  French 

cellor  was  accompanied  by  Count  von  Arnim.  pienipo- 
The  difficulties  of  the  French  representatives  tentiaries- 
by  no  means  diminished  in  the  discussions  with  the 
"  man  of  blood  and  iron."    On  the  one  hand,  M.  Thiers 

1  Cf.  May,  op.  cit.,  p.  44. 

2  J.  Valfrey,  Histoire  du  traitt  de  Franc  fort  et  de  la  liberation  du  territoire 
jrancais  (Paris,  1874),  Pt.  I.  pp.  17,  18. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  38. 


76  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

was  anxious  to  sign  the  definitive  peace  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  to  avoid  protracted  negotiations  and 
persistent  efforts  to  combat  the  German  demands — 
indeed,  hedged  in  on  all  sides  and  having  just  emerged 
from  his  conflicts  with  the  Commune,  it  appeared 
that  he  was  disposed  to  make  peace  at  any  price,  if 
only  it  could  be  effected  speedily.  On  the  other 
hand,  M.  Favre,  the  first  French  plenipotentiary,  was 
lacking  in  calmness  and  firmness  ;  his  terror-stricken 
and  lachrymose  disposition  was  not  of  the  kind  to 
impress  Bismarck  favourably  and  to  secure  conces- 
sions from  him.  M.  Pouyer-Quertier,  however,  was 
not  intimidated  by  the  bluntness  and  abruptness — 
with  the  ever-underlying  menace — of  the  Chancellor  ; 
whenever  the  first  plenipotentiary  gave  him  an  oppor- 
tunity, he  examined  and  criticised  the  German  claims, 
and — thanks  to  his  ready  Norman  wit,  urbanity, 
good  sense,  and  undisturbed  composure— he  gained 
more  than  one  point.  Thus  he  prevailed  on  Bismarck 
to  abandon  in  the  Belfort  district  the  valley  of  the 
Marcine,  with  a  French-speaking  population,  whereby 
the  most  direct  communication,  via  Delle,  between 
France  and  Switzerland  was  preserved.  On  the 
same  day  he  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  relinquish- 
ment of  the  commune  of  Villerupt  (containing  valuable 
iron-mines),  which  had  previously  been  included  in 
the  territories  to  be  ceded  to  Germany,  in  return  for 
the  latter' s  agreement  to  extend  the  radius  of  the 
Belfort  frontier.  Bismarck  had  just  declared  he 
would  make  no  further  territorial  concessions,  where- 
upon M.  Pouyer-Quertier  observed  :  "If  you  were 
the  conquered  party,  I  give  you  my  word  that  I  would 
not  have  compelled  you  to  become  a  Frenchman, 
and  here  you  make  me  a  German." 

"  How  is  that  ?  "  exclaimed  the  Chancellor.     "  And 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  77 

who  is  talking  of  taking  your  Normandy  ?  I  do  not 
understand  in  the  least." 

"  The  matter  is,  however,  very  simple,  Prince.  I 
am  one  of  the  principal  shareholders  in  the  forges  of 
Villerupt,  and  you  see  clearly  that,  in  this  quarter, 
you  make  me  a  German." 

"  Well,  well,"  said  Bismarck,  "  don't  cry  about  it. 
I  leave  you  Villerupt.  But  do  not  ask  me  for  any- 
thing more,  or  I  shall  take  it  back  again."  1 

The  definitive    treaty  was  signed  at  Frankfort  on 
May  10.   The  new  frontier  and  the  relinquish- 
ment of  Belfort   by  Germany  in  return  for    *™vis}ons£ 

J  i  of  Treaty  of 

the  cession  of  Lorraine  territory  by  France  Frankfort, 
were  provided  for  in  Article  I  : 

"  The  distance  between  the  town  of  Belfort  and  the 
line  of  frontier  such  as  it  had  been  proposed  during 
the  negotiations  of  Versailles,  and  such  as  it  is  marked 
on  the  map  annexed  to  the  ratifications  of  the  Pre- 
liminaries of  the  26th  February,  is  considered  as 
describing  the  radius  which,  by  virtue  of  the  clause 
relating  thereto  in  Article  I  of  the  Preliminaries,  is 
to  remain  to  France  with  the  town  and  fortifications 
of  Belfort. 

"  The  German  Government  is  disposed  to  extend  that 
radius  so  as  to  include  the  cantons  of  Belfort,  Delle, 
and  Giromagny,  as  well  as  the  western  part  of  the 
canton  of  Fontaine,  to  the  west  of  a  line  to  be  traced 
from  the  spot  where  the  canal  from  the  Rhone  to  the 
Rhine  leaves  the  canton  of  Delle  to  the  south  of 
Montreux-Chateau,  to  the  northern  limits  of  the 
canton  between  Bourg  and  Felon,  where  that  line 
would  join  the  eastern  limit  of  the  canton  of  Giro- 
magny. 

1  A.  Laussedat,  La  Delimitation  de  la  frontUre  franco- allemande  (Paris, 
I9Qi),  p.  5*. 


78  ALS  ACE-LORR  AIN  E 

"  The  German  Government  will  nevertheless  not 
cede  the  above  territories  unless  the  French  Republic 
agrees,  on  its  part,  to  a  rectification  of  frontier  along 
the  western  limits  of  the  cantons  of  Cattenom  and 
Thionville,  which  will  give  to  Germany  the  territory 
to  the  east  of  a  line  starting  from  the  frontier  of 
Luxemburg  between  Hussigny  and  Redingen,  leaving 
to  France  the  villages  of  Thil  and  Villerupt,  extending 
between  Erronville  and  Aumetz,  between  Beuvillers 
and  Boulange,  between  Trieux  and  Lomeringen,  and 
joining  the  ancient  line  of  frontier  between  Avril  and 
Moyeuvre. 

"  The  international  commission  mentioned  in  Arti- 
cle I  of  the  Preliminaries  shall  proceed  to  the  spot 
immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty 
to  execute  the  works  entrusted  to  them,  and  to  trace 
the  new  frontier,  in  accordance  with  the  preceding 
dispositions." 

With  regard  to  the  radius  round  Belfort,  the  above 

article  gave  France  the  option  either  of  maintaining  the 

radius  previously  fixed  at  seven  kilometres, 

Belfort.  r  .     .  ,  .  ,  , 

or  of  receiving  such  an  extension  as  would 
secure  for  her  nearly  the  whole  administrative  district 
of  Belfort ;  but  if  she  chose  the  latter  alternative  she 
was  to  abandon  to  Germany  a  portion  of  territory 
ten  kilometres  long  on  the  Luxemburg  frontier.  In 
the  former  case,  the  enlarged  zone  near  Belfort  con- 
tained some  6,000  hectares  (i.e.  about  23  square 
miles),  with  a  population  of  27,000  ;  in  the  latter  case 
the  territory  to  be  given  up  in  exchange  comprised 
an  area  of  10,000  hectares  (i.e.  about  38  square  miles), 
and  a  population  of  only  7,000.  This  arrangement 
appeared  on  the  whole  to  be  to  the  advantage  of 
France  ;  but  it  involved,  none  the  less,  the  abandon- 
ment to  Germany  of  7,000  inhabitants  (who  would 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  79 

have  remained  with  France  had  the  terms  of  the 
Preliminaries  been  followed),  as  well  as  an  inter- 
ference with  the  communication  with  Luxemburg, 
and  the  sacrifice  of  a  very  valuable  mining  district 
in  the  vicinity  of  Longwy.  In  the  debates  in  the 
French  Parliamentary  Commission  and  in  the  As- 
sembly on  this  proposed  exchange  of  territory,  con- 
flicting opinions  were  expressed  as  to  the  expediency 
and  advantage  of  the  exchange.  M.  Thiers,  however, 
emphasised  the  strategic  value  of  Belfort,  and  declared 
that  France  would  remain  rich  enough  in  iron,  without 
the  resources  of  the  region  near  Longwy.  Thiers' s 
view  prevailed,  and  the  exchange  was  sanctioned. 

When  the  territorial  dispositions  were  published  in 
Germany  various  sections  of  the  people,  including  the 
military  classes,  many  journalists,  and  de- 
puties of  the  Reichstag  thought  that  the  affect  to  be 
acquisitions  were  inadequate,  and  that  Bis-  lsappoin 
marck  had  been  much  too  moderate  in  his  demands. 
In  military  circles  Belfort  above  all  was  regretted. 
Many  declared  that  the  German  negotiators  ought  to 
have  insisted  also  on  the  cession  of  Burgundy  and 
Franche  Comte,  and  even  suggested  the  annexation 
of  Dunkirk  ;  it  was  thought  in  many  quarters  that 
France  had  been  dealt  with  far  too  leniently  and 
considerately. 

However  this  may  be,  when  the  extent  and  the 
character  of  the  acquired  territory  became  known 
more  precisely  in  Germany,  there  was  not  a  But  reall 
little  surprise  at  the  magnitude  of  the  con-  surprised  at 
quest,  and  the  economic  benefits  secured  onques 
thereby.  It  not  infrequently  happens  that  a  party 
seeking  to  enter  into  an  unconscionable  transaction, 
or  making  exorbitant  demands  on  another,  loudly 
proclaims — with  his  tongue  in  his  cheek — that  he  is 


80  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

really  asking  too  little,  and  that  he  is  not  at  all  doing 
himself  justice  in  the  arrangement  suggested.  Colonel 
Laussedat,  who  was  on  the  delimitation  commission 
for  tracing  the  new  frontier,  observes  in  his  work  on 
the  subject 1  that,  during  the  negotiations,  he  could 
not  but  conclude  that  the  conquerors  were  astonished 
at  their  success,  and  were  dazzled  by  their  annexa- 
tion, that  they  scarcely  believed  their  own  eyes,  and 
could  not  understand  how  the  French  could  so  promptly 
give  up  such  a  rich  territory  inhabited  by  a  French 
population. 

The   work   of  the   boundary  commission   took   six 
years  :    it  began  in  May  1871,  and  ended  on  April  26, 

The  bound-  I^77  »  an<^  ^e  ratifications  thereof  were 
arycom-  exchanged  at  Metz,  May  31,  1877.  In  the 
course  of  the  topographical  labours,  the 
German  commissioners  disputed  the  soil  foot  by 
foot 2  ;  where  the  stipulations  of  the  treaties,  which 
were  to  serve  as  a  guide,  were  indefinite  or  ambiguous 
they  invariably  claimed  the  benefit  of  the  doubt, 
and  pushed  their  claims  to  the  uttermost  limit  possible. 
To  the  populations  immediately  concerned,  the  pro- 
ceedings were  throughout  a  source  of  bitter  and  cruel 
trials  ;  the  staking  out  of  the  new  boundary  was 
observed  with  grief  and  misgiving,  and  not  always 
with  acquiescence  ;  for  in  many  cases,  no  sooner 
were  the  poles  and  pegs  fixed  and  the  commissioners 
out  of  sight,  than  they  were  all  pulled  up  ;  later,  even 

1  La  Delimitation  de  la  frontiere  franco- allemande,  p.  14  :  "  Pendant  la 
duree  des  negotiations  auxquelles  j'ai  pris  part  au  sujet  du  trace  dennitif 
de  cette  frontiere  qui  mutilait  la  France  et  qui,  tot  ou  tard,  c'est  mon  voeu 
le  plus  cher,  creera  a  la  Prusse  des  ennuis  inextricables  et  peut-etre  mortels, 
j'ai  acquis  la  certitude  que  nos  vainqueurs  etaient  stupefaits  de  leurs  succes, 
eblouis  de  leur  conquete.  Us  n'en  croyaient  par  leurs  yeux  et  ne  comprenaient 
pas  que  nous  leur  eussions  abandonne  sitot  une  si  riche  proie,  un  si  merveilleux 
pays,   des  populations  si  francaises  !  " 

2  Ibid.,  pp.   85  seq. 


ANNEXATION    IN    187 1  81 

many  boundary-stones  were  removed.  Colonel  Laus- 
sedat  refers  to  the  frequent  scenes,  here  of  despair, 
there  of  ardent  patriotism,  that  were  witnessed  in  the 
course  of  this  sinister  severance  of  people  from  their 
mother-country.     He  relates  the  following  incident : 

"It  was  on  the  boundary  of  the  two  communes  of 
Beuvillers  and  Boulange.  We  had  all  arrived  at  the 
first  boundary-mark,  except  the  Mayor  of  Boulange. 
The  German  Commissioner,  M.  Hauchecorne,  who  had 
summoned  him,  was  getting  impatient,  and,  seeing 
him  coming  in  the  distance  at  a  walking-pace,  and 
swinging  himself  about : 

"  '  Come,  Mr.  Mayor,  hurry  up,  you  are  late,  and 
we  are  waiting  for  you,'  he  shouted  to  him. 

"  But  the  Mayor  of  Boulange,  a  miller  by  trade,  if 
I  recollect  rightly,  and  with  a  breadth  of  shoulder  I 
could  not  help  admiring,  seemed  to  slacken  his  pace 
still  more  ;  this  made  the  German  Commissioner 
furious,  and  caused  him  to  fall  into  the  mistake  of 
assuming  an  authoritative  tone,  which,  by  the  way, 
was  common  enough  with  him. 

"  The  miller  did  not  put  himself  out  at  all,  in  appear- 
ance at  least,  but  slackened  his  pace  still  more  instead 
of  hastening  it  ;  and  when  he  came  quite  close  to 
M.  Hauchecorne — 

"  '  Ah,  there  now  !  '  said  he  calmly,  and  looking 
him  full  in  the  face,  '  do  you  think,  then,  that  I  am 
in  such  a  hurry  to  become  a  Prussian  ?  '  " 

Besides  the  delimitation  of  the  new  frontier,  there 
were  various  other  questions  that  presented  themselves 
for  solution,  as  a  result  of  the  cession  of  Rights  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  The  Preliminaries  of  Ver-  m  J^SS 
sailles  had  already  provided  for  the  commercial  territory, 
and  civil  rights  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed 
territory,  and  for  their  unimpeded  emigration  : 
6 


82  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

"  Article  V. — The  interests  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territories  ceded  by  France,  in  everything  relating  to 
their  commerce  and  their  civil  rights,  shall  be  regu- 
lated in  as  favourable  a  manner  as  possible  when 
the  conditions  of  the  definitive  peace  are  settled.  A 
certain  time  will  be  fixed  during  which  they  will  enjoy 
particular  advantages  for  the  disposal  of  their  produce . 
The  German  Government  will  put  no  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  free  emigration  by  the  inhabitants  from  the 
ceded  territories,  and  shall  take  no  steps  against  them 
affecting  their  persons  or  their  property." 

The  Treaty  of  Frankfort  afterwards  stipulated  as 
follows,  with  regard  to  the  industrial  produce  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  : 

"  Article  IX. — The  exceptional  treatment  at  present 
granted  to  the  produce  of  the  industry  of  the  ceded 
territories  for  imports  into  France  shall  be  continued 
for  six  months,  from  the  ist  March,  under  the  con- 
ditions made  with  the  commissioners  of  Alsace." 

The  questions  of  option,  amnesty,  archives,  regis- 
ters, etc.,  pecuniary  deposits,  ecclesiastical  authority, 
navigation  on  rivers  and  canals,  and  canalisation  of 
the  Moselle  were  thus  regulated  by  the  definitive 
treaty  : 

"  Article  II. — French  subjects,  natives  of  the  ceded 
territory,  actually  domiciled  in  that  territory,  shall 
up  to  the  ist  October,  1872,  and  on  their 
making  a  previous  declaration  to  that  effect 
to  the  competent  authority,  be  allowed  to  change  their 
domicile  into  France  and  to  remain  there,  that  right 
in  nowise  infringing  the  laws  on  military  service,  in 
which  case  the  title  of  French  citizen  shall  be  main- 
tained. 

"  They  shall  be   at  liberty  to  preserve  their  im- 
movables situated  in  the  territory  united  to  Germany. 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  83 

"  No   inhabitant   of   the   ceded   territory   shall   be 
prosecuted,  annoyed,  or  sought  for,  either  in 
his  person  or  in  his  property,  on  account  of 
his  political  or  military  acts  previous  to  the  war. 

"Article  III. — The  French  Government  shall  deliver 
over  to  the  German  Government  the  archives,  docu- 
ments, and  registers  relating  to  the  civil,  Public 
military,  and  judicial  administration  of  the  records- 
ceded  territories.  Should  any  of  the  documents  be 
found  missing,  they  shall  be  restored  by  the  French 
Government  on  the  demand  of  the  German  Government. 

"  Article  IV. — The  French  Government  shall  make 
over  to  the  Government  of  the  Empire  of  Germany 
within  the  term  of  six  months  dating  from  the  Pecuniary 
exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty  1  :  deposits. 
(1)  The  amount  of  the  sum  deposited  by  the  depart- 
ments, communes,  and  public  establishments  of  the 
ceded  territories.  (2)  The  amount  of  the  premium 
of  enlistment  or  discharge  belonging  to  soldiers  and 
sailors,  natives  of  the  ceded  territory,  who  shall  have 
chosen  the  German  nationality.  (3)  The  amount  of 
security  of  responsible  agents  of  the  State.  (4)  The 
amount  of  sums  deposited  for  judicial  consignments 
on  account  of  measures  taken  by  the  administrative 
or  judicial  authorities  in  the  ceded  territories." 

"  Article  VI. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  being 
of  opinion  that  the  diocesan  circumscriptions  of  the 
territories  ceded  to  the  German  Empire  must  Eccie- 
agree  with  the  new  frontier  determined  upon  siasticai 
by  Article  I  above,  will  consider,  without  au  ony* 
delay  after  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty, 
upon  the  measures  to  be  taken  in  common  upon  the 
subject. 

"  The    communities    belonging   either    to    the    Re- 

1  The  ratifications  were  exchanged  at  Frankfort  on  May  20,    1871. 


84  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

formed  Church  or  to  the  Augsburg  Confession,  estab- 
lished on  the  territories  ceded  by  France,  shall  cease 
to  be  under  French  ecclesiastical  authority. 

"  The  communities  of  the  Church  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession  established  in  the  French  territories  shall 
cease  to  be  under  the  Superior  Consistories  and  of 
the  Directors  residing  at  Strassburg. 

"  The  Jewish  communities  of  the  territories 
situated  to  the  east  of  the  new  frontier  shall  cease 
to  depend  on  the  Central  Jewish  Consistory  residing 
at  Paris. 

"  Article  V. — The  two  nations  shall  enjoy  equal 
privileges  as  regards  the  navigation  on  the  Moselle, 
.T    .  the  canal  of  the  Marne  to  the  Rhine,  the 

Navigation  A  ' 

on  rivers      canal  of  the  Rhone  to  the  Rhine,  the  canal 

and  canals.       <•   j_i_       o  j    j.t_  i_i  l 

oi  the  barre  and  the  navigable  waters  com- 
municating with  those  channels  of  navigation.  The 
right  of  floatage  shall  be  maintained. 

"  Article  XIV. — Each  of  the  two  Parties  shall  con- 
tinue on  his  territory  the  works  undertaken  for  the 
r     ,.  ...     canalisation   of   the   Moselle.     The   common 

Canalisation 

of  the  interests  of  the  separate  parts  of  the  two 
departments  of  the  Meurthe  and  the  Moselle 
shall  be  liquidated." 

Article  XVII  made  provision  for  the  carrying  out 
of  such  further  arrangements  as  would  be  necessitated 
by  the  due  execution  of  the  Preliminaries  and  the 
definitive  treaty. 

To  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  were  appended  a  number 
of  supplementary  articles  concerning  the  purchase  of 
Re  lation  French  railways  and  other  rights  connected 
of  various  therewith,  and  the  rectification  of  the  fron- 
tier near  Belfort.  In  accordance  with  the 
above-mentioned  Article  XVII,  more  than  a  hundred 
conventions  were  entered  into  between  France  and 


ANNEXATION    IN    1871  85 

Germany.1  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present 
work  to  go  into  all  these  details,8  so  that  we  must 
here  confine  ourselves  to  mentioning  that,  by  the 
Additional  Convention  8  concluded  at  Frankfort,  De- 
cember 11,  1871,  various  important  matters  affecting 
the  transferred  territory  were  regulated  :  choice  of 
nationality  by  natives  resident  outside  Alsace-Lorraine, 
pensions  (civil,  religious,  and  military),  execution  of 
judgments,  judicial  proceedings,  exchange  of  crimi- 
nals and  lunatics,  guarantee  of  mortgage  rights, 
restitution  of  all  titles,  documents,  etc.,  belonging  to 
communes  detached  from  their  former  administration, 
diocesan  circumscriptions  crossed  by  the  new  frontier, 
patents,  appointment  of  financial  commission,  export 
and  import  duties,  concessions  granted  by  France  in 
the  ceded  territory,  financial  regulations  relative  to 
canals,  railways,  renewal  of  treaties,  etc. 

1  These  are  contained,  together  with  many  other  documents  and  records, 
in  the  voluminous  publication  of  Villefort,  Recueil  des  traites,  conventions, 
lois,  ddcrets  et  autres  actes  relatifs  a  la  paix  avec  I'Allemagne,  5  vols.  (Paris, 
1872-79). 

2  For  the  various  arrangements  necessitated  by,  and  the  various  legal 
and  political  effects  consequent  on,  a  cession  of  territory  see  Phillipson, 
Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  Pt.  I.,  ch.  iv.  ;  Pt.  II.  chaps,  xi. 
xii.  and  xiii. 

3  Villefort,  Recueil,  vol.  i.  p.  89. 


CHAPTER   V 

PROPOSALS  AS  TO  THE  FATE  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE  AFTER 
ITS  CONQUEST — BISMARCK' S  VIEW  OF  THE  TASK  OF 
ASSIMILATION 

Protests  in  Germany  against  the  annexation — German  policy  as  to  the 
annexed  territory — View  as  to  neutralisation — View  as  to  plebiscite — 
Division  of  the  territory  suggested — Autonomy  suggested — Alsace- 
Lorraine  made  a  Reichsland — Bismarck's  view  as  to  German  assimila- 
tion-— His  doubts  about  Metz. 

When  it  became  abundantly  clear,  after  the  fall  of 
Sedan,  that  the  war  against  France  was  a  war  of 
Protests  in  spoliation,  voices  even  in  Germany  were 
against" the  raised  against  the  policy  of  the  victors, 
spoliation.  xhe  German  Socialists  protested  publicly 
and  energetically  against  the  projected  annexation  of 
French  territory.  They  condemned  any  arrangement 
whatever  that  would  involve  the  humiliation  of  France 
and  would  engender  lasting  bitterness  and  an  ardent 
desire  for  retaliation  ;  they  demanded  that,  in  the 
very  interests  of  the  German  people,  an  honourable 
peace  should  be  granted  to  France.1  On  May  25,  187 1, 
Bebel  said  in  the  Reichstag  :  "I  protest  categorically 
against  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  I  consider 
it  a  crime  against  the  right  of  the  people  ;  I  consider 
it  a  disgraceful  stain  on  German  history."  A  similar 
protest  was  offered  by  Liebknecht.  For  their  cour- 
ageous and  enlightened  opposition,   they  were  tried 

1  Cf.  E.  Milhaud,  La  Dimocratie  socialists  allemande  (Paris,   1903),  p.  39  ; 
Novicow.  op.  cit.,  p.  381. 

86 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  87 

for  high  treason  and  condemned  to  two  years'  imprison- 
ment in  a  fortress. 

It  is  of  special  interest  to  recall  the  observations 
made  in  the  autumn  of  1870  by  various  German 
leading  papers,  as  showing  that  it  was  by  no  means 
the  entire  German  people  that  had  become  possessed 
of  a  conquering  fury  and  territorial  lust.  The  follow- 
ing may  be  referred  to  as  illustrations  : 

The  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  August  17,  1870  :  "  The 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  shrilly  demanded 
by  a  section  of  National  Liberals  and  National  Demo- 
crats. The  powder  acts  as  an  intoxicant  on  the 
democratic  parties.  They  invoke  the  brutal  right  of 
conquest,  and  hardly  trouble  to  dissimulate  their 
claims.  They  do  not  ask,  What  do  the  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers  say  ?  Do  they  wish  to  become  German 
or  remain  French  ?  " 

The  Rheinische-Westfaelische  Zeitung,  August  17, 
1870  :  "  The  question  of  a  French  cession  of  territory 
is  very  difficult  if  we  do  not  merely  wish  to  assert  the 
right  of  conquest." 

The  Zukunft,  September  18,  1870  :  "  They  tell  us 
that  Alsace-Lorraine  must  be  taken  from  France. 
There  is  no  surer  way  of  turning  the  coming  peace 
into  an  armistice  until  the  moment  when  France 
will  have  recovered  sufficient  strength  to  claim  the 
restitution  of  the  territory  we  are  taking.  The  most 
jingoistic  Teuton  will  not  dare  to  pretend  that  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers  are  yearning  for  the  joys  of 
German  rule."  l 

Germany  having  compelled  France  to  abandon 
Alsace-Lorraine,  the  first  problem  the  German  Govern- 

1  These  extracts  were  given  in  the  Daily  Telegraph,  October  19,  1917, 
and  were  supplied  to  this  paper  by  the  Ligue  Patriotique  des  Alsaciens- 
Lorrains. 


88  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

ment  was  confronted  with  was — what  was  to  be 
German  done  with  the  surrendered  territory  ?  Was 
the  amesed  ft  to  be  incorporated  in  the  newly  estab- 
territory.  Hshed  German  Empire,  and,  if  so,  on  what 
basis  ?  Was  it  expedient  to  neutralise  it  and  con- 
stitute it  a  buffer  State  between  the  rival  nations  ? 

In  a  speech  delivered  in  the  Reichstag,  May  2,  187 1, 
Bismarck  foreshadowed  the  future  policy  that  was  to 
be  adopted,  and  criticised  certain  proposals  that  had 
been  advanced  as  against  annexation,  e.g.,  the  mere 
dismantling  of  the  French  fortresses  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
and  allowing  the  territory  to  remain  French  ;  or  the 
neutralisation  of  the  territory.  The  Chancellor  re- 
ported a  conversation  he  had  had  before  the  Franco- 
German  War  with  the  recently  deceased  King  William 
of  Wurtemberg.  The  latter  declared  he  was  for  peace, 
but  that  if  war  broke  out  against  France  he  would 
participate  in  the  conflict.  "  Give  us  Strassburg,"  he 
observed  to  Bismarck,  "  and  we  shall  be  united  for  all 
eventualities  ;  but  so  long  as  Strassburg  will  remain 
a  sally-port  for  an  armed  Power,  I  fear  my  country 
will  be  invaded  by  foreign  troops  before  the  German 
Confederation  will  be  able  to  help  me."  Thus  Strass- 
burg was  thought  to  be  the  knot  of  the  situation  ; 
so  long  as  it  was  not  German  it  would  always  be 
regarded  as  an  obstacle  on  the  one  hand  to  South 
Germany's  committing  herself  without  reserve  to 
German  unity,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  develop- 
ment of  a  German  national  policy. 

As  to  the  suggested  dismantling  of  the  French 
fortresses  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  Bismarck  said  he  strongly 
objected  to  such  an  inadequate  scheme.  In  the  first 
place,  he  thought  it  was  of  little  practical  use  in  the 
interests  of  maintaining  peace.  Besides,  the  geo- 
graphical configuration  of  the  advanced  bastion  was 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  89 

too  near  Stuttgart  and  Munich,  so  that  it  therefore 
became  necessary  to  push  it  back.  Further,  Metz, 
by  its  topographical  nature,  was  a  place  that  demanded 
very  little  works  to  make  a  formidable  fortress  of  it, 
and  demolished  works  could  easily  be  reconstructed. 
Secondly,  political  reasons  were  against  imposing  on 
a  State  restrictions  interfering  with  its  self-defence. 
"To  constitute  a  condition  of  servitude  upon  foreign 
policy  and  soil  is  to  create  a  very  heavy  burden, 
very  annoying  to  the  sentiments  of  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  the  country  upon  which  it  weighs." 

The  proposed  plans  to  neutralise  Alsace-Lorraine, 
Bismarck  said,  had  many  advocates  amongst  its  popula- 
tion.    If  it  were  made  an  independent  neutral    ... 

r  View  as  to 

State,  like  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  there  neutraiisa- 
would  thus  be  a  chain  of  neutral  States 
extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Swiss  Alps,  and 
separating  France  from  Germany.  The  Germans, 
being  accustomed  to  respect  treaties  and  neutrality, 
would  therefore  be  prevented  from  attacking  the 
French  ;  but  the  French  would  not  be  prevented  from 
realising  the  plan  conceived  during  the  last  war,  viz. 
to  despatch  a  fleet  to  Germany  with  troops  for  landing, 
or  to  land  French  troops  in  allied  countries  and  after- 
wards invade  German  territory.  Accordingly  France 
would  be  protected  against  Germany  by  this  belt  of 
neutral  States,  but  Germany  would  remain  exposed  to 
naval  attacks,  seeing  that  the  German  fleet  was  not 
as  powerful  as  the  French.  Furthermore — and  this 
was  conceived  to  be  a  more  important  reason  against 
neutralisation — neutrality  is  tenable  only  if  the  neu- 
tralised country  is  resolved  to  safeguard  and  defend 
it ;  but  if  Alsace-Lorraine  were  established  as  a  neutral 
State,  the  strong  French  elements  in  it,  French  sym- 
pathies and  interests,  would  induce  it  to  take  the  side 


90  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  France  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  with  Germany. 
Hence  there  was  only  one  course  to  adopt,  viz.  to 
subject  Alsace-Lorraine  to  German  dominion. 

Treitschke,  writing  in  1870,1  had  already  con- 
demned (before  Bismarck's  definitive  pronouncement) 
the  proposal  to  neutralise  Alsace-Lorraine.  Like  so 
many  other  Germans,  he  regarded  small  nations  with 
impatience  and  contempt.  "  What  is  the  use,"  he 
exclaimed,  "  of  attempting  to  answer  the  suggestion 
that  Alsace  and  Lorraine  should  form  a  neutral  State  ? 
Has  Europe  not  had  enough  of  that  already  in  the 
disgusting  spectacle  of  the  '  Luxemburg  nation '  ? 
Only  the  brain  of  an  English  Manchester  man,  sur- 
rounded by  the  mists  he  blows  from  his  pipe  of  peace, 
could  conceive  such  extraordinary  bubbles.  No  won- 
der that  every  enemy  of  Germany  should  approve  of 
this  suggestion.  No  better  way  has  yet  been  thought 
of  to  enable  France  to  recover  all  that  she  has  lost." 

To  the  suggestion  that  recourse  should  be  had  to  a 
plebiscite  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  destiny  of 
view  as  to  the  provinces,  German  opinion  was  still 
plebiscite.  more  strongly  opposed.  Such  a  policy  natur- 
ally finds  little  favour  with  those  who  repudiate 
democratic  demands,  who  look  upon  the  masses  of 
the  people  as  mere  objects  of  government,  and  who 
are  animated  by  dreams  of  jingoistic  imperialism  and 
territorial  aggrandisement. 

Thus  Lasson,  one  of  the  leading  teachers  of  modern 
Germany  and  a  persistent  advocate  of  the  virtues  and 
desirability  of  war,  observes 2 :  "To  allow  a  people,  and 
still  more  a  fraction  of  a  people,  to  decide  international 

1  H.  von  Treitschke,  Was  fordem  wir  von  Frankreich?  (Berlin,  1870).  An 
English  translation  of  this  pamphlet  is  included  in  a  volume  entitled  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  and  Islam  (London,  1915)  ;  p.  163  (reference  to  the  English 
edition). 

2  A.  Lasson,  Das  Culturideal  und  der  Krieg  (Berlin,   1868). 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  91 

questions,  for  example,  which  State  shall  control  them, 
is  as  good  as  making  the  children  of  a  house  vote  for 
their  father.  It  is  the  most  ridiculous  fallacy  that 
human  wit  has  ever  conceived."  It  may  be  said,  on 
the  contrary,  that  this  comparison  involves  a  most 
ridiculous  fallacy.  To  ask  the  inhabitants  of  a  given 
territory  to  decide  its  fate  is  to  ask  them  to  vote  for 
themselves  ;  for  they  are  more  directly  concerned  than 
the  sovereign  whose  subjects  they  were  originally. 

Von  Sybel,  one  of  the  most  eminent  historians  of 
Germany,  writing  in  1870,1  says  that  a  cession  of  terri- 
tory is  the  natural  conclusion  of  a  war  in  which  one  side 
is  victorious  and  the  other  defeated  ;  the  defeated 
party  is  a  debtor  of  a  particular  kind  who  cannot  pay  his 
debt  except  by  abandoning  a  portion  of  his  territory  ; 
there  is  no  longer  any  diplomacy,  or  politics,  or  history, 
if  it  be  claimed  that  the  payment  of  this  debt  should 
be  subordinated  to  the  vote  of  a  province.  In  reply 
to  this  pronouncement,  one  may  say  that  it  rests  on 
the  fallacious  basis  that  a  defeated  country  necessarily 
becomes  indebted  to  the  victor.  What  if  the  victorious 
sovereign  was  an  ambitious,  unscrupulous  aggressor, 
and  the  defeated  country — comparatively  small,  power- 
less, and  helpless — is  the  object  of  the  former's  covet ous- 
ness,  and  is  attacked  without  any  provocation  and 
without  any  legitimate  reason  ?  In  what  sense,  then, 
can  it  be  said  that  the  small,  innocent  country  overrun 
and  crushed  by  its  powerful,  merciless  neighbour 
becomes  indebted  to  it  ?  To  argue  thus  is  indeed  to 
resort  to  such  a  "  transvaluation  of  values"  as  will 
make  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason,  and  will 
call  black  white  and  evil  good. 

Treitschke,  in  the  course  of  a  speech  made  in  the 

1  H.  von  Sybel,  Deutschlands  Rechte  auf  Elsass  und  Lothringen  (Leipzig, 
1871). 


92  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Reichstag  in  1871,  acclaimed  Germany's  refusal  to 
entertain  the  proposal  of  a  plebiscite.  "  With  sound 
German  pride,"  he  said,  "  we  have  despised  the 
Bonapartist  jugglery  of  universal  suffrage."  J  Similarly, 
Herr  Wagner,  a  professor  of  Gottingen,  in  a  pamphlet 
published  in  1870,  calls  the  universal  vote  a  "  comedy."  a 
Schemes  for  neutralisation  and  plebiscite  Jiaving 
been  rejected  by  the  mass  of  German  opinion  and  by 
^.  .  .      ,  the   German   Government,   it   followed  that 

Division  of  p  ' 

the  territory  Alsace- Lorraine  was  to  become  part  of  the 
suggese.  £mpjre>  jQ  effect  this  object  it  was  sug- 
gested in  some  quarters  in  Germany  that  the  acquired 
territory  should  be  divided  between  the  Kingdom  of 
Bavaria  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden ;  and  the 
question  was  raised,  too,  in  the  Bundesrat.  It  may 
be  recalled  that  after  the  Preliminaries  of  Versailles 
were  signed  by  the  representatives  of  Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg,  and  Baden,  Bismarck  is  said  to  have  declared 
that  "  in  order  to  effface  any  unpleasant  recollections 
of  the  war  of  1866,  he  intended  to  hand  over  to  Bavaria 
the  town  of  Weissenburg  after  the  annexation  of 
Alsace."  "These  tidings,"  observes  M.  Jules  Jolly,  in 
his  Recollections  (he  was  the  representative  of  Baden, 
at  the  Versailles  negotiations)  "  had  been  welcomed 
with  lively  emotion  by  Count  von  Bray,  the  Bavarian 
minister."  s 

Such  distribution  of  Alsatian  territory  was  after- 
wards objected  to.  Treitschke  opposed  not  only  the 
suggested  partition  of  Alsace-Lorraine  between  Bavaria 
and  Baden,  but  also  the  assignment  of  the  territory 
entirely  either  to  the  one  State  or  to  the  other — as 

1  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Islam,  p.  194. 

2  A.  Wagner,  Elsass  und  Lothringen  und  ihre  Wiedergewinnung  fiir  Deutsch- 
land  (Leipzig,   1870). 

3  Cf.   Ottokar  Lorenz,   Kaiser   Wilhelm  und  die  Begriindung  des  Reichs, 
1866-71  (Jena,  1902),  p.  525. 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  93 

both  these  alternatives  had  also  been  brought  forward  ; 
and  he  proposed  that  the  provinces  should  be  given  to 
Prussia.  He  said  it  was  unreasonable  to  entrust  this 
"outwork  of  Germany"  to  a  secondary  State,  and 
doubted  whether  German  boundaries  would  be  safe  in 
Bavarian  hands,  and  whether  Bavaria  possessed  the 
intellectual  and  political  power  necessary  for  fusing 
Alsace  into  union  with  herself.1  Rather,  a  common 
diplomacy  and  a  collective  German  parliament  were 
best  fitted  for  the  work  of  assimilation.  Prussia,  how- 
ever, might  be  an  efficient  master.  "  Prussia  alone," 
he  said,  "  can  undertake  the  remorseless  sweeping  away 
of  the  French  officials  in  Alsace,  which  is  indispensable, 
and  replace  the  foreign  powers  by  vigorous  home 
ones.  Prussia  alone  can  steadfastly  maintain  the 
state  of  siege  which,  we  may  easily  imagine,  may  be 
necessary  for  a  time  in  some  of  the  districts  of  the  for- 
lorn land.  ...  A  powerful  State,  which  has  impressed 
its  spirit  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  Rhine  country 
and  the  people  of  Posen,  will  know  how  to  reconcile 
the  separate  life  of  the  half-French  Germans."  2 
"  The  people  of  Alsace  have  learned  to  despise  this 
Germany,  broken  into  fragments.  They  will  learn  to 
love  us  when  the  strong  hand  of  Prussia  has  educated 
them."  s  But  against  this  suggestion  many  objections 
were  raised  ;  moreover,  the  Prussian  monarch  had 
declared  in  September  1870  that  he  desired  no  increase 
of  territory. 

A  more  liberal  proposal  was  advanced  in  some 
quarters,  viz.  that  the  acquired  provinces  should 
constitute  a  new  autonomous  State  within  Autonomy 
the  German  Empire.  The  German  Govern-  susgested- 
ment,  however,  was  not  disposed  to  adopt  such  a 
liberal   and   generous    course.     In    a    speech   in    the 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  163-6.         2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  167,  168.         3  Op.  cit.,  p.  173. 


94  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Reichstag,  Treitschke  argued  against  the  multiplica- 
tion of  small  German  States  :  "  We  have  been  con- 
tending vigorously,  gentlemen,  during  many  years  for 
the  unity  of  Germany  ;  we  have  seen,  in  the  course  of 
this  century,  hundreds  of  small  German  States  collapse; 
we  are  now  prepared,  as  men  of  good  feeling,  to  respect 
and  to  spare  the  few  States  which  remain,  because 
they  are  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  be  exactly  injurious 
to  the  might  of  the  German  Empire.  But  to  create 
a  new  State  in  addition  to  the  already  too  great  existing 
number,  now  when  we  are  hard  at  work  counteracting 
the  German  tendency  to  division,  to  form  afresh  a 
State  out  of  the  departments  which  never  in  the 
course  of  their  history  were  a  State,  to  cultivate  a 
new  half-German  provincialism  on  the  severely  en- 
dangered frontier — that,  gentlemen,  I  call  striking 
our  own  face."  * 

Eventually  it  was  decided  to  make  Alsace-Lorraine 
simply  an  imperial  province — a  Reichsland — to  be 
Aisace-  the  collective  property  of  all  the  German 
made*"6  States  ;  for  its  dismemberment  and  division 
Reichsland.  between  two  or  more  or  its  assignment  to 
one  of  the  States  would  have  aroused  jealousy  and 
dissatisfaction  in  the  others,  and  so  might  have  im- 
perilled the  stability  of  the  newly  established  confedera- 
tion. It  thus  becomes — to  use  the  words  of  a  recent 
writer  already  referred  to2—"  la  premiere  colonie  de 
la  Confederation  germanique,"  or  a  kind  of  dependency 
placed  under  the  sovereign  control  of  the  Empire  and 
administered  by  organs  of  imperial  government  acting 
independently  of  each  and  all  of  the  federated  States 
as  such.3     The  federal  constitution  did  not  apply  ex 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  188-9.  2  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  103. 

3  Cf.  A.  Haenel,  Dentsches  Staatsrecht  (1892,  etc.),  vol.  i.  p.  124  ;  Anschiitz, 
in  F.  von  Holtzendorfif-Vietmansdorf  (Ed.  J.  Kohler),  Enzyclopddie  der 
Rechtswissenschaft  (Munchen  ;    Leipzig,  1913-14),  5  vols.  vol.  ii.  p.  559. 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  95 

proprio  vigore  to  the  annexed  provinces  ;  only  ex- 
press imperial  legislation  could  make  it  applicable 
thereto.1  The  three  main  reasons  that  impelled  the 
German  Government  to  impose  this  status  on  Alsace- 
Lorraine  were,  first,  the  difficulty  of  satisfactorily 
fitting  conquered  territory  into  a  federation  of 
autonomous  States,  secondly,  the  danger  of  a  sub- 
sequent French  invasion  in  the  hope  of  recovering 
it,  and  thirdly,  the  danger  of  internal  disorder  due 
to  the  discontentment  and  alienation  of  the  inhabi- 
tants whose  territory  was  annexed  without  consulting 
them. 

In  his  speech  before  the  Reichstag,  May  25,  187 1, 
Bismarck  referred  to  what  were  deemed  to  be  the  only 
two  practicable  courses,  viz.  to  unite  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  Prussia,  or  to  constitute  it  an  "  immediate  terri- 
tory "  of  the  Empire.  He  thought  from  the  first 
that  the  second  alternative  was  preferable,  because 
dynastic  questions  would  not  then  become  mixed 
with  political  questions,  and  because  the  Alsatians 
would  more  easily  assimilate  to  themselves  the  name 
of  Germans  than  that  of  Prussians — in  France  it  was 
the  Prussians,  not  so  much  the  Germans,  who  had  been 
the  detested  people. 

As  to  how  Germany  would  assimilate  the  conquered 
country  and  make  the  population  loyal  Germans 
the  Chancellor  had  early  made  up  his  mind.  Bismarck's 
It  is  related  that  when  he  was  asked  in  1870  vlG^rman 
at  Versailles  by  one  William  Jones,  an  English  assimilation, 
quaker,  how  the  denationalisation  of  Alsace  would  be 
accomplished,  he  replied  that  the  children  would  be 
brought  up  in  German  schools,  and  the  younger 
generation  would  be  subjected  to  the  discipline  of  the 

1  As  to  the  status  of  the  Reichsland  and  the  regime  introduced  therein, 
see  infra,  chap.  ix. 


g6  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

great  German  army.1     In  his  speech  of  May  2,  187 1, 
in  the  Reichstag,  he  went  into  this  difficult  question 
a  little  more  fully.     He  referred  to  the  antipathy  of 
the  population  to  their  being  taken  over  by  Germany  : 
"  This  antipathy  exists,  it  is  a  fact,  and  it  is  our  duty 
to  overcome  it  by  dint  of  patience.  .  .  .  We  Germans 
are  in  the  habit  generally  of  governing  with  more  good- 
nature, sometimes  with  a  little  clumsiness,  but  on  the 
whole  we  are  more  benevolent,   more   human   than 
French  statesmen  ;    this  superiority  of  the  German 
regime  will  soon  reveal  itself  and  seduce  the  German 
hearts  of  the  Alsatians.  .  .  .  Besides,  we  are  able  to 
grant  the  inhabitants  communal  and  individual  liberty, 
self-government,  infinitely  greater  than  they  enjoyed 
under  French  institutions  and  traditions.  .  .  .  Thanks 
to  German  patience  and  benevolence,  we  shall  succeed 
in  gaining  over  the  population,  and  that  perhaps  in  less 
time  than  may  be  thought  at  present ."     With  regard 
to  the  ways  and  means  of  beginning  this  task,  he 
pointed  out  that  only  a  provisional  arrangement  was 
then  possible,  that  only  empirical  methods  could  in  the 
circumstances  be  adopted  :    for  the  situation  was  an 
abnormal  one,  in  that  the  territory  was  acquired  by 
conquest,  and  was  made  the  common  property  of  a 
Confederation  of  sovereign  princes  and  free  towns — 
a  fact,  indeed,  that  was  very  rare  in  history,  if  not 
unparalleled.     Two   years   later   (May  16,    1873)    the 
Chancellor  again  spoke  in  the  Reichstag  of  the  work  of 
assimilation  and  absorption.     He  emphasised  that  it 
was   necessary  to   combat   in   Alsace   the   prevailing 
sympathies  for  a  past  that  gave  the  inhabitants  many 
advantages  and  many  glories,  that  it  was  incumbent 
on  the  Imperial  Government  to  recognise  the  truly 
French  sympathies  of  the  country  and  to  overcome 

1   H.  Welschinger,  Bismarck  (Paris,   1900),  p.  130. 


PROPOSALS    AS    TO    ITS    FATE  97 

them,  despite  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  and  above  all 
to  act  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  compromise  the  material 
security  of  Germany. 

That  Bismarck  fully  appreciated  the  difficulties 
involved  and  foresaw  the  troubles  that  would  follow 
this  forcible,  arbitrary,  and  factitious  annexa-  His  doubts 
tion  is  evident  from  such  reported  conversa-  about  Metz- 
tions  as  the  following  (on  the  day  following  the  capitu- 
lation of  Paris)  :  "As  you  see,  we  are  keeping  Metz  ; 
but  I  confess  I  don't  like  that  part  of  the  arrangement. 
Strassburg  is  German  in  speech,  and  will  be  so  in  heart 
ten  years  hence.  Metz,  however,  is  French,  and  will 
be  a  hotbed  of  dissatisfaction  for  a  long  time  to  come. 
The  Emperor  has  too  many  foreigners  for  subjects  as 
it  is.  We  have  had  more  than  enough  trouble  with  our 
Poles,  though  they  have  been  benevolently  governed, 
God  knows  !  And  we  shall  have  still  more  with  these 
Lorrainers,  who  hate  us  like  poison  and  will  have,  very 
likely,  to  be  roughly  handled,  whereas  the  good  old 
German  Elsasser  will  be  treated  with  the  utmost 
consideration.  They  will  soon  like  us  better  than  they 
ever  liked  the  Frenchmen,  who  were  never  weary  of 
poking  fun  at  them,  gibing  at  their  accent  and  gener- 
ally holding  them  up  to  ridicule."  1 

We  shall  see  in  subsequent  chapters  to  what  extent 
the  German  task  succeeded,  and  how  far  the  attempted 
assimilation  and  absorption  failed.2  In  the  mean- 
time it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  the  public  protests 
against  the  annexation  made  by  the  representatives 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  National  Assembly  and  by 
other  notable  deputies. 

1  Conversations  with  Prince  Bismarck.     Collected  by  H.  von  Poschinger. 
Edited  by  S.  Whitman  (London  and  New  York,   1900;    p.  98). 

2  See  infra,  chaps,  ix  and  x. 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE    PROTESTS   OF    1871   AGAINST  THE   ANNEXATION 

Declaration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  deputies — Submitted  to  the  National  As- 
sembly— Various  other  protests — Debates  in  the  Assembly  on  the 
proposed  cession — Vote  on  the  Preliminaries — Further  protest  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  deputies — Demand  from  Germany — Effects  of  the  annexation. 

Thou  hast  consulted  shame  to  thy 
house  by  cutting  off  many  people, 
and  hast  sinned  against  thy  soul. 

For  the  stone  shall  cry  out  of  the 
wall  and  the  beam  out  of  the  timber 
shall  answer  it. 

Hab.  ii.  10,  11. 

After  the  three  weeks'  armistice  was  concluded  on 
January  28,  187 1,  the  National  Assembly  was  elected, 
Protest  of  and  met  a*  Bordeaux  (February  12)  for  the 
Alsace-        purpose  of  deciding  on  the  continuance  or 

LorTciinc 

deputies  in  definitive  cessation  of  hostilities,  in  view  of 
1  7I'  the  German  demands  as  to  the  payment  of 

an  enormous  indemnity  and  the  cession  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

On  February  17,  after  the  speech  of  M.  Jules  Grevy, 
who  thanked  the  Assembly  for  the  honour  of  electing 
him  its  President,  M.  Emile  Keller,  the  head  of  the 
list  of  deputies  for  the  department  of  the  Upper  Rhine, 
dressed  in  his  officer's  uniform,  which  was  worn  and 
dusty,  read  the  celebrated  declaration  of  protest 
against  the  proposed  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  Germany.1     Before  he  read  it,  he  said  :    "I  am 

1  See  H.  Welschinger,  La  Protestation  de  V Alsace-Lorraine  les  17  fevrier 
et  ler  mars  1871  a  Bordeaux  (Paris,  1914),  to  which  indebtedness  for  various 
particulars  is  acknowledged.  Cf.  also  the  same  writer's  La  Guerre  de  1870  ; 
causes  et  responsabilites  (Paris,   1910). 

98 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  99 

convinced  that  the  proposition  I  am  about  to  lay 
before  you  will  receive  your  unanimous  approval, 
for  our  honour  and  our  national  unity  are  at  stake  : 
on  this  point  there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion  in  a 
French  assembly." 

The  solemn  declaration,  signed  by  all  the  representa- 
tives of  Alsace-Lorraine  (the  departments  of  the  Lower 
Rhine,  Upper  Rhine,  Moselle,  and  Meurthe),  has  now 
become  a  noteworthy  historical  document ;  so  that  it 
may  be  given  here  both  in  the  original 1  and  in  an 
English  translation  : 

"  We,  the  undersigned  French  citizens,  elected  by 
the  constituents  of  the  departments  of  the  Lower 
Rhine,  the  Upper  Rhine,  the  Meurthe  and  the  Vosges, 
and  chosen  by  them  to  bring  to  the  National  Assembly 
of  France  the  unanimous  expression  of  the  wish  and 
will  of  the  populations  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  having 
previously  met  for  and  deliberated  on  the  subject, 

1  "I.  L' Alsace  et  la  Lorraine  ne  veulent  pas  etre  alienees. 

"  Associees  depuis  plus  de  deux  siecles  a  la  France,  dans  la  bonne  comme 
dans  la  mauvaise  fortune,  ces  deux  provinces,  sans  cesse  exposees  aux  coups 
de  l'ennemi,  se  sont  constamment  sacrifices  pour  la  grandeur  nationale  ; 
elles  ont  scelle  de  leur  sang  l'indissoluble  pacte  qui  les  rattache  a  l'unite 
francaise.  Mises  aujourd'hui  en  question  par  les  pretentions  etrangeres, 
elles  affirment  a  travers  les  obstacles  et  tous  les  dangers,  sous  le  joug  meme 
de  l'envahisseur,  leur  inebranlable  fidelite. 

"  Tous  unanimes,  les  citoyens  demeures  dans  leurs  foyers,  comme  les 
soldats  accourus  sous  les  drapeaux,  les  uns  en  votant,  les  autres  en  combattant, 
signinent  a  l'Allemagne  et  au  monde  l'immuable  volonte  de  l'Alsace  et  de 
la  Lorraine  de  rester  francaises. 

"II.  La  France  ne  peut  consentir  ni  signer  la  cession  de  la  Lorraine 
et  de  l'Alsace.  Elle  ne  peut  pas,  sans  mettre  en  peril  la  continuite  de  son 
existence  nationale,  porter  elle-meme  un  coup  mortel  a  sa  propre  unite  en 
abandonnant  ceux  qui  ont  conquis,  par  deux  cents  ans  de  devouement 
patriotique,  le  droit  d'etre  defendus  par  le  pays  tout  entier  contre  les  entre- 
prises  de  la  force  victorieuse. 

"  Une  assemblee,  meme  issue  du  suffrage  universel,  ne  pourrait  invoquer 
sa  souverainete,  pour  couvrir  ou  ratifier  des  exigences  destructives  de 
l'integrite  nationale.  Elle  s'arrogerait  un  droit  qui  n'appartient  meme  pas 
au  peuple  reuni  dans  ses  cornices. 

"  Un  pareil  exces  de  pouvoir,  qui  aurait  pour  effet  de  mutiler  la  mere 


ioo  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

have  resolved  to  set  forth  in  a  solemn  declaration  our 
sacred  and  inalienable  right,  so  that  the  National 
Assembly,  France,  and  Europe,  who  have  before  their 
eyes  the  wishes,  the  will,  and  the  resolutions  of  our 
constituents,  may  not  take,  or  allow  to  be  taken  for 
granted,  an  act  of  a  nature  to  injure  the  rights  of  which 
a  formal  mandate  has  confided  to  us  the  guardianship 
and  the  defence. 

"  I.  Alsace  and  Lorraine  refuse  to  be  transferred. 

"  Associated  with  France  for  more  than  two  centuries, 
in  good  as  in  evil  fortune,  and  unceasingly  exposed 
to  the  blows  ,of  the  enemy,  these  two  provinces  have  * 

commune,  denoncerait  aux  justes  severites  de  l'histoire  ceux  qui  s'enrendraient 
coupables. 

"  La  France  peut  subir  les  coups  de  la  force,  elle  ne  peut  sanctionner  ses 
arrets. 

"  III.  L'Europe  ne  peut  permettre  ni  ratifier  l'abandon  de  l'Alsace  et  de 
la  Lorraine. 

"  Gardiennes  des  regies  de  la  justice  et  du  droit  des  gens,  les  nations 
civilisees  ne  sauraient  rester  plus  longtemps  insensibles  au  sort  de  leurs 
voisins,  sous  peine  d'etre  a  leur  tour  victimes  des  attentats  qu'elles  auraient 
toleres.  L'Europe  moderne  ne  peut  laisser  saisir  un  peuple  comme  un  vil 
troupeau  ;  elle  ne  peut  rester  sourde  aux  protestations  repetees  des  popu- 
lations menacees  ;  elle  doit  a  sa  propre  conservation  d'interdire  de  pareils 
abus  de  la  force.  Elle  sait  d'ailleurs  que  l'unite  de  la  France  est  aujourd'hui, 
comme  dans  le  passe,  une  garantie  de  l'ordre  general  du  monde,  une  barriere 
contre  l'esprit  de  conquete  et  d'invasion. 

"  La  paix,  faite  au  prix  d'une  cession  de  territoire,  ne  serait  qu'une  treve 
ruineuse  et  non  une  paix  definitive.  Elle  serait  pour  tous  une  cause  d'agi- 
tation  intestine,  une  provocation  legitime  et  permanente  a  la  guerre.  Et 
quant  a  nous,  Alsaciens  et  Lorrains,  nous  serions  prets  a  recommencer  la 
guerre  aujourd'hui,  demain,  a  toute  heure,  a  tout  instant. 

"  En  resume,  l'Alsace  et  la  Lorraine  protestent  hautement  contre  toute 
cession.     La  France  ne  peut  la  consentir  ;    l'Europe  ne  peut  la  sanctionner. 

"  En  foi  de  quoi  nous  prenons  nos  concitoyens  de  France,  les  gouvernements 
et  les  peuples  du  monde  entier  a  temoin  que  nous  tenons  d'avance  pour  nuls 
et  non  avenus  tous  actes  et  traites,  votes  ou  plebiscite,  qui  consentiraient 
abandon  en  faveur  de  l'etranger  de  tout  ou  partie  de  nos  provinces  de  l'Alsace 
et  de  la  Lorraine. 

"  Nous  proclamons  par  les  presentes  a  jamais  inviolable  le  droit  des  Alsaciens 
et  des  Lorrains  de  rester  membres  de  la  nation  francaise,  et  nous  jurons,  tant 
pour  nous  que  pour  nos  commettants,  nos  enfants  et  leurs  descendants,  de 
le  revendiquer  eternellement,  et  par  toutes  les  voies,  envers  et  contre  tous 
usurpateurs." 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  101 

constantly  sacrificed  themselves  for  the  national 
greatness  ;  they  have  sealed  with  their  blood  the 
indissoluble  ties  that  bind  them  to  French  unity. 
Being  challenged  by  foreign  pretensions,  they  affirm 
their  unswerving  loyalty  in  the  face  of  all  obstacles 
and  dangers,  under  the  very  yoke  of  the  invader. 

"  The  citizens  who  have  remained  at  home  and  the 
soldiers  who  have  joined  the  colours  unanimously 
proclaim — the  former  by  their  votes,  the  latter  by 
righting— to  Germany  and  to  the  world  the  unalter- 
able determination  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  remain 
French. 

"II.  France  may  neither  consent  to  nor  sign  the 
cession  of  Lorraine  and  Alsace.  She  cannot,  without 
imperilling  the  continuance  of  her  national  existence, 
herself  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  her  own  unity,  by 
abandoning  those  who  have  acquired  by  two  hundred 
years  of  patriotic  devotion  the  right  to  be  defended 
by  the  entire  country  against  the  aggression  of  vic- 
torious force. 

"  An  Assembly,  even  though  elected  by  universal 
suffrage,  cannot  invoke  its  sovereignty  to  sanction  or 
ratify  demands  that  are  destructive  of  the  national 
integrity.  It  would  be  arrogating  to  itself  a  right 
which  does  not  belong  even  to  the  people  themselves 
assembled  to  vote  under  a  plebiscite. 

"  Such  an  excess  of  power,  which  would  result  in 
the  mutilation  of  the  mother- country  common  to 
both  of  them,  would  expose  to  the  just  condemnation 
of  history  those  responsible  for  it. 

"  France  may  suffer  the  blows  of  violence,  she  can- 
not sanction  its  decrees. 

"  III.  Europe  may  not  permit  or  ratify  the  aban- 
donment of  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

"  Guardians  of  the  law  of  justice  and  of  the  rights 


102  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  peoples,  the  civilised  nations  can  no  longer  remain 
insensible  to  the  fate  of  their  neighbours,  under  pain 
of  becoming  in  their  turn  victims  of  the  outrages  they 
have  tolerated.  Modern  Europe  cannot  allow  a  people 
to  be  seized  like  a  herd  of  cattle  ;  she  cannot  remain 
deaf  to  the  repeated  protests  of  the  menaced  popula- 
tions. She  owes  it  to  her  own  preservation  to  forbid 
such  abuses  of  force.  She  knows,  moreover,  that  the 
unity  of  France  is  now,  as  in  the  past,  a  guarantee  of 
the  general  order  of  the  world,  a  barrier  against  the 
spirit  of  conquest  and  invasion. 

"  Peace  concluded  at  the  price  of  a  cession  of  terri- 
tory would  be  only  a  disastrous  truce  and  not  a  defini- 
tive peace.  It  would  be  for  all  a  cause  of  internal 
unrest,  a  legitimate  and  permanent  provocation  for 
war.  And  as  for  us,  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers,  we  would 
be  ready  to  make  war  again  to-day,  to-morrow,  at  any 
hour,  at  any  moment. 

"  Finally,  Alsace  and  Lorraine  protest  aloud  against 
any  cession.  France  may  not  consent  to  it  ;  Europe 
may  not  sanction  it. 

"  In  faith  whereof  we  take  to  witness  our  fellow- 
citizens  of  France,  and  the  governments  and  nations 
of  the  world,  that  we  consider  in  advance  as  null  and 
void  all  acts  and  treaties,  votes  or  plebiscite,  which 
consent  to  the  abandonment,  in  favour  of  a  foreign 
country,  of  all  or  part  of  our  provinces  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine. 

' '  We  proclaim  by  this  act  that  the  right  of  the  Alsa- 
tians and  Lorrainers  to  remain  members  of  the  French 
nation  shall  ever  remain  inviolable,  and  we  swear,  on 
our  own  behalf  as  well  as  for  our  constituents,  our 
children  and  their  descendants,  always  to  claim  this 
right,  by  every  means,  against  all  usurpers." 

Having  read  this  declaration,  M.  Keller  submitted 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  103 

it  to  the  Assembly  for  its  earnest  consideration,  and 
reminded  it  of  the  painful  situation  of  the  provinces 
due  on  the  one  hand  to  their  great  suffer-  Declaration 
ings  in  the  war,  and  on  the  other  to  the  £e  National 
menaced  alienation  from  their  mother-country.  Assembly. 
His  last  words,  as  M.  Welschinger  aptly  remarks,  were 
at  once  a  cry  of  anguish  and  a  cry  of  hope  :  "  Behold, 
gentlemen,  we  are  like  the  sailor  who  has  let  his  vessel 
be  sunk  rather  than  surrender  his  flag.  We  stretch 
out  our  hands  to  you,  do  not  refuse  us  yours  !  "  1 

These  words  brought  tears  into  many  eyes  ;  but  M. 
Thiers,  whilst  sharing  the  feelings  of  Keller,  reminded 
the  members  of  the  Assembly  of  the  urgent  exigencies 
of  the  situation,  that  it  was  incumbent  upon  them  to 
act  as  practical,  serious  men  of  affairs,  and  to  make  up 
their  minds  whether  the  peace  negotiators  were  to  be 
armed  with  full  powers  or  not — for  the  one  question  to 
be  determined  upon  was  peace  or  war.  After  the 
sitting  had  been  suspended  for  a  short  time,  the  follow- 
ing resolution  was  carried  :  "  The  National  Assembly, 
welcoming  with  the  profoundest  sympathy  the  declara- 
tion of  M.  Keller  and  his  colleagues,  places  its  confi- 
dence in  the  wisdom  and  patriotism  of  its  negotiators." 
Then  M.  Thiers  was  elected  head  of  the  executive. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  peace  negotiations 
at  Versailles  which  led  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Pre- 
liminaries   on    February    26,    187 1.     Whilst       „   . 

•  '  Various 

these  negotiations  were  in  progress  the  various  other 

groups  of  the  National  Assembly  met  to  pr0  es  s' 
consider  the  course  they  should  adopt.  The  extreme 
left  was  for  continuing  the  war  rather  than  submit  to 
the  humiliating  terms  demanded  by  the  enemy.     On 

1  "  Tenez,  messieurs,  nous  sommes  comme  le  marin  qui  a  vu  couler  son 
navire  plutot  que  de  rendre  son  drapeau  ;  nous  vous  tendons  la  main,  ne 
nous  refusez  pas  la  votre  !  " 


104  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

February  18  the  party  assembled  under  the  presidency 
of  Victor  Hugo,  and  adopted  an  address,  drawn  up  by 
Louis  Blanc,  which  was  delivered  to  the  deputies  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  It  declared  that  neither  the  National 
Assembly  nor  the  entire  French  nation  had  the  right 
to  make  even  a  single  Alsatian  or  Lorrainer  a  subject 
of  Prussia  ;  it  held  in  advance  null  and  void  every  vote 
or  plebiscite  whereby  any  portion  of  Alsace  or  of 
Lorraine  should  be  ceded ;  it  affirmed  that,  whatever 
might  happen,  the  citizens  of  those  territories  remained 
the  countrymen  and  brothers  of  the  French  people  ; 
and  it  promised  them,  on  behalf  of  the  Republic  "  an 
eternal  vindication."  *  This  address  was  signed  by 
thirty-eight  deputies,  including  Victor  Hugo,  Louis 
Blanc,  Edgar  Quinet,  and  Clemenceau. 

On  February  28  M.  Thiers  submitted  to  the  Assembly 
the  Preliminaries  of  Versailles  ;  and  at  the  next  day's 
Debates  in  sitting,  under  the  presidency  of  M.  Grevy, 
onSpropSed  the  "terms  of  peace  were  discussed.  As  soon 
cession.  as  -^q  proceedings  commenced,  one  member 
rose  to  make  a  protest  against  all  eventual  cession  of 
territory  ;  another  demanded  that  the  inhabitants  of 
the  provinces  in  question  should  be  consulted  ;  a  third 
denied  the  right  to  cede  any  territory  at  all ;  a  fourth 
handed  his  resignation  to  the  President,  saying  that  he 
could  not  be  a  party  to  the  discussion  of  territorial 
cession  ;  and  so  on.  In  reply  it  was  pointed  out  that 
the  enemy  was  inexorable,  and  that  it  was  an  urgent 
necessity  to  arrest  the  invasion  ;  if  the  Assembly 
chose  to  renew  the  conflict  by  refusing  to  ratify  the 
Preliminaries,  Paris  would  be  occupied,  the  invasion 
of  France  extended,  and  Heaven  knew  what  further 
disasters  might  follow  ;  the  Assembly  was  therefore 
urged  not  to  abandon  itself  to  a  policy  of  desperation. 

1  Welscliinger,  op.  cit.,  p.  14. 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  105 

Edgar  Quinet   said   that  till  then  the  conquest  had 
been    only   depredation,   but  if   it   were    ratified   by 
the  Assembly  it  would  assume   the    character  of    a 
right  ;    Prussia    wanted   France    to    commit    suicide, 
by  means  of  a  vote  of  the  Assembly  ;    Alsace   and 
Lorraine  were  not  only  two  French  provinces,  they 
were  also  bulwarks  of  France.    Victor  Hugo  vowed  that 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  would  remain  French  whatever 
might  happen,  and  that  France  would  never  abandon 
her  right  and  duty  in  regard  to  the  provinces.     "  Non, 
la  France  ne  perira  pas,  quelle  que  soit  la  lachete  de 
l'Europe.     Des  demain,  la  France  n'aura  plus  qu'une 
pensee  :    se  reconstituer,  reprendre  ses  forces,  ramasser 
son    energie,    nourrir    de    saintes    coleres,    elever    sa 
generation  ;    ses  petits  deviendront  grands  ;    former 
une  armee  qui  sera  un  peuple  tout  entier,  travailler 
sans  relache,  etudier  les  procedes  et  la  science  de  nos 
ennemis,  redevenir  la  grande  France,  la  France  de 
1792,  la  France  de  l'idee  et  de  Tepee  .  .  .  Et  puis  un 
jour    elle    se    dressera    invincible."  1    He    ended    his 
speech  on  a  humanitarian  note,  predicting  a  fraternal 
reconciliation  :  "  France,  one  day  victorious,  would  raise 
defeated  Germany  and  say  to  her  that  they  were  sisters, 
and  ought  to  act  together  as  a  single  people,  a  single 
family,   a  single   Republic."     Louis  Blanc   said  that 
history  would  ask  Europe  why  she  remained  silent  in 
the  face  of  Prussian  proceedings,  the  enormity  of  which 
exceeded  all  bounds.   What  could  one  expect  of  Prussia, 
who  began  with  the  robbery  of  Silesia  and  the  partition- 
ing of  Poland  ?  Did  not  Russia  see  the  German  imperial 
eagle  stretching  its  wings  over  the  Baltic  ?  Had  Austria 
forgotten  Sadowa  ?  Did  not  Italy  see  the  eye  of  Prussia 
on  Trieste  ?    Had  not  the  fate  of  Denmark  warned 
Holland  ?    Did  not  England  understand  the  designs 

1  Cf.  Villefort,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  49. 


io6  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  Pan- Germanism  ?  Was  it  so  long  ago  that  in  the 
interests  of  European  equilibrium  Belgium  was  placed 
under  protection  from  invasion  ? 

Once  more  Keller  appealed  to  the  Assembly  not  to 
deliver  up  Alsace-Lorraine  ;  and  he  repudiated  the 
treaty,  which  was  for  him  a  lie.  "  We  wish  to  remain 
French,"  he  said,  "  and  we  shall  remain  French  ;  no 
power  in  the  world,  no  signature,  either  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  Prussia,  can  prevent  us  from  remaining  French. 
...  Is  it  honourable  to  abandon  populations  who  wish 
to  remain  French,  and  who,  despite  all,  will  remain 
French  ?  .  .  .  This  treaty,  which  it  is  proposed  to  ratify, 
is  an  injustice  and  at  the  same  time  a  lie.  .  .  .  Before 
leaving  this  place  I  am  bound  to  protest,  as  an  Alsatian 
and  as  a  Frenchman,  against  a  treaty  which  is,  in  my 
eyes,  an  injustice,  a  lie,  and  a  dishonour  ;  and,  if  the 
Assembly  should  ratify  it,  I  appeal  to  God,  the  avenger 
of  just  causes  ;  I  appeal  to  posterity,  which  will  judge 
us  one  and  all ;  I  appeal  to  all  peoples,  who  cannot  let 
themselves  be  sold  like  a  wretched  herd  of  cattle  ;  I 
appeal  finally  to  the  sword  of  men  of  mettle  who  will 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment  tear  up  this  detestable 
treaty  !  "  *  Here  Thiers  exclaimed  to  Keller  :  "  Give 
us  means,  not  words."  Keller  did  not  reply,  but  another 
member,  M.  Tirard,  got  up  and  cried  :  "  Levy  en 
masse  !  You  ask  for  the  means.  Let  the  750  repre- 
sentatives put  themselves  at  the  head  of  France,  and 
you  will  save  France  !"  To  which  Thiers  replied  : 
"  If  you  think  you  can  get  better  conditions,  send  other 
negotiators,  and  you  will  thus  take  away  a  great  burden 
from  me.  If  you  think  you  have  military  resources, 
produce  them."  A  silence  followed.  All  eyes  turned 
towards  General  Chanzy,  who  remained  silent.  Then 
Thiers  emphasised  that  France  was  not  in  a  position  to 

1  Welschinger,  op.  cit.,  p.  18. 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  107 

go  on  with  the  war,  and  fully  explained  the  whole 
situation  ;  he  impressed  upon  the  Assembly  his  view 
that,  if  France  decided  to  continue  the  war  instead  of 
accepting  the  terms  imposed,  she  would  be  ruined 
and  her  future  would  be  destroyed.  He  reminded 
his  auditors  that  when  France  was  mad  enough  to 
declare  war  in  1870,  she  was  not  prepared  for  it  ; 
hostilities  had  gone  on  in  a  state  of  military  dis- 
organisation from  the  first  ;  and  after  the  disasters 
that  had  been  suffered  in  consequence  it  was  no  longer 
possible  to  offer  successful  resistance  to  the  large 
duly  constituted  armies  of  the  invader. 

A  vote  was  then  taken  on  the  Preliminaries  ;  vote  on 
546  voted  for  their  acceptance,  and  107  for  ^naS" 
their  rejection. 

Then  M.  Jules  Grosjean  read  another  protest  in  the 
name  of  all  his  colleagues  representing  the  departments 
of  the  Lower  Rhine,  Upper  Rhine,  and  the  Moselle. 
It  was  as  follows  : 1 

"  The  representatives  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  have 

1  "  Les  representants  de  1' Alsace  et  de  la  Lorraine  ont  depose,  avant  toute 
negotiation  de  paix,  sur  le  bureau  de  l'Assemblee  nationale,  une  declaration 
affirmant  de  la  maniere  la  plus  formelle,  au  nom  de  ces  provinces,  leur  volonte 
et  leur  droit  de  rester  francaises. 

"  Livres,  au  mepris  de  toute  justice  et  par  un  odieux  abus  de  la  force,  a 
la  domination  de  l'etranger,  nous  avons  un  dernier  devoir  a  remplir. 

"  Nous  declarons  encore  une  fois  nul  et  non  avenu  un  pacte  qui  dispose 
de  nous  sans  notre  consentement. 

"  La  revendication  de  nos  droits  reste  a  jamais  ouverte  a  tous  et  a  chacun 
dans  la  forme  et  dans  la  mesure  que  notre  conscience  nous  dictera. 

"  Au  moment  de  quitter  cette  enceinte  ou  notre  dignite  ne  nous  permet 
plus  de  sieger,  et  malgre  l'amertume  de  notre  douleur,  la  pensee  supreme 
que  nous  trouvons  au  fond  de  nos  coeurs  est  une  pensee  de  reconnaissance 
pour  ceux  qui,  pendant  six  mois,  n'ont  pas  cesse  de  nous  defendre,  et  d'in- 
alterable  attachement  a  la  patrie  dont  nous  sommes  violemment  arraches. 

"  Nous  vous  suivrons  de  nos  vceux  et  nous  attendrons,  avec  une  confiance 
entiere  dans  l'avenir,  que  la  France  regeneree  reprenne  le  cours  de  sa  grande 
destinee. 

"  Vos  freres  d 'Alsace  et  de  Lorraine,  separes  en  ce  moment  de  la  famille 
commune,  conserveront  a  la  France,  absente  de  leurs  foyers,  une  affection 
filiale  jusqu'au  jour  ou  elle  viendra  y  reprendre  sa  place." 


108  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

delivered  to  the  office  of  the  National  Assembly, 
Further  before  all  peace  negotiations,  a  declaration 
protest  of  affirming  in  the  most  formal  manner,  in  the 
Lorraine  name  of  these  provinces,  their  will  and  their 
deputies.      right  to  remain  French. 

"  Given  up,  in  contempt  of  all  justice  and  by  an 
odious  abuse  of  force,  to  foreign  domination,  we  have 
one  last  duty  to  fulfil. 

"  We  declare  once  more  null  and  void  a  compact  that 
disposes  of  us  without  our  consent. 

"  The  vindication  of  our  right  remains  ever  open  to 
all  and  each  of  us  in  such  form  and  measure  as  our 
conscience  shall  dictate. 

"  At  the  moment  of  leaving  these  precincts  where  our 
dignity  no  longer  permits  us  to  remain,  and  despite  the 
bitterness  of  our  grief,  the  supreme  thought  we  find  in 
the  bottom  of  our  hearts  is  a  thought  of  gratitude  to 
those  who  for  six  months  did  not  cease  to  protect  us, 
and  of  unalterable  attachment  to  the  mother-country 
from  which  we  are  violently  torn. 

"  We  shall  follow  you  with  our  prayers  and  we  shall 
wait  with  perfect  confidence  in  the  future,  till  regener- 
ated France  resumes  the  course  of  her  high  destiny. 

"Your  brothers  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  separated 
at  this  moment  from  the  common  family,  will  preserve 
for  France,  absent  from  their  hearths,  a  filial  affection 
until  the  day  when  she  will  come  to  take  her  place 
there  again." 

"  C'etait,"  comments  M.  Welschinger,1  "  le  dernier 
sanglot  des  deux  provinces  arrachees  a  la  France." 
In  vain  did  the  Assembly  appeal  to  the  protesting 
deputies  to  remain  in  their  places  ;  having  thus 
resigned  their  positions,  they  left  "  sombres  et  silen- 
cieux."     "  Cette  fin  de  seance  eut  un  aspect  funebre."  2 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  21.  2  Ibid. 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  109 

Several  members  of  the  Republican  party,  notably 
MM.  Rochefort,  Ranc,  Benoit  Malon,  Felix  Pyat, 
also  sent  in  their  resignations,  saying  they  would  not 
sit  a  single  day  longer  "in  an  Assembly  that  had 
surrendered  two  provinces,  dismembered  France,  and 
ruined  the  country."  J 

Such  were  the  scenes — the  eloquent  speeches,  the 
burning  protests,  the  vows  of  brotherhood  exchanged 
by  those  who  were  to  be  severed,  the  sobs  of  bereaved 
souls — that  were  witnessed  on  that  memorable  occasion 
when  the  representatives  of  France  had  thrust  upon 
them  for  their  acceptance  the  humiliating  conditions 
demanded  by  an  inexorable  conqueror.  "  Will  such 
scenes,"  observes  M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  "  the  lessons 
which  they  carry,  and  the  duties  which  they  impose, 
ever  be  effaced  from  the  memory  of  the  nation  ?  "  2 

After  the  ratification  of  the  Preliminaries  of  Ver- 
sailles the  protesters  saw  clearly  that  the  fate  of  their 
provinces  was  sealed  ;  and  on  March  24  M.  Demand 
Frederic  Hartmann  turning  towards  Germany  from 

uttered  these  words,  apt  and  precise  :  "  By 
the  fact  that  you  have  conquered  us  you  owe  us  a  legal 
status,  a  civil  and  political  constitution  in  harmony 
with  our  traditions  and  our  customs."  This  sentence 
enshrines  the  wisest  policy — next  to  that  of  refraining 
from  forcible  annexation — which  would  in  the  circum- 
stances have  readily  commended  itself  to  statesmen 
possessing  clear  vision  and  sympathetic  understanding. 
Whether  it  was  through  lack  of  these  qualities  or 
through  the  overweening  arrogance  and  obstinacy  of  un- 
generous and  irate  masters,  the  counsel  was  disregarded. 
Thus  was  perpetuated  the  Franco-German  estrange- 

1  For  the  protests  made  in  the  Reichstag  in  1874  by  the  deputies  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  see  infra,  chap,  x,  in  init. 

2  Contemporary  France,  English  trans.   (London,   1903),  vol.  i.  p.  125. 


no  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

ment,  which  did  much  to  foster  Germany's  militarism 
and  her  resolve  to  acquire  hegemony  in  Europe,  to  pro- 
mote a  sinister  international  diplomacy  and  intriguing 
political  combinations,  and  so  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death  of  the  present  day. 

An  authoritative  German  historian,  commenting  on 
the  fateful  European  politics  consequent  on  the 
Effects  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  observes:  "  From  the 
annexation,  very  outset  the  new  structure  of  the  German 
Empire  was  burdened  as  it  were  by  a  French  mort- 
gage, since  every  foreign  foe  could  henceforth  reckon 
unconditionally  on  French  support.  As  in  the  past 
Frederick  the  Great  had  had  to  vindicate  his  conquest 
of  Silesia  in  a  seven  years'  war  against  a  European  com- 
bination, so  Bismarck  in  his  turn  was  painfully  aware 
that  the  menace  of  a  coalition  hourly  weighed  upon 
his  new  creation.  The  great  aim  of  his  policy,  from 
the  first,  was  to  prevent  the  formation  of  any  such 
coalition."  l 

It  appears  that  Bismarck  himself  admitted,  a  few 
years  after  the  war,  that  the  dismemberment  of  France 
was  a  blunder.  In  a  despatch  addressed  to  the  French 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  November  14,  1879,  M.  de 
Saint-Vallier,  the  French  ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported 
a  conversation  he  had  with  the  German  Chancellor. 
The  latter  is  stated  to  have  expressed  himself  to  this 
effect  :  "  One  destroys  a  nation  if  one's  power  permits 
it,  or  if  one's  interest  demands  it  ;  one  does  not  mutilate 
it  with  impunity  .  .  .  and  history,  the  great  instructor 
of  statesmen,  teaches  us  that  one  has  always  to  repent 
it.  In  mutilating  and  humiliating  Prussia,  Napoleon 
caused  the  Steins  and  the  Scharnhorsts  to  arise  ;  in 
taking   from    you    Metz    and   part   of  Lorraine,   the 

1  Professor  Hermann  Oncken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History  (Cambridge, 
1910),  vol.  xii.  p.  136. 


THE    PROTESTS    OF    1871  ill 

Emperor,  my  master,  and  the  militarists  who  inspired 
this  resolve  committed  the  greatest  of  political  mis- 
takes."1 

In  the  light  of  an  admission  of  this  kind,  and  in  view 
of  the  disastrous  effects  produced  by  a  factitious  and 
irrational  dismemberment,  we  have  now  to  examine 
the  claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine  that  have  been  made 
from  time  to  time  in  Germany,  and  the  alleged  grounds 
of  its  annexation. 

1  Nothing  seems  to  have  been  said  of  Alsace,  according  to  this  reported 
conversation 


CHAPTER    VII 

GERMAN  CLAIMS  TO  ALSACE  -  LORRAINE  —  ALLEGED 
GROUNDS  OF  ANNEXATION  !  (a)  HISTORICAL 
GROUNDS  ;     NATIONALITY    AND    RACE  )     LANGUAGE 

Historical  grounds  :  Ranke's  view — Mommsen's  view — Treitschke's  view — 
Early  treaties — Appeal  to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire — Difficulties  in 
such  contentions.  Racial  grounds  :  Names  as  a  criterion — Claim 
untenable — Treitschke's  arrogant  pretensions.  Claim  on  ground  of 
language  :  Early  struggles  between  languages— German  dialect  becomes 
predominant — Position  of  the  pays  messin.  Principle  of  nationality — 
Attachment  of  Alsace  to  France — Principle  of  public  right. 

The  claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine  laid  by  Germany  are 
based  on  various  grounds,  e.g.  historical  considerations 
and  previous  ownership,  nationality  and  race 

German  ■%  ■>• ,  •       •>  • ,  ■«      r^ 

claims  to  language,  political  necessity  and  German 
Lorraine  unity,  military  necessity  and  security,  and 
finally  (after  1870)  the  right  of  conquest. 
Before  1870  these  claims  were  advanced  on  several 
noteworthy  occasions.  Thus  during  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  they  were  made  by  Prussian  patriots  in  18 13  and 
18 15,  when  the  Allied  armies  had  penetrated  into 
France.  During  the  peace  negotiations  in  the  latter 
year  the  demand  of  the  King  of  Prussia  that  France 
should  be  so  dismembered  was  objected  to  by  the 
Tsar,  and  the  objection  was  acquiesced  in.  Prussia, 
however,  did  her  utmost  to  maintain  the  anti-French 
movement,  which  had  before  been  set  on  foot  in 
Europe  in  consequence  of  the  Revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  regimes.  Her  writers  and  professors  began 
to  be  more  insistent  on  the  pretension  that  Alsace  and 

112 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  113 

Lorraine  were  really  part  of  Germany  and  ought 
legitimately  to  be  under  German  dominion.  The 
claim  was  repeated  in  1840,  when  Europe  was  nearly 
dragged  into  a  general  conflict  as  a  result  of  the  am- 
bitious enterprise  of  the  astute  Mehemet  All  ;  and  it 
was  reiterated  in  1859  when  Prussia  was  on  the  point 
of  intervening  in  the  conflict  between  France  and 
Austria.  Till  1866,  France  laughed  at  those  demands  ; 
but  in  1867,  when  the  Luxemburg  affair  aroused  Prus- 
sian public  opinion  with  regard  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  she 
realised  that  the  position  was  becoming  serious.  On 
the  declaration  of  war  in  1870  it  was  generally  felt  that 
the  integrity  of  French  territory  was  at  stake.  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  well  aware  of  the  franzosen-fresserei  of 
Germans  and  of  their  repeated  demands,  saw  clearly 
that  its  destiny  was  now  in  question  ;  and  only  a  few 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  realised  that 
its  fate  was  sealed. 

Let  us  consider  one  by  one  the  German  claims  to 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  grounds  alleged  for  the 
annexation. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  contended  that  the  territory 
had  been  part  of  the  German  dominions  until  France 
got  possession  of  it  by  force  or  fraud  ;  so  Claims  on 
that  the  claim  thereto  amounted  to  no  more  historical 
than  the  vindication  of  an  old  inalienable  groun  s" 
right.  Accordingly  the  Germans  long  held  that  its 
annexation  would  be  a  mere  restoration— a  zuruckero- 
berung  (a  recapture)  as  distinguished  from  an  ero- 
berung  (a  conquest). 

This  was  in  the  mind  of  the  eminent  historian, 
Leopold  von  Ranke,  when  he  addressed  the  following 
remark  to  Thiers  in  the  autumn  of  1870  Ranke's 
immediately  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  III  :  Vlew* 

"It  is  against  Louis  XIV  that  we  have  now  to  wage 


ii4  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

war."  *  He  was  thinking  of  the  French  act  of  aggression 
whereby  the  provinces  were  wrested  in  the  seventeenth 
century  from  a  disunited  Germany,  and  of  the  latter' s 
necessity  to  undo  that  act. 

Similarly,  in  1870,  in  a  series  of  letters  addressed  to 
the  people  of  Italy,  which  were  published  in  Milanese 
Mommsen's  papers,  Mommsen  said,  speaking  of  the 
view.  German    war    aims2  :    "  We    ask   something 

more  than  money.  We  claim  territory  ;  not  French 
territory,  but  German.  .  .  .  Melancholy  is  the  tale  of 
our  neighbours  appropriating  Lorraine  first,  then 
Alsace.  .  .  .  The  feeble  policy  of  our  forefathers 
betrayed  our  land,  our  faith,  and  our  language." 
He  emphasised  that  it  was  a  question,  therefore,  of 
restoration  and  not  of  conquest  :  "  Let  France  keep 
her  French  territory  intact,  whether  always  hers  or 
not  we  will  not  ask.  We  desire  no  conquests ;  we  want 
what  is  our  own,  neither  more  nor  less." 

Treitschke,  writing  also  in  1870  after  the  first 
German  successes  against  France,  said  :  "  The  thought 
Treitschke's  which,  after  first  knocking  timidly  at  our 
view.  doors  as  a  shamefaced  wish,  has,  in  four  swift 

weeks,  grown  to  be  the  mighty  war-cry  of  the  nation, 
is  no  other  than  this  :  Restore  what  you  stole  from  us 
long  ago  ;  give  back  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  .  .  .  Why 
was  it  that,  before  the  declaration  of  the  war,  the 
anxious  cry  rang  through  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  '  The 
dice  were  to  be  thrown  to  settle  the  destiny  of  our 
provinces,'    before   a  single   German   newspaper   had 

1  For  a  somewhat  different  interpretation  of    Ranke's  words  see  infra, 

V-   J39. 

2  Letters  on  the  War  between  Germany  and  France  (London,  1871).  Letters 
I,  II,  and  III,  by  T.  Mommsen  ;  No.  1  published  in  the  Milanese  paper,  La 
Perseveranza  ;  Nos.  II  and  III  in  the  Milanese  paper,  II  Secolo  (August  20, 
1870).  The  references  are  to  the  English  translation  issued  under  the  above 
title. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  20,  21,  24,  29. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  115 

demanded  the  restitution  of  the  plunder  ?  Because  the 
awakened  conscience  of  the  people  felt  what  penalty 
would  have  to  be  paid  in  the  interests  of  justice  by  the 
disturber  of  the  peace  of  nations."1  This  is  not  the  true 
answer.  The  true  answer  is :  because  it  was  known 
that  the  Germans  had  long  claimed  the  territory,  that 
they  regarded  its  eventual  acquisition  as  only  a  restora- 
tion, that  they  did  not  make  war  for  the  vindication  of 
honour  and  equitable  reparation,  but  for  territorial 
aggrandisement,  that  they  coveted  its  mineral  resources, 
and  finally  because  Alsace-Lorraine  was  the  most 
convenient  French  territory  that  could  be  annexed  for 
geographical  and  commercial  reasons. 

Other  claimants  alleging  these  grounds  are  not  so 
modest  from  an  historical  point  of  view.  They  refer 
even  to  such  an  ancient   transaction  as  the  Early 

Treaty  of  Verdun,  a.d.  843,  to  show  that  treaties. 
Germany  should  extend  to  the  Meuse.  But  as  Germany 
then  consisted  of  a  great  number  of  small  States,  and 
there  was  no  consciousness  of  national  unity  whatever, 
it  is  a  far-fetched  and  absurd  contention  for  modern 
Germans  to  advance  that  the  territories  concerned 
formerly  constituted  part  of  the  German  "  father- 
land "  ;  at  an  early  date  like  this  a  German  "  father- 
land" was  not  in  existence,  and  it  is  a  distortion  of 
historical  perspective  to  speak  of  it  as  such.  Nor  can 
we,  on  behalf  of  France,  invoke  the  treaty  of  peace 
and  alliance  contracted  at  Vaucouleurs  between  Albert, 
King  of  the  Romans,  and  Philip  the  Fair,  whereby  the 
former,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  prelates  and  nobles 
of  Germany,  agreed  that  the  boundaries  of  France 
should  be  extended  from  the  Meuse  to  the  Rhine.2 

1  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Islam  (London,  191 5),  pp.  99,  100. 

2  This  treaty  is  reported  by  the  fourteenth-century  chronicler,  Guillaume 
de  Nangis  ;    modern  edition  by  H.  Geraud  (Paris,  1843),  vol.  i.  p.  308. 


ii  6  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

The  extravagant  character  and  inadmissibility  of 

the   appeal   to   the   Holy   Roman   Empire   made   by 

German    writers   become    self-evident    when 

Appeal  to  .  . 

Holy  Roman  we  look  at  the  constitution  of  this  Empire. 
mpire'  It  was  not  a  State  in  the  modern  sense  of  the 
term  ;  it  was  an  artificial  and  precarious  Confederation 
that  was  held  together  with  extreme  looseness.  It 
comprised  the  following  :  Central  Europe  ;  the  United 
Provinces  (Holland)  ;  the  territories  including  the 
modern  Luxemburg  and  the  greater  part  of  modern 
Belgium  ;  about  a  third  of  modern  France,  including 
in  the  north  (under  Charles  V)  Flanders  and  Artois, 
in  the  north-east  the  territory  between  the  Rhine  and 
the  Meuse  (i.e.  Alsace-Lorraine,  etc.),  in  the  east  the 
Franche  Comte  and  a  part  of  Burgundy,  in  the  south- 
east the  territory  between  the  Alps  and  the  Rhone  (viz. 
Provence,  Dauphine,  Savoy,  and  Lyonnais)  ;  Switzer- 
land ;  north  and  central  Italy  as  far  as  Naples.  This 
heterogeneous  conglomeration  of  races,  peoples,  nation- 
alities, kingdoms,  duchies,  countships,  bishoprics, 
republics,  free  cities,  etc.,  cannot  be  said  to  constitute 
a  "fatherland"  or  a  nation.  In  the  later  fifteenth 
century  it  contained  some  four  hundred  "  States  " 
or  political  units.  Conflicts  between  them  were  fre- 
quent ;  and  frequent  were  the  appeals  made  by  this 
or  that  ruler  or  league  of  rulers  to  foreign  monarchs, 
notably  to  the  kings  of  France  and  Sweden.  In  those 
days,  too,  national  boundaries  had  not  yet  become 
fixed  or  stable  ;  the  feudal  regime  made  impossible 
the  very  existence  of  nations  and  nationality.  To 
belong  to  the  Empire  meant  little  more  than  the  pay- 
ment of  tribute  ;  it  did  not  defend  the  weaker  con- 
stituents from  foreign  raiders  and  plunderers.  Before 
Alsace  became  French  it,  too,  lacked  a  homogeneous 
political  system  ;    it  was  a  miniature  counterpart  of 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  117 

the  Empire  itself  in  that  it  comprised  a  large  number 
of  dissociated  units — bishoprics,  free  towns,  self- 
governing  republics,  baronies,  counties,  and  hereditary 
fiefs  of  the  House  of  Austria.  When  Alsace  became 
French  this  political  heterogeneity  began  rapidly 
to  disappear  ;  and  Germany,  in  the  modern  sense  of 
the  term,  was  not  in  existence.  Indeed,  Alsace  was 
part  of  France  before  such  French  territories  as  Lille, 
Nancy,  Besancon. 

Further,  of  this  Holy  Roman  Empire— of  which  Vol- 
taire aptly  said  that  it  was  not  an  Empire,  nor  Roman, 
nor  holy — Austria,  and  not  Germany,  was  the  successor. 

In  the  Middle  Ages  Alsace,  even  though  attached 
to  this  Confederation,  sought  inspiration  from  France 
for  her  culture,  art,  literature,  architecture,  Medi£eval 
scholarship.  "As  a  fact,"  observes  a  recent  Alsace  and 
Alsatian  writer,1  "  Alsace,  even  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  though  it  spoke  a  German  dialect,  was  in  the 
orbit  of  French  culture.  The  Gothic  artists  who 
built  Strassburg  Cathedral  came  from  the  lie  de  France 
or  had  learnt  their  art  there.  The  Alsatian  authors 
who  figure  in  German  literature,  such  as  Gottfried  of 
Strassburg,  and  Fischart,  imitated  French  authors,  or 
initiated  their  German  readers  into  the  courtly  life  of 
France.  Alsatian  scholars  studied  in  Paris,  and  at  all 
periods  many  persons  conversant  with  the  French 
tongue  were  to  be  found  in  the  cultivated  classes." 

However  this  may  be,  supposing  that  historical 
grounds   be   taken  as  the  basis  for   modern    _.„    f4. 

0  Difficulties 

territorial  claims,  the  essential  question   at  in  historical 

once  arises— What  date  is  to  be  regarded  as 

the  point  of  departure  ?     If  former  entities  and  political 

1  P.  A.  Helmer,  Alsace  under  German  Rule  (London,  1915),  pp.  7,  8  ;  cf. 
the  same  author's  France — Alsace  (Paris,  1916),  pp.  36-96  :  "  L'Alsace 
sous  le  regime  allemand." 


1 1 8  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

attachments  are  to  be  re-established,  which  Europe 
is  to  be  set  up  again  (asks  Fustel  de  Coulanges  1  in 
his  effective  reply  to  Mommsen's  Letters) — that  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  or  of  the  fifteenth,  or  that  of  the 
more  distant  epoch  when  ancient  Gaul  possessed  the 
whole  of  the  Rhine  and  when  Strassburg,  Saverne,  and 
Colmar  were  Roman  towns  ? 

Could  the  German  claim  to  Alsace  on  historical 
grounds  be  entertained,  we  should  at  once  be  confronted 
with  a  number  of  corollaries  that  would  lead  us  into 
a  maze  of  absurdities  and  impossibilities.  If  modern 
Germany  is  entitled  to  the  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
because  it  formerly  belonged  to  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  then  she  is  equally  entitled  to  the  possession  of 
Belgium,  Switzerland,  Northern  France,  Northern  Italy, 
etc.  Adopting  the  same  reasoning,  we  should  have  to 
conclude  that  England  has  a  legitimate  claim  to  the 
United  States,  that  Spain  may  advance  a  valid  claim  to 
the  Spanish- American  Republics,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 

Next  we  come  to  the  question  of  race,  kingship, 
and  ethnical  nationality,  which,  of  course,  does  not 
„,  .  necessarily  coincide,  in  the  case  of  a  given 

Claims   on  .  J    .  .  -  .      °   . 

racial  territory,  with  the  question  of  early  historical 

association,  but  which  may  be,  and  often  is, 
connected  with  it.  German  writers  have  asserted  the 
claims  of  their  country  to  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  ground 
that  the  population  was  of  German  blood  ;  the  follow- 
ing verse  expresses  this  view  : 

Doch  dort  an  den  Vogesen 
Liegt  ein  verlornes  Gut  ; 
Dort  gilt  es  deutsches  Blut 
Vom  Hollenjoch  zu  losen. 
(There,  hard  by  the  Vosges,  is  a  lost  treasure ;   there  German  blood  must 
be  delivered  from  the  yoke  of  hell.) 

1  N.  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  L' Alsace,  est-elle  allemande  ou  francaise?   Reponse 
a  M.  Mommsen  (Paris,  1870),  p.  14. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  119 

It  is  pointed  out  that  the  Germanic  origin  of  Alsa- 
tians is  shown  in  the  modern  names  of  persons.  An 
American  observer1  writes  thus:  "The  ori-  Names  as 
ginally  Germanic  character  of  the  people  of  a  criterion- 
Alsace  is  plainly  shown  by  the  family  names.  Passing 
down  Rufacherstrasse,  a  leading  street  in  Colmar,  I 
note  these  names  on  the  door-plates  and  signs  :  Lange, 
Heilgendorf,  Scherrer,  Schultz,  Weill,  Schonbrod, 
Schaffer,  Casper,  Roths,  Hacker,  Didier,  Werkemann, 
Burger,  Spira,  Meyer,  Pfleger,  Wilberger,  Klein, 
Schanzler,  Becker,  Luttin,  Levy,  Rueff,  Moore,  Geegert, 
Hidgen,  Eglensdorfer,  Heyne,  Schoy,  Kayser,  Hild, 
Wertheim,  Gerwig,  Heimburger,  Wyler,  Burlen, 
Albrecht,  Schuler,  Helmer,  Lentz,  Blum,  Matter, 
Engasser,  Wittersheim. 

"  In  the  directory  of  Miilhausen,  the  first  forty-six 
names  are  Aab,  Abegy,  Abele,  Aberlen,  Abermann, 
Aberth,  Abraham,  Abrahamsohn,  Abry,  Abt,  Ach, 
Achenbach,  Acker,  Ackerer,  Ackermann,  Adam, 
Adams,  Adelbrecht,  Adelhold,  Adis,  Adler,  Adloff, 
Adehung,  Adolph,  Adnau,  Achen,  Aeble,  Aeby, 
Aegister,  Aegler,  Aeschmann,  Agde,  Agrippino,  Ahr, 
Ahrens,  Aicheler,  Aischelmann,  Aigle,  Aichinger,  Aig- 
ner,  Ailuger,  Albanesius,  Alber,  Albert,  Albich, 
Albinus. 

"  But  two  of  these  (Abele,  Aigle)  have  a  French 
origin,  and  one  (Adams)  is  apparently  English.  Three 
(Agrippino,  Albinesius  and  Albinus)  represent  the 
Teutonised  Latin  widely  spread  over  Germany  in  an 
earlier  day.  It  is  worth  noting  that  all  the  republican 
or  nationalist  leaders  of  Upper  Alsace  have  German 
names,  while  in  Lorraine,  in  several  cases,  German  con- 
servatism is  marked  by  names  unqualifiedly  French." 

1  D.  S.  Jordan,  Alsace-Lorraine  :   A  Study  in  Conquest,  1913  (Indianopolis, 
I9i7).  PP-  36-8. 


120  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

However  this  may  be,  from  the  character  of  names 
and  from  ethnical  considerations  generally  it  is  possible 
to  draw  quite  different  conclusions.  In  regard  to  names 
there  is  undoubtedly  a  tendency  for  the  conquered, 
subject,  or  alien  inhabitants  of  a  country  to  assume 
such  names  or  so  modify  their  own  names  as  to  make 
them  similar  or  akin  to  those  of  the  conquerors  or  of 
the  native  population  as  the  case  may  be.  One  well- 
known  instance  will  suffice  as  an  illustration,  viz.  the 
case  of  the  Jews  :  in  England  their  names  are  frequently 
anglicised  ;  in  Germany  they  are  often  germanised  ; 
in  Russia  they  are  russified,  and  so  on  ;  and  yet  they 
are  all  of  the  same  race.  Julius  Caesar  says  he  found 
the  territories  that  are  now  Alsace-Lorraine  inhabited 
by  Gauls  ;  the  German  invasions  afterwards  introduced 
another  racial  element  ;  and  a  certain  fusion  between 
them  was  also  effected.  The  Celtic  type,  in  fact,  sub- 
sists in  Alsace  ;  and  in  Lorraine  it  appears  to  pre- 
dominate ;  the  presence  of  the  Germanic  type  does  not 
prove  that  the  country  is  German.  If  this  were  so,  we 
might  argue  that  because  the  Goths  left  considerable 
Germanic  traces  in  Spain  when  they  invaded  the  country 
many  centuries  ago,  therefore  Spain  is  to  be  regarded 
as  more  or  less  germanised,  and  hence  the  modern 
Germans  are  entitled  to  lay  claim  to  the  parts  of  Spain 
thus  affected.  That  the  racial  criterion  cannot  be 
adopted  to  support  claims  to  territorial  proprietorship 
or  dominion  is  clearly  shown  by  such  examples  as 
Belgium,  with  her  Flemish  and  Walloon  elements,  and 
Switzerland,  with  her  different  ethnical  constituents. 
If  race  is  to  be  the  determining  factor,  then  Portugal 
should  be  absorbed  by  Spain,  Scotland  should  be 
separated  from  England,  Posen  from  Germany,  Livonia 
and  Riga  from  Russia,  and  so  on. 

We  may  apply,  too,  in  regard  to  the  racial  claim 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  121 

an  argument  similar  to  that  we  have  already  applied 
in  reference  to  the  historical  claim,  and  effect    _.„    u. 

'  Difficulties 

in  the  former  case,  as  in  the  latter,  a  reductio  in  racial 
ad  absurdum.  Thus,  Alsace  was  predomi- 
nantly German  before  it  became  largely  French  ;  but  it 
was  Celtic  or  Gallic  before  it  became  predominantly 
German  ;  before  the  Celtic  inhabitants  there  were  the 
prehistoric  aborigines  ;  and  before  the  latter  there  were 
— presumably — apes.  It  is  in  view  of  such  a  resulting 
absurdity  that  Renan  writes  :  "  Avec  la  philosophic 
de  l'histoire  telle  que  la  pratiquent  les  Allemands  il  n'y 
a  de  legitime  de  par  le  monde  que  le  droit  des  orangs- 
outangs  injustement  depossedes  par  la  perridie  des 
civilises." 

Though  the  Germans  long  claimed  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  really  a  German  country,  and  that  the 
greater  part  of  its  population  was  of  true 
German  blood,  yet  when  they  "  recovered  "  seif-con- 
their  "lost  brothers"  or  "lost  children" 
they  imposed  a  large  number  of  restrictions  on  them, 
and  throughout  denied  their  province  the  legal  status  of 
a  German  State  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  German 
enough.  There  is  thus  the  contradiction  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was,  on  the  one  hand,  wrenched  from  France 
because  it  was  alleged  to  be  overwhelmingly  German, 
and  was,  on  the  other  hand,  refused  equal  treatment 
because  it  was  strongly  anti-German.1  There  is  a 
further  contradiction — the  opposition  of  Germany  to 
a  plebiscite  before  the  annexation,  and  the  consent  to 
allow  the  inhabitants  an  option  as  to  their  allegiance. 
It  would  therefore  appear  that  it  was  not  really  their 
"  lost  brothers  "  and  the  long-lamented  German  blood 
that  the  Germans  had  sought  to  recover,  but  their 
country  and  its  resources.     Treitschke,  however,  has 

1  Cf.  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  189. 


122  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

his  reply  ready  in  defence  of  the  annexationist  policy — 
a  reply  inspired  by  arrogance  and  impaired  by  incon- 
sistency and  confusion  of  thought. 

"  In  view  of  our  obligation  to  secure  the  peace  of 
the  world,"  he  exclaims,  "  who  will  venture  to  object 
Treitschke's  ^nat  the  people  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  do 
arrogant  not  want  to  belong  to  us  ?  The  doctrine  of 
able  pre-  the  right  of  all  the  branches  of  the  German 
tensions.  race  ^  decide  on  their  own  destinies,  the 
plausible  solution  of  demagogues  without  a  fatherland, 
shivers  to  pieces  in  presence  of  the  sacred  necessity 
of  these  great  days.  These  territories  are  ours  by 
the  right  of  the  sword,  and  we  shall  dispose  of  them  in 
virtue  of  a  higher  right — the  right  of  the  German  nation, 
which  will  not  permit  its  lost  children  to  remain 
strangers  to  the  German  Empire.1  We  Germans  who 
know  Germany  and  France,  know  better  than  these 
unfortunates  themselves  what  is  good  for  the  people 
of  Alsace,  who  have  remained  under  the  misleading 
influence  of  their  French  connection  outside  the 
sympathies  of  new  Germany.  Against  their  will  we 
shall  restore  them  to  their  true  selves.  .  .  .  Before  the 
nineteenth  century  closes  the  world  will  recognise  that 
the  spirits  of  Erwin  von  Steinbach  and  Sebastian 
Brandt  are  still  alive,  and  that  we  were  only  obeying 
the  dictates  of  national  honour  when  we  made  little 
account  of  the  preferences  of  the  people  who  live  in 
Alsace  to-day."  2  The  subsequent  history  of  the 
provinces  under  the  German  regime  shows  (as  we  shall 
see  later  on  5)  that  these  high  claims  and  confident  pre- 
dictions were  not  fulfilled. 

1  Treitschke  is  said  to  have  admitted  soon  afterwards  that  the  claim  in 
regard  to  the  racial  origin  of  the  Alsatians  was  a  mere  "  swindle  "  ;  see  infra, 
p.  138. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  105,  106. 

3  See  chap,  ix,  pp.  155  sea. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  123 

With  regard  to  the  German  claim  to  Alsace-Lorraine 
on  the  ground  of  language,  Mommsen  declared  *  in 
1870  that  the  population  of  Alsace  was  purely  . 
German,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  French  ground  of 
valleys  in  the  Vosges — the  latter  comprising  lansuage- 
only  120  communes  with  30,000  inhabitants,  the 
remaining  917  communes  with  1,035,102  inhabitants 
speaking  German.  "  One  of  our  most  conscientious 
political  economists  calculated,  before  the  war,  that 
but  a  seventh  part  of  the  Alsatians  understand  French  ; 
and  again,  but  a  small  part  of  these  use  this  language 
in  domestic  life.  The  country  people  and  peasants 
universally  speak  nothing  but  German.  .  .  .  Here  in 
these  valleys  you  hear  our  songs  and  our  legends  ; 
and  our  literature  has  formed  here  a  nucleus  of  opposi- 
tion against  Paris.  ..."  As  to  so-called  German 
Lorraine,  including  part  of  the  department  east  of 
the  Meurthe  and  the  Moselle  and  the  cantons  of  Saar, 
the  same  writer  asserts  that  until  1751  it  conducted 
all  its  official  affairs  in  German,  and  it  still  preserved 
this  language  in  its  private  life.  "  By  the  account  of 
the  French  Minister  of  Instruction,  made  out  in  1865, 
in  76  communes  of  the  department  of  the  Meurthe, 
out  of  46,508  inhabitants  only  6,870  could  speak  the 
French  language  ;  whilst  among  those  who  attended 
the  schools,  in  number  6,800,  only  2,400  could  be  said 
to  speak  it  correctly.  .  .  .  The  city  and  canton  of 
Thionville  are  completely  German." 

To  this  much  too  brief  account  given  by  Mommsen 
we  may  add  the  following  observations  both  as  a 
supplement   and  as  a  correction.2      From  the  fourth 

1  Letters,   etc.,   pp.   24  seq. 

2  Cf.  C.  Pfister,  La  limite  de  la  langne  francaise  et  de  la  langite  allemande 
en  Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  1890)  ;  G.  May,  La  lutte  pour  le  francais  en  Lorraine 
avant  1870. — Annates  de  I'Est  publiees  par  la  Faculte  des  Lett*es  de  I'Uni- 
versite  de  Nancy  (Paris  ;    Nancy,  1912). 


124  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

century  to  the  middle  of  the  first  century  B.C.  both 
Early  slopes  of  the  Vosges  (including  the  modern 

between8  Alsace-Lorraine)  were  inhabited  by  Celtic 
languages,  tribes.  During  the  Germanic  invasions  of 
the  first  century  B.C.  the  Triboci  established  them- 
selves in  Lower  Alsace  among  the  Mediomatrici,  a 
Celtic  tribe.  In  72  B.C.  the  Sequani,  another  Celtic 
people,  occupying  Upper  Alsace  and  the  modern 
Besancon,  appealed  for  aid  to  the  German  chieftain, 
Ariovistus,  who  took  possession  of  the  country  of  the 
people  he  came  to  help.  He  was,  however,  expelled 
by  Caesar  in  58  B.C.  ;  but  the  Triboci  remained.  Thus 
a  Germanic  tongue  was  spoken  from  the  frontiers  of 
Sequania  to  the  Sauer.  From  a.d.  100  to  the  middle 
of  the  fourth  century  Latin  predominated.  A  little 
later  the  Germanic  language,  already  spoken  in  Alsace, 
was  brought  into  Lorraine  by  the  barbarian  soldiers  in 
the  Roman  service  and  by  barbarian  colonists  (the 
Alemanni).  The  incursions  continuing,  the  Germanic 
element  increased,  and  began  to  prevail  over  the  Latin. 
After  the  recall  of  the  Roman  troops  in  the  fifth  century 
Alsace  was  invaded  by  the  barbarians,  and  in  the 
following  century  Latin  almost  disappeared  from 
the  country — except  in  one  corner  of  the  Vosges,  at 
Orbey,  Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines,  and  Schirmeck,  where 
Latin  took  the  form  of  a  Romance  dialect.1  In  Lor- 
raine the  earlier  names  were  replaced  by  German  in 
the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries. 

Later,  German  made  progress  in  Alsace  ;  it  pre- 
dominated in  the  south  near  Oberlarg  and  Lucelle, 
German  and  gained  in  the  north  in  the  valley  of 
cimYsprV-  Sainte  -  Marie  -  aux  -  Mines.  In  the  fifteenth 
dominant,  century,  however,  French  was  the  principal 
language    in    this    valley,   though    in   the    following 

1  Pfister,  op.  cit. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  125 

century  the  German  population  increased— on  the 
one  hand  there  were  the  Saxon  immigrants  who  came 
to  the  silver  mines,  on  the  other  there  were  Calvinist 
refugees.  Thus  from  1560  to  1789  the  Germanic 
patois  supplanted  French  in  these  mining  districts.  In 
the  upper  valley  of  the  Bruche  a  Germanic  colony  was 
brought  by  the  Anabaptists  of  Salm  ;  but  in  the  four- 
teenth and  sixteenth  centuries  Swiss  peoples,  taking 
refuge  in  the  Schirmeck  district,  reinforced  the 
Romance  element.  Thus  the  progress  of  German, 
due  to  the  immigrations,  was  comparatively  small. 
French  had  gained  a  little  in  Lorraine,  in  the  two 
upper  valleys  of  the  Sarre.1  Its  slow  progress  in  Alsace 
was  due  to  the  neglect  of  Louis  XI V,  who,  though  con- 
cerned about  religious  unity,  did  nothing  for  extending 
the  teaching  of  French  ;  not  a  word  of  French  was 
taught,  says  M.  Pfister,  in  the  villages  of  Alsace  and 
German  Lorraine  before  1789.2  Only  the  upper  classes 
among  the  urban  populations  spoke  French,  which  they 
acquired  in  Paris,  and  not  in  the  universities,  which 
taught  in  Latin.  Writing  was  done  in  Gothic,  and  not 
in  Roman  characters.  Later,  Louis-Philippe  introduced 
French  into  the  schools ;  and  Napoleon  III  made 
systematic  provision  for  its  use  and  teaching.  Its 
expansion,  however,  was  hindered  by  a  portion  of  the 
clergy,  who  feared  the  language  of  Voltaire,  and 
respected  German  as  the  language  of  the  Catechism. 
Nevertheless,  French  advanced,  especially  in  the 
towns  ;  but  in  1870  it  had  not  generally  overtaken 
German.*  After  that  date,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the 
latter  language  made  further  progress  under  the  German 
regime.  Had  the  annexation  been  deferred  for  a  time 
there  is  no  doubt  that  French  would  have  become 
the  predominating  language.4 

1  Pfister,  op.  cit.,  p.  39.       2  Ibid.,  p.  40.       3  Ibid.       *  May,  op.  cit.,  p.  8 


126  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

In  a  word,  before  the  union  of  Alsace  to  France,  the 
Alsatians,  or  the  greater  part  of  them,  spoke  German, 
which  continued  after  the  union  to  be  the  predomi- 
nating language  of  the  province.  Before  the  union  of 
the  Duchy  of  Lorraine  to  France  the  greater  part  of  its 
population  spoke  French  ;  but  in  about  a  third  of  the 
territory,  known  as  German  Lorraine,  very  little 
French  was  spoken.  After  France  acquired  the  Duchy 
the  Germanic  dialect  continued  to  be  used  in  German 
Lorraine  in  families,  in  business  relationships,  in  schools 
and  in  religious  services,  but  not  for  official  purposes. 
Two  points  are  here  to  be  noted  :  first,  German 
Lorraine  would,  till  1870,  have  been  more  appropriately 
described  as  German-speaking  Lorraine,  for  the  use  of 
the  language  did  not  necessarily  make  the  people 
German  in  thought,  feeling,  or  usages ;  secondly, 
their  language  (like  that  of  Alsace)  was  not  the  classical 
German,  but  a  Germanic  patois. 

Moreover,  in  1871,  Germany  annexed  not  only 
Alsace  and  German-speaking  Lorraine,  but  also  a 
p  siti  n  of  considerable  portion  of  French  -  speaking 
the  pays  territory,  e.g.  the  pays  messin  :  Metz  always 
spoke  French,  though  it  is  now  predominantly 
German. 

Mommsen  admitted  that  to  take  this  town  from 
France  could  not  be  defended  on  the  ground  of  language, 
sentiment,  etc.  "  In  possessing  ourselves  of  Metz,"  he 
writes,  "  there  will  be  a  difficulty,  as  every  one  will  see, 
in  taking  a  French  province,  however  small,  ruled  by 
French  laws  and  sentiments,  and  making  it  German  ; 
and  public  opinion,  when  it  classes  Metz  with  Alsace 
and  German  Lorraine,  I  think  makes  a  mistake."  1 

From  the  above  exposition  of  the  language  question, 
it  can  by  no  means  be  inferred  that  the  use  of  a  par- 

1  Letters,  pp.  30,  31. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  127 

ticular  language  in  a  certain  locality  is  either  a  valid 
criterion  for  determining  nationality  in  the  proper 
significance  of  the  term  (not  merely  in  its  Lan  u  e 
ethnical   sense),  or  an   admissible  basis  for  as  a 

founding  territorial  claims.  In  the  first  place, 
the  argument  as  to  priority  is  here  also  applicable  :  from 
what  date  are  we  to  start  in  asserting  the  predominance 
of  this  or  that  language  in  a  given  country  ?  Secondly, 
if  Germany  might  claim  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1870, 
because  of  the  predominance  of  Germanic  dialects  in 
these  provinces  at  that  date,  then  she  might  just  as 
legitimately  have  then  claimed  also  (and  may  claim 
even  now)  various  other  countries  or  distinct  parts  of 
countries  where  Germanic  languages  prevail,  e.g.  Bel- 
gium (Flemish),  Holland,  a  large  part  of  Switzerland, 
Luxemburg  and  Austria.  Similarly,  England  might 
claim  the  United  States ;  and  France  might  demand  a 
great  part  of  Switzerland,  of  Belgium,  and  of  Canada. 
The  use  in  a  country  of  a  common  language  no  doubt 
tends  to  cement  the  nation ;  but  it  certainly  cannot  be 
taken  as  the  characteristic  test  of  nationality.  That 
Germany  can,  when  it  suits  her,  disregard  historical, 
racial,  and  linguistic  considerations  is  shown  by  the 
annexation  of  a  part  of  Poland,  which  was  Slav  in  race 
and  language. 

Nationality,  indeed,  depends  much  more  on  a 
people's  common  sentiment,  aspirations,  ideals,  in- 
terests, remembrances,  and  desire  for  unity  princiPie  of 
and  for  a  common  social  life.  Intention  and  nationality- 
will  and  actual  facts  are  of  far  greater  consequence  than 
the  fortuitous  circumstances  relating  to  distant  and 
long-forgotten  origins.  It  is  for  these  vital  reasons, 
and  not  in  virtue  of  ethnographical  and  philological 
conclusions,  that  men  are  willing  to  live  together,  to 
fight  side  by  side,  to  die  for  each  other.     The  fact  that 


128  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  Marseillaise  was  composed  and  first  sung  in  Strass- 
burg  and  stirred  the  blood  of  its  citizens  possesses  a 
greater  significance  than  the  fact  that  in  this  or  that 
corner  of  the  city  a  Teutonic  dialect  was  spoken.  To 
wrest  a  population  from  a  country  and  a  political 
system  to  which  it  is  attached  by  ties  of  affinity,  to 
which  it  wishes  to  remain  attached,  and  thrust  it 
against  its  will  into  another  country  and  political 
system  which  it  regards  as  alien  can  never  be  justified 
by  inferences  drawn  from  a  state  of  things  that  existed 
in  the  past.  Human  beings  are  not  chattels  ;  no  law 
and  no  morality,  other  than  those  of  savages  and  bar- 
barians, can  treat  one  group  of  men  as  the  objects  of 
transactions,  as  the  pawns  of  a  game,  carried  on  between 
other  groups  of  men.  The  only  sense  in  which  the 
principle  of  nationality  may  legitimately  apply  is 
where  a  province  or  a  population  refuses  obedience  to 
a  foreign  pretender  ;  it  may  not  be  invoked  by  a 
foreign  pretender  as  a  ground  for  forcible  annexation. 
Thus  the  principle  of  nationality  did  not  entitle 
Piedmont  to  conquer  Milan  and  Venice;  but  it  gave 
Milan  and  Venice  the  right  to  liberate  themselves 
from  Austria  and  unite  themselves  voluntarily  to 
Piedmont.  "  Ce  principe,"  said  Fustel  de  Coulanges 
in  1870  to  Germany,  "  peut  bien  donner  a  1' Alsace  un 
droit  ;  mais  il  ne  vous  en  donne  aucun  sur  elle.  .  .  . 
II  constitue  un  droit  pour  les  faibles ;  il  n'est  pas  un 
pretexte  pour  les  ambitieux."  '  Whatever  Germanic 
elements  of  race  and  language  Alsace  may  have  pos- 
sessed, it  was  for  a  long  time  French  in  its  real  nation- 
ality and  its  sentiment  de  patrie. 

Even  as  long  ago  as  1709,  at  a  critical  moment  for 
France  resulting  from  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion, the  Prussian  ambassador  at  the  Court  of  France, 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  6,  7. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS 


129 


Baron  Schmettau,  presented,  in  the  name  of  his  master 
Frederick  I,  a  memorandum  to  the  plenipotentiaries  at 
the  Hague,  wherein  he  declared  that  the  . 
Alsatians  weremore  French  than  the  Parisians,  of  Alsace 
that  they  were  ever  ready  to  take  up  arms  t0  France- 
on  behalf  of  the  King  of  France  to  repel  the  German 
invaders,  and  that  they  were  united  to  France  by 
such  strong  ties  of  affection  that  they  would  sooner 
convert  their  country  into  a  desert  than  let  Germans 
take  possession  of  it.  "  L' Alsace  n'est  pas  a  comparer 
a  la  Franche-Comte  au  point  de  vue  de  l'utilite  que  les 
Hauts  Allies  en  peuvent  retirer.  Car,  outre  qu'il  est 
notoire  que  les  habitants  de  1'Alsace  sont  plus  francais 
que  les  Parisiens  et  que  le  roi  de  France  est  si  sur  de 
leur  affection  a.  son  service  et  a  sa  gloire,  qu'il  leur 
ordonne  de  se  fournir  de  pistolets,  de  hallebardes, 
d'epees,  de  poudre  et  de  plomb  toutes  les  fois  que  le 
bruit  court  que  les  Allemands  ont  dessein  de  passer  le 
Rhin,  et  qu'ils  courent  en  foule  sur  les  bords  du  Rhin 
pour  en  empecher  ou  du  moins  disputer  le  passage  a 
la  nation  germanique,  au  peril  evident  de  leurs  propres 
vies,  comme  s'ils  allaient  au  triomphe  ;  en  sorte  que 
l'Empereur  et  1' Empire  doivent  etre  persuades,  qu'en 
reprenant  1'Alsace  seule,  sans  recouvrer  la  Franche- 
Comte,  ils  ne  trouveront  qu'un  amas  de  terre  morte 
pour  l'auguste  Maison  d'Autriche  et  qui  couvera  un 
brasier  d' amour  pour  la  France  et  de  fervent s  desirs 
pour  le  retour  de  son  regne  en  ce  pays,  auquel  ils 
donneront  toujours  conseil,  aide  et  faveur  dans 
l'occasion."  ' 

This  union  was  definitively  consecrated  at  the  French 
Revolution,  when  a  complete  fusion  between  the 
French  and  the  Alsatian  people  was  effected.     During 

1  G.   de  Lamberty,   Memoires  pour  servir  d,  I'histoire  du  XVIIIs  siicle, 
14  vols.  (Amsterdam,  1734-40),  vol.  v.  p.  282. 

9 


130  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  revolutionary  wars  Alsatian  patriotism  gave 
France  distinguished  leaders  like  Kellermann,  the 
Voluntary  victor  of  Valmy,  and  Kleber,  the  victor  of 
fusion  Maestricht,  Altenkirchen,  and  the  hero  of  the 
French  and  Egyptian  campaign  ;  during  the  wars  of  the 
Alsatians.  Empire,  Alsace  produced  more  generals  and 
men  than  any  other  French  province — such  names  as 
Rapp,  Lefebvre,  Sirhamm,  Berckheim,  Hengel,  and 
others  are  a  permanent  record  of  the  attachment  of 
Alsace  to  its  adopted  country .  ' '  From  that  time, ' '  said 
Fustel  de  Coulanges  in  1870,  addressing  himself  to 
Germany,  "  Alsace  has  followed  all  our  destinies ;  it  has 
lived  our  life.  All  that  we  thought,  it  thought ;  all 
that  we  felt,  it  felt.  It  has  shared  our  victories  and 
our  reverses,  our  glory  and  our  mistakes,  all  our  joys 
and  all  our  sorrows.  It  has  had  nothing  in  common 
with  you.  In  its  eyes  France  is  its  fatherland,  and 
Germany  an  alien  country.  ...  If  your  reasonings 
tell  you  that  Alsace  ought  to  have  a  German  heart, 
my  eyes  and  my  ears  assure  me  that  it  has  a  French 
heart."  l  He  reminds  the  Germans,  too,  of  the  deter- 
mined Alsatian  resistance  soon  after  the  opening  of 
the  campaign  and  the  reverses  of  the  French  armies  ; 
whether  the  valiant  defenders  spoke  a  Germanic 
tongue  or  not,  they  were  the  compatriots  of  the  French 
and  not  of  the  Germans.  Did  the  German  soldiers 
who  bombarded  Strassburg,  aimed  at  the  cathedral, 
set  fire  to  the  New  Temple,  the  library,  hospitals 
and  houses,  feel  that  they  were  the  countrymen  of 
those  they  attacked  so  furiously  and  mercilessly  ?  2 

In  conclusion,  we  may  say,  with  the  writer 
of  public      just  quoted,  that  pretensions  based  on  ques- 
tions of  language,  race,  origin,  matter  little  in 
comparison  with  the   claim  resting  on  the  supreme 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  10-11.  2  Ibid.,    p.    13. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  131 

principle  of  public  right,  whereby  a  population  is  en- 
titled to  be  governed  by  the  institutions  that  it  accepts 
freely,  and  may  not  be  detached  from  one  State  and 
attached  to  another  without  its  voluntary  consent. 
To  claim  a  province  on  the  ground  that  it  once  belonged 
to  us  is  illegitimate  ;  a  province  and  its  people  are  not 
an  object  of  possession  to  be  restored — for  they 
belong  to  themselves.  The  province  is  not  owned  by 
the  State  to  which  it  is  united  ;  it  is  simply  associated 
with  it.  The  only  reason  why  France  wished  to  retain 
Alsace  was  that  Alsace  valiantly  showed  its  desire 
to  remain  with  France.  France,  as  Fustel  de  Cou- 
langes  said  aptly,  did  not  fight  in  1870  to  force  it  to 
remain  with  her  ;  she  fought  to  prevent  Germany  from 
forcing  it  to  leave  her.1 

1  Ibid.,  p.   16. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

GERMAN  CLAIMS  TO  ALSACE-LORRAINE  —  ALLEGED 
GROUNDS  OF  ANNEXATION  :  (b)  NECESSITY  ;  CON- 
QUEST AS  CONFIRMED  BY  THE  TREATY  OF 
FRANKFORT 

Claim  on  ground  of  necessity — Economic  necessity  :  Outlet  for  overcrowded 
Germany  ? — Natural  deficiencies  of  Germany.  Political  necessity : 
German  unity  and  the  Reichsland.  Military  necessity  :  Frontier 
security — Mommsen  on  Metz.  Conquest  as  confirmed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  :  Prussia's  territorial  ambitions — Bismarck's  admission 
in  1862 — German  views  as  to  "  right  of  conquest  " — Recent  growth  of 
opinion  as  to  conquest — Ground  of  illegitimacy  of  conquest — When 
conquest  justified — International  law  as  it  existed  in  1871.  Binding 
force  of  Treaty  of  Frankfort — Supersession  of  one  treaty  by  another. 

Having  examined  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  German 
claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  grounds  of  earlier 
association,  race  and  nationality,  and  use  of  Germanic 
dialects,  and  having  shown  their  fundamentally  irrele- 
vant and  untenable  nature,  we  have  now  to  look  at 
the  claims  based  on  the  further  grounds  of,  first,  neces- 
sity, and,  secondly,  conquest  as  confirmed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort. 

The  first  of  these  grounds,  necessity,  may 
ground  of  be  looked  at  from  three  points  of  view — 
necessiy.     econ0mic,  political,  military. 

With  regard  to  the  question  of  economic  necessity, 
several  German  writers  had  urged,  before  the  annexa- 
Economic  tion  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  that  the  additional 
necessity,  territory  would  serve  as  a  kind  of  colonial 
outlet  for  the  rapidly  increasing  population  in  Germany. 
But  this  contention  is  rather  fatuous,  considering  the 

132 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  133 

comparatively  small  area  of  the  provinces — about 
5,600  square  miles,  as  compared  with  Germany's 
209,000  square  miles. 

Moreover,  events  after  the  acquisition  of  the  terri- 
tory showed  that  crowded  Germany  gained  very  little 
indeed  in  this  respect.  The  immigrant  Ger- 
mans constitute  a  small  part  of  the  total  i^f^over^ 
population,  except  in  Strassburg  (which  is  Gc^ned 
about  two-fifths  German)  and  Metz  (about 
three-fifths  German)  ;  in  such  important  industrial 
centres  as  Miilhausen  and  Colmar  the  native  element 
easily  preponderates.  Even  in  Strassburg  and  Metz, 
as  an  American  writer  says,  the  germanisation  in  this 
respect  is  scarcely  more  marked  than  that  of  various 
manufacturing  cities  outside  Germany,  e.g.  Milwaukee 
or  St.  Louis  in  the  United  States,  or  Sao  Paulo  in  Brazil ; 
with  the  development  of  German  industries,  Strassburg 
and  Metz,  like  other  German  manufacturing  towns, 
received  a  substantial  accession  of  unskilled  "  cheap 
labour,"  much  of  it  temporary,  from  Poland  and  Italy. 
The  lands  of  Alsace  still  belong  to  the  Alsatians.1 
Furthermore,  it  has  been  calculated,  that  in  the 
twenty-five  years  after  the  annexation  the  total  number 
of  Germans  who  settled  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  including 
the  considerable  body  of  officials  and  their  families, 
was  far  less  than  that  of  the  emigrants  from  Germany 
in  a  single  year.2 

The  provision  for  an  outlet  for  the  crowded  districts 
of  Germany  being  necessarily  insignificant,  other 
economic  reasons  were  advanced  to  show  the  J  . 

Natural  de- 

necessity  of  incorporating  the  territory — the  fidencies  of 
fertility  of  its  soil  and  the  favourable  con-  ermany- 
figuration  of  its  surface  were  deemed  to  be  an  indis- 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  63,  64. 

*  Cf.  J.  Heimweh,  La  Guerre  et  la  fronttire  du  Rhin  (Paris,  1895),  p.  84. 


134  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

pensable  compensation  for  the  natural  deficiencies  of 
Germany.     This  is  an  argument  to  which  Treitschke 
had  recourse  in  the  pamphlet  issued  in  1870  during 
the  war.1     "  Our  sober  judgment,"  he  said,  "  cannot 
refuse  to  admit  that  nature  has  dealt  with  our  country 
much  more  like  a  step-mother  than  a  mother.     The 
singularly  barren   outline  of   our  shore  coast-line  on 
the  North  Sea,  and  the  course  of  most  of  our  German 
rivers   and   hill-chains   are   just    as   unfavourable   to 
political   unity   as  they   are  to   commerce.  .  .  .  But 
here,  in  Alsace,  there  is  a  real  German  district,  the  soil 
of  which,  under  favouring  skies,  is  rich  with  blessings 
such  as  only  a  very  few  spots  in  the  Upper  Rhenish 
Palatinate  and  the  mountain  country  of  Baden  enjoy. 
The  unusual  configuration  of  the  country  has  made  it 
possible  to  pierce  canals  through  gaps  in  the  mountains 
— magnificent  waterways  from  the  Rhine  to  the  basin 
of  the  Rhone  and  of  the  Seine — such  as  German  ground 
scarcely  ever  admits.     We  are  by  no  means  rich  enough 
to  be  able  to  renounce  so  precious  a  possession."  2 

An  argument  of  this  kind  would  be  intelligible  if  it 
were  a  case  of  the  contemplated  acquisition  of  the 
provinces  by  fair,  just,  and  pacific  means,  e.g.  by 
purchase,  exchange,  etc.  As  it  was,  it  was  no  more 
than  the  argument  of  a  burglar  who  wants  another's 
property.  So  that  we  need  only  say  that  neither  the 
deficiencies  of  a  country,  in  regard  to  its  natural 
features  or  possessions,  nor  its  inadequacy  for  accom- 
modating its  population,  can  possibly  constitute  a 
legitimate  and  valid  reason,  juridically  or  morally,  for 
forcibly  dismembering  another  country  and  seizing 
a  part  of  it. 

1  Was  fordern  voir  von  Frankreich  ?  (Berlin,  1870).  Eng.  trans,  in  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  and  Islam  (London,  1915). 

2  English  trans.,  loc.  cit.,  p.  113. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  135 

Next,  as  to  the  political  aspect  of  necessity.  Many 
Germans  claimed  that  the  acquisition  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  essential  for  consolidating  the  Political 
German  peoples  and  for  effecting  the  unity  necessity, 
of  the  Empire.  "  When  our  united  strength,"  observes 
Treitschke,  "  has  won  that  outwork  of  the  German 
State,  which  is  now  in  such  mortal  peril,  the  nation 
will  have  pledged  its  soul  to  the  idea  of  unity.  The 
resistance  of  the  new  province  will  strengthen  the 
impulse  of  our  policy  towards  unity,  and  constrain 
all  sensible  men  to  range  themselves  in  disciplined 
loyalty  behind  the  Prussian  throne."  1 

In  reply  to  this  contention  we  may  say  with  Novicow, 
the  Russian  writer  already  referred  to  more  than  once, 
that  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  German 
not  at  all  necessary  for  securing  German  un'^y  did 
unity,  which,  indeed,  could  have  been  estab-  on  the 
lished  without  the  war  of  1870.  And  even  Reichsland- 
if  such  a  war  as  that  of  1870  was  really  necessary  for 
attaining  this  object,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  dis- 
memberment of  France  was  also  indispensable.  The 
conduct  of  the  war  by  the  German  States  in  common 
was  one  thing  ;  the  spoliation  of  France  was  a  totally 
different  thing.  Already,  after  the  victory  of  Worth 
and  the  capitulation  of  Sedan,  the  peoples  of  Bavaria, 
Wiirtemberg,  and  Baden  were  united  against  the 
"  common  enemy  "  ;  and  hence  it  was  possible  to 
conclude  a  reasonable  peace  on  the  conditions  soon 
afterwards  proposed  by  Jules  Favre,  including  the 
principle  of  "no  annexation."  It  has  been  suggested 
that  Bismarck  insisted  on  the  abandonment  of  the 
French  provinces  not  for  the  purpose  of  increasing 
German  territory,  but  with  the  view  of  establishing 
along  the  western  German  frontier   such  a  fear   of 

1  Loc.  cit,  p.  in. 


136  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

renewed  conflict  as  would  necessitate  and  maintain 
the  union  of  the  German  peoples.  This  view  is  super- 
ficially plausible,  but  far-fetched  and  inadmissible. 
The  fear  of  a  subsequent  conflict  with  France  could 
not  have  induced  Bavaria,  say,  to  enter  a  German 
Confederation,  if  she  was  really  opposed  to  such  a 
system.  Had  Bavaria  been  opposed  to  the  establish- 
ment of  such  a  system,  and  had  she  been  resolved  to 
preserve  her  separation  and  independence,  she  could 
easily  have  allied  herself  with  France,  as  against  the 
other  German  States  that  were  bent  on  a  union,  in 
order  to  maintain  and  secure  her  political  status. 
The  South  German  States,  indeed,  had  had  no  great 
love  for  Prussia  ;  several  times  in  the  course  of  the 
nineteenth  century  they  declared  their  preference  for 
France.  They  agreed  to  form  part  of  the  German 
Empire,  and  remained  in  it,  not  because  they  feared 
a  rupture  with  a  reinvigorated  France,  but  because 
such  a  policy  was  desired  by  them  and  was  calculated 
to  promote  their  interests.  The  theory  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  furnished  the  necessary  cement  for  binding 
the  Empire,  in  view  of  possible  French  aggression, 
involves  a  confession  of  the  then  non-existence  of 
German  nationality.  "  Dire  qu'il  [the  Empire]  se 
tient  uni  seulement  par  terreur  de  la  France,  c'est 
nier  1' existence  d'une  nationality  allemande."  *  On 
the  contrary,  Germans  of  all  States  have  always 
loudly  proclaimed  their  German  nationality ;  whatever 
German  pretensions  may  be  disputed,  this  claim  needs 
no  proof.  So  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose,  as  Novicow 
well  remarks,  that  it  needed  French  bayonets  to 
preserve  the  strength  of  this  sentiment  of  common 
nationality. 

Further,    apart    from    considerations    of    political 

1  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  137 

theory,  dictates  of  public  policy  and  national  senti- 
ment, actual  events  in  the  Franco-German  War  showed 
that  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  not  a  sine 
qua  non  of  German  unity.  We  find,  for  example,  that 
the  arrangement  between  Prussia  and  Bavaria  for  the 
establishment  of  the  Empire  was  concluded  on  Novem- 
ber 25,  1870,  and  that  the  letter  of  the  King  of  Bavaria 
to  William  I  suggesting  that  the  latter  should  assume 
the  title  and  position  of  German  Emperor  was  delivered 
on  the  following  December  3.  Thus  the  complete 
unity  of  Germany  was  already  assured  some  three 
months  before  the  Preliminaries  of  Versailles  were 
signed,  wherein  the  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was 
stipulated.  King  William  was  proclaimed  Emperor 
at  Versailles  on  January  18,  187 1 — an  act  which  was 
at  once  a  solemn  recognition  of  unity  on  the  part  of 
the  constituent  members  of  the  Empire,  and  an  open 
declaration  thereof  to  the  world.  To  dismember 
France  after  this  political  achievement  was  not  neces- 
sary— however  auspicious  and  appropriate  a  conquest 
might  seem  to  a  newly  created  Emperor  and  a  newly 
founded  Empire.  "  The  Emperor  and  I  would  be 
guillotined,"  Bismarck  is  reported  to  have  said,  "  if 
we  returned  to  Berlin  without  Alsace  and  Lorraine." 
Finally,  assuming  that  the  annexation  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  necessary  for  securing  German  unity,  it 
does  not  by  any  means  follow  that  the  German  States 
were  entitled  morally  or  legally  to  tear  it  away  from 
France  in  order  to  promote  their  own  interests. 

The  third  aspect  of  the  alleged  necessity  for  the  an- 
nexation relates  to  military  security  and  self-defence. 
Thus  Treitschke,  speaking  of  the  reparation  Military 
that  is  to  be  exacted  from  "  the  disturber  of  necessity- 
the  peace  of  nations,"  says  :    "  What  is  demanded  by 


138  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

justice  is,  at  the  same  time,  absolutely  necessary  for 
our  security."  *  In  his  pamphlet  of  1870  the  German 
historian,  like  other  clamorous  German  claimants, 
called  for  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  (as  has 
already  been  pointed  out)  for  reasons  of  race  and 
nationality.  Two  years  later,  however,  in  a  conversa- 
tion with  M.  Monod  on  the  alleged  German  origin  of  the 
Alsatians,  Treitschke  is  reported  to  have  observed  : 
"  All  this  is  a  swindle.  Even  if  the  Alsatians  hal 
been  Japanese,  we  would  have  annexed  them  just  the 
same,  because  we  had  need  of  Metz  and  Strassburg 
from  a  strategic  point  of  view."  2  Bismarck  cared 
little  for  ethnological  and  linguistic  arguments  and  for 
the  kindred  lucubrations  of  the  German  professorial 
class-room  ;  without  resorting  to  any  subterfuge  he 
openly  avowed  the  main,  if  not  the  only,  reason  for 
requiring  the  cession  of  the  provinces — viz.  military 
strategy.  Metz  and  Strassburg  were  sally-ports  from 
France  into  Germany  ;  therefore  those,  together  with 
their  surrounding  territories,  must  be  taken  away  from 
France.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  he  had, 
and  for  some  time  continued  to  have,  doubts  about 
Metz  ;  but  he  yielded  to  the  demands  of  the  military 
staff,  who  emphasised  that  the  possession  of  this  town 
was  alone  worth  two  army  corps.  From  the  open  doors 
of  Strassburg  and  Metz  the  French  were  said  to  have 
invaded  German  territory  twenty-three  times  ;  these 
doors  must  therefore  be  shut  against  them. 

A  German  historian,  whom  we  have  quoted  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  has  thus  recently  explained  the  true 
Frontier  reason  for  the  forcible  acquisition  of  Alsace- 
secudty.  Lorraine  :  "  The  motive  for  the  annexa- 
tions,"  he   says,    "  is   often   misrepresented.     Every- 

1  Op.   cit.,   p.   100. 

2  G.  Monod,  Allemands  et  Francais  (Paris,   1872),  p.   151. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  139 

one  knows  the  famous  words  spoken  by  Leopold  von 
Ranke,  the  historian,  to  Thiers  in  the  autumn  of 
1870,  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  III :  '  It  is  against 
Louis  XIV  that  we  have  now  to  wage  war '  ;  that  is 
to  say,  we  have  now  to  fight  against  the  country  which 
has  for  centuries  looked  upon  the  defenceless  condition 
of  the  Germans  as  the  strongest  bulwark  of  her  own 
hegemony  on  the  Continent.  Bismarck's  motive  for 
the  annexation  lay  in  no  faded  memories  of  past 
imperial  history  upon  which  national  enthusiasts  dwelt, 
but  in  the  real  and  pressing  necessity  for  permanent 
military  defence  of  German  unity  against  all  attacks 
from  the  west — a  unity  which  had  been  threatened, 
so  lately  as  1866,  by  the  preposterous  demand  of 
Napoleon  III  for  the  cession  of  Mainz  and  a  portion 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  This  necessity  alone 
impelled  him  to  shift  the  frontier  across  the  Rhine 
into  the  Vosges  Mountains,  for  southern  Germany  had 
been  long  enough  at  the  mercy  of  French  artillery. 
For  this  reason  too,  and  for  this  alone,  he  decided, 
almost  under  compulsion  from  the  generals,  to 
acquire  the  fortress  of  Metz,  situated  in  the  French- 
speaking  area,  in  addition  to  Alsace,  which,  with  the 
large  German  element  in  its  population,  might  be 
expected  to  become  gradually  assimilated  to  the 
Empire.  The  annexation,  far  from  being  a  deed  done 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment  by  the  caprice  of  an  indi- 
vidual, was  the  inevitable  outcome  for  both  nations  of 
several  centuries  of  their  history.  .  .  ."  x 

Mommsen,  writing  in  1870  when  the  annexationist 
demands  were  put  forward  on  various  grounds,  pointed 
out  that,  whilst  the  annexation  of  Metz,  Mommsen 
unlike  that  of  Alsace  and  German  Lorraine,  on  Metz- 
could  not  be  justified  by  reason  of  nationality,  senti- 

1  H    Oncken,  in  Camb.  Mod.  Hist.,  vol.  xii.  pp.  135-6. 


140  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

ment,  language,  etc.,  it  might  none  the  less  be  justified 
on  the  ground  of  frontier  security.  He  did  not  indeed 
state  this  conclusion  explicitly  ;  he  merely  said  that 
many  Germans  insisted  thereon  ;  and  he,  for  his  part, 
preferred  to  leave  the  matter  undiscussed  and  to  rely 
upon  the  "  able  hands  which  hold  the  destinies  of  the 
two  nations."  1 

Finally,  we  now  have  the  declaration  of  William  I 
himself,  made  in  a  letter,  October  26,  1870,  to  the 
Empress  Eugenie.  (This  letter  was  made  public  by 
M.  Pichon  at  the  beginning  of  March,  1918.)  "  After 
having  made  immense  sacrifices  for  her  defence," 
observed  the  German  sovereign,  "  Germany  wishes 
to  be  sure  that  the  next  war  will  find  her  better  pre- 
pared to  repel  the  aggression  which  we  may  be  certain 
will  be  made  as  soon  as  France  will  have  prepared  her 
forces  and  formed  allies.  That  alone  is  the  deplorable 
consideration,  and  not  a  desire  to  enlarge  our  country, 
of  which  the  territory  is  big  enough,  which  obliges 
me  to  insist  on  the  cession  of  territories  which  has 
no  other  object  than  to  make  more  remote  the  point 
of  departure  of  the  French  armies  that  in  the  future 
will  come  to  attack  us." 

Having  shown  that  neither  economic  nor  political 
necessity  could  lawfully  sanction  the  forcible  annexa- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine,  it  remains  to  consider  whether 
military  necessity,  in  the  sense  explained  above,  could 
justify  it — for  it  was  this  military  necessity  that  con- 
stituted the  bulwark  of  the  German  claims.  The  con- 
sideration of  this  question  involves  an  examination 
of  the  broader  question  of  conquest  in  general ;  for 
after  187 1  Germany  held  that,  whatever  validity  her 
different  claims  possessed,  the  annexed  provinces  be- 
came hers  by  right  of  conquest,  recognised  and  con- 

1  Letters,  loc.  cit.,  p.  31. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  141 

firmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  which  settled 
the  question  once  for  all  in  the  eyes  of  international 
law. 

The  underlying  impulse  that  led  to  the  dismem- 
berment of  France  was  Prussia's  lust  for  territorial 
aggrandisement.  Seldom  had  the  wars  of  Prussia>s 
Prussia  been  waged  purely  for  the  vindication     territorial 

r  1  •  l    1  r         1 1  1  •  c      ambitions. 

ot  national  honour  or  tor  the  reparation  01 
wrong  ;  whatever  the  cause  and  whatever  the  ostensi- 
ble purpose  might  be,  the  fundamental  aim  of  her 
wars  has  frequently,  if  not  invariably,  been  the  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  and  the  extension  of  dominion.  In 
regard  to  political  theory  the  modern  German  mind 
appears  to  have  impregnated  itself  with  Machiavellian 
conceptions  :  for  Machiavelli  and  his  disciples  the 
predominant  object  of  politics  was  the  aggrandisement 
of  the  State,  and  for  them  war  was  merely  a  continua- 
tion of  politics  carried  out  by  more  violent  and  more 
drastic  methods.  This  is  the  frankly  avowed  view 
of  such  German  writers  as  Clausewitz,  Lasson,  Jahns, 
Von  der  Goltz,  Treitschke,  Bernhardi,  and  others.  The 
glory,  dignity,  greatness,  and  prestige  of  a  State  are  by 
them  measured  by  the  area  of  territory  and  the  number 
of  subjects  governed.  An  idea  of  this  kind  was  in  the 
mind  of  the  late  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  when  he  said 
on  one  occasion  :  "I  want  to  end  my  reign  with  as  many 
square  kilometres  as  I  began  it."  l  What  he  lost  in 
Lombardy  and  Venetia  he  made  up  in  Bosnia  and  the 
Herzegovina.  A  victorious  sovereign  took  possession 
of  territory  to  show,  too,  that  he  had  no  fear  of  the 
vanquished ;  for  to  renounce  conquests  implied  a 
respect  for  the  rights  of  man — but  mediaeval  and 
traditional  records  considered  such  respect  asa"  revo- 

1  Cf.  Le  Matin,  January  24,  1909  ;    cited  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  28. 


142  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

lutionary  "  tendency  that  must  be  repressed.1  To  this 
school  of  thought  belonged  the  Prussian  sovereign 
Frederick  the  Great,  who  once  said  :  "  Let  us  first 
take ;  we  shall  find  jurists  afterwards  to  legitimise  our 
rights." 

The  territorial  ambitions  of  Prussia  were  fully 
recognised  by  Talleyrand  at  the  time  of  the  Vienna 
nd  Congress  ;  he  realised  her  disposition  to 
on  Prussian  fasten  on  sniy  pretext,  to  stop  at  no  scruple, 
to  measure  law  and  right  by  her  own  interests 
in  seeking  to  augment  her  dominions  ;  and  he  therefore 
emphasised  the  absolute  necessity  of  preserving  all 
the  small  States  of  Europe  :  "  En  Allemagne,  la 
domination  a  combattre  est  celle  de  la  Prusse  :  la 
constitution  physique  de  sa  monarchic  lui  fait  de 
V  ambition  une  sorte  de  necessite  ;  tout  pretexte  lui 
est  bon,  nul  scrupule  ne  l'arrete,  la  convenance  est 
son  droit ;  il  est  done  necessaire  de  mettre  un  frein  a 
son  ambition  en  restreignant  d'abord  autant  qu'il  est 
possible  son  etat  de  possession  en  Allemagne  par  la 
conservation  de  tous  les  petits  etats  et  par  l'agrandisse- 
ment  des  etats  moyens  et  en  paralysant  son  influence 
par  T organisation  federale." 

Thinking  of  this  Vienna  settlement  and  of  the 
Prussian  annexationist  policy,  Bismarck  observed  in 
Bismarck's  ^s  n°teworthy  speech  of  September  30,  1862  : 
admission  "  Prussia  must  collect  her  strength  for  the 
propitious  moment  which  has  more  than 
once  been  allowed  to  slip  by.  The  frontiers  assigned 
to  Prussia  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  are  not  good  for 
a  healthy  and  strong  State.  It  is  not  by  speeches 
and  the  votes  of  majorities  that  the  questions  of  our 
time  will  be  settled ;  it  is  by  iron  and  blood."  These 
words  were  a  fitting  prelude  to  the  subsequent  war 

1  Novicow,  ibid. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  143 

enterprises  of  Prussia  and  her  wholesale  annexations. 
Bismarck  found  a  worthy  colleague  in  Moltke,  who  did 
not  hesitate  to  declare  that  conquest  was  in  conformity 
with  the  order  of  things  established  by  God. 

This  view  was   elaborately   set   forth   in    187 1   by 
Adolf  Lasson.1     It  is  only  in  recent  times,  he  says, 
that   the   "right   of   conquest"    has   begun 
to  be  doubted.     The  theory  that  conquest  views*™  *o 
is  robbery  and  brigandage  is  based  on  the     "  risht  °* 

J  00  conquest. 

principle  of  the  inviolable  character  of  fron- 
tiers. These  ideas  have  a  significance  only  in  so  far  as 
States  are  considered  the  property  of  these  sovereigns. 
In  free  States  the  condition  of  things  is  different.  Each 
State  that  goes  to  war  with  another  State  puts  its  own 
existence  at  stake,  and  must  therefore  submit  to  the 
losses  entailed  by  defeat.  The  conqueror  is  empowered 
to  act  towards  the  vanquished  as  he  deems  fit,  because 
the  latter  would  have  proceeded  in  a  similar  manner 
had  he  been  the  victor.  A  conquest  is  justified  only 
when  it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  conquering  State  ; 
then  it  is  as  reasonable  as  any  other  measure  that 
is  dictated  by  the  "  reason  of  State."  2  It  is  really 
unnecessary  to  refute  such  arbitrary  assertions 
and  gratuitous  assumptions,  which  are  repugnant  to 
civilised  mankind  and  to  the  juridical  consciousness  of 
the  family  of  nations  ;  the  reasoning  based  thereon 
is  as  fallacious  as  it  is  superficial.  What  difference  is 
there  between  an  autocratic  sovereign  making  a  con- 
quest, and  a  republic  making  one  ?  The  evil  inflicted 
is  the  same  in  both  cases.  Does  the  possession  of 
liberty  in  a  republic  confer  the  right  to  violate  the 
liberty  of  a  neighbouring  country  ?  If  a  conqueror  may 
do  what  he  likes  with  the  conquered,  it  means  that 

1  A.  Lasson,  Princip  und  Zukunft  des   Vdtkerrechts  (Berlin,   1871). 

2  Ibid.,  p.  82. 


144  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  conquered  becomes  a  thing  of  the  conqueror  : 
this  is  a  negation  of  right,  and  not  right.  To  speak 
therefore  of  a  right  of  conquest  is,  strictly  speaking, 
a  contradiction  :  right  as  between  States  necessarily 
implies  the  existence  of  States,  so  that  to  put  an  end 
forcibly  to  the  existence  of  a  State  is  inevitably  to 
step  outside  the  sphere  of  right.1 

To  make  up  for  the  deficiencies  of  an  abstract  theory 

of  conquest  German  writers  point,  in  defence  of  the 

practice,  to  the  various  notable  precedents 

growth  of     furnished  by  European  history.     The  French 

opinion  as     Revolution    dealt    a    blow   at    the   right    of 

to  conquest.  ° 

conquest,  but  in  the  wars  of  the  Empire  it 
was  resumed.  The  succeeding  half  century  (1815- 
1864),  however,  saw  a  markedly  progressive  move- 
ment. Many  notable  territorial  modifications  were, 
indeed,  effected  in  this  interval,  for  example,  in  the 
case  of  Greece,  Belgium,  the  Danubian  States,  France, 
Italy ;  but  these  were  all  in  conformity  with  the  desire 
of  the  populations  concerned,  and  were  carried  out 
in  their  interest.  The  more  recent  examples  that 
Prussia  could  cite  in  187 1  were  her  own,  viz.  those  of 
1864  and  1866  ;  but  those  created  by  Prussia's  own 
proceedings  could  not  legitimately  be  invoked  by  her 
as  valid  precedents. 

The  defenders  of  conquest  and  annexation  ask,  What 

law  does  international  jurisprudence   prescribe   that 

*  prohibits  the  practice  ?     It  is  true  there  is 

Written  and  *  .  x  . 

unwritten  no  written  law  against  it  ;  but  modern 
nations  feel  that  there  is  none  the  less  an 
unwritten  law,  inasmuch  as  such  a  prohibition  is  of 
necessity  implied  in  the  universally  recognised  principle 
that  States  and  peoples  possess  the  fundamental  and 
inalienable   right    to   dispose    of   their    own   destiny. 

1  Cf.  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  208,  209. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  145 

This  principle  must  have  been  recognised  even  in 
Germany  after  the  events  of  1848  and  the  parliament 
of  Frankfort  ;  and  subsequent  events  further  enlight- 
ened European  public  opinion  on  the  question.  A 
plebiscite  came  to  be  regarded  as  an  indispensable 
condition  for  sanctioning  an  annexation.  Thus  was 
the  unity  of  Italy  established,  and  thus  were  Nice  and 
Savoy  added  to  France.  That  the  plebiscite  in  the 
case  of  the  latter  was  not  (as  some  German  writers  have 
contended)  a  mere  piece  of  jugglery  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon  III  is  shown  by  the  loyalty  and  attachment 
of  these  provinces  to  France  in  the  hour  of  her  supreme 
agony  in  1870  ;  not  only  was  there  not  the  least  sign 
of  revolt,  there  was  not  even  a  protest  against  the 
annexation  of  i860.1 

The  recognition  by  the  modern  world  of  the  intrinsic 
illegitimacy  of  conquest  and  forcible  incorporation 
is  based  ultimately  on  the  axiom  that  a  man,     _ 

J  .  Ground  of 

a  group  of  men,  or  a  nation  cannot  be  the  illegitimacy 
possession  of  another  man,  group  of  men,  or  °  conquest- 
nation — an  axiom  all  the  more  applicable  to  and 
ineradicable  from  a  society  of  Christian  peoples.  To 
deny  this  axiom  is  a  negation  of  law  and  order,  and 
amounts  to  an  apotheosis  of  brute  force  and  inter- 
national anarchy.  The  advance  of  modern  civilisation 
is  irrevocably  in  the  direction  of  liberty  and  equality  ; 
a  world  catastrophe  like  the  present  may  reveal  here 
and  there  retrograde  tendencies,  but  it  has  shown  that 
nearly  all  the  nations  of  the  world  are  prepared  to  face 
slaughter  and  devastation  rather  than  abandon  their 
loyalty  and  devotion  to  the  sacred  cause  of  justice  and 
right,  freedom,  and  equality,  rather  than  give  up  the 
right  to  dispose  of  their  own  destinies. 

Further,  if  in  the  case  of  an  annexation  of  another 

1  As  to  the  question  of  plebiscite  see  further  infra,  chap.  xvii. 
10 


146  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

State's  territory  and  population,  no  assimilation  or 
moral  conquest  has  been  brought  about  in  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time,  the  policy  of  the 
assimilate  annexing  Power  stands  condemned  as  much 
additional  as  ^s  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  annexed 
condemna-  population.  To  drag  alien  bodies  within 
the  circle  of  a  State  is  a  proceeding  that  is 
deprecated  even  by  Treitschke.  In  a  lecture  on  the 
nature  of  the  State,  he  observed  in  reference  to  Napo- 
leon's policy  :  "  It  was  a  sin  against  the  spirit  of 
history  that  the  rich  diversity  of  kindred  peoples 
should  be  changed  into  the  dreary  uniformity  of  a 
world-empire.  Such  a  naked  policy  of  conquest  in 
the  long  run  destroys  its  own  instruments  ...  it  is 
a  huge  blunder.  ...  It  presumes  to  take  possession 
of  countries  which  cannot  be  fitted  into  the  national 
State  as  living  members."  And  yet  at  other  times 
he  spoke  with  contempt  of  little  nations,  and  of  the 
expediency  of  more  powerful  neighbours  to  absorb 
them.  We  have  already  referred  to  the  doubts  and 
apprehensions  of  Bismarck  in  regard  to  the  annexation 
of  Metz  and  the  pays  messin.  Many  German  writers 
have  been  mentioned  as  supporting  the  alleged  right 
of  conquest ;  there  were  other  German  publicists  and 
writers,  however — e.g.  Bebel,  Liebknecht,  Mommsen — 
who  declared  in  1870  and  187 1  that  conquest  is 
illegitimate  and  indefensible.  Thus  Mommsen  defended 
the  German  demand  for  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  ground 
that  it  involved  a  restoration  and  not  a  mere  conquest. 
"  If  this  were  a  matter  of  conquest,"  he  said,  "  the  case 
might  reasonably  alarm  the  nations,  for  every  conquest 
is  a  crime  against  the  rights  of  nations — to  trample 
upon  one  nation  is  to  offend  all.  ...  If  these  French 
provinces,  with  a  German  nationality,  belong  again 
politically  to  Germany,  there  will  be  no  infringement  of 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  147 

European  political  equilibrium."  1  We  may  concede 
that  the  eminent  historian  sincerely  believed  the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  be  no  more  than  a 
"  restoration,"  by  reason  of  its  earlier  association, 
nationality,  and  language.  The  weakness  and  in- 
applicability of  these  grounds  have  already  been  shown. 
As  to  his  statement  that  the  annexation  would  not 
infringe  European  equilibrium,  subsequent  facts  proved 
that  his  historical  vision  and  judgment  of  policy  erred 
most  grievously  :  for  there  is  scarcely  any  other  act 
in  European  history  that  infringed  and  endangered  the 
equilibrium  to  such  an  alarming  extent. 

As  a  last  resource,  Germans  claim  that  even  if 
conquest  is  unjustifiable  generally,  it  is  justified 
when  there  has  been  serious  provocation  on  When 
the  part  of  the  defeated  State.  Thus  they  conquest 
hold  that  France  was  the  aggressor  in  1870,  ]US  x  e  * 
that  she  would  have  annexed  German  territory  had  she 
then  been  victorious,  and  that  Germany  was  entitled 
to  take  possession  of  French  territory  as  the  reward  of 
her  victory  and  as  the  price  of  the  aggressor's  defeat. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  Bismarck  calcu- 
lated that  the  French  had  invaded  German  territory 
on  twenty- three  separate  occasions.  He  therefore 
felt  doubly  justified  in  taking  away  those  districts 
which  contained  the  sally-ports  of  invasion.  In  many 
quarters  other  than  German  it  was  believed  that  Louis 
Napoleon  was  really  the  aggressor,  and  that  his 
conduct  gave  the  victor  — to  use  the  phrase  of  the  Duke 
of  Argyll — "  a  right  to  annex  conformably  to  the 
ancient  acknowledged  right  of  nations  in  successful 
wars."  2     Gladstone  appears  also  to  have  been  con- 

1  Letters,  etc. 

2  Lord  Morley,  The  Life  of  W.  E.  Gladstone,  3  vols.  (London,  1903),  vol.  ii, 
P-  347- 


148  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

vinced  of  "  the  deep  culpability  of  France,"  and  whilst 
he  did  not  altogether  differ  from  the  Duke  of  Argyll, 
he  condemned  the  "  violent  laceration  "  on  the  ground 
that  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  were  attached  to  their 
country,  and  on  general  political  grounds— viz.  that 
such  European  complications  would  result  therefrom 
as  would  imperil  the  peace  of  the  Continent.1  On  the 
assumption  that  France  was  the  aggressor,  Treitschke 
does  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  in  favour  of  annexation 
—a  pronouncement  that  is  couched  in  extravagant 
language  :  "  If  a  reckless  robber- war  like  this  is  to 
cost  that  frivolous  people  nothing  more  than  a  war 
indemnity,  the  cynical  jesters,  who  worship  chance 
and  fortune  as  the  only  governing  powers  among  the 
nations,  and  laugh  at  the  rights  of  States  as  a  dream 
of  kind-hearted  ideologues,  would  be  proved  to  be  in 
the  right.  The  sense  of  justice  to  Germany  demands 
the  lessening  of  France."  2 

We  have  now  examined  all  the  grounds  of  the 
German  claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine — early  association, 
nationality  and  race,  language,  economic  necessity, 
political  necessity,  military  necessity,  conquest  con- 
sequent on  alleged  French  aggression — and  we  have 
already  shown  that  all  these  grounds  save  the  last  are 
untenable. 

As  to  the  last,  we  must  have  regard  to  what  the 
international  law  as  it  existed  in  187 1  said  on  the 
inter-  subject.     This    can    be    summed   up    briefly 

as  it°2dsted  m  a  quotation  taken  from  a  recent  work  of 
in  1871.  the  present  writer  3  :  "  Perhaps  the  only 
cases  where  a  right  of  conquest  may  be  pleaded  are 

1  Lord  Morley,  The  Life  of  W.  E.  Gladstone,  3  vols.  (London,  1903),  vol.  ii, 
pp.  346-8. 

2  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Islam  (1915),  p.  100. 

3  C  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  30,  31. 


GERMAN  CLAIMS  149 

where  the  people  of  a  country  are  given  to  savagery, 
cannibalism,  inhuman  practices,  or  where  in  a  war  of 
self-defence  it  is  found  absolutely  indispensable  in  the 
interests  of  general  and  more  enduring  peace  to  take 
away  from  an  aggressive  State  a  portion  of  its  territory. 
As  Fiore  observes *  :  '  La  conquete  d'un  territoire  ne 
peut  pas  etre  par  elle-meme  une  condition  suffisante 
pour  exiger  la  cession  du  territoire  conquis  quand  le 
droit  du  vainqueur  n'existe  pas.  Le  vainqueur  pourra 
imposer  cette  cession,  quand  elle  sera  justifiee  par  des 
conditions  evidentes  de  moralite,  et  par  un  interet 
general  d' assurer  la  paix.'"  If  a  conquest,  made  on 
such  grounds,  is  supported  by  the  assent  of  the  political 
and  legislative  authority  of  the  country  from  which 
the  territory  is  taken,  by  means  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
signed  as  a  bilateral  transaction,  then  it  is  valid  in  the 
eye  of  international  law,  however  it  be  deprecated  and 
condemned  by  international  morality  and  international 
politics. 

Now  we  cannot  enter  here  into  the  question  of  the 
Ems  telegram  and  into  the  allegations  that  are  some- 
times brought  forward  that  Napoleon  was 
thereby  wrongfully  entrapped  by  Bismarck.  as°recog- 
In  1870  it  was  the  belief  throughout  Europe  msetreTtya 
that  France  was  the  aggressor,  and  that 
belief  has  generally  prevailed  since.  Assuming,  then, 
the  belief  to  be  founded  on  fact,  we  must  conclude 
that  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  after  its 
conquest,  and  its  formal  cession  by  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort,  was  a  valid  act  transferring  the  legal  title 
of  France  thereto  to  Germany. 

Such  an  eminent  authority  as  Lord  Stowell  main- 
tained even  that  a  treaty  of  cession  was  not  indispen- 

1  P.  Fiore,  Nouveau  droit  international  public,  2nd  ed.  ;   traduit  de  l'italien 
par  C.  Antoine.     3  vols.  (Paris,  1880)  ;   §  1696. 


150  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

sable  to  validate  a  conquest.  Thus  when  Heligoland 
fell  into  British  possession  by  conquest,  and  before  its 
formal  cession  by  the  Treaty  of  Kiel,  1814,  he  held 
that  the  island  in  the  circumstances  became  rightfully 
the  property  of  the  British  Crown,  and  that  a  conqueror 
was  entitled  to  alienate  domains  as  soon  as  he  acquired 
firm  possession.  "  No  point,"  he  said,  "  is  more 
clearly  settled  in  the  courts  of  common  law  than  that 
a  conquered  country  forms  immediately  part  of  the 
.King's  dominions."  x  This  pronouncement  must  be 
taken  subject  to  the  qualifications  implied  in  "  firm 
possession ' '  :  some  time  must  elapse  in  order  to 
allow  the  conqueror's  claim  to  ripen,  and  to  obtain 
or  enforce  definitively  the  acquiescence  of  the  de- 
feated country  and  the  recognition  of  the  conquest 
by  third  States.  And  such  acquiescence  and  re- 
cognition are  ensured  by  a  treaty  of  cession,  or  a 
treaty  of  peace  stipulating  the  cession  of  the  territory 
concerned. 

That  conquest  followed  by  such  a  treaty  confers  a 
good  and  lawful  title  has  also  been  recognised  by  the 
American  Courts.2 

The  same  view  is  held  by  practically  all  international 
jurists.3  We  must  add  here,  however,  that  due 
account  must  be  taken  of  the  recent  development  of 
universal  public  opinion — the  father  of  public  law — 
which  is  strongly  against  the  forcible  annexation  of 
territory  on  any  grounds  whatever. 

1  The  Foltina  (1814),  1  Dodson,  450-51  ;  referring  to  Campbell  v.  Hall 
(1774),  Cowper,  208. 

2  U.S.  v.  Hayward  (1815),  2  Gallison,  485;  U.S.  v.  Rice  (1819),  4  Wheaton, 
246  ;    American  Insurance  Co.  v.  Canter  (1828),  1  Peters,  511. 

3  It  is  beyond  the  limits  of  our  space  to  cite  more  than  one  or  two  leading 
modern  representatives  :  J.  C.  Bluntschli,  Das  moderne  Volkerrecht  (Nord- 
lingen,  1872)  ;  French  translation  by  C.  Lardy,  Le  Droit  international  codifid, 
(Paris,  1895),  §  286  ;  C.  Calvo,  Le  Droit  international,  th&orique  et  pratique. 
6  vols.,  5th  ed.  (Paris,  1896)  ;  vol.  v.  §  3141. 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  3*51 

Further,  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  must  be  regarded 
as  possessing  binding  force  from  the  moment  ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged  (May  20,  187 1)  till  the 
moment  it  is  superseded  by  another  formal  force  of 
treaty.  No  such  formal  treaty  has  yet  been  ^SSSmt 
concluded  ;  therefore,  notwithstanding  the 
existence  of  the  present  war,  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
retains  its  legal  validity.1  It  does  not  belong  to  the 
class  of  treaties  that  are  annulled  ipso  facto  on  the  out- 
break of  war  between  their  signatories,  nor  to  the 
class  of  treaties  suspended  during  the  continuance  of 
hostilities.  A  treaty  of  peace,  involving  a  cession  of 
territory,  delimitation  of  boundaries,  creation  of 
servitudes,  etc.,  is  a  dispositive  or  transitory  treaty, 
which  establishes  a  permanent  condition  of  territorial 
rights,  and  cannot  be  affected  by  war  between  the 
parties  thereto.  From  the  point  of  view  of  interna- 
tional law  and  practice  it  is  just  as  binding  during  war 
as  treaties  entered  into  expressly  for  the  event  of  war, 
or  general  law-making  treaties,  like  the  Hague  Conven- 
tions, the  Declaration  of  Paris,  1856,  the  Declaration 
of  St.  Petersburg,  1868,  or  treaties  effecting  permanent 
international  settlements,  like  neutralisation  treaties, 
and  so  on.  This  is  a  well-established  principle  of 
international  law  :  it  is  accepted  and  acted  on  by 
States,  emphasised  by  jurists,  and  declared  by  courts 
of  law.2 

It  appears  to  be  thought  in  some  quarters  that  a 
treaty  imposing  humiliating  conditions,  especially  so 
on  a  great  Power,  is  not  a  moral  engagement  which 
such  Power  is  obliged  to  observe  :  whence  it  would 
follow  that  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  whereby  France 

1  As  to  the  binding  character  of  treaties  of  peace  see  Phillipson,  op.  cit., 
pp.  162  seq.     Cf.  the  declaration  of  the  Bishop  of  Strassburg,  infra,  pp.  1S6,  187. 

2  As  to  the  effect  of  war  on  different  classes  of  treaties,  see  Phillipson, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  250-68. 


152  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

was  compelled  to  cede  a  portion  of  her  territory — to 

her  great  humiliation — might  be  disregarded  by  her 

whenever    she    thought  fit   to   denounce  it. 

Is  a 

humiliating  But  nearly  every  treaty  of  peace  imposes 
binding  ?  disadvantageous  or  humiliating  terms  on  the 
defeated  party ;  the  element  of  disadvantage 
or  humiliation  does  not,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
international  law,  vitiate  such  a  transaction,  whatever 
resentment  and  righteous  indignation  it  may  produce, 
whatever  desire  for  retaliation  it  may  engender.  Un- 
satisfactory peace  treaties  have  no  doubt  led  to  war 
in  many  cases  ;  and  it  may  be  that  a  party  that 
had  previously  felt  itself  humiliated  managed,  in  the 
subsequent  conflict,  to  gain  such  a  success  as  to  enable 
it  to  reverse  the  prior  decision  and  to  conclude  a  more 
satisfactory  treaty.  Here,  however,  it  was  not  the 
unsatisfactory  character  of  the  first  treaty  that  deprived 
it  of  binding  effect ;  it  simply  fell  to  the  ground  as 
soon  as  it  was  formally  supplanted  by  the  second  treaty 
accepted  and  signed  by  both  disputants  as  a  solution 
of  their  difference.  The  first  treaty  remained  legally 
operative  until  it  was  thus  formally  supplanted  by 
the  second. 

Now  international  law  does   not   demand  that   a 

nation,  having  been  compelled  through  defeat  to  enter 

into    an    unfavourable    transaction,    should 

Supersession  r  .  ,        ,      ■%     .  -,  •,-,  ■,     « 

of  one  for  ever  remain  contented  therewith  ;  it  is 
another7  no^  *he  business  of  international  law  to 
demand  any  such  thing.  It  is  entirely  an 
affair  of  national  policy  and  international  politics. 
International  law  has  not  hitherto  prescribed  what 
grounds  and  causes  are  sufficient  for  undertaking  a 
war — for  resorting  to  this  ultima  ratio  in  order  to 
redress  a  grievance.  The  Germans  condemn  the 
French   revanchegelust — hankering   after    "  revanche," 


GERMAN    CLAIMS  153 

i.e.  restitution,  retaliation  (not  necessarily  vengeance) — 
as  a  reprehensible  aim  on  the  ground  that  it  is  contrary 
to  the  settlement  effected  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  ; 
and  yet  they  have  themselves  repeatedly  declared  that 
if  they  should  one  day  be  defeated  and  compelled  to 
give  up  Alsace-Lorraine  in  a  treaty  reversing  the 
dispositions  of  that  of  187 1,  they  would  never  rest 
content  until  they  had  once  again  wrested  the  territory 
from  their  conquerors.  Recent  pronouncements  to 
this  effect  are  familiar  to  all  readers  ;  we  may  supple- 
ment them  by  recalling  such  a  declaration  as  was  made 
before  the  present  war  by  Dr.  Arendt,  a  deputy  of  the 
Reichstag  1  :  "If  Germany  be  one  day  conquered 
and  Alsace  retaken,  the  German  people  will  never 
cease  to  claim  Strassburg  and  Metz,  as  a  sacred  and 
patriotic  duty,  and  will  be  prepared  to  fight  for  cen- 
turies in  a  war  to  the  death."  Thus  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Germans  it  is  reprehensible  and  dishonourable  for  the 
French  to  seek  to  reverse  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort, 
but  for  themselves  it  is  a  "  sacred  and  patriotic  duty  " 
to  seek  to  reverse  such  treaty  as  may  eventually 
supersede  that  of  187 1.  In  point  of  fact,  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  itself  superseded  in  regard  to  territorial 
arrangements  a  number  of  earlier  treaties — e.g.  the 
treaties  of  Westphalia  (1648),  Nimeguen  (1678),  Rys- 
wick  (1697),  Utrecht  (17 13),  and  Vienna  (18 15) — and 
is  in  turn  liable  to  be  superseded  by  the  regular  and 
legitimate  method  sanctioned  by  international  law, 
viz.  the  conclusion  of  a  new  international  engagement. 
We  must  conclude,  then,  that  the  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort is  at  present  binding,  and  that  Alsace-Lorraine  still 
belongs  lawfully  to  Germany  and  will  continue  to  do 
so  until  she  cedes  it  to  France  or  otherwise  renounces 

1  Cf.  Florent-Matter,  L' Alsace  de  nos  jours  (Paris,  1908),  p.  517  ;   Novicow, 
op.  cit.,  p.  203. 


154  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

her  sovereignty  over  it.     It  is  quite  a  different  ques- 
tion, however,  whether  Germany  has  achieved  a  moral 
conquest  over  the  provinces,  and  has  dealt 

When  .  i 

Alsace-  with  the  annexed  people — formerly  French 
wu" cease  citizens — in  such  a  wise,  just,  and  equitable 
to  belong     manner  as  to  absorb  them  into  her  political 

to  Germany.     ,    .  i  •.  i 

regime  and  national  culture,  and  make  the 
severance  from  France  complete.  This  is  the  question 
to  which  we  have  now  to  address  ourselves. 


CHAPTER    IX 

GERMAN    REGIME    IN    ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Military  occupation,  1870-71 — Status  from  February  1871  to  June  1871 — 
Dictatorship,  187 1-3 — The  imperial  constitution  applied,  1874 — 
Territorial  Delegacy  established,  1874 — Council  of  State  established, 
1879 — Application  of  the  regime — Repressive  measures — New  con- 
stitution, 191 1 — Why  autonomy  refused — Precautions  of  Germany  on 
outbreak  of  the  present  war — -Why  thorough  germanisation  not  effected 
— The  German  official  classes — The  German  immigrants — Pan-ger- 
manism — German  methods  compared  with  French. 

From  the  middle  of  August  1870,  when  the  Germans 
entered  into  the  military  occupation  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
to  February  26,  187 1,  when  the  Preliminaries  Mflitar 
of  Versailles  were  concluded,  stipulating  its  occupation, 
cession,  the  territory  was  placed  under  the 
authority  of  a  military  governor-general  appointed  by 
the  King  of  Prussia,  and  was,  conformably  to  inter- 
national practice,  subject  to  the  martial  and  other 
law  enforced  by  the  former.  During  this  interval  it 
remained  de  jure  French  territory,  though  the  sove- 
reignty of  France  was  suspended  de  facto  and  French 
law  ceased  to  apply  in  so  far  as  it  was  inconsistent 
with  the  provisional  military  law. 

From  the  conclusion  of  the  Preliminaries  to  the 
German  law  of  annexation,  June  9,  187 1  (which  came 
into   force   June   28,    187 1),    the   regime    of 

•  v.  ,.  1  i-       1  1  Status  from 

military  occupation  was  no  longer  applicable  ;      February 
the  rights  of  the  acquiring  State  were  derived  ju^JL'0 
from  the  formal  cession  ;    the  status  of  the 
acquired  territory  with  regard  to  third  Powers  was 

^5 


156  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

definitively  fixed.  It  did  not,  however,  become  a 
constituent  State  of  the  German  Empire  under  the 
German  Constitution,  which  did  not  extend  to  it  in 
proprio  vigor e. 

The  next  was  a  transition  period  1  of  two  and  a 
half  years — June  28,  187 1,  to  December  31,  1873 — 
Dictatorship,  during  which  the  German  Emperor  was  not 
1 871 -3.  the  ruler  (in  the  sense  of  being  ruler  of  Prussia) , 
but  the  dictator  of  the  Reichsland  (imperial  territory) , 
exercising  the  functions  of  an  imperial  organ.  On 
December  30,  187 1,  an  official  known  as  an  Ober- 
prasident  was  appointed  ;  he  had  an  official  seat  at 
Strassburg,  and  acted  under  the  direction  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  in  matters  of  administration. 
He  was  not  empowered  to  countersign  ordinances 
of  the  Emperor,  or  to  act  as  the  representative  of  the 
Chancellor  ;  but  he  prepared  the  budget  and  the 
drafts  of  laws  and  ordinances  for  the  territory, 
which  had  to  be  submitted  to  the  Reichstag  for 
approval.2  Apart  from  legislative  modifications  made 
in  this  way,  the  existing  French  law  remained  opera- 
tive for  the  time  being. 

We  may  mention  here  that  soon  after  the  formal 
annexation  an  assembly  of  Alsatian  notables  in  Strass- 
burg appealed  to  the  German  Government  to 
military  postpone  the  introduction  of  the  law  of 
introduced  mmtary  service  into  the  transferred  territory 
— for  obvious  reasons.  But  the  appeal  was 
rejected.  Treitschke's  observations  in  the  Reichstag 
represented  the  view  of  the  governing  authorities,  and 
amounted  to  a  glorification  of  the  German  Army  and 

1  For  a  convenient  summary  of  the  status  and  changes  from  1871  to  1879, 
see  B.  E.  Howard,  Alsace-Lorraine  in  its  relation  to  the  German  Empire,  in 
Political  Science  Quarterly  (New  York,  1906),  vol.  xxi.,  pp.  447-74. 

2  C/.  P.  Laband,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  deutschen  Reiches.  3  vols.  (Freiburg  i. 
B„  1876-82),  vol.  ii.  p.  218. 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  157 

German  military  discipline  as  the  unfailing  source  of 
the  noblest  virtues.  "  This  wish,"  he  said,  "  proceeds 
from  the  scanty  knowledge  of  German  life  which  still 
prevails  in  Alsace  ;  it  proceeds  in  the  first  place  from 
the  vague  idea  that  there  may  some  day  be  a  war  with 
France,  and  the  hearts  of  the  Alsatians  revolt  against 
the  thought  of  fighting  against  their  old  fellow-country- 
men. But  we  cannot  come  to  an  understanding  with 
the  Alsatians  until  they  give  up  such  vague  expecta- 
tions, and  learn  to  regard  their  present  condition  as 
one  which  will  last  for  ever.  Further,  that  wish  pro- 
ceeds from  a  confusion  of  the  French  and  German 
military  establishments.  Our  army  is  not  an  aggressive 
power  intended  within  a  measured  interval  to  return 
home  with  a  certain  amount  of  military  glory  ;  it  is 
the  nation  in  arms,  it  is  the  great  school  of  courage,  of 
manly  discipline,  of  moral  self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of 
the  whole  flower  of  the  nation,  and  from  this  great 
school  we  do  not  wish  to  exclude  the  Alsatians  at  the 
outset.  On  the  contrary,  I  say  that  the  German  law 
of  military  service  should  be  introduced  as  soon  as 
the  economic  conditions  of  the  frontier  territory 
admit  of  it."  ' 

Under  the  law  of  June  25,  1873,  Alsace-Lorraine 
was  empowered  to  return  fifteen  members  to  the 
Reichstag  at  the  next  election.  On  January  1,  The  im_ 
1874,  the  imperial  constitution  came  into  Peri&}  c?n- 
force  and  the  dictatorship  of  the  Emperor  applied, 
ipso  facto  ceased  ;    so  that  the  law-making  l8?4' 

power  was  transferred  to  the  ordinary  legislature  of 
the  Empire.  In  the  preceding  year,  however,  it  was 
enacted  that  when  the  Reichstag  was  not  sitting  the 
Emperor  might,  with  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrat 
(the  Federal  Council),  issue  decrees  having  the  force 

1  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Islam,  pp.  184-5. 


158  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  law,  provided  they  were  not  incompatible  with  the 
constitution  or  with  the  existing  imperial  law.  Though 
the  legislative  powers  had  thus  been  reshuffled,  the 
dictatorial  regime  none  the  less  remained  in  fact. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  on  February  18, 
1874,  the  Alsace-Lorraine  deputies  presented  a  protest, 
in  the  form  of  a  motion,  against  the  annexation  (we 
shall  come  back  to  this  in  the  next  chapter *)  ;  and — as 
a  sequel  to  this  protest — the  Abbes  Guester  and 
Winterer  moved  in  the  Reichstag  on  the  following 
March  3  that  the  dictatorial  regime  should  be  abolished. 
Bismarck,  in  reply,  reminded  the  Alsatian  repre- 
sentatives that  the  annexation  was  that  of  a  conqueror, 
that  they  themselves  were  also  responsible  to  some 
extent  for  the  war,  and  that  the  kind  of  government 
to  be  given  to  the  conquered  provinces  depended  only 
on  the  will  of  the  victor.  "  These  gentlemen  of 
Alsace,"  he  observed,  "  complain  that,  during  these 
three  years,  we  have  not  made  them  happy,  as  they  no 
doubt  were  under  French  domination.  .  .  .  But  that 
was  not  exactly  the  object  of  the  annexation.  ...  I 
will  beg  these  gentlemen  of  Alsace,  in  order  to  abate 
their  wrath,  to  remember  also  a  little  the  way  in  which 
annexation  was  arrived  at.  .  .  .  Each  of  them  has 
his  own  30,000,000th  share  of  complicity  and  responsi- 
bility in  the  war  which  was  declared  against  us.  .  .  .'■' 
Bismarck  did  not  confine  his  mockery  and  sarcasm 
to  the  Alsatian  deputies,  but  directed  his  pungent 
observations  also  against  the  French  Government 
and  the  French  Assembly.  "  If  such  speeches,  in 
the  event  of  French  victory,  had  been  uttered  at  the 
Assembly  of  Versailles,  we  may  be  certain  that,  if 
not  the  majority,  at  least  M.  le  President  Buffet, 
with  the  cutting  manner  that  is  peculiar  to  him,  would 

1  See  infra,  chap,  x,  in  init. 


REGIME,    1870 — 1914  159 

soon  have  made  liberty  of  speech  an  illusory  privilege 
for  the  complainants."  Bismarck  concluded  in  favour 
of  maintaining  the  dictatorial  regime,  and  on  a  vote 
taken  his  view  was  supported  by  196  against  138. 
The  latter  figure  shows  considerable  progress  in 
support  of  the  amelioration  of  the  status  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

On  October  29,  an  imperial  decree  authorised  the 
establishment  of  the  Landesausschuss,  i.e.  a  Terri- 
torial Committee  or  Delegacy,  consisting  of 
thirty  members  (ten  for  each  of  the  three  Delegacy 
districts  of  Upper  Alsace,  Lower  Alsace,  and  esta>bh*eJ 
Lorraine),  whose  function  was  to  advise  on 
matters  relating  to  local  legislation  and  taxation, 
before  bills  were  laid  before  the  imperial  legislature. 
The  powers  of  this  body  were  purely  permissive — 
advisory,  and  not  consultative. 

The  results  of  the  erection  of  the  Territorial  Dele- 
gacy being  satisfactory,  its  functions  were  greatly 
extended  by  a  law  of  May  2,  1877,  whereby  functions 
it  became  also  a  consenting  body  in  regard  enlarged, 
to  legislative  projects,  and  could  initiate 
territorial  legislation.  The  legislature  for  the  pro- 
vinces now  consisted  of  the  Emperor,  the  Bundesrat, 
and  the  Landesausschuss  (the  approval  of  the  Reichs- 
tag being  no  longer  necessary). 

Next,  under  the  law  of  July  4,  1879  (which  became 
operative  on  October  1,  1879),  a  great  change  was  made, 
which  marked  a  notable  stage  in  the  move-  „ 

o  Progressive 

ment  towards  autonomy.  The  administra-  change  in 
tion  was  dissociated  from  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor ;  the  office  of  Oberprasident  was  abolished  ; 
and  a  Statthalter  (governor)  was  appointed  instead, 
the  first  to  hold  the  office  being  Baron  von  Manteuffel. 
The  latter,  who  represented  the  Emperor  and  not  the 


160  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Imperial  Chancellor,1  was  assisted  by  a  Secretary  of 
State,  and  three  Under-Secretaries — the  heads  of  the 
different  executive  departments;  they  were  all 
appointed  by  the  Emperor,  and  together  constituted  a 
"ministry  for  Alsace-Lorraine,"  with  their  offices  at 
Strassburg,  and  to  them  were  transferred  some  of  the 
functions  of  the  Bundesrat.  The  Territorial  Delegacy 
was  enlarged  to  fifty-eight  representatives,  thirty- four 
of  whom  were  elected  by  the  general  councils  of  the 
three  districts  from  their  own  members,  four  were 
appointed  by  the  municipal  councils  of  Strassburg, 
Metz,  Colmar,  and  Miilhausen,  and  twenty  were  elected 
by  the  delegates  of  the  rural  communes  ;  and  the 
powers  of  the  Delegacy  were  extended. 

A    Council   of   State,    possessing   advisory   powers, 

was   established  ;     it   consisted   of   the   Secretary   of 

.,    .    State,  the   Under-Secretaries,    the  President 

Council  of 

state  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Reichsland,  the 

chief  attorney  of  this  court,  and  from  eight 
to  twelve  members  appointed  by  the  Emperor  for  three 
years  ;  and  was  presided  over  by  the  Governor,  or, 
in  his  absence,  by  the  Secretary  of  State.  There 
were  thus  six  legislative  and  administrative  institu- 
tions for  Alsace-Lorraine:  within  the  territory — the 
Governor,  the  Ministry,  the  Council  of  State,  and  the 
Delegacy  ;  outside  the  territory — the  Emperor  and 
the  Bundesrat. 

The  normal  mode  of  legislating  for  the  territory 
involved  a  roundabout  and  complicated  procedure  : 
Roundabout  the  bill  was  drafted  by  the  local  ministry ;  was 
legislation.  SUDmitted  to  the  local  Council  of  State  ;  trans- 
mitted to  the  Prussian  Ministry,  who,  having  given 
what  has  been  termed  a  "  certificat  d'innocuite,"  8 
submitted  it  to  the  Emperor  ;  sent  back  to  the  Governor 

1  Laband,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.  p.  229.  2  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  112. 


REGIME,    1870— 19 14  161 

for  his  counter-signature  ;  laid  before  the  Bundesrat  ; 
passed  through  three  readings  by  the  Delegacy  ;  again 
presented  to  the  Bundesrat  (by  Prussia,  as  the  pre- 
siding State  of  the  German  Confederation)  for  definitive 
ratification  ;  promulgated  by  the  Emperor  (if  he  did 
not  veto  the  measure).  Laws  could  also  be  made, 
however,  without  the  intervention  of  the  Territorial 
Delegacy,  e.g.  by  decree  of  the  Emperor  with  the 
consent  of  the  Reichstag  and  the  Bundesrat  ;  or  even 
by  decree  of  the  Emperor  with  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrat,  having  the  force  of  a  provisional  law.  Thus 
no  legislation  of  any  kind  was  entirely  within  local 
control.  The  co-operation  of  the  Delegacy  was  not 
essential,  but  only  permissive  ;  and  even  when  it  was 
permitted  to  co-operate,  the  local  ministry  could 
appeal  to  the  Reichstag  (which,  in  fact,  not  infrequently 
interposed  in  the  legislation  of  Alsace-Lorraine). 

Such  was  the  constitution  and  scheme  of  govern- 
ment that  prevailed  in  Alsace-Lorraine  for  some  thirty 
vears.     But  the  fundamental  restrictions  and    .    ,.    .. 

J  Application 

disabilities  imposed  thereby  did  not   affect         of  the 

the  people  so  much  as  the  mode  and  details 

of  the  application  of  the  regime  and  the  attitude  of 

the  governing  authorities,  especially  so  of  the  minor 

officials. 

Baron  von  Manteuffel,  the  first  Statthalter,  how- 
ever, made  during  the  tenure  of  his  office  (1879-87) 
a  conscientious  and  persistent  attempt  to  Manteuffei's 
win  over  the  population  by  mild  methods  and  success. 
sympathetic  treatment.1  He  realised  that  the  an- 
nexed territory  had  once  been  French,  and  that  time, 
patience  and  tact  were  needed  for  transforming  the 
nationality  of  its  population  and  gaining  their  voluntary 

1  Cf.  P.  A.  Helmer,  Alsace  under  German  Rule  (London,  1915),  pp.  15,  16. 
II 


162  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

allegiance.  He  respected  their  feelings,  and  took  into 
account  the  differences  of  their  outlook,  their  ways, 
education,  culture,  and  religion.  He  was  ever  ready 
to  associate  with  them,  and  to  listen  to  their  grievances. 
And  yet,  despite  the  respect  and  esteem  which  his 
generous  and  affable  disposition  procured  him,  the 
fundamental  object  of  his  governorship  was,  in  the 
eyes  of  his  fellow-Germans,  far  from  being  attained. 
As  M.  Helmer  says  :  "  The  first  Statthalter's  successes 
were  purely  personal.  His  loyal  and  generous  attitude 
was  incomprehensible  to  his  compatriots.  Baron  von 
ManteuffeFs  manner  of  approaching  the  Alsace-Lor- 
raine problem,  and  the  principles  which  inspired  him 
in  his  efforts  to  win  popularity,  were  contrary  to  the 
spirit  of  the  German  nation.  Germany,  which  had 
tardily  achieved  unhoped-for  power,  knew  nothing  of 
chivalrous  traditions,  nor  of  respect  for  the  personality, 
the  rights  and  interests  of  others.  The  tact  and 
delicacy  of  Manteuffel,  the  nobility  of  heart  which 
made  him  defer  to  the  sentiments  of  the  vanquished, 
were  foreign  to  the  great  majority  of  his  people."  ' 
He  was  even  accused  by  Germans  of  siding  with  the 
native  population  as  against  the  immigrant  officials  ; 
and  his  countrymen  demanded  that  his  mild  and 
indulgent  administration  should  be  replaced  by  a  strict 
and  uncompromising  regime.  He  died  in  1887,  and 
was  succeeded  as  governor  by  Prince  von  Hohenlohe 
Schillingsfurst,  who  was  specifically  instructed  by 
Bismarck  to  adopt  more  rigorous  methods  towards 
the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

In  the  meantime  various  happenings  in  France 
pointed  to  the  possibility  of  a  new  Franco-German 
war,  the  object  of  which  would  be  to  restore  the  lost 
provinces.     The    feelings    aroused  in   France  on  the 

1  Alsace  under  German  Rule  (London,  19 15),  p.  16. 


REGIME,    1870— 19 14  163 

occasion  of  the  visit  of  Alfonso  XII  of  Spain  (1883), 
and  afterwards  during  the  Boulangist  movement 
(1886  and  1887),  and  by  such  incidents  as  "  Protest- 
the  Schnaebele  affair  (1887), l  met  with  a  berf returned 
ready  response  in  the  Reichsland.  However  to^e^^. 
this  may  be,  at  the  elections  of  January,  Lorraine. 
1887,  Alsace-Lorraine  once  more  returned  to  the 
Reichstag  "  protesting  "  members — following  the  ex- 
amples of  1874, 188 1,  and  1884 — in  spite  of  the  pressure 
exercised  by  the  German  authorities  to  bring  about 
a  different  electoral  result.  Now,  Manteuffel  having 
gone,  and  the  provinces  proving  recalcitrant  in  their 
attitude  and  repeatedly  hostile  in  their  elections,  a 
period  of  repression  commenced. 

At  the  same  time  the  Alsatian-Lorrainers  began 
to  realise  that,  what  with  the  political  vicissitudes  in 
France,  the  absence  of  national  unity,  and  Autonomist 
the  pacific  policy  of  the  greater  part  of  movement- 
French  democracy,  the  dream  of  liberation  was  a  hope- 
less one ;  accordingly  they  attached  themselves  to  the 
movement  for  autonomy  within  the  German  Empire, 
and  "Alsace  for  the  Alsatians"  became  the  guiding 
watchword.2 

For  many  years  the  repressive  measures  were  applied 
systematically  and  persistently  to  every  side  of  social 
life,  public  activity,  and  exterritorial  relation-  Repressive 
ships.  When  the  new  governor  was  pressed  measures- 
to  adopt  severe  methods,  he  made  the  following 
comment  in  his  note-book  :  "It  seems  that  at  Berlin 
they  want  to  drive  the  annexed  population  to  des- 
peration and  to  open  revolt,  in  order  to  suppress  the 
civil  power  and  set  up  again  the  military  dictatorship.' '  3 
Numerous  edicts  were  issued — Abwehrgesetze  (laws  of 

1  As  to  these  see  infra,  pp.  217,  221.         3  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 

2  See  infra,  chap.   x. 


164  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

protection),  known  locally  as  "lois  d' exception" — for 
"  Lois  d'ex-  the  purpose  of  combating  the  influences 
ception."  emanating  from  France.  Newspapers  were 
from  time  to  time  suppressed,  e.g.  the  Union,  Odilien- 
Newspapers  blatt,  Colmarer  Zeitung,  Miilhauser  Volksblatt, 
suppressed.  £c/zo  de  Schiltigheim,  Lorraine  Sportive. 
Clubs  and  societies  were  arbitrarily  dissolved,  e.g. 
Societies  the  "  sport "  clubs  of  Metz,  the  souvenir 
dissolved,  societies  for  the  decoration  of  French  graves, 
the  Alsatian  Society  of  Mechanical  Construction  (its 
head  being  a  Frenchman),  as  well  as  various  singing, 
music,  and  gymnastic  societies.  Restrictions  were 
imposed  on  correspondence,  the  movements  of  excur- 
sionists, the  performance  of  French  plays. 
"'"'  ip'  Ardent  "  nationalists  "  (e.g.  M.  Antoine  and 
M.  Lalance)  and  also  sympathetic  visitors  from 
France  or  Switzerland,  were  imprisoned,  banished,  or 
expelled. 

The  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  who  had  emigrated 
from  their  country  in  pursuance  of  the  right  of  option 
Passport  conceded  to  them  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
system.  were  not  allowed  to  return  except  with 
permits,  which  were  obtainable  with  difficulty  and 
available  only  for  very  short  periods.  For  some 
fifteen  years  the  passport  regime  was  enforced,  which 
to  a  large  extent  isolated  Alsace-Lorraine  from  the 
rest  of  the  world,1  and — what  was  the  greatest  of 
hardships — separated  the  native  families  from  their 
numerous  French  relations.  Von  Capri vi,  the  suc- 
cessor of  Bismarck,  stated  on  June  10,  1890,  that  he 
had  decided  to  maintain  the  passport  regulations  "  in 
order  to  make  still  wider  the  barrier  that  separated 
France  from  Germany."  French  officers  who  crossed 
over  into  the  Reichsland  had  to  submit  to  rigorous 

1  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  165 

and  humiliating  formalities,  whilst  German  officers 
moved  about  freely  at  Nancy,  Belfort,  and  suspicion 
Toul.  The  natives  were  regarded  with  sus-  .  an<* 
picion,  their  words  and  acts  were  watched, 
and  the  practice  of  espionage  and  delation  was  resorted 
to :  "La  delation  avait  en  effet  ete  erigee  chez  nous 
a.  la  hauteur  d'un  principe  de  gouvernement."  1 

The  natives  were  excluded  as  much  as  possible  from 
public  functions  ;  in  case  of  disputes  between  them 
and  the  immigrants,  judicial  decisions  some-  Exclusion 
times  unfairly  favoured  the  latter.  "Pour  from  public 
i'habitant  autochtone  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine, 
il  n'y  avait  plus  ni  justice,  ni  droit,  ni  liberte.  Avec 
toutes  les  formes  hypocrites  de  la  legalite,  on  en 
faisait  un  paria  dans  son  propre  pays."  2 

Most  of  the  business  orders  of  the  administration 
were  sent  to  Germany,  and  all  kinds  of  devices  and 
contrivances  were  adopted  to  get  the  indus-  Economic 
trial  undertakings  of  Alsace-Lorraine  into  pressure. 
German  hands.  "  .  .  .  Malgre  nos  protestations  indi- 
gnees,  toutes  les  commandes  des  administrations 
civiles  et  milit aires  allaient  a  des  fournisseurs  d'outre- 
Rhin  ;  toutes  les  grandes  entreprises  industrielles, 
mines  de  fer,  de  charbon,  de  potasse,  passaient  aux 
mains  de  syndicats  germaniques.  L' affaire  de  Grafen- 
staden  et  l'enquete  ouverte  1'an  dernier  par  les  chambres 
de  commerce  sur  la  participation  des  capitaux  etrangers 
aux  affaires  alsaciennes-lorraines,  prouverent  que  les 
Allemands  avaient  meme  1' intention  arretee  de  s'em- 
parer  des  maisons  existant  avant  la  guerre  de  1870."  3 

Furthermore,  the  University  of  Strassburg  was 
thoroughly  germanised.  The  children  of  the  Educational 
natives  were  discouraged  to  attend  the  inter-  measures, 
mediate  and  the  higher  schools.     French  instruction 

1  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  32.  2  Ibid.,  p.  34.  3  Ibid.,  p.  33. 


166  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

in  the  secondary  schools  was  limited,  and  as  far  as 
possible  had  to  be  given  through  the  medium  of  the 
German  language. 

In  the  case  of  the  elementary  schools  French  was 

banished  altogether,  except  in  certain  entirely  French- 

.     speaking  villages.     The  Government  seemed 

Fight  against    r  °  . 

French  to  be  determined  to  eradicate  the  use  of  the 
anguage.  pj-gn^  language  in  the  annexed  provinces. 
Business  signs  and  notices  had  to  be  written  or  printed 
in  German,  special  permission  being  required  for  the 
use  of  French.  Such  words  as  coiffeur,  menu,  restaurant, 
modes,  etc.,  etc.,  were  banned ;  they  had  to  be  replaced 
by  friseur,  speisekarte,  restauration,  moden,  and  so  on. 
A  Strassburg  trader  was  fined  for  using  the  foreign 
expression,  liquidation  totale,  instead  of  the  German 
form  totale  liquidation ;  after  paying  the  fine  he 
put  up  a  notice,  "  Hier  wird  Deutsch  gesprochen."  ' 
"  The  struggle  against  the  French  language,"  says 
Paul  Deroulede,  "  is  one  of  the  most  ridiculous  aspects 
of  the  pangermanist  campaign.  French  souvenirs, 
French  monuments,  French  tombs,  French  cookery, 
French  bills  of  fare,  French  visiting-cards,  French 
teaching,  French  Christian  names,  French  gymna- 
sium suits,  French  bugles,  excite  the  wrath  of  the 
pangermanists.  They  would  even  germanise  red 
skirts  and  blue  skies.  They  would  raise  between 
Alsace  and  France,  her  former  country,  a  Chinese 
wall."  2 

In  reference  to  the  German  policy  directed  against 
the  French  language  and  French  culture  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  a  Swiss  writer  observes  :  "  The  old  policy  of 
the  Allemanni  in  enslaving  their  conquered  foes  is 
revived  in  the  nineteenth  century.     Not  slavery  in  a 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  52. 

2  Preface  to  H.  Zislin,  Sourires  d' Alsace  (Paris,  1913). 


REGIME,  1870— 1914  167 

physical  or  economic  sense,  of  course,  but  touching 
their  purest,  most  intimate  and  most  legitimate 
feelings.  Slavery  of  the  body  may  be  more  easily 
borne  than  constraint  of  the  spirit."  J 

It  was  to  this  period  of  repression  that  the  Alsatian 
deputy,  M.  Preiss,  referred  when  he  said  in  the  Reichstag 
on  one  occasion  "  that  peace  reigned  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine— the  peace  of  cemeteries."  3 

In  the  meantime  the  movement  in  favour  of  auto- 
nomy was  advancing  ;  and  it  was  felt  in  Germany 
that  the  governing  officials,  who  constituted  The  official 
a  kind  of  "  close  oligarchy,"  3  had  by  their  °%archy. 
meddlesome  disposition  and  arrogant  behaviour  con- 
tributed not  a  little  to  the  alienation  of  the  inhabitants 
and  to  the  progress  of  the  "  nationalist "  cause. 
Accordingly  the  Emperor  intervened  personally,  and 
put  an  end  to  the  ascendancy  of  the  official  circle. 
The    Secretary  of   State,  Von  Puttkammer,  v 

was  dismissed  ;  and  Von  Koeller  was  ap-  Koeiier's 
pointed  in  his  place,  with  instructions  to 
inaugurate  a  policy  of  conciliation  and  pacification. 
The  latter  did  much  to  restrain  the  interference  of  the 
officials  and  to  allay  the  general  irritation.  The  dicta- 
torial abuses  were  to  a  large  extent  removed,  and  "  ex- 
ceptional laws  "  were  repealed.  The  new  Government, 
interposing  little  in  public  life,  and  leaving  it  to  the 
free  play  of  the  party  organisations,  thus  countered 
the  political  opposition  to  the  sovereign  authority 
and  reduced  it  to  comparatively  small  dimensions. 
"  If  the  national  question,"  says  a  leading  observer, 
"  had  been  a  mere  outcome  of  the  political  situation, 
it  might  have  been  supposed  that  germanisation  had 
now  been  achieved."  4    But,  owing  to  the  insolent  and 

1  A.  Gobat,  Le  Cauchemar  de  V Europe,  cited  by  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

2  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  143.         3  Helmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  21.        *  Ibid.,  p.  27. 


168  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

contemptuous  attitude  of  the  German  immigrants 
and  the  consequent  conflicts  between  them  and  the 
native  population,  Alsatian  disaffection  was  nourished 
and  demands  for  autonomy  were  renewed. 

Next  Von  Koeller  was  replaced  by  Baron  de  Bulach, 
an  Alsatian  statesman,  "  qui  crut  devoir  inaugurer 
Baron  de  imuiediatement,  pour  se  faire  pardonner  ses 
Buiach's  origines,  la  politique  de  la  '  main  forte.'  "  He 
became  the  tool  of  Herr  Mandel,  a  Bavarian, 
the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  a  harsh 
man  devoted  to  the  strict  and  undiscriminating  applica- 
tion of  the  written  law — "  un  Bavarois  dur  et  grossier, 
le  type  du  legiste  qui  ne  connait  que  la  loi  ecrite  et 
T applique  sans  menagements."  1  The  policy  adopted 
was  a  resumption  of  the  high-handed  regime,  which 
had  met  with  failure  throughout  ;  and  before  long 
there  was  an  open  rupture  between  the  ministry  and 
the  Territorial  Delegacy.  Various  incidents  contri- 
buted to  this  :  e.g.  the  prohibition  of  the  performance 
of  Racine's  comedy,  Les  Plaideurs,  the  stormy  debates 
on  the  Kubler  motion  relative  to  the  teaching  of  French 
in  the  elementary  schools,  the  affair  of  Noisseville  and 
the  Weissenburg  monument  (1908) ,'  the  expulsion  of 
the  Swiss  Wegelin  for  causing  the  Marseillaise  to  be 
played  in  a  Miilhausen  restaurant,  the  trials  of  the 
native  artists  and  caricaturists  Hansi  and  Zislin,  the 
closing  of  the  students'  club,  the  incident  of  the 
play  in  The  Daughter  of  the  Regiment  at  the  Colmar 
theatre,  and  finally  the  indignation  aroused  in  the 
Territorial  Delegacy  by  the  observation  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  :  "  The  Empire  owes  you  nothing." 
Proceedings  such  as  these  could  not  but  give  rise  at 
the  meetings  of  the  Landesausschuss  to  bitter  and 
excited  discussions,    "  que  1' incapacity  du  Secretaire 

1  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  n6.  2  See  infra,  p.  198. 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  169 

d'Etat  et  1' impertinence  de  M.  Mandel  trans formaient 
en  scenes  scandaleuses  " — as  an  eye-witness  says.1 

In  these  circumstances  the  Secretary  of  State  urged 
upon  the  Governor,  Count  von  Wedel,  that,  in  view  of 
the  difficulties  of  the  political  position  in  Efforts 
Alsace-Lorraine,  it  was  essential  to  modify  Nationalist 
its  constitution  in  such  a  way  as  to  get  rid  of  movement, 
the  nationalist  opposition.  The  nationalist  programme 
contained  four  fundamental  demands  :  (1)  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  should  be  made  a  State  of  the  German  Empire  ; 
(2)  that  the  executive  authority  should  be  vested  in 
an  independent  head,  either  prince  or  president  ;  (3) 
that  a  legislative  body  should  be  established  within 
the  State,  with  powers  similar  to  those  possessed  by 
the  legislative  bodies  of  the  other  German  States  ; 
and  (4)  that  the  interposition  of  the  Emperor,  the 
Reichstag,  and  the  Bundesrat  in  legislation  exclusively 
relating  to  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be  abolished. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg,  expressed  himself  in  favour  of  reform.  At  the 
end  of  19 10  a  Government  Bill,  approved  by  Government 
the  Bundesrat,  was  laid  before  the  Reichstag.  Bill»  I9I°* 
Its  main  proposals  were  :  (1)  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
should  remain  an  imperial  territory  (Reichsland)  ; 
(2)  that  the  Emperor  should  continue  to  exercise 
sovereign  authority,  as  the  agent  of  the  confederated 
States,  through  his  representative,  the  Statthalter,  at 
Strassburg  ;  (3)  that  the  legislative  powers  of  the 
Bundesrat  and  Reichstag  in  matters  relating  exclu- 
sively to  the  territory  should  be  abrogated  ;  and  (4) 
that  two  chambers — an  upper  and  a  lower — should 
be  established,  the  second  of  which  was  to  be  elected 
by  manhood  suffrage. 

In  the  Reichstag  debates  on  the  Bill  there  was  a 

1  Wetter le,  p.  117. 


170  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

conflict  between  the  autonomists  and  the  conserva  ives, 
who  also  objected  to  the  provision  for  manhood 
suffrage.  The  measure  was  referred  to  a  special  com- 
mittee, who  suggested  amendments  to  the  effect  that 
the  territory  should  be  constituted  a  State  of  the 
Empire  and  that  the  Statthalter  should  hold  office 
for  life.  The  latter  point  was  rejected  by  the  Govern- 
ment ;  and  in  regard  to  the  former  a  compromise  was 
accepted  whereby  Alsace-Lorraine,  though  not  raised 
to  the  precise  status  of  a  State,  should  be  allowed 
three  votes  in  the  Bundesrat,  which  were  not  to 
count  either  in  favour  of  any  Prussian  proposal  except 
when  Prussia  gained  a  majority  without  them,  or 
(whether  for  or  against)  in  the  case  of  any  proposal 
to  amend  the  imperial  constitution.  The  amended 
Bill  was  passed,  May  31,  1911,  and  the  new  constitution 
came  into  force  on  the  following  September  1. 

Various  progressive  features  were  thus  introduced  ; 

the  rights  of  the  population  were  very  considerably 

enlarged.     As  before,  the  Kaiser  was  vested 

New  consti-        •.->      ,-,  ,.  ,-,        .,  ^t 

tution  with  the  supreme  executive  authority.     Ine 

enacted,  Statthalter,  appointed  and  dismissable  by 
the  Emperor,  exercised  as  his  representative 
the  executive  power,  together  with  all  the  rights  that 
were  formerly  in  the  hands  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 
He  was  also  empowered  to  appoint  and  instruct  the 
three  delegates  at  the  Bundesrat.  Imperial  decrees 
and  orders  could  not  have  the  force  of  law  without  his 
signature.  No  bill  could  become  law  without  the  assent 
of  the  Emperor  and  the  two  Chambers.  He  was 
empowered  to  summon,  adjourn,  and  dissolve  them. 
The  Upper  Chamber  was  to  consist  of  twenty-three 
members :  five  permanent  ex-officio,  viz.  the  Bishops 
of  Strassburg  and  Metz,  the  Presidents  of  the  two 
Protestant  Consistories,  and  the  President  of  the  Court 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  171 

of  Appeal ;  the  rest  being  elected  members  representing 
the  University,  the  Jewish  Consistory,  the  municipal 
councils,  and  the  commercial,  agricultural,  and  indus- 
trial associations.  But  the  Emperor  could,  at  the 
instance  of  the  Bundesrat,  appoint  twenty-three  others 
for  the  duration  of  the  parliament — a  serious  defect 
that  prepared  the  way  for  subservience  to  the  imperial 
authority.  The  Lower  House  was  to  consist  of  sixty 
members  elected  by  direct  and  secret  ballot  by  male  Ger- 
man citizens  of  twenty-five  years  of  age  who  had  resided 
for  at  least  three  years  in  Alsace-Lorraine  (one  year  in 
the  case  of  teachers  and  officials) .  The  annual  budget 
was  to  be  submitted  first  to  the  Lower  House,  and  was 
to  be  accepted  or  rejected  in  its  entirety  by  the  Upper 
House.  If  the  former  refused  to  vote  supplies,  the 
Government  was  empowered  (as  before)  to  raise  taxes 
and  issue  treasury  bonds. 

The  constitution  could  be  modified  only  by  the 
Reichstag  and  the  Bundesrat,  so  that  it  rested  on 
a  precarious  foundation.  The  Strassburg 
Government  depended  virtually  on  Berlin :  °SAi°ace- 
for  the  Emperor  appointed  the  Statthalter,  Locrame 
and  could  dismiss  him  at  discretion,  and  the 
latter  instructed  the  Bundesrat  Delegates  ;  and  the 
composition  of  the  Upper  Chamber  was  to  a  great 
extent  subject  to  the  Emperor's  pleasure — "  la  com- 
position du  Senat  placait  nos  institutions  parlemen- 
taires  au-dessous  de  celles  des  pays  les  plus  retro- 
grades." %  M.  Wetterle  thus  sums  up  the  position  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  under  the  Constitution  of  19 11,  con- 
sidering it  most  unfavourable,  despite  the  reforms,  real 
and  apparent,  introduced  :  "  Nous  restions,  en  theorie 
comme  en  fait,  terre  d' empire,  propriete  collective  des 
Etats,  colonie,   jouissant,  mais  provisoirement  seule- 

1  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  122. 


172  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

ment,  du  droit  de  s'administrer  elle-meme  sous  la 
souverainete  du  roi  de  Prusse.  Nous  etions  livres 
pieds  et  poings  lies  au  bon  vouloir  des  pouvoirs 
legislatifs  et  de  l'executif  de  Berlin."  x  Similarly 
M.  Novicow  regards  the  constitution  as  a  deception 
— " trompe-roeil" — as  a  "manifestation  of  political 
hypocrisy  scandalously  practised  recently  on  so  large 
a  scale  "  :  though  it  provided  a  senate,  a  chamber  of 
deputies,  universal  suffrage,  representation  on  the 
Bundesrat,  etc.,  it  did  not  give  the  essential  thing,  viz. 
the  right  of  the  people  to  manage  their  affairs  as  they 
deemed  fit.2 

Why  the  Imperial  Government  has  refused  Alsace- 
Lorraine  autonomy  is  a  question  that  can  be  readily 
answered.  It  is  because  of  the  persistence 
autonomy  of  French  feelings  in  the  provinces,  especially 
among  certain  of  the  political  leaders,  and 
the  imperfect  germanisation  of  the  territory  and  people 
as  a  whole.  "  L'unique  raison,"  remarks  M.  Sembat,1 
"qui  a  suspendu  jusqu'ici  l'octroi  de  cette  autonomic, 
c'est  la  persistance  des  sentiments  francais  dans  les 
provinces  annexe  es.  L' administration  allemande  en 
prend,  a  la  fois,  alarme  serieuse,  et  texte  commode 
aux  exagerations  patriotiques  et  au  maintien  des 
mesures  arbitraires."  In  February  19 10  it  is  reported 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  said  to  the  deputies  of  the 
Territorial  Delegacy  at  Strassburg  :  "  Have  the  courage 
to  declare  that,  being  Alsatians,  you  are  Germans,  and 
you  will  receive  autonomy  at  once."  The  constitution 
of  19 1 1  shows  that  the  deputies  were  not  prepared  to 
make  such  a  declaration." 

Herr   von   Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  the  course  of  a 

1  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  pp.  122-3.  2  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  160. 

3  M.  Sembat,  Faites  un  roi,  sinon  faites  la  paix  (Paris,  1915),  p.  170. 

4  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  173. 


REGIME,    1870 — 19 14  173 

speech  in  the  Reichstag  March  14,  19 10,  recognised 
the  necessity  of  conferring  on  Alsace-Lorraine  a  larger 
measure  of  political  independence ;  but  he  emphasised 
that  the  formula  of  the  nationalists — "  Alsace  for 
the  Alsatians  " — could  not  be  put  into  practice  so 
long  as  their  leaders  affected  to  ignore  the  German 
character  of  the  population,  and  were  disposed  to 
gallicise  the  provinces  contrary  to  the  considerations 
of  history  and  ethnography.  Again,  in  the  Prussian 
Upper  Chamber  Herr  Wedelpissdorf  said  on  April  5, 
19 1 1  :  "  The  debates  that  have  taken  place  in  regard 
to  a  constitution  for  Alsace-Lorraine  have  aroused  in  us 
a  deep  anxiety,  for  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the 
inhabitants  of  this  country  have  not  yet  become 
German  enough  in  order  that  it  may  be,  without 
danger,  constituted  a  confederate  State."  x 

This  opposition  of  the  German  Government  on  the 
one  side  and  the  alienation  of  sections  of  the  people  on 
the  other  constitute  a  dilemma  which  may  be  expressed 
thus.  Germany  says  to  Alsace-Lorraine  :  "I  will  not 
give  you  freedom  until  I  am  sure  of  your  love."  To 
which  Alsace-Lorraine  replies  :  "I  cannot  love  you 
till  you  set  me  free."  2  Germany  evidently  does  not 
think  it  safe  to  bestow  on  the  Reichsland  the  complete 
liberty  and  rights  of  an  autonomous  State  until  the 
whole  of  the  people  are  thoroughly  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  "  Deutschtum,"  have  fully  absorbed  German 
traditions  and  culture,  and  have  become  responsive 
to  official  discipline  and  amenable  to  the  ubiquitous 
exigencies  of  a  paternal  Government.  So  far — till  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war — Alsace- Lorrainers  have 
not,  in  the  eyes  of  the  governing  classes,  merited  a 
higher  category  than  that  of  second-class  Germans — 

1  Independance  Beige,  April  7,  191 1  ;    cited  by  Novicow,  p.  173. 

2  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  3. 


174  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

"Deutsche  zweiter  Klasse " — to  use  an  expression 
sometimes  heard  in  Alsace. 

With  regard  to  the  requirement  of  the  German 
Government  that  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  should  become 
tit  for  liberty  before  it  is  conferred  upon  them,  we 
may  recall  the  wiser  and  more  generous  view  of  Glad- 
stone. The  great  Liberal  statesman,  writing  to  Mr. 
Forster  (April  12,  1882),  on  the  occasion  of  the  Irish 
land  disturbances,  observed  :  "  It  is  liberty  alone 
which  fits  men  for  liberty.  This  proposition,  like 
every  other  in  politics,  has  its  bounds  ;  but  it  is  far 
safer  than  the  counter  doctrine— wait  till  they  are 
fit."  1 

A  few  months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  was 

thought  in  Berlin  that  a  severer  regime  than  that  of 

Count  von  Wedel  was  necessary  ;  accordingly 

under16       the    latter    was    replaced   by   Dallwitz    von 

Daiiwitz       Roedern,  who  —in  the  words  of  M.  Wetterle 

von  Koedern.  ' 

— "  was  to  substitute  rods  of  iron  for  rods  of 
wood,  and  to  resume  in  Alsace-Lorraine  the  reign  of 
terror,  so  that  the  difficulties  resulting  therefrom  might 
provoke  the  annexation  of  the  imperial  territory  to 
Prussia."  2  It  was,  indeed,  frequently  advocated  in 
German  conservative  and  military  circles  that  the 
Kaiser  should  be  made  Landesherr  (sovereign)  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  that  it  should  be  annexed  to 
Prussia.  Threats  have  more  than  once  been  made 
officially  that  this  plan  might  be  resorted  to  on  account 
of  the  continued  indocility  of  sections  of  the  popula- 
tion and  the  agitation  of  parliamentarians  and  other 
national  leaders. 

Thus  in  May  19 12,  after  the  Mayor  of  Strassburg 
had  made  a  complaint  in  regard  to  some  industrial 

1  Lord  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone  (1903),  vol.  iii.  p.  58. 

2  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  127. 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  175 

injustice  to  the  city,  the  Emperor  is  reported  to  have 
replied :  ' '  Listen ;  so  far  you  have  known  only  my 
good  side.  If  this  situation  lasts  we  shall  The  Kaiser's 
suppress  your  constitution  and  annex  you  to  threat>  I912- 
Prussia."  1  In  the  following  year,  after  the  Zabern 
affair,2  Herr  von  Jagow  remarked  that  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  his  countrymen  appeared  to  be  in  an  enemy 
country. 

Finally,  a  word  remains  to  be  said  on  the  precautions 
and  proceedings  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war.3     It  is  stated 

Precautions 

that  lists  had  been  prepared  containing  the  of  German 
names  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  whom  it  onVwtbreak 
was  thought  necessary  to  remove  and  keep  of  the  Pre~ 

•11  At  1       sent  war. 

under  surveillance.  One  list  contained  the 
names  of  some  three  hundred  persons  who  were  to  be 
arrested  for  preventive  purposes  on  the  eve  of  the 
mobilisation  and  handed  over  to  the  military  authori- 
ties. Many  of  them  fled.  A  second  list  contained  a 
number  of  suspects  who  were  regarded  as  less  dangerous 
but  whom  it  was  thought  advisable  to  remove  from  the 
Reichsland  ;  they  were  accordingly  taken  away  to 
various  German  towns  and  placed  under  police  super- 
vision. As  for  the  territory  generally,  a  rigorous 
regime  was  introduced.  Foreign  news  was  admitted 
only  through  the  medium  of  German  papers.  Nearly 
all  the  local  newspapers  were  suppressed  or  ceased  to 
appear.  A  strict  censorship  was  imposed  on  private 
correspondence.  To  leave  Alsace  was  almost  im- 
possible ;  those  who  obtained  special  authorisation 
were  subjected,  before  proceeding  to  a  foreign  country, 
to  a  sort  of  quarantine — "  une  sorte  de  quarantaine 
prealable " — in   a   German   town.     Restrictions   were 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  58,  59,  note.  3  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  pp.  74,  75. 

2  See  infra,  p.  198. 


176  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

imposed  on  the  movements  of  the  population.  The 
use  of  the  French  language  was  entirely  forbidden , 
even  in  private  conversation.  The  least  mark  of 
sympathy  shown  towards  the  French — even  kindness 
to  the  French  wounded — was  punished.  The  property 
of  fugitives  was  confiscated,  and  their  relatives  were 
treated  as  suspects.  On  the  declaration  of  war 
thousands — it  is  stated — fled,  and  enlisted  under  the 
French  flag,  some  in  Algeria,  Morocco,  or  with  the 
forces  sent  to  Turkey,  others  in  France. 

We  may  conclude  this  chapter  with  a  few  words, 
supplementary  to  the  various  indications  already 
why  given   above,   to   explain   why  the   German 

thorough      Government   has  not    succeeded  in   Alsace- 

germanisa-  ...  n 

tionnot  Lorraine  m  its  endeavours  to  germanise 
effected.  thoroughly  the  population — to  bring  about 
their  entwelschung  (' '  def oreignisation  " ) .  The  Germans 
have  not  infrequently  attributed  their  failure  to  their 
hesitation,  and,  above  all,  to  their  leniency  in  adminis- 
tration ;  they  have  thought  it  a  mistake  to  permit 
of  the  least  compromise  in  Lorraine  with  French 
sympathy,  and  in  Alsace  with  Swiss  republican  ideals. 
Some  of  the  Statthalters,  e.g.  Manteuffel,  Zeppelin, 
Von  Koeller,  have  therefore  been  censured  for  paying 
heed  to  local  opinion.1  Others,  however,  have  taken 
an  entirely  contrary  view,  and  have  thought  that  the 
failure  was  really  due  to  the  excessive  severity  imported 
into  the  administration,  advocated  as  it  was  by  the 
militarists  and  the  pangermanists  ;  and  they  have 
held  that  the  Imperial  Government  and  the  local 
ministries  have  erroneously  considered  Alsace-Lor- 
raine responsible  for  or  identified  with  the  occasional 
chauvinistic  or  revanchard  manifestations  in  France. 

1   Cf.  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  55. 


REGIME,    1870 — 1914  177 

The  reason  given  by  the  latter  critics  is  undoubtedly 
the  right  one. 

The  fundamental  deficiency  of  the  rulers  was  a  lack 
of  tact  and  sympathy,  the  indispensable  attributes  in 
a  conqueror  who  would  win  loyalty  from 
the  conquered.  The  absence  of  these  quali-  mentai  de- 
ties  means  the  use  of  an  undiscriminating  JjJJJj^jf 
coercion,  which  in  its  turn  alienates  the 
sympathy  and  good-will  of  the  governed  ;  it  is  the 
reciprocally  spontaneous  good-will  alone  that  is  the 
true  cement  of  nationality  and  the  controlling  force  of 
allegiance.  The  Germans  have,  admittedly,  produced 
great  works  of  philosophy  and  psychology  ;  but  in 
practice  they  have  failed  to  grasp  the  very  essentials 
of  national  psychology.  They  appeared  to  believe,  if 
we  may  judge  of  their  proceedings  in  the  Reichsland, 
that  constraint  is  the  father  of  adherence  and  affection  ; 
whereas — to  use  the  words  of  Novicow  1 — to  force 
people  to  love  is  as  impossible  psychologically,  as  it  is. 
impossible  geometrically  to  force  a  triangle  not  to 
have  three  angles.  The  ignorance  of  the  very  essentials 
of  social  science  on  the  part  of  Bismarck  and  Moltke 
and  their  successors  led  them  to  commit  the  radical 
mistake  of  substituting  for  the  earlier  false  principle 
"  cujus  regio  ejus  religio,"  the  equally  false  principle 
"  cujus  regio  ejus  natio."  3  Force  provokes  antipathy, 
hatred  ;  it  can  never  produce  national  organic  amalga- 
mation. To  show  the  conquered  that  he  is  weak 
and  cannot  liberate  himself,  whilst  the  conqueror  is 
powerful  and  if  need  be  can  crush  him,  is  a  policy  that 
can  never  result  in  a  natural  fusion — it  is  at  most  an 
"  assimilation  caporaliste."  3  This  is  recognised  by 
such  a  writer  as  Herr  Naumann,  who  observes  in  his 
recently  published  well-known  work  :    "  Prussia  took 

1  L' Alsace-Lorraine,  p.  153.  2  Ibid.,  p.  159.  3  Ibid.,  p.  156 

12 


178  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

compulsion  in  one  hand  and  material  prosperity  in  the 
other,  and  demanded  loyalty  in  exchange.  She 
brought  about  much  good,  but  found  no  way  to  the 
heart  of  the  people."  1 

The  introduction  of  a  large  number  of  German 
minor  officials  aggravated  the  difficulties  of  the  situa- 
„.    n         tion.     Bismarck  had   himself  fully   realised 

The  German  ,  ,  J 

official  the  necessity  of  importing  into  the  territory 
as  few  as  possible  ;  but  what  he  saw  clearly 
in  187 1  immediately  after  the  formal  annexation,  was 
forgotten  later  on.  The  most  unsympathetic,  arro- 
gant, and  interfering  of  all  the  official  caste  were  the 
Prussians  ;  they  were  devoid  of  tact  and  understanding, 
and  withheld  as  much  as  possible  from  social  relations 
with  the  people.  Many  of  the  lesser  posts  were  filled 
by  non-commissioned  officers  who  were  accustomed 
to  the  harsh  and  rigorous  discipline  of  Prussian  bar- 
racks. Karl  Blind,  an  observer  and  publicist  of  wide 
experience,  whilst  favouring  the  cause  of  the  Germans, 
emphasises  this  mistake  :  "  Had  the  Berlin  Govern- 
ment sent  into  the  newly  acquired  provinces  officials 
of  a  less  hard  type  than  many  of  those  who  came  from 
Prussia,  had  more  South  Germans  been  appointed 
who  better  understood  the  kindred  Alsatian  character, 
the  reconciliation  would  have  made  still  quicker  pro- 
gress." 2 

The  non-official  German  immigrants  were  naturally 
of  the  same  metal  as  their  official  brethren,  although 
The  German  they  were  not  in  a  position  to  inflict  adminis- 
immigrants.  trative  hardships.  The  hostility,  open  or 
concealed,  between  them  and  the  native  population 
was  due  to  the  same  fundamental  causes  as  have  been 

1  F.  Naumann,  Central  Europe,  English  trans.  (London,  1916),  p.  79. 

2  Alsace-Lorraine   and    William  II.   (with   personal  recollections),   in  Fort- 
nightly Review,  vol.  lxxviii.  (1902),  pp.  257  seq.,  at  p.  258. 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  179 

mentioned  above.  The  immigrants  generally  assumed 
an  attitude  of  superiority  ;  they  thought  they  came  as 
enlightened  missionaries,  devotees  of  the  vaunted 
Kultur,  to  bring  the  light  to  a  benighted  country 
and  true  civilisation  to  a  backward  and  inferior  race. 
There  were  naturally  marked  differences  between  the 
newcomers  and  the  old  inhabitants  :  the  former  were 
believers  in  force  and  in  ready  obedience  to  bureau- 
cratic regulations,  they  were  hustlers,  and  were  not 
endowed  with  a  sense  of  humour  ;  the  latter  were 
profoundly  democratic,  easy-going,  they  appreciated 
the  ridiculous  side  of  things,  and  were  not  infrequently 
moved  to  laughter  at  the  bombastic  pretentiousness 
of  their  new  neighbours.  The  Germans  invariably 
preserve  wherever  they  go  their  distinctive  national 
characteristics — their  manners,  customs,  prejudices — 
and  they  seem  as  incapable  of  being  assimilated  as 
of  assimilating.  "  The  self-conscious  isolation  of  the 
German,"  says  Sir  Thomas  Holdich,  "  his  unbending 
belief  in  his  own  high  destiny,  added  to  a  certain  want 
of  the  magnetic  attraction  due  to  perfect  tact  and 
manners,  militates  against  his  success  as  a  colonist,  as 
much  as  his  tactless  appreciation  of  the  worst  form 
of  Prussia  a  militarism  foredoomed  the  failure  of 
peaceful  administration  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and 
rendered  the  annexation  of  these  two  provinces  a  great 
blunder."  l 

No  wonder,  then,  that  for  a  long  time  the  immigrants 
were  not  received  in  the  native  families,  and  that 
marriages  between  Germans  and  Alsatians  or  Lorrainers 
were  very  rare  ;  so  that,  despite  the  comparatively 
large  immigrant  population  of  300,000  as  against  the 
native  population  of  1,800,000,  there  has  not  been  any 

1  Sir  Thomas  H.  Holdich,  Political  Frontiers  and  Boundary-making  (London, 
1916),  pp.  24,  25. 


180  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

fusion,  or  even  real  contact,  between  the  Schwob  l 
and  the  Welsche  (or  Franzosling)  .» 

The  greatest  deficiency  of  all  in  the  governing  classes 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  is  their  incapacity  to  appreciate  the 
Panger-  spirit  of  the  people,  to  understand  their 
manism.  regrets,  their  hopes,  their  tradition,  and  their 
aspirations.  This  incapacity  is  intensified  by  the 
pangermanists'  reactionary,  autocratic,  and  militarist 
conceptions,  according  to  which  a  conquered  popula- 
tion, if  not  conforming  promptly  and  voluntarily  to  the 
standard  set  before  them,  should  be  subjected  to  the 
drastic  methods  of  a  Procrustean  regime.  Thus  the 
writer  of  an  article  that  appeared  in  the  Elsdsser 
Courier,  a  German  paper  of  Colmar,  makes  the  following 
pronouncement  :  "  Were  I  Emperor,  there  would  be  a 
dictator,  not  a  Statthalter,  in  authority.  No  student 
should  enter  the  University  of  Strassburg  till  he  had 
spent  two  years  at  a  University  elsewhere  in  Germany. 
All  private  schools  should  be  closed,  and  all -public 
schools  should  be  taught  in  German.  There  should  be 
no  public  meetings  in  which  French  is  spoken,  and  no 
private  gatherings  save  in  the  presence  of  a  German 
official.  No  newspapers  should  be  printed  in  French, 
and  each  paragraph  in  French  should  have  by  its  side 
a  German  translation.  Each  citizen,  as  he  comes  of 
age,  should  declare  his  eternal  allegiance  to  Germany. 
He  should  give  his  pledge  not  to  buy  secretly  any 
newspapers,  books,  or  periodicals  in  French.  All  this 
under  pain  of  expulsion  from  the  land."  3 

It  is  this  pangermanism  that  has  throughout  been 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  the  obstacle  to  assimilation,  peace, 

1  An  Alsatian  name  for  a  German. 

2  A  German  name  for  the  anti-German  native. 

3  D.  Frymann,  Ware  ich  Kaiser,  an  article  published  in  the  Elsdsser  Courier 
(Colmar),  as  copied  from  the  Strasburger  Post,  July  191 3  ;  quoted  by  Jordan, 
PP-  32-3- 


REGIME,    1870 — 1914  181 

and  good  understanding,  as  it  has  been  in  Europe 
generally  the  obstacle  to  international  amity  and 
security.  An  Alsatian  writer  emphasises  this  in  no 
uncertain  accents.  "  Pangermanism  is  the  exotic," 
he  says,  "  which  ruins  the  colour  of  Alsace.  ...  It 
is  evident  that  the  only  obstacle  to  the  definite  ger- 
manisation  of  Alsace  is  the  pangermanist  alone,  the 
odious  pangermanist  under  all  his  disguises,  the  pan- 
germanist journalist,  the  pangermanist  functionary, 
the  pangermanist  magnate,  the  pangermanist  peda- 
gogue, the  pangermanist  ecclesiastic,  the  panger- 
manist policeman,  the  pangermanist  higher  officer, 
the  pangermanist  subaltern,  the  pangermanist  indus- 
trialist, the  pangermanist  trader.  There  is  also  the 
feminine  pangermanist,  and  we  have  to  call  on  all  the 
vestiges  of  gallantry  remaining  to  us  from  French 
times  to  induce  us  not  to  speak  of  her.  That  is  all  to 
her  profit.  When  the  last  pangermanist  shall  be  put 
under  the  sod,  on  that  very  day  Alsace  will  find  herself 
germanised  as  if  by  enchantment  and  with  the  best 
grace  in  the  world.  On  that  same  day  we  shall  have 
seen,  sure  as  the  dawn  arises,  the  United  States  of 
Europe,  to  which  the  pangermanists  constitute  the 
sole  obstacle,  the  day  when  international  fraternity 
between  States  will  efface  them  or  leave  them  to  retain 
only  a  conventional  and  administrative  significance."  * 
A  point  of  great  importance  to  note  is  that  these 
pangermanist  aims  and  tendencies  are  resisted  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  even  by  the  German  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers, 
the  immigrants'  sons  who  were  born  in  the  territory  ; 
many  of  them  are  devoted  adherents  of  the  nationalist 
movement.2     This  strong  opposition  to  the  Prussian 

1  J.  Froelich,  Le  pangermaniste  en  Alsace  ;    quoted  by  Jordan,  op.    cit., 
pp.  108-10. 

2  See  the  next  chapter. 


182  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

regime  has  been  persistently  offered  in  Upper  Alsace, 
and  in  its  two  principal  towns,  Colmar  and  Miilhausen  ; 
and  also  in  Eastern  Lorraine,  which  is  Germanic  by 
blood  and  speech.  Indeed,  the  American  writer  to 
whom  we  have  frequently  referred  goes  so  far  as  to 
say,  as  a  result  of  his  personal  inquiries  made  in 
the  Reichsland  in  the  year  before  the  war,  that  the 
political  unrest  there  appeared  to  be  more  freely 
expressed  by  the  inhabitants  of  Germanic  origin  than 
by  those  of  French  blood.1 

In    1874    a    distinguished    Prussian    publicist    and 
writer   issued   a   work 2    in   which  he   examined   the 

German  policy  inaugurated  in  the  conquered 
methods  country,  and  compared  it  with  the  methods 
wittFrench  adopted   by   the   French.     In   view   of   the 

systematic  exclusion  of  the  French  language, 
he  asks  what  part  can  the  French-speaking  Alsatians 
play  in  the  public  life  of  Alsace.  A  language  cannot 
be  imposed  on  a  people,  he  emphasises,  without  taking 
into  consideration  their  antecedents,  sympathies,  needs, 
relationships,  and  the  education  of  generations  ;  the 
obstinate  war  made  by  the  German  Government  on 
the  French  language  will  be  condemned  by  history  as 
a  crime  against  the  most  sacred  rights  of  humanity.3 
He  points  out — with  accuracy  and  notable  impartiality 
— that  the  French  Government,  from  the  annexation 
of  Alsace  to  France  till  the  Revolution,  pursued  a 
different  policy  :  it  respected  the  institutions,  the 
manners,  and  customs  of  the  people  ;  it  left  them 
nearly  all  their  own  laws  and  traditional  usages  ;  and 
it  never  attempted  to  substitute  by  force  French  for 
German.     That  was  why  France  since  1789  obtained 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  41. 

2  G.  Rasch,  Die  Preussen  in  Elsass  und  Lothringen  (Braunschweig,  1874)  ; 
French  translation  (Paris,  1876). 

3  Ibid.,  chap.  xii.  p.  163  (Fr.  ed.). 


REGIME,    1870— 1914  183 

the  cordial  attachment  of  the  annexed  population, 
and  their  devotion  to  French  nationality.  (It  may  be 
added  that,  for  saying  these  things,  the  author  was 
sentenced  to  four  months'  imprisonment,  and  the  book 
was  confiscated  and  suppressed.) 

More  recently  the  German  ministerial  Director, 
Herr  Althoff,  whilst  asserting  (after  the  notorious 
fashion  of  Herr  Houston  Chamberlain)  the  Political 
supremacy  of  his  countrymen  in  every  other  incaPacity- 
sphere,  admits  their  political  incapacity — the  one 
failing.  "  We  Germans,"  he  is  reported  to  have  said 
to  Prince  von  Biilow,  "  are  the  most  learned  nation  in 
the  world,  and  the  best  soldiers.  We  have  achieved 
great  things  in  all  the  sciences  and  arts  ;  the  greatest 
philosophers,  the  greatest  poets  and  musicians,  are 
Germans  ;  of  late  we  have  occupied  the  foremost  place 
in  the  natural  sciences  and  in  almost  all  technical 
spheres,  and  in  addition  to  that  we  have  accomplished 
an  enormous  industrial  development.  How  can  you 
wonder  that  we  are  political  asses  ?  There  must  be  a 
weak  point  somewhere."  This  passage  has  been  cited 
by  Prince  von  Biilow,1  the  German  ex-Chancellor,  as 
an  argument  against  the  institution  of  manhood 
suffrage  in  Prussia  ;  the  German  people,  he  declared, 
are  incapable  of  self-government.  How  can  people 
govern  others,  we  may  well  add,  if  they  cannot  govern 
themselves  ? 

1  Prince  von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  English  translation  (London,  191 6), 
p.  161. 


CHAPTER    X 

VIEWS    AND    ASPIRATIONS    OF    ALSACE-LORRAINE — THE 
NATIONALIST   MOVEMENT 

Protest  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  deputies  in  the  Reichstag,  1874 — Why  auto- 
nomist movement  began — Aim  in  social  and  intellectual  life  of  the 
people — Method  of  the  nationalist  leaders — Differentiation  between 
autonomists  and  protesters — Socialist  party  ;  anti-clerical  campaign — 
Democrats  leave  the  Catholic  party — National  Union  formed,  1910  ; 
its  programme — -Manifesto  against  the  Constitution  of  191 1 — "  Home 
rule"  demanded,  19 13— Before  present  war,  memory  of  1871  fading 
in  Alsace-Lorraine — Did  Alsace-Lorraine  desire  reunion  with  France  ? 
— Noisseville  affair  ;  Saverne  affair — Attitude  of  the  people  towards 
France  and  Germany — Distinctive  personality  of  Alsace-Lorraine — 
The  new  generation  and  France — Doubtful  indications  as  to  feelings 
and  desires  of  the  people — Attitude  of  Alsace- Lorrainers  at  outbreak  of 
the  war — Declarations  of  the  two  Chambers,   19 17 — Conclusions. 

The  first  fifteen  years  of  the  history  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
under  German  domination  may  be  described  as  "  the 
period  of  protest,"  and  the  subsequent  period  may  be 
designated  "  the  era  of  young  Alsace,"  when  the 
autonomist  movement  was  set  on  foot  and  developed, 
the  watchword  being  "  Alsace  for  the  Alsatians." 
First,  then,  as  to  the  period  of  protest. 

On  February  18,  1874,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Reichstags 
a  protest  against  the  annexation  was  submitted,  in 

the  form  of  a  motion,  by  fourteen  out  of 
the  Aisace-  the  fifteen  deputies  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The 
deputies6  in  spokesman  was  M.  Teutsch,  an  Alsatian 
the  Reichs-  advocate.1     He  desired  to  express  himself  in 

French,  but  was  compelled  to  use  German. 
The  declaration  he  read  was  subjected  to  repeated 

1  His   speech  is  reprinted  in  French  in  Patiens,  L' Alsace-Lorraine  devant 
I 'Europe  (Paris,  1894),  Appendix,  Note  B. 


NATIONALIST   MOVEMENT  185 

interruptions,  shouts,  and  sarcastic  outbursts  of 
laughter  ;  and  he  was  more  than  once  called  to  order. 
The  principal  passages  are  as  follows  1  : 

"  The  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  whose  representa- 
tives we  are  at  the  Reichstag,  have  entrusted  to  us  a 
special  and  most  grave  mission,  which  we  are  anxious 
to  fulfil  without  delay. 

"  Your  last  war,  which  terminated  to  the  advantage 
of  your  nation,  undoubtedly  gave  it  the  right  to 
reparation.  But  Germany  exceeded  her  right  as  a 
civilised  nation  in  compelling  France  to  sacrifice  a 
million  and  a  half  of  her  children. 

"  In  the  name  of  the  Alsatian- Lorrainers,  sold  by 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  we  protest  against  the  abuse 
of  force  of  which  our  country  was  the  victim. 

1  "  Les  populations  d' Alsace- Lorraine,  dont  nous  sommes  les  representants 
au  Reichstag,  nous  ont  confie  une  mission  speciale  et  des  plus  graves,  que  nous 
avons  a  coeur  de  remplir  sans  retard. 

"  Votre  derniere  guerre,  terminee  a  l'avantage  de  votre  nation,  donnait  in- 
contestablement  droit  a  celle-ci  a  une  reparation.  Mais  l'Allemagne  a  excede 
son  droit  de  nation  civilisee  en  contraignant  la  France  vaincue  au  sacrifice 
d'un  million  et  demi  de  ses  enfants. 

"  Au  nom  des  Alsaciens-Lorrains,  vendus  par  le  traite  de  Francfort,  nous 
protestons  contre  l'abus  de  la  force  dont  notre  pays  a  ete  la  victime. 

"  Si,  dans  des  temps  eloignes  et  relativement  barbares,  le  droit  de  conquete 
a  pu  quelquefois  se  transformer  en  droit  effectif,  si  aujourd'hui  encore  il 
reussit  a  se  faire  absoudre,  lorsqu'il  s'exerce  sur  des  peuples  ignorants  et 
sauvages,  rien  de  pareil  ne  peut-etre  oppose  a  l'Alsace-Lorraine.  .  .  .  En 
admettant,  ce  que  nous  ne  reconnaissons  pas,  que  la  France  ait  eu  le  droit 
de  nous  ceder,  le  contrat  que  vous  nous  opposez  n'a  pas  de  valeur.  Un 
contrat  ne  vaut,  en  effet,  que  par  le  libre  consentement  des  deux  contractants. 
Or,  c'est  l'epee  sur  la  gorge  que  la  France  saignante  et  epuisee  a  signe  notre 
abandon.  Elle  n'a  pas  ete  libre,  elle  s'est  courbee  sous  la  violence,  et  nos 
codes  nous  enseignent  que  la  violence  est  une  cause  de  nullite  pour  les 
conventions  qui  en  sont  entachees. 

"  Vous  le  voyez,  Messieurs,  nous  ne  trouvons  dans  les  enseignements  de 
la  morale  et  de  la  justice  rien,  absolument  rien,  qui  puisse  faire  pardonner 
notre  annexion  a  votre  empire,  et  notre  raison  en  cela  s'accorde  avec  notre 
coeur.  Notre  coeur  en  effet  se  sent  irresistiblement  attire  vers  notre  patrie 
francaise.  Deux  siecles  de  pensee  et  de  vie  en  commun  creent  entre  les 
membres  d'une  meme  famille  un  lien  sacre,  qu'aucun  argument,  et  moins 
encore  la  violence,  ne  saurait  detruire." 


186  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

"  If,  in  distant  and  relatively  barbarous  ages,  the 
right  of  conquest  was  sometimes  transformed  into  an 
effective  right,  if  at  the  present  day  again  it  receives 
absolution  when  applied  to  ignorant  and  savage  people, 
nothing  of  the  kind  can  be  urged  against  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  .  .  .  Even  admitting — what  we  do  not 
recognise — that  France  was  entitled  to  cede  us,  the 
contract  which  you  impose  upon  us  has  no  validity. 
A  contract,  is,  indeed,  valid  only  by  the  free  consent 
of  the  two  contracting  parties.  Now,  it  was  with 
the  sword  on  her  throat  that  France,  bleeding  and 
exhausted,  signed  our  abandonment.  She  was  not 
free,  she  was  bent  by  violence,  and  our  codes  teach  us 
that  violence  renders  null  and  void  agreements  vitiated 
by  it. 

"  You  see,  gentlemen,  we  find  in  the  teachings  of 
morality  and  law  nothing,  absolutely  nothing,  that 
can  justify  our  annexation  to  your  Empire,  and  in  that 
respect  our  reason  is  in  accord  with  our  feelings.  Our 
hearts  indeed  feel  that  they  are  irresistibly  drawn  to 
our  French  fatherland.  Two  centuries  of  thought  and 
life  in  common  create  between  the  members  of  the 
same  family  a  sacred  bond,  which  no  argument,  and 
still  less  violence,  can  destroy." 

On  the  following  day,  however,  Mgr.  Raess,  Bishop 
of  Strassburg,  made  a  counter-declaration  on  behalf  of 
...       , .,     himself  and  his  co-religionists  to  the  effect  that 

View  of  the  ° 

Bishop  of  they  hadnointention  of  repudiating  the  Treaty 
rass  urg.  o£  Frankfort,  which  was  concluded  between 
two  great  Powers:  "Messieurs,  pour  prevenir  des 
commentaires  facheux,  qui  pourraient  nous  atteindre, 
moi  et  mes  co-religionnaires,  je  me  trouve  en  conscience 
oblige  de  deposer  ici  une  simple  declaration  :  les 
Alsaciens-Lorrains  de  ma  confession  n'ont  aucune 
intention  de  mettre  en  question  le  traite  de  Francfort, 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  187 

conclu  entre  deux  grandes  puissances.  Voila  ce  que 
je  voulais  dire  des  le  debut." 

This  counter-declaration  called  forth  the  next  day 
a  public  letter  from  M.  Pouquet,  the  deputy  for  Sarre- 
guemines,  who  stated  that  the  Bishop  of  Strassburg 
had  spoken  in  his  own  name  only,  and  not  on  behalf 
of  his  co-religionists.  A  warm  controversy  then 
ensued  in  the  newspapers  published  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 
In  the  Journal  a1' Alsace  of  February  21a  communica- 
tion appeared  from  Mgr.  Raess,  who  sought  to  explain 
his  position  and  to  amplify  his  previous  statement. 
The  following  is  the  principal  passage  :  "  As  I  could 
not  purely  and  simply  regard  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
as  being  of  no  account,  and  not  wishing  to  accept  it 
purely  and  simply  in  all  its  consequences,  I,  in  order 
to  preserve  an  open  and  free  field  for  the  discussion, 
chose  ameans  and  an  expression  which,  whilst  respecting 
the  treaty,  would  not  prevent  us  from  bringing  out 
and  attacking  its  deplorable  consequences  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  would  allow  us  to  remain  in  the  Reichs- 
tag to  defend  our  rights  and  effectively  present  our 
grievances  and  our  wishes.  Thus  I  have  kept  within 
the  Christian  and  Catholic  doctrine  which  teaches  us 
in  its  ethical  books,  in  the  apostolic  constitutions  and 
in  the  Syllabus  (of  which  every  one  knows  the  name 
and  only  a  few  know  the  contents  and  value) ,  that  an 
individual  may  not,  at  his  will,  tear  up  treaties  regu- 
larly concluded  between  individuals,  towns,  and  nations. 
All  this  does  not  prove  that  I  have  ever  been  sym- 
pathetic towards  the  annexation  of  Alsace."  l 

At  the  subsequent  elections  in  188 1,  1884,  and  1887 
*'  protesting  "  members,  as  in  1874,  were  sent  to  the 

1  Mimorial  diplomatique  (1874),  p.  152  ;  F.  Klein,  L'Eveque  de  Metz:  Vie 
de  Mgr.  Dupont  des  Loges  (Paris,  1899),  p.  376  ;  cited  by  Hanotaux,  Con- 
temporary France,  Eng.  trans.  (1905),  vol.  ii.  p.  431,  note. 


188  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Reichstag  by  the  annexed  provinces,  notwithstand- 
ing the  pressure  exercised  by  the  German  Government 
to  secure  the  return  of  less  hostile  representa- 
autJnomist  tives.  The  regime  of  repression  was  accord - 
movement  ingly  introduced  in  good  earnest  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  germanising  measures  rapidly 
multiplied.  What  with  the  unsettled  state  of  France 
and  the  pacific  aims  of  French  democracy,  the  Alsatians 
and  the  Lorrainers  came  to  realise  that  their  hope  of 
liberation  from  the  yoke  of  the  conqueror  was  vain, 
and  that  therefore  their  only  political  salvation  lay 
in  the  establishment  of  their  territory  as  an  autonomous 
State  within  the  German  Empire. 

The  formula  "  Alsace  for  the  Alsatians"  gradually 
assumed  a  wider  scope  ;  from  the  sphere  of  practical 
Aim  in  politics  it  was  imported  into  the  various 
social  and     spheres  of  social  and  intellectual  life  of  the 

intellectual       *  . 

life  of  the  population.  The  aim  was  to  preserve  their 
peope'  essential  characteristics,  their  own  individu- 
ality, and  their  particular  cultural  aptitudes  and 
aspirations,  so  that  the  German  attempt  at  ent- 
welschung  might  be  defeated  or  neutralised.  Some 
sections  of  the  people  devoted  themselves  to  the  pro- 
motion of  national  literature,  the  fine  arts,  painting, 
drawing,  engraving,  design,  the  decorative  arts,  archi- 
tecture, and  so  on  ;  the  Alsatian  plays  of  Stosskopf,1 
written  in  dialect  and  performed  by  amateurs,  depicted 
the  contemporary  life  of  the  provinces.  Others 
rallied  round  such  journals  as  the  Revue  Alsacienne 
Illustree,  which  encouraged  contact  with  and  sym- 
pathy for  French  culture — not,  however,  with  a  view 
to  gallicising  the  population,  but  rather  to  graft  on 
the  natural  soil  such  congenial  elements  as  could  be 
extracted  from  the  intellectual,  spiritual,  and  aesthetic 

1   Cf.  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  189 

resources  of  the  former  mother-country  ;  for  it  was 
recognised  that  the  mass  of  the  people  was  of  a  mixed 
culture,  neither  French  nor  German  in  a  distinctive 
sense.  All  these  tendencies  were  manifestly  opposed 
to  the  policy  of  germanisation,  and  fostered  the  spirit 
of  nationalism  or  particularism. 

The  method  adopted  by  the  nationalist  leaders  was 
founded  in  political  opportunism,  which  at  once 
took  cognisance  of  actual  facts  and  conditions    ,,  t.       , 

0  Method  of 

and  implied  no  sacrifice  of  feelings  and  ideals,  the  nation- 
Hence  they  agreed  to  establish  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, as  well  as  in  the  Territorial  Delegacy,  alliances 
with  the  Catholic  centre  and  the  Social  Democrats 
amongst  the  German  parties,  for  the  purpose  of  attain- 
ing certain  practical  aims,  e.g.  the  removal  of  the 
dictatorship,  the  emancipation  of  the  press,  and  so 
paving  the  way  to  self-government  as  the  great  goal. 
And  these  efforts  were  ably  seconded  by  journalists, 
humorists,  and  cartoonists,  who  set  forth  the  claims  of 
the  governed  and  the  ridiculous  pretensions,  together 
with  the  odious  practices,  of  the  governing  authorities. 
The  fundamental  point  of  view  of  the  active  nationalists 
has  been  summed  up  thus  :  "  Whether  our  aim  is 
possible  in  our  life- time  or  not,  that  is  not  our  concern. 
It  is  our  right,  and  so  it  becomes  our  duty  as  free  men, 
to  speak.  A  lesson  of  our  history  is  this.  We  have 
endured  the  Huns,  the  Vandals,  and  the  Pandours,  and 
Alsace  is  still  Alsace.  Let  us  hope  for  better  days,  my 
children  ;  for  the  future,  do  not  forget,  belongs  to  the 
good  God  and  not  to  the  ugly  fellow  who  presides  over 
the  Pangermanist  League."  l 

In  course  of  time  the  autonomists  became  more  or 
less  differentiated  from  the  protesters,  and  a  certain 
antagonism  even  grew  up  between  them  ;  the  latter 

1  Quoted  by  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  113,  114. 


1 90  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

remained  opposed  to  germanism  and  to  the  German 
regime,  whilst  the  former  were  less  uncompromising, 
Differentia-  an(l  were  prepared  to  arrive  at  an  accom- 
tion  between  mo Nation   with   the    Imperial    Government, 

autonomists  i  11         •  •  •  -t      • 

and  pro-  to  act  loyally  in  union  with  it,  and  to 
testers.  make  the  annexed  territory  a  true  and  genuine 
constituent  of  the  Empire  on  the  basis  of  internal  self- 
administration.  This  twofold  division  did  not  remain 
throughout  clearly  defined  ;  political  thought  could 
not  adjust  itself  precisely,  during  the  course  of  its 
development,  to  this  dual  classification.  Different 
parties  arose,  their  groupings  and  composition  being 
somewhat  complicated.1 

At  the  elections  of  189 1  and  1893  the  Socialist 
party,  imported  from  Germany,  made  its  appearance, 
A  and    its    activities    intensified    the    political 

Appearance  c 

of  Socialist  struggles  and  contributed  much  to  modify 
the  clearness  and  simplicity  of  the  former 
issues.  Its  immediate  purpose  was  to  break  up  the 
union  of  Alsace-Lorrainers. 

As  a  result  of  its  establishment  a  violent  anti- 
clerical campaign  was  inaugurated  ;  this  compelled 
Anti-ciericai  the  Catholics  to  f  orm  themselves  into  the 
campaign.  Volkspartei  (popular  party),  which  soon  be- 
came the  Landespartei  (national  party).  The  latter 
asserted  itself  in  1896,  when,  owing  to  the  Reichstag's 
rejection  of  the  elected  candidate,  M.  Poehlmann,  the 
Kreisdirector  of  Schlestadt,  M.  Spiess,  the  former  mayor 
of  the  town,  offered  himself  as  candidate  of  the  Catholic 
party  and  was  elected  by  a  considerable  majority,  in 
spite  of  government  pressure  exercised  against  him. 
At  this  time,  too,  the  Liberal  Democratic  party,  though 
not  yet  properly  constituted,  manifested  its  existence. 

In  1897  the  Democrats  left  the  ranks  of  the  Catholic 

1   Cf.  Wetterle,  op.  cit.,  p.  146. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  191 

party  ;  and  after  this  separation,  another  distinctive 
group  was  established,  viz.  the  Liberals,  who 
were  "  de  nuance  gouvernementale,"  and 
anti-Catholic.  The  elections  of  the  follow-  leave  the 
ing  year  brought  out  the  rivalries  of  the  Capa?ty! 
various  parties  and  combinations  ;  but  on  the 
whole  the  predominating  feeling  was  hostility  to  the 
repressive  regime  of  the  Imperial  Government.  In  all 
these  political  conflicts  religious  dissension  played  a 
great  part  ;  though  about  80  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion was  Catholic,  there  were  among  the  remainder 
vigorous  Protestant  centres  in  the  larger  towns.  Still, 
natives  and  German  immigrants  combined  more  and 
more  in  their  demands  for  autonomy,  which  the 
Imperial  Government  persistently  refused  to  grant,  on 
the  ground  (as  we  have  already  seen)  that  the  pro- 
vinces were  not  yet  sufficiently  German. 

In  19 10  was  formed  the  National  Union,  which 
contained  representatives  of  various  parties,  and 
whose  object  was  to  stimulate  the  native 
population  in  favour  of  the  national  move-  Vnion 
ment  and  against  the  policy  of  germanisation.  i0T^lt' 
The  Liberal  and  Socialist  sections,  however, 
offered  strong  opposition  to  this  new  association.  The 
fundamental  demands  of  the  autonomists  in  general 
have  already  been  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  chapter.1 
The  complete  programme  of  the  National  Union  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  which  was  formally  adopted  on 
June  27,  19 11,  is  an  elaboration  of  these  demands  and 
is  to  the  following  effect  : 

1.  The  constitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be 
that  of  an  autonomous  State  within  the  its  pro- 
German  Empire,  and  should  possess  all  the  gramme- 
rights  of  a  confederated  State  equally  with  the  other 

1  See  supra,  p.  169. 


192  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

constituent   States.     The   guiding   motto    must    be : 
"  Alsace-Lorraine   for   the   Alsatian-Lorrainers." 

2.  In  the  work  of  public  administration  the  officials 
should  speak  the  languages  spoken  in  the  provinces  ; 
they  should  understand  and  take  due  cognisance  of 
the  intellectual  life  of  the  people,  their  traditions,  their 
customs,  and  habits.  More  offices  should  be  given  to 
natives,  though  vested  rights  might  well  be  left  un- 
disturbed. 

3.  Taxes  and  the  national  expenditure  should  be 
diminished  ;  the  budget  of  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be 
used  mainly  in  the  interests  of  the  population  of  the 
territory  ;  and  the  benefits  acquired  by  the  Empire 
from  the  railways  of  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be  shared 
with  them. 

4.  In  the  public  educational  institutions  children 
should  be  allowed  to  learn  French  ;  family  traditions 
and  the  traditions  of  the  country  should  be  respected ; 
and  books  should  not  be  introduced  nor  lessons  given 
which  might  cast  any  disadvantageous  or  deprecatory 
reflections  on  the  ancestors  of  the  scholars  and  their 
parents. 

5.  As  for  the  military  question,  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  should  be  permitted  to  perform  their 
military  service  in  their  own  province  ;  soldiers  should 
be  allowed  to  speak  their  own  language,  and  should 
not  be  compelled  to  substitute  German  for  it. 

6.  The  economic  questions  of  the  territory  should  be 
solved  more  in  its  own  interest. 

7.  The  national  individuality  of  the  country  and 
the  people  should  be  respected,  and  their  right  to 
preserve  and  promote  their  individuality  by  every 
means  should  be  recognised.  Regard  should  be  paid 
to  their  use  of  two  languages,  their  relation  to  two 
different  civilisations,  and  their  desire  to  remain  in 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  193 

contact  with  the  literature,  arts,  intellectual  life,  sports,, 
and  worldly  life  of  the  two  nations  from  whom  they 
derive  so  many  of  their  characteristics.  They  should 
be  at  liberty  to  visit  their  friends  and  relations  who 
emigrated,  and  the  formalities  and  restrictions  imposed 
on  the  latter  during  their  stay  in  the  territory  should 
be  abolished.  They  should  enjoy  the  right  to  pay 
respect  as  they  thought  fit  to  the  tombs  of  the  fallen, 
whatever  flag  they  fought  under.  In  return  for  the 
loyal  submission  of  the  people  to  the  order  established, 
they  claimed  respect  for  their  remembrances  and 
traditions,  and  the  unrestricted  liberty  to  maintain 
them. 

On  June  n,  19 12,  the  National  Union  issued  from 
Strassburg  a  manifesto  directed  against  the  constitution 
of  19 1 1.1     It  declared  that  the  imposing  of 
a    new  constitution  on  the  people,   against  a^st^e 
their  will,  was  a  retrograde  step,  and  brought  constitution 

of  1911. 

them  no  nearer  to  autonomy ;  and  it  demanded 
that  the  country  should  be  placed  on  a  footing  of 
equality  with  the  other  States  of  the  Empire,  for  the 
people  did  not  deserve  to  be  treated  as  an  inferior  race. 
The  exceptional  situation  was  intolerable.  Hence  it 
was  decided  to  establish  a  National  Party  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  with  the  object  of  preserving  the  individuality 
of  the  territory  and  the  people,  and  of  acquiring  the 
position  of  an  autonomous  State  within  the  German 
Empire. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  after  19  n  the  Reichstag  parties 
obtained  considerable  support  from  leading  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers,  e.g.  M.  Hoeffel,  deputy  of  Saverne  ; 
M.  Vondersheer,  deputy  of  Schlestadt  ;  M.  Gregoire, 
deputy  of  Metz  ;  M.  Ricklin,  deputy  of  Altkirch- 
Thann.     M.   Wetterle   severely  censures  the  latter' s 

1  See  supra,  p.  1 70. 
13 


194  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

attitude,  which  is  regarded  as  having  greatly  facilitated 
the  Imperial  Chancellor's  task.1  In  more  recent  years 
the  German  Government  gradually  gained  over  several 
others  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  leaders  ;  and  in  19 17 
(as  we  shall  presently  see)  we  find  that  solemn  declara- 
tions were  made  in  the  Upper  and  Lower  Chambers 
expressing  loyalty  and  firm  adherence  to  Germany. 

In  19 13,  again,  Alsace-Lorraine  asked  for  "  home 
rule  "  ;  thus,  M.  Georges  Weill,  the  Socialist  deputy 
of  Metz,  pleaded  for  it  in  the  Reichstag, 
Lorraine  December  4,  19 13.  Whereupon  it  was 
«sJomef  argued  by  some  Germans  that  the  demand 
rule  "  in  was  made  not  in  the  interest  of  the  territory 
and  its  population,  but  simply  because  of  a 
desire  to  be  on  the  same  footing  with  the  constituent 
States  of  the  Empire. 

At  the  Social  Democratic  Conference  of  Jena,  19 13, 
the  Alsatian  Socialists  present  submitted  a  resolution 
Re  ubiican  claimmg  f°r  their  country  republican  auto- 
autonomy  nomy  ;  this  resolution  was  unanimously  con- 
firmed on  July  5, 19 14,  by  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
Socialist  Congress  held  at  Strassburg. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  before  the  present  war  the 
memory  of  1870-1,  if  not  entirely  obliterated  in  Alsace- 
Before  the  Lorraine,  had  been  fast  fading.  As  a  recent 
present  war  Frencri  writer  observes 2  :   "II  est  d'ailleurs 

memory  of 

1871  fast  trop  vrai  que,  jusqu'a  ces  derniers  temps, 
Aisace-in  la  pensee  de  T  Alsace-Lorraine  et,  en  general, 
Lorraine.  jes  S0UVenirs  de  1870  avaient  grandement 
perdu  de  leur  puissance  sur  les  masses.  Elles  avaient 
applique  a  leurmaniere  le  mot  malheureux  de  Gambetta, 
II  faut  y  penser  toujours  et  n'en  parley  jamais.  Elles 
n'en  parlaient  jamais  et  n'y  pensaient  pas  davantage." 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  125. 

2  General  Palat,  L' Alliance  franco-allemande  ou  la  guerre  (Paris,  1914),  p.  133. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  195 

M.  Jacques  Preiss,  formerly  deputy  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine  in  the  Reichstag,  and  previously  one  of  the 
most  vigorous  protesters  against  the  annexation, 
emphasised  in  an  address  1  delivered  on  February  17, 
19 13,  that  his  countrymen  were  strongly  opposed  to 
war  as  a  means  of  settling  the  question,  that  they  did 
not  desire  their  rights  and  liberties  to  be  defended  by 
violence  or  menaces,  and  that  all  they  wanted  was 
autonomy.  By  way  of  summing  up  our  considera- 
tions regarding  the  autonomist  movement  and  the 
predominating  views  that  were  held  by  the  leaders  of 
political  thought  in  Alsace-Lorraine  before  the  present 
war,  we  may  set  forth  the  following  passages  from  the 
address  referred  to  above  : 

"  Alsace-Lorraine  wants  autonomy.  She  adopts 
the  motto  :  '  Alsace  for  the  Alsatians.'  She  claims 
to  be  put  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other     _ 

r  *  °  Summary 

parts  of  the  Empire.     She   wants  her  own        of  aims 

,  ji  1       •  1    j.*  t-j  and  ideals. 

government  and  her  own  legislative  body, 
both  to  be  independent  in  the  same  degree  as  those  of 
the  Grand-Duchy  of  Baden,  of  Mecklenburg,  and  of 
the  little  principality  of  Reuss,  the  younger  branch. 
She  wishes  to  govern  herself,  to  regulate  her  home 
affairs  in  her  own  way,  to  live  her  own  life,  according 
to  her  characteristic  tastes  and  traditions.  She  wishes 
her  particular  individuality  to  be  respected,  just  as  that 
of  Baden,  Bavaria,  and  the  other  States  of  the  Empire 
is  respected.  We  have  the  same  duties  and  the  same 
burdens  as  the  other  parts  of  Germany,  and  we  ought 
in  common  justice  to  have  the  same  rights  and  the 
same  liberties. 

"  At  home  no  one  listens  to  us,  no  one  understands. 
That  is  why  we  have  decided  to  bring  our  just  claims 

1  See  Bourdon,   L'Enigme   allemande,  pp.   467   seq.  ;     English  trans.,   pp. 
353  seq. 


1 96  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

before  the  pacific  tribunal  of  European  public  opinion, 
which  has  so  strongly  asserted  its  great  ideas  of  justice 
and  solidarity  with  regard  to  the  Balkan  peoples. 
And  no  one  shall  hinder  us  from  expressing  ourselves 
wherever  we  may  think  it  useful  and  necessary.  It 
ought  to  be  known  in  the  civilised  world,  that  in  the 
centre  of  modern  Europe  there  is  an  oppressed  people, 
who,  although  of  an  ancient  and  highly  civilised  race, 
and  passionately  addicted  to  peaceful  industries,  is 
yet  deprived  of  the  essential  conditions  of  a  normal 
and  honourable  existence. 

"  The  German  Empire  holds  Alsace-Lorraine  in  virtue 
of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  concluded  between  France 
and  Germany.  Alsace-Lorraine  has  never  adhered 
to  this  treaty.  Her  word  has  never  been  pledged  in 
favour  of  this'  treaty.  Her  consent  has  always  been 
withheld.  Not  only  has  Alsace-Lorraine  never  ac- 
cepted or  ratified  this  treaty,  but  she  has  formally 
protested  against  her  cession  to  and  incorporation 
with  Germany.  These  are  the  plain  and  simple 
facts. 

"  There  are  jurists  who  declare  with  much  learning 
that  all  that  counts  for  nothing,  that  there  is  no 
Alsatian  question,  that  it  has  been  definitively  settled 
by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  Let  us  leave  these  good 
people  to  their  gentle  babblings  and  stick  to  facts. 
The  protest  of  Bordeaux  and  Berlin  is  an  historical 
fact.  This  historical  fact  is  so  clear,  so  striking,  so 
dazzling,  and  so  charged  with  moral  significance, 
that  in  any  case  it  would  need  an  equivalent  act  on 
the  part  of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  an  equally 
clear,  obvious,  and  open  manifestation,  showing  a 
will  and  sentiments  entirely  opposed,  in  order  to 
efface  it  and  blot  it  out  of  our  history.  .  .  . 

"  Let  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  then,  be  con- 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  197 

suited  as  to  their  nationality,  and,  provided  they  have 
a  free  vote,  we  shall  accept  this  as  a  sovereign  decree. 
.  .  .  Above  all  written  law  and  formal  treaties  imposed 
by  force  of  arms,  there  is  the  natural  right  of  a  people 
to  decide  its  own  nationality.  .  .  ." 

It  is  to  be  observed  that,  in  view  of  the  earlier 
portion  of  this  extract,  the  later  passage  as  to  choice 
of  nationality  does  not  appear  to  mean  a  choice  as 
between  French  and  German  nationality,  i.e.  between 
remaining  a  part  of  the  German  Empire  or  returning 
to  France,  but  a  choice  as  between  the  existing  position 
of  the  Reichsland  and  the  status  of  a  confederate 
State  of  the  German  Empire,  with  all  the  rights  of 
autonomy  and  self-government.  An  ardent  Alsatian 
patriot  like  M.  Wetter le  1  holds  that  this  autonomy 
aimed  at  is  to  be  only  a  stepping-stone  to  another 
goal,  namely,  reunion  with  France  ;  others  look  upon 
it  as  an  advance  towards  the  achievement  of  complete 
independence.  But  whether  or  no  this  be  the  real 
view  at  present  of  the  majority  of  the  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers,  there  is  no  evidence  that  such  was  their 
view  before  the  present  war. 

The  measures  of  repression  adopted  by  the  Imperial 
Government  and  the  brutal  proceedings  of  the  German 
officials  in  Alsace-Lorraine  no  doubt  alienated  Did  Alsace. 
the  people,  and  turned  many  of  them  to  Lorraine 
France.  But  there  is  no  doubt  also  that  umonwith 
those  who  in  such  circumstances  turned  France? 
their  eyes  to  their  mother-country  fully  realised 
that  it  was  powerless  to  come  to  their  assistance,  and 
that  their  yearnings  and  sentiments  thus  provoked 
were  but  a  natural,  though  ineffective,  reaction  to 
the    oppression    suffered    by    them.     Similarly,    the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  108. 


198  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

occasional  anti-German  outbursts,  e.g.  in  1908  and 
in  19 13,  indicated  the  hostility  of  the  people  to  the 
German  regime  and  the  offensive  militarism  ;  they 
were  not  necessarily  manifestations  of  a  widespread 
determination  or  even  desire  to  effect  a  reunion  with 
France.  Warm  sympathies  and  cherished  recollec- 
tions connected  with  France  were  evoked  ;  but  we 
cannot  conclude  therefrom  that  the  predominant 
aim  of  the  people  as  a  whole  was  to  bring  about  an 
incorporation  with  France. 

Thus  in  1908,  in  the  case  of  the  Noisseville  affair, 
when  Count  Zeppelin,  the  Statthalter,  authorised  the 
Noisseville  erection  of  a  monument  to  French  soldiers 
affair.  W^Q  fen  at  Noisseville,  large  masses  of  the 
Lorraine  people  assembled  to  witness  the  dedication, 
sang  the  Marseillaise,  and  otherwise  gave  vent  to 
sympathy  for  their  former  country.  That  the  Ger- 
mans were  a  little  alarmed  at  this  manifestation  and 
much  more  irritated  thereby  is  not  surprising  ;  that 
they  determined  to  tighten  their  grip  on  the  territory 
and  to  wean  the  people  from  francophil  tendencies  by 
all  manner  of  severe  measures  is  true  ;  but  the  con- 
clusion drawn  from  this  incident  by  certain  Alsace- 
Lorraine  patriots  is  scarcely  warranted. 

Again,  in  19 13,  in  the  Saverne  (Zabern)  affair,  when 
a  Prussian  subaltern  aroused  the  hostility  of  the  local 
Saveme  population  by  abusing  Alsatians  before  his 
affair.  men,  the  general  indignation  excited  was 
against  the  insolent  and  contemptuous  attitude  of  the 
Prussian  military  hierarchy,  and  merely  showed  that 
the  germanisation  of  the  people  was  by  no  means 
achieved  and  that  their  subjection  was  not  acquiesced 
in.  Indeed,  it  was  incidents  like  this  that  provoked 
the  disaffection  and  resistance  of  the  people  much 
more  acutely  than  did  the  systematic  measures  adopted 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  199 

by  the  Imperial  Government  for  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing about  the  entwelschung  of  the  provinces.  No 
wonder,  then,  that  Herr  von  Jagow  afterwards  ob- 
served, in  a  letter  that  was  made  public  :  "  The  officers 
stationed  in  Alsace-Lorraine  have  the  impression  of 
living  in  an  enemy  country."  Officers  swollen  with 
arrogance  and  haughtiness,  and  nourishing  a  profound 
contempt  for  civilians,  will  always  find  themselves  in 
an  enemy  country  wherever  there  are  traditions  of 
liberty  and  equality  before  the  law. 

The  Alsatians  in  general  have  no  leanings  towards 
the  neo-germanic  culture  or  to  the  German  political 
conservatism ;  they  are  democratic  and  Attitude  of 
republican  in  temperament,  and  opposed  to  the  people 
the  regime  of  paternalism,  and  everything  in  France  and 
the  German  polity  that  savours  of  the  ancien  Germany- 
regime  and  dynastic  loyalism,  and  demands  sub- 
servience to  officialdom  and  militarism.1  It  is  the 
arrogance  and  persecuting  spirit  of  the  conquerors, 
rather  than  what  is  German  in  itself,  that  arouse 
their  antipathy  and  disaffection.  The  peasantry  as  a 
whole  concern  themselves  little  with  the  question 
whether  they  are  more  French  or  more  German, 
or  with  the  questions  of  broader  politics  ;  they  show 
no  enthusiasm  for  problems  of  this  kind ;  what 
they  prefer,  above  all,  is  to  be  let  alone,  to  be 
allowed  to  go  on  in  their  own  way,  and  to  be  less 
interfered  with  in  regard  to  the  exactions  of  military 
service.  They  are  not  really  dissatisfied,  and  not 
hostile  to  the  German  administration,  whose  thorough 
and  systematic  methods  they  appreciate,  as  con- 
ducing to  the  agricultural  as  well  as  to  the  industrial 
progress  of  the  country.     On  the  other  hand,  the  old 

1  Cf  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 


200  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Alsatian  and  Lorraine  aristocracy  and  bourgeoisie  are 
in  favour  of  French  culture  and  the  French  language, 
which  they  endeavour  to  maintain  despite  the  ubi- 
quitous restrictions  imposed.  But  there  have  been 
numerous  defections  among  the  bourgeois  classes ; 
more  and  more  of  them  have  associated  themselves 
with  the  national  movement,  and  have  set  their  minds 
on  national  self-realisation  as  against  any  possible 
amalgamation  with  France.  Thus  we  may  say  that 
the  intimate  feelings  of  the  great  majority  of  the 
population  before  the  present  war  can  be  pretty 
adequately  expressed  by  the  following  three  lines  of 
current  doggerel : 

"  Francais  ne  peux,  (Frenchman  I  can't  be, 

Prussien  ne  veux,  Prussian  I  won't  be, 

Alsacien  suis."  Alsatian  I  am).1 

The  agitation  to  return  to  France  was  temporary 

and  restricted.     The  "  Ligue  Patriotique  "  established 

in  Strassburg,  with  the  object  of  effecting 

Agitation  to  r  U.  •  a.       x? 

return  to  the  restoration  ot  the  provinces  to  b  ranee, 
temporary^  contained  only  a  few  hundred  members,  and 
and  re-  already  in  1894  there  was  very  little  active 
propaganda  ;  so  that  its  fundamental  aim 
assumed  the  form  of  a  mere  vceu,  or  pious  aspira- 
tion. Writing  in  19 15,  MM.  Lichtenberger — anti- 
German  as  they  are — express  a  doubt  whether  the 
Alsatians,  if  given  the  choice,  would  prefer  French  to 
German  administration.8 

It  is  necessary  to  take  cognisance  of  the  fact  that, 
notwithstanding  occasional  anti-German  ebullitions, 
Position  of  ^e  mass  °f  the  people  have  fallen  into  line 
the  mass  of  with  the  German  regime  and  have  taken 
e  peope'  full  advantage  of  the  benefits  it  offered.  To 
mention  but  one  instance  :    "  Is  it  not  a  noteworthy 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  83.  2  Op.  cit.,  p.  87. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  201 

sign,"  asks  Karl  Blind,  "  that  in  these  once  French 
provinces — which  are  situated  inland,  high  up  in  the 
south  of  Germany — the  number  of  seamen,  cadets, 
and  officers  who  have,  of  their  own  free  will,  entered 
the  German  fleet  should  have  risen  during  the  last 
eight  years  [1884-1902]  from  145  to  1,750  ?  This 
number  is  nearly  twice  that  which  would  correspond 
to  the  number  of  the  population  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
as  compared  with  the  remainder  of  Germany."  * 

The  French  Socialist  deputy,  M.  Sembat,  who  is 
well  acquainted  with  the  popular  tide  of  feeling, 
doubted  in  19 13  whether  Alsace-Lorraine 
was  anxious  to  be  restored  to  France  at  all.  Aisace- 
He  points  out  that,  with  the  passing  of  time,  a^ forty 
great  material  and  moral  modifications  have      years.  of 

,,,,..,  .  ,  annexation. 

been  brought  about  in  the  territory  ;  that 
the  constant  influx  of  immigrants,  who  are  not  all 
detested  by  the  native  population,  has  inevitably 
made  a  profound  difference.  He  emphasises  that  a 
distinction  must  be  drawn  between  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
of  to-day  and  that  of  187 1,  that  the  temper  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  forty  years  after  the  annexation  is  not  to 
be  judged  from  the  charlatanism  of  grief  of  the  French 
boulevards,  from  the  barrel-organ  exhibitions  of 
Parisian  alleys,  or  from  the  myths  of  cafe-concerts. 
"  Quelle  est  aujourd'hui  la  volonte  de  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine  ? "  he  asks.  "  Je  ne  dis  pas  de  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine  de  1871,  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine  en  deuil,  a 
genoux,  eploree  et  telle  que  l'eternisent,  en  statues 
de  pierre,  les  sculpt eurs  patriotes.  Je  dis  de  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine  d'a  present,  de  cette  region  si  pleine  de  vie, 
si  active,  si  prospere,  si  industrieuse  et  qui  n'a  rien, 
je  vous  assure,  des  allures  languissantes  et  geignardes 
que  lui  pretent  les  mythes  de  nos  cafes-concerts." 

1  Fortnightly  Review  (1902),  vol.  lxxviii.  p.  259. 


202  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

We  must  recognise  the  truth  that  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, originally  different  in  many  respects,  acquired 
through   their   common   destiny   a   common 
personality   spirit,  and  have  developed,  in  the  twenty- 
of  Aisace-    £ve  years  before  the  present  war,  a  distinctive 

Lorraine.  J  r 

personality,  and  their  own  particular  ideals 
of  nationalism  and  self-government.  Thus  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  neither  French  nor  German  ;  it  is  itself. 
Through  the  failure  to  grasp  this  fundamental  point , 
both  France  and  Germany  have  in  the  past  made 
many  serious  mistakes  and  have  been  misled  by 
unfounded  assumptions  and  grave  misconceptions. 
If  Alsace-Lorraine  has  any  noticeable  affinity  with 
any  neighbouring  country  at  all,  it  is  perhaps  with 
Switzerland.1 

Account  must  be  taken,  too,  of  the  fusion  between 

natives  and  immigrants,  and  of  the  rise  of  the  younger 

generations  in  the  country.     A  considerable 

between       proportion    of   the   immigrants— the   Einge- 

natives  and  wan^erte — are  now  in  the  second  generation ; 

immigrants.  ° 

and  many  of  them  have  contracted  marriages 
with  the  native  stock.  It  has,  indeed,  been  calcu- 
lated that  over  12  per  cent,  of  the  annual  number  of 
marriages  are  "  mixed  "  ;  and  that  28  per  cent,  of 
the  children  born  are  either  entirely  German  or  the 
issue  of  these  mixed  marriages.  It  is  a  mistake 
to  suppose  that  all  these  immigrants  are  bullies, 
arrogant  interlopers,  and  devoid  of  all  agreeable 
qualities.  Even  such  an  ardent  patriot  and  uncom- 
promising censor  of  the  German  regime  as  Maurice 
Barres  sees  fit  to  portray  a  fine  immigrant  type  in 
Asmus,  in  his  novel  Colette,  Baudoche.  Colette  marries 
Asmus  ;    what  is  her  position  thereafter  with  regard 

1  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  p.  76. 


NATIONALIST   MOVEMENT  203 

to  the  contending  claims  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  to 
whatever  revanche  aspirations  may  be  cherished 
in  France  ?  Can  she  desire  war  to  bring  about  a 
liberation  of  the  provinces  ?  The  voice  of  Colette 
Asmus,  says  M.  Sembat,1  has  frequently  been  heard 
in  Miilhausen. 

Moreover,  the  new  generation  does  not  regard 
France  as  its  "  patrie  "  ;  nor,  indeed,  does  it,  for  the 
most  part,  regard  Prussia  or  any  other  State 
whence  the  older  generation  came  as  its  generation 
vaterland.  The  Alsatian-born  sons  of  the  d°regard 
immigrants  consider  themselves  as  Alsatians  ; .  France  as 
and  many  of  them  are  in  fact  vigorous 
leaders  in  the  autonomist  movement.  They  live  and 
think  as  Alsatians,  and  speak  the  Alsatian  dialect.8 
This  assimilation  by  the  new  environment  is  more 
thorough  and  striking  in  the  case  of  the  sons  of  the 
South  German  immigrants  ;  for  there  is  a  far  greater 
kinship  between  the  latter  and  Alsatians  than 
between  the  North  Germans  and  the  Alsatians.  With 
regard  to  the  position  of  this  new  generation  and  the 
question  of  assimilation,  M.  Andre  Lichtenberger 
relates  an  illustrative  anecdote  of  peculiar  significance  : 
At  Strassburg  two  boys — one  an  Alsatian,  the  other 
the  son  of  an  immigrant — began  to  quarrel  in  the 
street.  "You  pig  of  a  Prussian,"  cried  the  first. 
Whereupon  the  other  exclaimed  indignantly,  "  That  is 
not  true  !  My  father  was  a  Prussian,  but  I  am  an 
Alsatian."  3 

Furthermore,   in   our   effort  to  ascertain  the   true 
feelings  and  desires  of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  160. 

2  Cf.  H.  Albert,  in  Renaissance  latine,  October  15,  1903,  p.  70  ;   referred  to 
by  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  167. 

3  Le  Matin,  March  26,  191 1  ;   cited  by  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  p.  167. 


204  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

as  a  whole,  we  must  take  care  not  to  be  misled  by 

various  indications  of  a  doubtful  character. 

indications    First,  there  is  the  question  of  language,  to 

and°dfesixesSS  which  reference  has  already  been  made.1     Of 

of  the         the     total     population    of    Alsace-Lorraine, 

viz.   about   2,000,000    (1,500,000    in    Alsace 

and    500,000    in    the    annexed  Lorraine),  it   appears 

that  only  about  one-sixth   of   them  are    of 

Language. 

French  origin  or  speak  French  or  a  French 
dialect  as  their  mother-tongue.  The  greater  part 
of  the  lower  classes  understand  French  even  when 
they  do  not  speak  it  in  their  homes  ;  whilst  the 
educated  classes  generally,  excepting  the  immigrants, 
speak  French  by  preference.  Thus  before  1870, 
says  Karl  Emil  Franzos,  about  one-third  of  the 
bourgeoisie  of  Strassburg  could  speak  and  write 
French  ;  another  third  did  not  write  it,  but  under- 
stood it  and  spoke  it  more  or  less  ;  the  remaining 
third  used  only  the  Germanic  dialect.  But  at  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  notwithstanding 
a  long  period  of  German  domination,  about  half  of 
its  population  speak  and  write  French,  whilst  a 
quarter  of  its  population  do  not  know  it  at  all.2  Thus 
French  has  advanced  in  many  quarters,  despite  the 
opposition  offered  thereto  by  the  governing  authorities. 
Roughly  speaking,  the  boundary  between  the  French 
and  German  languages  in  Alsace  follows  the  summit 
line  of  the  Vosges.  Herr  Werner  Wittich,  a  professor 
at  the  University  of  Strassburg,  points  out  that  on 
the  whole  the  upper  and  middle  classes  of  the  towns, 
as  well  as  the  gentry  of  the  country,  and  the  people 
of  the  world,  prefer  French  for  their  usual  speech 
and    communication,    though    they    may    speak    the 

1  See  supra,  pp.  38,  123. 

2  Cited  by  Florent- Matter,  L' Alsace-Lorraine  de  nos  jours  (1908),  p.  193. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  205 

Germanic  dialect  to  their  servants  and  workmen. 
We  may  say,  then,  that  at  least  four  languages  and 
dialects  are  spoken  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  viz.  French, 
German,  a  Germanic  dialect,  and  a  French  dialect 
(or  at  least  a  form  of  French  which  differs  very  much 
from  the  standard  French  of  educated  Frenchmen). 
However  this  may  be,  we  cannot  infer  from  this 
distribution  of  languages,  or  from  the  preference 
shown  here  or  there  for  French,  conclusions  as  to 
political  preference  and  attachment  on  the  one  hand,, 
and  aversion  and  disaffection  on  the  other.  For,  in 
the  first  place,  the  use  of  a  language  is  determined 
by  geographical  and  hereditary  circumstances  ;  and, 
secondly,  the  preference  for  French  is  for  the  most 
part  due  to  the  preference  for  French  literature, 
culture,  and  social  life.  The  international  diplomacy 
of  the  past  has  preferred  French  to  German  because 
it  was  simpler,  more  elastic,  more  pleasing,  and  in  all 
respects  more  suitable  for  intercourse,  not  because 
the  government  of  the  French  was  preferred  to 
that  of  the  Germans. 

Nor  can  we  infer  political  preferences  from  the 
character  of  the  names  of  the  inhabitants.  In  certain 
localities,  as  has  already  been  shown,1  Ger-  Names  of 
man  names  predominate  ;  but  it  may  well  inhabltants- 
be  that  many  of  these  names  have  deliberately  been 
adopted  conformably  to  the  dictates  of  prudence  or 
the  exigencies  of  business. 

Another  source  of  error  as  to  the  temper  and  re- 
quirements of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  to  be 
found  in  the  productions  of  imaginative  Novels  and 
literature.  Reference  has  been  made  to  a  poetry  not  a 
certain  novel  of  Maurice  Barres.  But  it  sa  e  gm  e* 
would  be  altogether  unscientific,  to  say  the  least,  to 

1  See  supra,  p.  119. 


206  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

place  too  great  reliance  on  the  constructive  imaginings 
of  novelists  :  it  is  not  the  aim  and  purpose  of  novelists 
and  other  artists  to  portray  a  people,  and  their  cir- 
cumstances, in  general,  but  only  particular  characters 
and  situations,  which  may  well  diverge  far  from  the 
so-called  average  type,  and  the  usual  prevailing 
conditions.  M.  Barres  depicts  in  a  masterly  manner 
the  strength  of  French  sentiment  in  certain  places, 
for  example,  in  Metz  ;  but  he  does  not  deal  with  the 
powerful  autonomist  currents  which  well-nigh  swept 
aside  in  many  parts  of  the  country  the  previously 
cherished  French  feelings  and  predilections.  Nor  are 
we  on  surer  ground  when  we  consider  the  passionate 
outbursts  of  native  poets,  such  as  Edgar  Reyle  of 
Metz,  who  exclaims  in  his  Gloria  Victis  (1908)  : 

"  La  Patrie,  oh  !    c'est  tout  !    quoi  qu'on  puisse  dire. 
C'est  la  mere  commune  et  l'immortel  amour  ; 
Honte  ou  mepris  a  ceux  qui  la  renient  un  jour  !  " 

Again,  the  outpourings  of  the  chauvinistic  journals 

of    the    contending    parties    cannot    be    regarded    as 

representing   a   widespread   public    opinion  ; 

Newspapers.       x  -,•-,  t        ,         t       r 

we  can  readily  understand,  from  our  own 
experience  of  political  journalism  and  pamphleteering, 
that  the  views  expressed  therein  are  frequently  no 
more  than  the  views  of  the  individual  writers,  and  are 
not  necessarily  shared  by  considerable  sections  of  the 
community. 

Further,  one  or  two  writers  have   suggested  that 
the  fact  that  children  and  others  in  Alsace-Lorraine 

sometimes  exclaim  "  Vive  la  France  !  "  serves 
tions  of "  to  show  the  prevailing  sentiment  and  leaning 
France  /"     °^  ^e  people.     It  may  as  well  be  argued  that 

because  Englishmen  occasionally  call  out 
"  Good  old  Ireland! "  therefore  they  are  in  favour  of 
Home  Rule,  or  prefer  Ireland  to  England. 


NATIONALIST   MOVEMENT  207 

Finally,  censors  of  the  Germans  and  partisans  of 
the  French  have  pointed  out  that  the  native  Alsatian 
women  adopt  the  fashions  of  Paris  rather 

*  French 

than  those  of  Berlin.     But  do  they  do  so  to   fashions  of 
mark  their  political  preferences  or  to  indicate 
their  national  grievances  ?     It  is  not  unreasonable  to 
conclude  that  they  do  so  because  the  Paris  fashions 
are  "  smarter  "  and  more  becoming. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  refer  to  the  attitude  of 
Alsace-Lorrainers  at  the  outbreak  of  and  during  the 
present  war.  The  autonomist  movement  Attitude  of 
before  the  war  was  based  on  the  acceptance  Aisace- 
of  the  territorial  status  quo,  and  on  the  recog-  at  outbreak 
nition  that  Germany  was  capable  of  pre-  ofthewar- 
serving  it,  and  that  France  was  and  would  probably 
remain  powerless  to  alter  it  ;  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
was  thus  regarded  by  the  advocates  of  autonomy  as 
incapable  of  abrogation  de  facto,  and  as  recording  and 
sanctioning  a  territorial  adjustment  which  was  a  fait 
accompli.  But  the  declaration  of  war  and  the  acces- 
sion of  powerful  allies  to  the  side  of  France  opened  a 
new  prospect  to  many  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers — a 
prospect  that  had  hitherto  existed,  if  it  existed  at 
all,  in  the  margin  and  not  in  the  focus  of  their  con- 
sciousness. It  seemed  as  though  the  earlier  dream 
of  reunion  with  France  might,  after  all,  become  a 
reality  ;  and  the  steadfast  devotees  of  the  mother- 
country  began  once  again,  and  with  greater  vigour 
and  ardour,  to  declare  their  claims  to  the  world. 

Several  political  leaders  of  the  Reichsland  went 
over  to  France  and  openly  repudiated  their  allegiance 
to  Germany.  The  deputy  for  Metz  in  the  Reichstag, 
a  Social  Democrat  who  had  been  one  of  the  autonomist 
leaders,  fled  to  France  and  announced  there  that  the 


208  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

pays  messin  was  looking  forward  to  reincorporation 
with  its  former  country.  M.  Blumenthal,  the  mayor 
of  Colmar,  also  fled  and  made  a  similar  announcement 
in  regard  to  Upper  Alsace.  The  Abbe  Wetterle,  a 
former  deputy  of  the  Reichstag  and  of  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  chamber,  who  has  recently  delivered  numerous 
eloquent  public  lectures  ardently  advocating  the 
restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  stated  in 
the  Echo  de  Paris,  August  28,  19 14,  that  he  had  been 
in  favour  of  autonomy  because  he  had  neither  hoped 
nor  expected  that  the  provinces  would  be  regained 
by  war ;  but  that,  war  having  broken  out,  the 
whole  situation  was  thereby  at  once  changed,  thus 
making  possible  the  reannexation  of  the  territory  to 
France. 

During  the  course  of  the  war  declarations  were 
made  from  time  to  time  by  representatives  of  various 
Alsace-Lorraine  societies  expressing  a  wish  that  the 
provinces  should  return  to  France.1  Thus  the  Ligue 
Patriotique  des  Alsaciens-Lorrains,  which  was  estab- 
lished in  London  in  November  19 14,  aims  at  "  a  speedy 
reunion  with  France,  so  desirable  and  necessary  for 
historical  and  economic  reasons,"  and  has  issued 
several  pamphlets  in  support  of  its  object. 

Again,  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  many 
Alsace-Lorraine  soldiers  have  deserted  from  the  Ger- 
man Army.  The  Paris  newspaper,  Le  Matin,  of 
August  22,  19 17,  stated  :  "  The  desertions  which  have 
taken  place  since  19 14  in  tens  of  thousands  in  the 
regiments  recruited  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  3,000 
years  of  imprisonment  imposed  in  the  space  of  a 
year  on  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine  suspected  of 
sympathy  for  France,  suffice  to  illustrate  the  feelings 
which  the  two  provinces  cherish  in  regard  to  Ger- 

1  See  Le  Matin  (Paris),  August  22,  19 17. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  209 

many."  Similarly,  M.  Georges  Weill,  a  Strassburg 
Alsatian  who  represented  Metz  in  the  Reichstag, 
asserted,  in  a  lecture  delivered  in  Essex  Hall,  London, 
November  17,  19 17,  that  in  the  few  months  after 
August  19 14  more  than  16,000  Alsatian-Lorrainers 
deserted  from  the  German  Army.1 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  German  proceedings 
and  rigorous  precautionary  provisions  adopted  in  the 
provinces  on  the  eve  of  the  mobilisation  and  Attitude  0f 
after   the   commencement   of   the   war — the  the  German 

.  authorities 

preparation  01  lists  of  suspects,  the  restric-  on  outbreak 
tions  on  free  movement  and  on  the  use  of  of  the  war" 
French  in  conversation,  the  censorship  of  news,  the 
transportation  and  internment  of  many  persons  of 
doubtful  German  loyalty,  etc.2  That  the  military 
authorities  were  alarmed  and  were  determined  to 
apply  the  most  drastic  measures  to  cases  of  hostility 
or  disaffection  goes  without  saying.  Thus,  a  Bavarian 
general  is  reported  to  have  issued  a  proclamation,  at 
the  time  his  troops  were  crossing  the  Rhine,  wherein 
he  observed  :  "  You  are  entering  an  enemy  country, 
and  you  must  bear  yourselves  accordingly."  Simi- 
larly, the  proclamation  of  General  Gaede  at  Kaysers- 
berg  said  :  "  The  country  pleases  me,  but  its  inhabi- 
tants will  have  to  be  destroyed."  3 

On  the  other  hand,  account  must  be  taken  of  the 
pronouncements  made  in  June  19 17  by  both  Chambers 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  affirming  their  desire  to 
perpetuate  their  union  with  the  German  of  the  two 
Empire,  and  emphasising  that  what  the  Cham^™[ 
people  had  before  the  war  been  striving  for 
was  autonomy  within  the  Empire.     Thus  Dr.  Ricklin, 

1  Observer,  November  18,  1917. 

2  See  supra,  p.  175. 

3  Wetterle,  in  Fortnightly  Review,  November  191 7,  p.  799. 

14 


210  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  president  of  the  Second  Chamber,  said  in  the 
presence  of  the  Statthalter  :  "  The  Germans,  and 
in  particular  we,  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
will  never  forget  that  the  Kaiser,  by  proffering  the 
hand  of  peace,  evinced  his  readiness  to  put  an  end  to 
the  calamities,  moral  and  material,  which  have  broken 
in  upon  our  land.  We  bless  every  act  calculated  to 
abridge  the  war,  were  it  only  for  a  day,  and  we  put 
away  from  us  everything  which,  undertaken  ostensibly 
for  the  purpose  of  changing  our  lot,  in  reality  protracts 
the  struggle,  and,  together  with  it,  our  sufferings. 
The  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  its  overwhelming 
majority  did  not  desire  war,  and  therefore  did  not 
want  this  war.  What  it  strove  for  was  the  consum- 
mation of  its  political  status  in  the  limits  of  its  de- 
pendence upon  the  German  Empire  ['  in  seiner 
Zugehorigkeit  zum  Deutschen  Reich'],  and,  that 
settled,  to  resume  its  peaceful  avocations.  In  this 
respect  the  war  has  changed  nothing  in  our  country. 
We  make  this  confession  aloud  and  before  all  the 
world.  May  it  be  everywhere  heard,  and  may  peace 
be  speedily  vouchsafed  us!" 

The  speaker  of  the  First  Chamber,  Dr.  Hoeffel, 
expressed  himself  to  the  same  effect.  The  following 
is  the  principal  passage  of  his  speech  :  "  Alsace- 
Lorraine  in  particular  has  felt  how  heavily  the  war 
presses  upon  us  all;  but  selfless  sacrifice  is  here,  too, 
taken  for  granted.  Our  common  task  has  knit  the 
imperial  provinces  more  closely  together  than  before, 
and  has  also  drawn  more  tightly  their  links  with  the 
German  Empire."  l 

The  Abbe  Wetterle,  however,  maintains  that  the 
above  pronouncements  are  not  representative  of  the 

1  These  passages  are  quoted  by  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  in  Fortnightly  Review, 
September,  1917,  p.  344,  referring  to  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  June  10,  1917. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  211 

opinion  of  the  provinces,  and  therefore  do  not  possess 
the  importance  which  has  been  attached  to  them. 
He  says  that  before  the  opening  of  the  whether 
spring  session,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  these  de- 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  proceeded  to  S  trass-  are  repre- 
burg  in  order  to  obtain  from  the  local  par-  sentatlve- 
liament  declarations  of  loyalty  to  Germany,  and 
that  he  was  accompanied  by  the  Socialist  deputy, 
Herr  Sudekum,  who  was  to  endeavour  to  win  over  the 
extreme  left — eleven  out  of  sixty  deputies.  But 
they  refused  to  associate  themselves  with  the  proposed 
collective  declaration.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  ap- 
proached the  bishops  of  Strassburg  and  Metz  (Mgr. 
Fritzen  and  Mgr.  Bentzler) — ex-officio  members  of  the 
Upper  Chamber— but  could  not  obtain  from  them  a 
pledge  of  attachment  in  the  name  of  their  diocesans. 
*'  The  bishops  thus  refused  to  alienate  themselves, 
by  a  declaration  which  would  have  been  severely  con- 
demned, from  the  sympathies  of  their  subordinates."  l 
(As  to  this  conclusion  we  may  say,  in  passing,  that 
it  scarcely  possesses  logical  cogency,  inasmuch  as  it 
involves  a  begging  of  the  question  :  for  we  are  not 
sure  whether  the  declaration  would  have  been  con- 
demned, and  what  the  sympathies  of  their  subordinates 
were.)  Further,  the  same  writer  points  out  that 
Dr.  Ricklin  is  an  arriviste  and  a  turncoat,  owing 
his  appointment  of  president  of  the  Second  Chamber 
to  the  agrarians  whose  cause  he  had  always  espoused  ; 
and  that  Dr.  Hoeffel  was  an  opportunist  throughout, 
being  one  of  the  senators  directly  nominated  by  the 
Emperor,  and  that  his  speeches  have  not  received 
wide  approval.2  Apart  from  this  personal  stricture  it 
is    true    that    the    Upper    Chamber,    considering   its 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  November  191 7,  p.  796. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  798. 


212  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

extraordinary  composition,1  can  hardly  be  the  inter- 
preter of  popular  views  and  feelings. 

The  only  fair  and  safe  inference  deducible  from  the 
above  account  of  the  secession  of  several  political 
„     ,    .       leaders  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  declarations  of 

Conclusion 

deducible     refugees,  the  precautionary  measures  of  the 

therefrom,      r*       '  '  r+  j_    j     t  j_i         j         •• 

German  Government  taken  m  the  territory, 
the  desertions  from  the  German  Army,  the  proclama- 
tions of  military  commanders,  the  pronouncements 
made  in  the  territorial  Chambers,  and  the  criticism 
thereof  by  ardent  patriots,  is  that  some  people  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  were,  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
desirous  of  being  united  again  to  France,  and  that 
others  were  desirous  of  remaining  within  the  German 
Empire,  especially  if  autonomy  were  conceded  to 
them.  What  the  proportion  of  these  or  those  people  is 
in  regard  to  the  total  population  cannot  be  estimated ; 
whether  the  views  of  the  one  side  or  the  other  repre- 
sent the  views  of  a  decisive  majority  cannot  be  affirmed. 
Moreover,  we  must  take  into  consideration  an 
important  factor  affecting  the  determination  of  these 
views,  viz.  the  vicissitudes  of  the  war  and  the  expecta- 
tions of  victory  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  or  the  Central 
Powers.  No  one  can  imagine  that,  in  the  event  of  the 
overthrow  of  the  latter,  the  native  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  will  deliberately  and  voluntarily  choose  to 
continue  their  association  with  Germany.  On  the  other 
hand,  are  we  justified  in  assuming  that,  if  Germany 
should  eventually  triumph,  those  same  people  would 
still  prefer  to  go  over  to  a  defeated  France  ?  The 
best  way  to  ascertain  the  sense  of  the  population 
is  by  asking,  without  threats  or  pressure,  each  citizen 
to  express  his  true  sentiments  and  wishes  ;  and  the 
best  time  and  circumstances  in  which  to  ascertain 

1  See  supra,  p.  170. 


NATIONALIST    MOVEMENT  213 

this  is  not  when  one  or  other  alliance  of  belligerents 
is  being  worsted  or  has  been  vanquished,  but  when 
neither  side  can  properly  claim  an  outstanding  victory, 
and  when  the  terms  of  peace  can  be  arranged  by 
negotiation  and  compromise  instead  of  being  dictated 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  by  a  victorious  belligerent. 
Thus  it  is  submitted  that  the  most  rational  and 
reliable  guidance  for  settling  the  destiny  of  the  pro- 
vinces is  to  be  found  in  the  preponderating  opinion 
and  wishes  of  the  population  as  they  were  expressed 
for  years  before  the  present  war,  and  not  in  the  un- 
certain, unnatural,  and  temporary  conditions  intro- 
duced by  the  war,  nor  under  the  influence  of  passions 
and  fears  engendered  thereby.  But  if  it  be  thought 
that  the  sense  of  the  majority  of  the  people  may  have 
entirely  or  substantially  altered  for  good  as  a  result  of 
the  present  conflict,  then  it  becomes  necessary  to  ascer- 
tain it  clearly  and  accurately  by  means  of  a  justly 
contrived  plan  1 ;  it  would  be  unfair  and  unsafe  merely 
to  assume  that  it  has  changed  in  a  contrary  direction. 
What  the  desires  of  the  great  majority  of  the  people 
were  before  the  war  we  have  attempted  to  set  forth  in 
the  previous  pages  ;  by  way  of  supplement  we  have 
now  to  consider  the  views  and  feelings  in  France  with 
regard  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  as  they,  too,  existed  before 
the  war  and  after  its  outbreak. 

1   See  infra,  chap.   xvii. 


CHAPTER  XI 

VIEWS  AND  FEELINGS  IN  FRANCE  AS  TO  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Three  phases  of  French  feeling — Revanche  ideal — Evanescence  of  revanche 
ideal  :  contributory  causes — Pacific  policy  of  French  democracy — 
Why  revanche  ideas  were  passing  away — Disturbing  currents  in 
France  since  1871 — France  and  the  question  of  nationalities — Recent 
national  policy  of  France — Von  Billow's  view  of  the  French  temper — 
French  views  after  outbreak  of  the  war — British  view — Why  France 
determined  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine — Whether  recovery  would  be 
"  restoration  "  or  conquest — Status  of  Alsace-Lorrainers  in  France 
during  the  war. 

Of  the  views  and  feelings  in  France  with  regard  to  the 
lost  provinces  there  are  three  phases  :  first,  passionate 

resentment  at  the  laceration  and  a  deter- 
phases  of  mination  to  effect  a  revanche  (that  is,  to 
frennh        "get    even"     with     Germany);     secondly, 

the  evanescence  of  the  revanche  ideal ;  and 
thirdly,  the  sudden  recrudescence  of  this  ideal  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War. 

The  famous  declaration  of  the  deputies  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  in  the  National  Assembly  is  said  to  have 
Revanche  been  drawn  up  by  or  under  the  direction  of 
ideal.  Gambetta.    The  latter,  who  had  proved  him- 

self for  a  space  a  mighty  protagonist  in  the  desperate 
struggle  against  the  invaders,  after  the  annexation 
gave  utterance  to  a  dictum  which  has  been  variously 
interpreted.  His  "  n'en  parlons  jamais,  pensons-y 
toujours  "  has  been  taken  by  some  people  to  be  a 
counsel  of  acquiescence  in  the  accomplished  fact. 
But  there  is  little  doubt  that  he  really  meant  the 

214 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  215 

contrary — viz.  silent  preparation  for  the  day  when 
France  would  be  in  a  position  to  make  her  actions 
speak  louder  than  her  words.  Indeed,  he  emphasised 
that,  failing  the  deliverance  of  the  captive,  there  would 
be  no  peace  in  Europe  and  order  and  revival  in  France  : 
"  II  n'y  aura  de  paix  en  Europe,  d'ordre  et  de  renais- 
sance en  France,  que  le  jour  ou  nous  aurons  delivre 
la  captive.  Preparons-nous  sans  phrases,  et  n'ayons 
jamais  d' autre  pensee  que  la  reprise  de  notre  bien."  l 

Ardent  souls  like  Paul  Deroulede  gathered  round 
them  a  League  of  Patriots  and  persistently  endeavoured 
to  maintain  the  revanche  aspirations  in  the  forefront 
of  the  French  national  life  and  policy.  To  men  like 
these,  whose  longing  for  restitution  was  unwavering 
and  all-absorbing,  nothing  could  possibly  be  an  ade- 
quate compensation  for  the  territorial  spoliation, 
except  the  actual  recovery  of  what  had  been  taken 
away.  The  acquisition  of  new  colonies  could  not  in 
their  eyes  make  up  for  the  loss.  Thus,  Deroulede, 
putting  what  he  conceived  to  be  his  country's  inde- 
feasible national  duty  before  all  projects  of  a  colonial 
policy,  exclaimed  to  Jules  Ferry:  'cMoi,  j'ai  perdu 
deux  enfants  ;  et  vous,  vous  m'offrez  vingt  domes- 
tiques."  Similarly,  masterly  and  eloquent  writers 
such  as  Maurice  Barres  did  much  to  nurture  and 
advance  the  old  ideal.  These  efforts  found  support 
at  the  tribune,  in  the  press,  and  on  the  stage. 

And  so  for  a  long  time  the  wound  remained  open ; 
grief,  rancour,  and  vows  of  retaliation  were  wide- 
spread in  France,  and  were  common  to  all  parties  and 
all  sections  of  the  people.  As  M.  Sembat  says  :  "  Des 
cris  dechirants,  d'abord,  au  moment  ou  le  fer  nous 
coupa  un  morceau  de  nous-memes  ;  puis  d' eclat  antes 
lamentations,  melees  a  des  clameurs  de  haine,  et  a 

1  H.  Galli,  Gambetta  et  I' Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  191 1),  p.  28. 


216  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

des  serments  de  revanche  ;  enfin,  de  longs  et  penibles 
gemissements,  dont  le  temps  assourdit  la  plainte. 
Ces  cris,  puis  ces  clameurs,  puis  ces  plaintes  sortaient 
de  nos  coeurs,  de  tous  nos  coeurs.  Pas  un  Francais, 
pas  un  seul,  du  royaliste  au  communard,  du  cagot  a 
1'athee,  qui  au  lendemain  de  la  guerre  ne  les  ait  pousses 
de  toute  son  ame."  l  The  most  poignant  element  in 
the  disaster  that  gave  rise  to  this  national  passion 
was  the  fact  that  France  had  in  187 1  paid  for  her 
liberation  from  the  invaders  by  the  sacrifice  of  a 
group  of  her  loyal  citizens.3  But  we  can  by  no  means 
be  certain  that,  even  if  the  provinces  and  their  popula- 
tion had  soon  afterwards  been  restored,  France  would 
have  ceased  cherishing  a  hope  of  retaliation,  in  view 
of  the  deep  humiliation  caused  by  her  signal  defeat 
and  the  exorbitant  ransom  of  five  thousand  millions 
of  francs.  The  history  of  the  world  shows  that,  when 
one  State,  relying  on  its  superior  brute  force,  acts 
unconscionably  towards  another,  it  not  infrequently 
sows  the  wind  to  reap  the  whirlwind. 

With  the  passing  of  time  and  the  economic  recupera- 
tion and  growing  prosperity  of  France,  these  revanche 
ideals  began  to  lose  ground  generally  ;   prac- 

Evanescence  °  °  °  ' 

of  revanche  tical-minded  people  recognised  the  uselessness 
and  inexpediency  of  maintaining  their  devo- 
tion to  them,  they  felt  that  the  lost  provinces  could 
never  be  recovered  forcibly  by  France,  which  was 
being  overwhelmingly  surpassed  by  Germany  in  the 
increase  of  population  and  in  military  and  naval 
armament  and  organisation.  Indeed  Gambetta,  who 
died  a  few  weeks  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  made  public,   and  his  opponent  Jules 

1  Faites  un  roi,  sinon  faites  la  paix  (1913),  p.  148. 

2  Cf.  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  217 

Ferry,  were  disposed  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  Germany.  In  certain  limited  circles,  however, 
there  were  still  those  who  adhered  to  the  old  ideal, 
and  at  every  opportunity  gave  vent  to  their  feelings. 
Moreover,  various  public  events,  notably  in  the 
eighties,  stirred  up  France,  and  showed  that  the  anti- 
German  sentiment  was  but  latent,  and  that  contributory 
the  revanche  aspirations  still  possessed  some  causes, 
strongholds  in  the  country.  In  September  1883 
Alfonso  XII  of  Spain  came  to  Paris  on  his  way  home 
after  his  visits  to  the  Austrian  and  to  the  German 
Emperors.  When  it  was  announced  that  the  latter 
had  made  him  colonel  of  a  regiment  of  Uhlans  gar- 
risoned at  Strassburg,  the  taking  of  which  city  was 
being  celebrated  in  an  ostentatious  manner  on  the 
very  arrival  of  Alfonso,  protests  were  made  in  the 
Paris  press,  and  the  King  was  hooted  as  he  drove 
through  the  streets  with  President  Grevy.  At  the 
instance  of  the  Extreme  Left,  General  Thibaudin, 
the  Minister  of  War,  refused  to  meet  "  le  roi  uhlan." 
In  1886,  with  the  advent  of  General  Boulanger,  a 
more  vigorous  military  policy  was  inaugurated,  which 
aroused  a  good  deal  of  enthusiasm  in  France,  and 
alarmed  Bismarck,  who,  regarding  Boulanger  as  the 
coming  dictator  for  a  war  of  retaliation,  asked  the 
Reichstag  for  an  increased  vote  for  the  German  Army, 
and  sought  to  safeguard  his  country  by  the  establish- 
ment of  alliances.  In  April  1887  the  Schnaebele 
incident  produced  a  grave  Franco-German  tension. 
The  arrest  of  the  French  commissary-special,  who 
had  stepped  over  the  frontier  to  effect  a  certain  ar- 
rangement with  the  corresponding  German  official, 
was  considered  an  outrage  in  France,  but  was  justified 
by  Bismarck  before  the  Prussian  Landtag  in  a  speech 
in  which  he  said  it  was  impossible  to  live  at  peace 


218  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

with  so  bellicose  a  nation  as  the  French.  The  whole 
proceeding  was  thought  in  France  to  be  a  trap  laid  by 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  with  the  object  of  provoking 
the  French  to  adopt  such  a  hostile  attitude  as  would 
precipitate  war.  On  the  accession  of  William  II,  in 
the  following  summer,  friendly  overtures  were  made 
to  France,  but  were  not  accepted.  In  February  189 1 
the  young  Emperor's  mother  came  to  Paris  ;  and  her 
visit  to  various  scenes  of  German  triumph  gave  rise 
to  an  outburst  of  anger  in  the  French  press,  which 
showed  that  the  old  fire  was  still  smouldering.  Again, 
anti-German  feeling  was  revealed  in  France  on  the 
conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  entente  in  July 
189 1  ;  and  later,  in  1905,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Franco-German  conflict  in  Morocco.  In  regard  to  the 
latter  affair,  Mr.  Bodley  says  :  "  The  impression  was 
current  in  France  that  Germany  wished  to  give  the 
French  nation  a  fright  before  the  understanding  with 
England  had  reached  an  effective  stage  [the  Anglo- 
French  convention  had  been  signed  on  April  8,  1904]  ; 
and  it  was  actually  believed  that  the  resignation  of 
Delcasse  averted  a  declaration  of  war.  Although 
that  belief  revived  to  some  extent  the  fading  enmity 
of  the  French  towards  the  conquerors  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  the  fear  which  accompanied  it  moved  a 
considerable  section  of  the  nation  to  favour  an  under- 
standing with  Germany  in  preference  to,  or  even  at 
the  expense  of,  friendly  relations  with  England."  1 

The  mourning  figure  of  Strassburg  in  the  Place  de 
la  Concorde  of  Paris  symbolises  the  abducted  daughters 
of  the  Vosges  ;  and  it  is  in  the  presence  of  the  Alsatian 
maid  that  the  boulevards  have  continued  more  or 
less  to  cherish  dreams  of  a  guerre  de  revanche,  of  a 
guerre  d'honneur,  and  have  continued  to  respond  in 

1  Art.  France,  in  Encyclopcsdia  Britannica,  vol.  x.  (1910),  p.  904. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  219 

their  imagination  to  the  traditional  call  of  the  patrie 
mutilee,  and  to  the  supposed  appeal  of  the  lost 
children. 

But,  despite  such  adventitious  and  sporadic  mani- 
festations, the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  French 
people  were  for  a  long  time  before  the  present 
war  sceptical  as  to  such  Alsatian  sympathies,      poiicy  of 
and  were  rather  inclined  to  promote  a  pacific        French 

r  r  democracy. 

policy  and  the  democratic  interests  of  the 
country.     And,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  the  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  them- 
selves had  long  been   doubtful  as  to  the   capacity, 
will,  or  inclination  of  the  mother-country  to  embark 
on  the  perilous  adventure  of  reconquest.     Thus  the 
ideals   and  aspirations  which  the  events  of  1870-71 
had  brought  into  being,  and  which  were  nurtured  for 
some  years  afterwards,  were  beginning  on  all  sides 
to  pass  away  ;    and  what  with  the  autonomist  move- 
ment and  the  era  of  Young  Alsace  inaugurated  in  the 
annexed  provinces,  the  great  majority  of  Frenchmen 
began   seriously  to  doubt  whether  the  lost  children 
would  be  really  disposed  to  return  to  France,  even  if 
they  were  relinquished  by  their  conquerors.     There 
is  a  pretty  general  agreement  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
would  have  been  quite  satisfied  with  the  status  of 
an    autonomous  State   within    the   German   Empire, 
and  was  in  any  case  opposed  to  war  as  a  means  of 
effecting  a  solution  *  ;  so  that  France  came  to  acquire 
the  reasonable  view  that  she  ought  to  be  satisfied,  if 
the  provinces  themselves  were  satisfied.     And  General 
Palat,  writing  in  19 14,  expresses  a  widespread  view 
when   he    says :     "  Pour   notre    modeste    part,    nous 
croyons  que,   si  1' Alsace-Lorraine  etait  satisfaite  de 
cette   autonomic   restreinte,    nous    aurions   mauvaise 

1  Cf.  Sembat,  op.  cit.,  p.  162. 


220  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

grace  a.  etre  plus  royalistes  que  le  roi.  .  .  .  Cette  solu- 
tion, nous  l'accepterions  done  de  grand  cceur."  x 

Why  were  the  old  revanche  ideas  passing  away  ? 
In  the  first  place,  as  we  have  just  pointed  out,  because 
why  ^  was  realise(l  that  Alsace-Lorraine  had  been 

revanche  developing  an  individuality  of  its  own, 
passing  was  striving  to  secure  autonomy  within  the 
away.  German  Empire  with  which  it  was  so  closely 

allied  economically,  and  was  very  probably  unwilling 
for  various  reasons  (which  are  to  be  considered  later  2) 
to  be  placed  under  French  administration.  Secondly, 
account  must  be  taken  of  the  internal  dissensions  in 
France,  the  disquieting  political  vicissitudes,  and  the 
consequent  need  that  was  felt  everywhere  for  securing 
and  cementing  the  unity  of  the  country  on  a  basis  of 
peace  and  progress. 

It  is  circumstances  such  as  these,  says  a  recent 
writer,  that  kept  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
dormant  in  the  minds  of  Frenchmen  :  "  The  distract- 
ing influence  of  civil  quarrels,  colonial  diversions,  that 
vague  terror  of  Caesarism  following  a  successful  war 
which  long  haunted  the  diplomacy  of  the  Republic,  a 
widely  diffused  prosperity  counselling  comfortable 
acquiescence,  the  emasculate  theories  of  internation- 
alists, the  fact  that  the  centre  of  gravity  in  French 
politics  has  shifted  to  a  part  of  the  country  which  its 
immunity  from  invasion  and  its  happy  climate  pre- 
disposed to  an  amiable  materialism — all  these  causes 
contributed  to  keep  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
dormant  in  French  minds."  3  But  this  dormancy 
practically  amounted,  except  in  a  small  minority  of 

1  L' Alliance  franco- allemande  ou  la  guerre  (Paris,   1914),  pp.   145,   146. 

2  See  infra,  chap.  xii. 

3  F.  Y.  Eccles,  Alsace-Lorraine  (Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914-15). 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  221 

cases,  to  evanescence,  if  not  to  non-existence.  These 
exceptional  cases  were  for  the  most  part  the  allies 
of  the  Royalist  and  clerical  parties  ;  but  the  mass  of 
the  nation,  faithful  and  uncompromising  republicans, 
discountenanced  the  revanche  imaginings  for  the 
reason— amongst  others — that  their  effective  applica- 
tion would  almost  inevitably  necessitate  a  revival  of 
monarchical  or  personal  rule.  This  is  the  fundamental 
point  of  view  expounded  in  M.  Sembat's  widely 
circulated  publication,  to  which  we  have  already 
referred  more  than  once.  That  the  fear,  however, 
was  a  mistaken  one,  is  proved  by  the  long  period  of 
war  of  incomparable  magnitude  waged  by  a  united 
French  nation.  But  would  there  have  been  this 
unity,  initial  warlike  determination,  and  subsequent 
righting  persistence  if  France  had  not  been  supported 
from  the  very  first  by  some  of  the  mightiest  Powers 
in  the  world  ? 

It  is  difficult  to  give  an  affirmative  answer  to  this 
question  when  we  consider  the  numerous  disturbing 
currents    in    French    public    life    after    the 
Franco-German  War.    First  of  all,  there  were  currents1?! 
the    reactionary    and    monarchical    projects  sincfi87ie 
associated  with  President  Macmahon  ;    then 
came  the  Boulangist  movement,   with  its  futile  and 
paltry   heroics,   and  its   speedy   collapse  ;    next   the 
Panama   affair  ;    the   Dreyfus   affair,    and   the   anti- 
Semitic  movement ;    anti-clericalism ;    to  all  of  which 
being  added  the  uncertain  gyrations  of  foreign  policy 
(from  1879  to  1894  there  were  no  less  than  fourteen 
changes  in  the  office  of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs). 
The  Dreyfus  affair — with  its  revelations  of  military 
scandals,    the    conflict    produced    between    pseudo- 
patriotism  and  anti-militarism,  and  the  fear  of  re- 
publicans that  it  involved  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 


222  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  army  chiefs  to  introduce  an  ultramontane  regime 
in  France,  whereby  Jews,  Protestants,  and  even  all 
liberals  were  to  be  excluded  from  citizenship — intensi- 
fied the  doubt  in  reasonable  men's  minds  as  to  the 
potentiality  of  the  revanche  policy,  and  the  wisdom 
of  continuing  to  talk  of  a  "  war  of  revenge."  More- 
over, the  anti-clerical  struggle,  produced  by  the 
Dreyfus  affair,  had  also  a  markedly  chilling  effect 
on  Alsace-Lorraine,  with  its  Catholic  population 
amounting  to  80  per  cent,  of  the  total  number.  To 
all  these  circumstances  must  be  added  this  important 
consideration — the  recognition  of  France  that  she  was 
being  hopelessly  outstripped  by  Germany  in  the 
accumulation  of  armies,  warships,  and  belligerent 
resources  generally  ;  due  account  must  also  be  taken 
of  such  matters  as  the  development  of  socialism,  the 
gravitation  of  the  Catholic  party  towards  the  Centre 
party,  the  rise  of  other  parties ;  and,  finally,  we  must 
remember  the  industrial  expansion  and  the  emergence 
of  economic  questions,  together  with  the  indubitably 
predominating  desire  of  the  nation  for  peace. 

Further,   as  one  of  the  ablest  English  writers  on 
French  public  life  and  thought  has  pointed  out,  France 

in  the  pre-war  period  ceased  to  care  about 
the  questkm  the  question  of  nationalities  :  "It  no  longer 
aiities10n"     tr0UDles  itself  on  the  subject  of  nationalities. 

Napoleon  III,  who  had  more  French  tem- 
perament than  French  blood  in  his  constitution,  was 
an  idealist  on  this  question,  and  one  of  the  causes  of 
his  own  downfall  and  the  defeat  of  France  was  his 
sympathy  in  this  direction  with  German  unity.  Since 
Sedan  little  has  been  done  in  France  to  further  the 
doctrine  of  nationalities.  A  faint  echo  of  it  was 
heard  during  the  Boer  War,  but  French  sympathy 
with  the  struggling  Dutch  republics  of  South  Africa 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  223 

was  based  rather  on  anti-English  sentiment  than  on 
any  abstract  theory."  1  The  same  writer  observes 
that  the  debates  in  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate 
on  the  Separation  Bill  (which  became  the  Separation 
Law  of  December  9,  1905,  coming  into  force  January  1, 
1906),  convinced  him  that  the  age  of  theories  and 
ideas  was  gone  in  France.2  He  says  that  the  French 
nation  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  had 
undergone  a  rapid  transformation  of  character.3  The 
electorate  were  affected  chiefly  by  material  concerns  ; 
"  the  strife  of  conflicting  doctrine  was  assuaged  under 
the  more  animating  influence  of  material  interest."  4 
"...  The  idealistic  causes  which  were  at  work  in 
1830,  in  1848,  and  in  187 1  are  never  heard  of  now. 
.  .  .  The  influences,  which  are  now  active,  to  rouse  the 
revolutionary  elements  in  the  nation,  are  the  living 
wage,  the  working  day  of  eight  hours,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  strikes.  .  .  .  The  France  of  the  young  century 
is  not  the  France  of  the  last  years  of  the  old."  5 

To  these  observations  may  be  added  the  testimony 
of  a  leading  French  historian.  Summing  up  the 
recent  national  policy  of  France,  at  least 
till  1909,  M.  Bourgeois  says,  after  pointing  national 
out  the  successful  French  colonial  policy  :  PFranCef 
"...  France  has  shown  great  anxiety  to 
associate  herself  with  all  the  plans  concerted  between 
the  Powers  at  the  two  Peace  Conferences  of  the  Hague, 
and  with  all  efforts  to  prevent  wars  by  arbitration 
treaties,  while  diminishing  by  international  legisla- 
tion their  risks  and  deadly  consequences.  The  restora- 
tion and  development  of  her  resources,  commercial, 
agricultural,  and  colonial,  a  foreign  defensive  policy 

1  J.  E.  C.  Bodley,  art.  France,  in  Ency.  Brit.,  vol.  x.  (igio),  p.  904. 

2  J.  E.  C.  Bodley,  The  Church  in  France  (London,  1906),  pp.  5,  7. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  5.  4  Ibid.,  p.  9.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  10,  12. 


224  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

directed  towards  the  maintenance  of  her  safety  and 
the  Balance  of  Power — these,  and  these  alone,  have 
been  her  general  aims,  her  instinctive  and  national 
policy."  1  Thus  the  revanche  ideas  were  fast  passing 
away.  Speaking  of  the  military  organisation  after 
187 1,  and  the  financial  burdens  on  the  people,  the 
same  writer  observes  :  "  It  is  evident  that  the  sacri- 
fices, once  eagerly  undertaken  by  the  nation  for  its 
safety,  appear  less  urgent  and  more  burdensome  to 
the  more  recent  generations  which  have  not  experienced 
the  danger,  and  are  not  actuated  to  the  same  degree 
by  the  bitterness  of  defeat  and  the  desire  of  revenge."  2 

In  concluding  this  section  of  the  chapter  we  may 
set  forth  the  remarkably  different  estimate  of  French 
aims  and  attitude  recently  made  by  Prince  Bernhard 
von  Biilow,  Imperial  Chancellor,  1904-9  : 

"  The  resentment  against  Germany  might  well  be 
called  the  soul  of  French  policy ;  the  other  inter- 
national questions   are   more  of   a   material 

Von  Biilow's         .  ,  ,  ,,        ,       ,  T ,     . 

view  of  the  nature,  and  only  concern  the  body.  It  is  a 
tender  peculiarity  of  the  French  nation  that  they 
place  spiritual  needs  above  material  ones. 
"  The  irreconcilability  of  France  is  a  factor  that  we 
must  reckon  with  in  our  political  calculations.  It 
seems  to  me  weakness  to  entertain  the  hope  of  a  real 
and  sincere  reconciliation  with  France  so  long  as  we 
have  no  intention  of  giving  up  Alsace-Lorraine. 
And  there  is  no  such  intention  in  Germany.  There 
certainly  are  many  individual  points  in  which  we  can 
see  eye  to  eye  with  France,  and  in  which  we  can  co- 
operate, at  any  rate,  from  time  to  time.  We  must 
always  endeavour  to  preserve  polite,  calm,  and  peaceful 
relations  with  France.     But  beyond  that  we  should 

1  E.  Bourgeois,  The  Third  French  Republic,  in  Camb.  Mod.  Hist.,  vol.  xii. 
(1910),  chap.  v.  p.  133.  2  Jbid.,  p.  97. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  225 

not  pursue  any  will-o'-the-wisp  delusions,  otherwise 
we  may  meet  with  the  fate  of  the  astronomer  in  La 
Fontaine,  who,  while  gazing  at  the  stars,  fell  into  the 
pit  which  lay  at  his  feet,  but  which  he  had  not  seen. 
In  this  case  the  pit  is  called  Le  trou  des  Vosges. 

"  Also,  as  regards  France,  we  must  not  hope  too 
much  from  attentions  and  amenities — the  small 
change  of  international  intercourse.  In  saying  this 
we  do  homage  to  the  proud  patriotism  of  a  great 
nation.  The  resentment  against  Germany  lies  too 
deep  in  the  hearts  of  the  French  for  us  to  be  able  to 
overcome  it  by  cheap  expressions  of  friendship. 
France  was  never  so  hard  hit,  not  even  after  the 
catastrophic  defeats  of  18 12-15,  as  by  the  war  of 
1870-71.  In  France  there  is  no  comprehension  of 
the  fact  that  what  seems  to  them  the  brutal  severity 
of  a  conqueror  was  really  a  matter  of  national  neces- 
sity to  us  Germans.  Perhaps  in  course  of  time  the 
French  nation  will  grow  reconciled  to  the  decisions  of 
the  Peace  of  Frankfort,  when  it  realises  that  they 
were  and  are  irrevocable.  But  so  long  as  France 
thinks  she  perceives  a  possibility  of  winning  back 
Alsace-Lorraine,  either  by  her  own  unaided  efforts 
or  with  the  help  of  others,  so  long  will  she  consider 
the  existing  arrangement  provisional  and  not  final. 

"  The  French  have  the  right  to  claim  understanding 
for  this  feeling  with  which  the  majority  of  the  people 
are  deeply  imbued.  It  is  a  proof  of  a  lively  sense  of 
honour  if  a  nation  suffers  so  keenly  from  a  single 
injury  to  its  pride  that  the  desire  for  retribution 
becomes  the  ruling  passion  of  the  people.  It  is  quite 
true  that  for  many  centuries  France  was  responsible 
for  the  spirit  of  unrest  which  troubled  the  history  of 
Europe.  We  had  to  fortify  our  position  in  the  west 
in  an  enduring  manner,  so  as  to  safeguard  our  peace 
15 


226  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

from  fresh  disturbances.  The  remedy  has  not  been 
altogether  unavailing,  not  only  so  far  as  Germany  is 
concerned,  but  for  the  whole  of  Europe.  .  .  .  We  wish 
to  prevent  the  return  of  such  times  as  those  of 
Louis  XIV  and  of  Napoleon  I,  and  for  our  greater 
security  have  therefore  strengthened  our  frontiers 
against  France. 

"  .  .  .  The  policy  of  revenge  is  supported  by  the 
unshakable  belief  of  the  French  in  the  indestructi- 
bility of  the  vital  power  of  France.  This  belief 
is  based  on  all  the  experiences  of  French  history. 
No  nation  has  ever  recovered  so  quickly  as  the  French 
from  the  effects  of  national  disasters  ;  none  have 
ever  so  easily  regained  their  elasticity,  their  self- 
confidence,  and  their  energy,  after  grievous  disap- 
pointments and  apparently  crushing  defeats.  .  .  . 

"  When  we  consider  our  relations  with  France,  we 
must  not  forget  that  she  is  unappeased.  So  far  as 
man  can  tell,  the  ultimate  aim  of  French  policy  for 
many  years  to  come  will  be  to  create  the  necessary 
conditions,  which  to-day  are  still  wanting,  for  a 
settlement  with  Germany  with  good  prospects  of 
success.  If  we  soberly  realise  this  truth,  we  shall  be 
able  to  adopt  a  proper  attitude  towards  France. 
Indignant  tirades  against  the  incorrigibility  of  the 
French  are  in  very  bad  taste,  as  are  futile  attempts 
to  propitiate  them.  The  German  '  Michel '  has  no 
need  again  and  again  to  approach  the  coy  beauty 
with  flowers  in  his  hand  ;  her  gaze  is  riveted  on  the 
Vosges.  Only  an  acceptance  of  the  irrevocability  of 
the  loss  of  187 1  can  accustom  France  finally  and 
without  restriction  to  the  state  of  affairs  fixed  in  the 
Peace  of  Frankfort.  .  .  ."  l 

The  above  statement  of  the  German  ex-Chancellor 

1  Imperial  Germany,  English  translation  (London,  1914),  pp.  70-74,  86. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  227 

needs  little  comment.  It  is  obviously  an  entirely 
erroneous  estimate,  and  an  extraordinary  misinter- 
pretation of  occasional  and  sporadic  revanche  His  estimate 
manifestations  as  constituting  the  national  erroneous- 
policy  of  France.  There  is  no  doubt  that  pronounce- 
ments like  this  are  meant  to  serve  as  a  justification 
to  the  German  people  of  the  German  Government's 
military  and  naval  preparations  and  as  a  blind — for 
Europe  in  general — to  cover  the  instinctive  and 
insuperable  aggressiveness  of  the  pangermanists  and 
the  German  military  classes.  The  essential  facts  are 
that  Germany  had  long  been  preparing  for  war,  that 
she  was  a  nation  armed  to  the  teeth  and  fully  equipped 
in  every  conceivable  manner,  that  she  was  ready  to 
strike  anywhere  at  a  moment's  notice,  that  her  military 
projects  were  prearranged  in  every  detail  and  were 
to  be  carried  out  according  to  programme  ;  that 
France  did  not  desire  and  was  not  prepared  for  war, 
and  that  she  indeed  took  up  arms  in  August  19 14, 
not  because  she  wanted  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine, 
but  because  she  was  obliged  to  protect  herself  against 
this  German  aggressiveness,  and  was  anxious  to 
remove  the  constantly  growing  German  menace  which 
made  life  on  the  Continent  well-nigh  unbearable.  To 
what  extent  the  old  revanche  ideas  and  feelings  were 
revived  after  the  war  had  thus  been  precipitated  we 
have  now  to  consider. 

At  the  session  of  the  French  Chamber,  August  4, 
19 14,  M.  Viviani  made  but  a  brief  allusion  French  views 
to  Alsace-Lorraine  :  "  L'Allemagne  n'a  rien  as  toLor5£e 
a  nous  reprocher.    Nous  avons  consenti  a  la   .  af*er  ?"'" 

r  break  of  the 

paix  un  sacrifice  sans  precedent  en  port  ant  war. 

un  demi-siecle,  silencieux,  a  nos  flancs,  la   blessure 
ouverte  par  elle." 


228  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

In  November  19 14  General  Joffre  said  at  Thann 
to  the  Alsatians  amongst  whom  he  found  himself  : 
"  Notre  retour  est  definitif,  vous  etes  Francais  pour 
toujours.  La  France  apporte,  avec  les  libertes  qu'elle 
a  toujours  representees,  le  respect  de  vos  libertes  a 
vous,  des  libertes  alsaciennes,  de  vos  traditions,  de 
vos  convictions,  de  vos  mceurs.  Je  suis  la  France, 
vous  etes  1' Alsace  ;  je  vous  apporte  le  baiser  de  la 
France." 

This  declaration  was  confirmed  by  President  Poin- 
care  at  Saint-Amarin,  February  12,  19 15  :  "  Je  viens 
confirmer  aux  populations  d' Alsace  les  declarations 
que  leur  a  deja  faites  le  general  Joffre.  La  France, 
heureuse  d'ouvrir  les  bras  a  1' Alsace  si  longtemps  et 
si  cruellement  separee  d'elle,  ne  doute  pas  que  la 
victoire  n' assure  bientot  la  delivrance  des  provinces 
qui  lui  ont  ete  arrachees  par  la  force  ;  et  tout  en 
respectant  leurs  traditions  et  leurs  libertes  elle  leur 
rendra  leur  place  au  foyer  de  la  patrie." 

On  December  23,  19 14,  at  an  extraordinary  session 
of  the  Chambers,  it  was  proclaimed  that  France  was 
determined  to  fight  on  and  not  lay  down  arms  until 
the  outrage  of  187 1  was  avenged  and  the  provinces 
torn  from  her  by  force  were  reunited  to  her. 

Similarly,  M.  Viviani,  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
on  February  18,  19 15,  reaffirmed  the  resolve  of  France 
to  prosecute  the  war  "  jusqu'a  la  liberation  morale  de 
1' Europe,"  and  demanded  the  return  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine :  "  Depuis  quarante-quatre  ans,  messieurs,  d'une 
facon  permanente  et  plus  vivement,  j'allais  dire  plus 
tendrement  depuis  le  debut  des  hostilites,  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine,  sous  toutes  les  formes,  a  manifeste  son 
attachement  au  foyer  franc ais.  Elle  a  prepare  elle- 
meme,  par  son  heroique  fidelite,  le  retour  a  la  patrie 
mutilee,  si  bien  que,  lorsqu'au  jour  venu,  nous  pourrons 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  229 

pour  ainsi  dire  resserrer  les  bras  autour  d'elle,  nous 
pourrons  dire  qu'elle  nous  est  revenue  non  pas  par  le 
fait  d'une  conquete,  mais  d'une  restitution."  In 
regard  to  such  pronouncements  as  this,  we  may  say 
that  France  may  have  justifiably  held  that  she  had  a 
moral  right  to  endeavour  to  recover  the  lost  pro- 
vinces ;  but  we  must  add,  with  all  due  submission, 
that,  conformably  to  the  evidence  adduced  in  this 
chapter,  the  claim  as  to  Alsace-Lorraine  having  all 
along  prepared  itself  for  reunion  to  France  can  scarcely 
be  substantiated. 

On  June  5,  19 17,  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies 
adopted  the  following  resolution  by  453  votes  against 
55  :  "  Contresignant  la  protestation  unanime  qu'en 
187 1  firent  entendre  a  l'Assemblee  Nationale  les 
representants  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine,  malgre  elle  ar- 
rachee  a  la  France,  elle  declare  attendre  de  la  guerre, 
qui  a  ete  imposee  a  1' Europe  par  1' agression  de  l'Alle- 
magne  imperialiste,  avec  la  liberation  des  territoires 
envahis,  le  retour  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine  a  la  mere 
patrie  et  la  juste  reparation  des  dommages."  The 
following  day  the  French  Senate  too  declared  amongst 
the  aims  of  the  war  "  la  restitution  de  1' Alsace-Lor- 
raine." l 

In  a  government  statement  made  in  the  Chamber 
by  M.  Painleve  on  September  18,  19 17,  it  was  said 
that  "  if  France  pursues  this  war  it  is  neither  for 
conquest  nor  vengeance,"  and  one  of  her  aims  was 
proclaimed  to  be  "  the  disannexation  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine."  2 

The  following  day  M.  Ribot,  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  said  :    "  We  did  not  enter  the  conflict  with 

1  Bulletin    des    informations    parlementaires.     Publications    du    parlement 
interallid.     (No.   i.      i     juillet,   1917.) 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  September  19,  1917. 


230  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

warlike  designs.  For  forty-five  years  we  desired 
peace,  notwithstanding  the  bleeding  wound  in  our 
side.  And  to-day,  after  all  the  French  blood  that 
has  been  shed  during  this  long  struggle  which  was 
imposed  upon  us,  what  do  we  want  ?  Justice.  France 
does  not  wish  to  do  violence  to  any  one.  She  only 
demands  justice.  .  .  .  When  we  demand  before  the 
world  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  we  are  the 
champions  of  violated  right,  and  we  claim  from  the 
world  the  indispensable  preface  to  a  durable  peace, 
namely,  reparation  for  the  injustice  which  was  done 
forty-five  years  ago,  and  which  for  forty-five  years 
has  weighed  upon  the  world.  If  that  is  not  done, 
nothing  is  done.  (Loud  cheers.)  It  would  merely 
mean  a  truce  for  some  years  ;  whereas  we  shall  not 
have  made  all  our  sacrifices  in  vain  if  we  found  peace 
on  what  is  eternal — on  justice  and  right."  f  The 
same  minister  observed  on  October  12,  1917,  that  an 
agreement  by  Germany  to  restore  Alsace-Lorraine  to 
France  is  "  a  condition  precedent  to  a  peace  founded 
on  justice,"  and  he  added  :  "  There  would  be  no 
peace  which  would  guarantee  our  children  from  a 
renewal  of  such  a  terrible  war,  if  the  injustice  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  were  not  repaired."  2 

From  time  to  time  various  other  political  leaders, 
such  as  M.  Barthou,  and  more  recently  M.  Clemenceau, 
have  expressed  themselves  to  the  like  effect.  And 
in  every  case  the  idea  of  holding  a  plebiscite  to  deter- 
mine the  wishes  of  the  population  concerned  was 
repudiated — when  it  was  mentioned  at  all — as  being 
at  once  unnecessary  and  in  the  circumstances  insulting. 

The  French  Socialist  party,  however,  recognised  the 
expediency  and  justice  of  resorting  to  a  referendum 
on  the  ground  that  all  oppressed  populations  were 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  21    1917.  2  Times,  October  15,  1917. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  231 

entitled  to  determine  their  own  destiny,  and  held 
that  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  not  a  purely 
territorial  question,  but  a  question  of  right.  At  the 
Congress  of  December  19 15  the  following  resolution 
was  passed  by  2,759  votes  against  72  and  92  absten- 
tions :  "  Pas  de  paix  durable  sans  que  soit  rendue  aux 
populations  opprimees  de  1' Europe  la  libre  disposition 
d'elles-memes  et  sans  que  soit  retabli  entre  la  France 
et  1' Alsace-Lorraine,  au  nom  d'un  droit  que  le  temps 
n'a  pas  present,  le  lien  que  la  brutalite  de  la  force 
avait  seule  tranche  en  187 1,  malgre  la  protestation 
socialiste  de  Bebel  et  de  Liebknecht  au  sein  de  la 
nation  allemande  elle-meme.  Ce  droit  etabli,  la 
France  saura  se  montrer  pre voy ante  et  juste  en  de- 
mandant a  1' Alsace-Lorraine  elle-meme  d'affirmer  a 
nouveau,  solennellement,  comme  le  firent  ses  repre- 
sentants  a  l'Assemblee  de  Bordeaux,  sa  volonte 
d'appartenir  a  la  communaute  franc aise." 

There  is  no  need  to  give  more  references  to  the 
numerous  and  repeated  French  declarations  on  the 
subject,  which  have  been  consistent  and  British 
unanimous.     This   openly  expressed  aim  of  view- 

France  was  accepted  by  the  British  Government  and 
by  authoritative  spokesmen  here,  who  have  more 
than  once  declared  their  determination  to  support 
France  so  long  as  she  laid  claim  to  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Thus  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  Prime  Minister,  said  on 
October  n,  19 17  :  '■'  However  long  the  war  may  last, 
however  great  the  drain  upon  our  resources,  this 
country  intends  to  stand  by  her  gallant  ally  France 
until  she  has  redeemed  her  oppressed  children  from 
the  degradation  of  a  foreign  yoke."  l  At  the  beginning 
of  19 18,  however,  the  Prime  Minister  made  use  of 
markedly  modified  expressions,  when  he  said  that  the 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  October  12,  1917. 


232  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Alsace-Lorraine  question  will  have  to  come  up  for 
"  reconsideration,"  along  with  other  territorial  ques- 
tions, at  the  peace  negotiations.  And  President 
Wilson  expressed  himself  to  the  same  effect. 

We  see,  then,  from  the  above  pronouncements  that 
France's  resolve  to  recover  the  lost  territories  is  based 
why  France on  ^our  mam  grounds— (i)  to  wipe  away  the 
determined   bitter  humiliation  of  having  been  forced  to 

to  recover 

Aisace-  surrender  a  portion  of  her  country  and 
Lorraine.  pe0pie  contrary  to  their  will,  (2)  to  vindicate 
right  and  justice,  (3)  to  give  effect  to  the  longings  of 
the  "  lost  children,"  and  (4)  to  ensure  the  maintenance 
of  European  peace.  The  first  reason  is  of  course  per- 
fectly intelligible,  and  commends  itself  to  all  who 
possess  any  self-respect  ;  the  second  is  also  admissible 
if  it  be  construed  in  the  sense  of  moral  right  and 
justice,  for — as  we  have  shown  in  an  earlier  chapter  1 
— the  legal  right  and  justice  in  regard  to  the  pos- 
session of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  undoubtedly  on  the 
side  of  Germany  in  the  eye  of  international  law  and 
usage,  through  the  sanction  of  the  deliberately  con- 
cluded Treaty  of  Frankfort ;  the  third  is  question- 
able, as  we  have  already  been  obliged  to  infer  from 
ample  evidence  ;  the  fourth  reason  is  much  more 
questionable. 

With  reference  to  these  grounds  suggested  in  the 

French  claim,  two  points  need  to  be  emphasised— for 

we  must  ever  be  mindful  of  the  fact  that 

Whether 

recovery  the  Allies  have  from  the  first  been  fighting 
^resfora-  on  behalf  of  law  and  order,  and  have  re- 
tion"  or  peatedly  protested  against  the  signal  viola- 
tions of  international  law  committed  by  the 
Germans.  In  the  first  place,  the  French  and  others 
hold  that   the  return   of  Alsace-Lorraine   to  France 

1  See  supra,  pp.  149  seq. 


FRENCH    ATTITUDE  233 

would  be  a  "  restoration  "  and  not  a  conquest,  and 
that  the  provinces  have  never  formed  part  de  jure 
of  the  German  Empire.  Secondly,  it  is  contended 
that  the  German  declaration  of  war  in  19 14  ipso  facto 
abrogated  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  The  second 
point  we  have  already  dealt  with,  and  have  sub- 
mitted that  the  contention  is  legally  untenable.1 
As  to  the  first  point,  we  may  say,  briefly,  that  if 
Germany  consents  to  return  the  provinces  before  the 
Allied  forces  have  militarily  occupied  them,  have 
ousted  the  Germans  from  them,  and  have  deter- 
mined to  take  them  away  permanently,  such  return 
will  amount  to  a  "  restoration"  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  term ;  but  if  Germany  is  compelled,  through 
the  military  occupation  by  her  opponents,  to  give  up 
the  territory,  then  the  acquisition  by  France  thereof 
is  a  result  of  conquest  and  annexation.  Accordingly, 
if  the  formula  "  no  annexation  "  is  accepted  by  the 
belligerents,  it  necessarily  implies  that  Germany  is 
to  retain  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Finally,  a  word  must  here  be  said  regarding  the 
status  of  Alsace-Lorrainers  in  France  during  the 
present  war.  If  it  be  true  that  they  (i.e. 
the  annexed  people  and  their  descendants,  Aisace- 
not  the  German  original  inhabitants  and  ^Sance 
immigrants)  have  always  desired  to  return  during  the 
to  France  and  that  they  have  never  ceased 
to  be  Frenchmen  at  heart,  it  follows  that  the  moment 
they  set  foot  on  French  soil  they  should  be  treated  as 
Frenchmen  and  not  subjected  to  discriminative  regu- 
lations. Thus  M.  Helmer  says  that,  in  view  of  the 
Alsatian  protests  before  the  National  Assembly  at 
Bordeaux  and  the  attitude  of  the  population  of  the 
provinces  for  forty-four  years,  the  "  annexes  "  ought 

1  See  supra,  pp.  151  seq. 


234  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

to  be  considered  simply  as  Frenchmen,  even  before 
the  reunion  resulting  from  victory.1  Similarly,  M. 
Barres  observes  in  the  preface  to  the  latter' s  book  : 
"  II  ne  peut  y  avoir  de  doute  que,  meme  durant  cette 
guerre  et  avant  la  reunion  qu'amenera  la  victoire,  les 
annexes  doivent  etre  consideres  comme  des  Francais."  8 
The  actual  facts,  however,  do  not  correspond  to  these 
views.  Whilst  the  "annexes"  do  not  appear  to  be 
treated  in  France  exactly  like  alien  enemies,  yet  the 
regime  applied  to  them — e.g.  the  insistence  on  the 
use  of  permits  for  residence,  their  internment,  and 
various  other  restrictions — constitutes  such  a  dis- 
crimination as  amounts  practically  to  a  denial  of 
their  alleged  status.  "  Decide ment,"  observes  M. 
Helmer,  "  la  situation  des  Alsaciens  n'est  vraiment 
pas  enviable."  3  No  doubt  precautions  must  be 
taken  in  these  days.  Whether  or  not  it  is  expedient 
to  do  so,  the  actual  treatment  in  France  of  the  "  an- 
nexes "  and  the  theoretical  claims  advanced  on  their 
behalf  are  obviously  incompatible. 

Having  already  given  an  account  of  the  nature  of 
the  Alsace-Lorraine  question,  the  character  of  the 
country  and  people  annexed,  their  history,  the  an- 
nexation in  187 1,  the  claims  of  Germany  to  the 
provinces,  the  German  regime  therein,  the  views, 
feelings,  and  national  movements  in  the  Reichsland, 
the  views  and  aspirations  of  France  before  and  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  we  have  now  to 
address  ourselves  to  our  concluding  task,  viz.  to 
examine  the  suggested  solutions  of  the  question  and 
to  show  which  it  is  best  to  adopt  in  view  of  the  present 
complicated  circumstances  and  conflicting  claims  and 
interests. 

1  P.  A.  Helmer,  France-Alsace  (Paris,  n.d.),  p.  123. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  x.  3  Ibid.,  p.  142. 


CHAPTER  XII 

SOLUTIONS  SUGGESTED  :    (a)  REANNEXATION  TO  FRANCE 

Reannexation  followed  by  referendum  suggested — German  pronouncements 
as  to  Alsace-Lorraine — Forcible  reannexation  not  a  true  solution; 
inherent  difficulty — -Various  other  difficulties  :  Frontier — Grouping  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  within  political  framework  of  France — The  language 
question — The  legal  system — The  industrial  organisation — The  com- 
mercial system— Fiscal  legislation — The  religious  question — The  edu- 
cational system — Position  of  immigrants  and  the  younger  generation — 
The  previous  nationalist  movement — Other  difficulties.  Interregnum 
suggested  for  smoothing  over  difficulties. 

One  of  the  solutions  suggested  as  a  settlement  of  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  question  is  the  reannexation  or  re- 
trocession of  the  territory  to  France.  This  reannexa- 
tion may  assume  one  of  two  forms  :  it  may  be  a 
forcible  recovery,  consecrated  by  the  treaty  of  peace, 
as  a  result  of  a  sufficiently  decisive  victory  enabling 
the  Allies  to  dictate  terms  ;  or  it  may  be  a  voluntary 
cession  on  the  part  of  Germany  before  such  victory 
be  gained.  Each  case  assumes  the  willingness  of  the 
population  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  accept  and  abide 
by  the  result.  For  the  present  we  may  eliminate  this 
element  of  willingness  or  opposition,  as  we  shall 
consider  it  later. 

Reannexation,  without  being  made  subject  to  this 
latter  qualification,  has  been  advocated  and  claimed 
by  many.  Reference  has  already  been  made  Reannexa. 
to   the    official   French    and   British   views,  tion  followed 

by  r6feren- 

Some  Frenchmen — for  example,  M.  Albert  dum  sug- 
Thomas,1  the  well-known  Socialist — have  sested* 
brought  forward  a  modified  proposal,  viz.  that  first 

1   Times,  Jan.  22,  1918,  p.  5. 
235 


236  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  territory  should  be  returned  to  France,  and  after- 
wards a  referendum  should  be  organized  "  under  the 
aegis  of  a  society  of  nations,"  for  ascertaining  the  will 
of  the  population  thus  transferred.  The  intention 
here  is  obviously  on  the  one  hand  to  atone  as  far 
as  possible  for  the  wrong  done  to  France  in  187 1, 
and  on  the  other  to  apply  the  principle  of  the  self- 
determination  of  populations — a  principle  that  has 
recently  been  more  than  ever  emphasised. 

The  main  difficulty  to  be  overcome  is  the  opposition 
of  Germany  ;  for  we  cannot  suppose  that  she  will 
restore  the  territory  voluntarily.  The  Germans  are 
just  as  determined  to  hold  Alsace-Lorraine  as  they 
are  to  hold  Berlin.  To  overcome  this  determination 
by  force  of  arms  will  mean  to  break  the  Central  Em- 
pires into  fragments  and  to  annihilate  the  Germanic 
population.  To  achieve  such  a  result  would  neces- 
sitate such  unspeakably  appalling  slaughter,  destruc- 
tion, and  sacrifice  on  all  sides  as  would  leave  Europe 
a  shambles  and  without  any  population  at  all.  Is 
the  result  worth  the  cost  ?  Only  an  unreasoning 
fanatic  could  answer  this  question  in  the  affirmative. 

However  shallow  and  insincere  German  pronounce- 
ments in  general  may  be,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
_  .     the   reiterated   declaration   not   to   give   up 

Crerman  de-  _  t  *■*  ■* 

termination  Alsace-Lorraine  is  meant  in  grim  earnest. 
nounce°"  Thus  Baron  von  Kuhlmann,  the  Foreign 
restoring t0  Secretary,  said  in  the  Reichstag  on  October  9, 
Aisace-  19 17 ,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Asquith's  speech  at 
Leeds,  September  26,  1917,  asking  whether 
Germany  was  ready  to  restore  what  she  took  away 
from  France  in  1871  :  "  There  is  but  one  answer  to 
the  question — Can  Germany  in  any  form  make  any 
concessions  with  regard  to  Alsace-Lorraine  ?  The 
answer  is,  No,  never.     So  long  as  a  single  German 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  237 

hand  can  hold  a  gun,  the  integrity  of  the  territory- 
handed  down  to  us  as  a  glorious  inheritance  by  our 
forefathers  can  never  be  the  object  of  any  negotiations 
or  concessions.  I  am  sure  that,  whether  on  the 
Right  or  on  the  Left,  you  will  stand  for  that  with 
equal  resoluteness  and  equal  self-sacrifice.  I  am  not 
of  those  who  think  that  a  candid  statement  of  such 
a  fact  might  be  detrimental  to  the  rise  of  a  clear 
and  sincere  will  for  peace.  On  the  contrary,  I  think 
such  a  will  can  only  prosper  and  be  fruitful  on  a 
ground  of  absolute  clearness.  Therefore  I  think  it 
necessary  to  state  emphatically,  with  all  possible 
conciseness  and  clearness,  as  against  all  other  ques- 
tions which  have  of  late  so  markedly  come  to  the  fore 
in  public  discussion,  and  which  have  taken  up  so 
much  space,  that  what  we  are  fighting  for,  and  will 
fight  for  to  the  last  drop  of  our  blood,  is  not  fantastic 
conquests,  but  before  all  the  integrity  of  German 
soil."  J 

Similarly,  a  little  later  during  the  Kaiser's  visit  to 
Rumania,  he  is  reported  by  the  Neue  Freie  Presse 
of  Vienna  to  have  remarked  in  regard  to  M.  Painleve's 
speech  in  the  French  Chamber  :  "  The  maiden  speech 
of  the  new  French  Premier  has  just  been  brought 
to  me.  So  M.  Painleve  wants  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
again  ?     Good  !     He  can  fetch  them."  2 

In  188 1  the  Emperor  William  I  said  :  "  Germany 
would  leave  her  eighteen  army  corps  and  her  42,000,000 
people  on  the  battle-field  rather  than  surrender  a 
single  stone  of  the  territory  won  in  1870." 

It  is  of  interest  here  to  recall  a  statement  made  a 
year  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  by  the 
Berlin  Professor  of  History,  Dr.  Hans  Delbriick,  who 
emphasised  the  absolute  impossibility  for  Germany  to 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  October  11,1917.  2  ibid.,  October  19,  191 7. 


238  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

give  up  the  provinces  or  exchange  them  for  other 
territory,  and  gives  various  reasons  (which  have 
already  been  dealt  with  in  preceding  chapters)  why 
she  insisted  on  the  cession  in  187 1  and  why  she  must 
retain  them.  He  said  to  an  interviewer  that  it  was  a 
mere  waste  of  time  to  discuss  the  question  of  restora- 
tion ;  and  he  is  reported  to  have  expressed  himself 
to  the  following  effect  :  "I  can  conceive  of  no  other 
single  question  within  the  scope  of  international 
politics,  with  the  possible  exception  of  disarmament, 
on  which  the  German  nation  would  chorus  a  more 
thundering  '  No,'  than  of  surrendering  the  conquered 
provinces.  Alsace-Lorraine's  connection  with  the 
Empire  is  the  very  last  word  of  irrevocability.  We 
might  as  well  be  asked  to  surrender  Prussia  as  to 
give  up  the  territory  bought  and  paid  for  at  Grave- 
lotte,  Mars-la-Tour,  St.  Privat,  and  Sedan.  Restoration 
of  Elsass-Lothringen  is  not  debatable  for  us  in  any 
form  whatever.  No  proffer  of  territory  in  exchange 
anywhere  on  the  face  of  the  globe  could  induce  the 
German  Government  even  to  consider  such  a  transac- 
tion. The  anti-German  sentiment  there  is  a  nebulous 
and  vanishing  force.  It  is  kept  up  for  the  most  part 
by  clerical  agitators.  Compare  the  condition  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  in  France  and  in  Germany, 
and  you  will  find,  with  me,  that  it  is  very  likely  that 
these  men  would  be  just  as  anti-French  as  they  are 
now  anti-German  were  the  tricolour  to  supplant  the 
black-white-red  of  Imperial  Germany.  Alsace-Lor- 
raine now  has  a  parliament  of  its  own  under  a  constitu- 
tion which  grants  the  inhabitants  of  the  provinces  the 
maximum  of  political  liberty  and  self-government.1 
France  is  confined  to  Metz  and  the  adjacent  frontier 
regions.     Alsace    and    Lorraine    were    German    long 

1  We  have  seen  in  chaps,  ix  and  x  that  this  was  not  so. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  239 

before  they  were  French.  Our  folk-song  literature  is 
replete  with  songs  of  Strassburg.1  Goethe  attended 
the  University  there.  When  we  took  Alsace-Lorraine 
in  187 1,  we  regained  what  was  our  own.  Why  did 
we  retake  it  ?  Because  the  safety  of  German  territory 
demanded  it.  France  openly  coveted  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine.  What  else  was  the  real  underlying 
cause  of  Napoleon's  war  ?  Alsace-Lorraine  had  to  be 
taken  if  that  part  of  our  fatherland  west  of  the  Rhine 
was  to  be  permitted  to  develop  in  peace  and  safety 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  German  nation.  Sir  Joseph 
Compton  Rickett  tells  us  that  the  restoration  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  would  be  the  end  of  revanche.  .  .  . 
It  would  be  the  very  beginning.  The  French  would 
say :  'If  the  Germans  are  supine  enough  to 
abandon  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  they  will  not  be 
strong  enough  to  resist  pressure  still  further  east.' 
Our  defensive  position,  instead  of  being  stronger, 
would  be  incomparably  weaker  after  we  had  scuttled 
out  of  Metz  and  Strassburg.  We  should  be  in  exactly 
the  same  perilous  military  situation  as  we  were  in 
before  1870.  This  is  a  state  of  things  not  even  the 
most  rabid  Social  Democrat  would  tolerate.  ...  It 
would  be  a  pitiable  politician  and  a  sorry  strategist 
who  would  begin  putting  the  national  house  in  order 
for  the  great  emergency  by  abandoning  the  '  watch 
on  the  Rhine.' 

One  more  German  view  may  be  referred  to — that 
of  Maximilian  Harden.  Writing  early  in  19 16,  he 
said  :  "If  people  think  in  France  that  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  peace  is  possible  only  through  the  restitu- 

1  "  O  Strasburg,  meine  Strasburg 

Du  wunderscbone  Stadt, 
Die  seit  zwei  hundert  Jahren 
So  viel  gelitten  bat." 

2  Daily  Mail,  August  20,  191 3. 


240  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

tion  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  if  necessity  compels  us 
to  sign  such  a  peace,  the  seventy  millions  of  Germans 
will  soon  tear  it  up." 

Many  Germans  are  fond  of  enlarging  on  the  argu- 
ment, referred  to  by  Dr.  Delbriick,  that  their  country 
The  German  paid  with  its  blood  for  the  acquisition  of  the 
Sit  the"'  territory.  To  retrocede  Alsace-Lorraine,  they 
annexation  say,  would  be  an  act  of  treason  committed 
wfthGer-  "  against  those  who  died  for  the  fatherland, 
man  blood,   g^  a  pjea  0f  ^is  ^m(j  js  untenable  ;    it  is 

very  nearly  like  saying  that,  because  a  burglar  lost 
his  life  in  taking  another's  property,  therefore  the 
ownership  of  the  property  must  not  be  questioned 
when  it  is  found  in  the  hands  of  the  burglar's  sons 
or  associates.  Because  our  forefathers  have  shed  their 
blood  for  an  error,  asks  Novicow,  must  we  persevere 
in  that  error  ?  To  do  so  would  mean  to  do  evil  to 
the  living  in  order  to  please  the  dead.  Fidelity  to  the 
ideas  of  ancestors,  if  these  ideas  were  or  have  become 
false,  is  obviously  an  anti-social  attitude.  The  an- 
cestors of  the  present  Germans  burnt  witches  ;  is 
that  a  reason  why  the  Germans  of  to-day  should  do 
so  ?  This  is  not  the  way,  says  the  last-mentioned 
writer,  to  acquire  a  "  place  in  the  sun "  :  it  is 
possible  to  fight  and  kill  and  steal  for  the  purpose  of 
acquiring  a  place  in  the  sun,  and  yet  actually  live  in 
a  fog.1 

However  little  importance  be  attached  to  such 
German  pronouncements  and  arguments  as  those  set 
Difficulty  forth  above,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a 
inherent  in  forcible  retrocession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to 
forcible  re-  France  cannot  be  a  true  solution  ;  for  a  true 
annexation.  solution  necessitates  an  amicable  accommo- 
dation and  voluntary  agreement  of  the  parties  con- 

1  Novicow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  319,  320. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  241 

cerned.  In  the  present  case  there  are :  France, 
Germany,  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  rest  of  Europe 
(more  correctly,  perhaps,  the  rest  of  the  civilised 
world).  If,  by  reason  of  a  decisive  defeat,  Germany 
felt  constrained  to  abandon  the  territory,  her  resulting 
grievance  would  be  a  far  greater  menace  to  the  peace 
of  Europe  than  the  grievance  of  France  proved  to  be 
after  187 1  ;  a  society  or  partnership  of  nations  to- 
gether with  disarmament  agreements  could  not  then 
possibly  be  established  ;  the  existence  of  a  festering 
sore  in  the  very  heart  of  Europe  would  render  im- 
possible frank  and  healthful  international  relationships, 
and  would  perpetuate  those  sinister  shadows,  suspicions, 
and  fears  which  it  is  the  business  of  a  salutary  regime 
to  remove  and  prevent. 

Moreover,  in  addition  to  this  great  difficulty  attend- 
ing a  forcible  restoration  of  the  provinces  there  are 
various  other  difficulties  that  are  incidental       TT   . 

Various 

both    to    this    kind    of    annexation    and    to  other 

11  •  •»«■  1  -1  difficulties. 

amicable  cession.  Many  simple  persons  be- 
lieve, says  M.  Wetterle,  that  nothing  is  easier  than 
the  reassimilation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  that 
French  legislation  may  at  a  single  stroke  of  the  pen 
supersede  the  existing  German  legislation,  that  French 
officials  may  immediately  supplant  the  existing  German 
officials,  and  that,  generally,  a  transformation  may  at 
once  be  effected  as  by  a  magic  wand.  Ardent  en- 
thusiast as  he  is  for  the  restoration  of  the  territory, 
this  Alsatian  patriot  cannot  but  admit  that  the  problem 
is  a  very  complicated  one,  that  the  long  period  of 
German  regime,  legislation,  organisation,  and  systems 
have  set  up  an  ever-widening  barrier  between  France 
and  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  have  caused  their  habits, 
customs,  and  interests  to  diverge — "  s'eloignant  tou- 
16 


242  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

jours  davantage  l'une  de  1' autre  et  creant  dans  deux 
populations,  qui  avaient  perdu  tout  contact  adminis- 
tratif,  des  habitudes,  des  mceurs,  des  interets  diver- 
gents."  x 

The   return   of    Alsace-Lorraine   to  France   within 
its  geographical  limits  as  existing  before  the  Franco- 
German    War    would,    of    course,    mean    a 

Former  r  ' 

frontier  restoration  of  the  former  boundary  between 
France  and  Germany — a  defective  boundary 
that  proved  such  a  stumbling-block  to  the  two  nations 
and  was  more  than  anything  else  responsible  for  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  of  1870. 2  Strassburg  and  Metz 
were,  in  German  eyes,  sally-ports  into  Southern 
Germany,  which  therefore  felt  itself  to  be  at  the 
mercy  of  French  artillery  and  French  invaders.  The 
fact  that  after  their  transference  to  Germany  they 
became  sally-ports  into  France  shows  that  the  frontier 
arrangement  of  187 1  was  defective,  not  that  the 
frontier  existing  before  then  was  good  ;  so  that  to 
substitute  the  former  boundary  for  the  present  one 
is  merely  to  substitute  one  evil  for  another.  The 
truth  is,  indeed,  that  it  is  not  so  much  faulty  boundary 
adjustments  that  prove  to  be  intrinsically  disastrous 
and  fatal,  as  the  accumulation  of  armament  and 
territorial  lust.  However  this  may  be,  the  point 
we  would  here  urge  is  that  the  retrocession  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France  would  involve  the  very  serious 
disadvantage  of  putting  back  again  an  untenable  line 
of  demarcation  between  the  two  countries. 

If  the  provinces  were  returned  to  France,  how  would 
they  be  grouped  within  her  political  framework  ? 
Before  the  cession  of  187 1  they  comprised  three  de- 
partments— Haut-Rhin,  Bas-Rhin,  Moselle  with  parts 
of    Meurthe.      Considering    the    development    of    an 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  290.  2  See  supra,  pp.  138  seq. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  243 

Alsace-Lorraine  personality  and  national  individuality 
during  the  last  half-century  (as  has  already  been 
shown),1  would  it  be  a  satisfactory  and  ex-  Grouping 
pedient   arrangement    to   split   the  territory    of  Alsape- 

*  o  r  j  Lorraine 

again  into  three  minor  departments,  and,  in  within 
view  of  the  profound  divergences  that  prevail,  framework 
to  reinstate  them  in  a  country  where  govern-  of  France- 
ment  and  administration  are  so  highly  centralised  ? 
Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  have  long  held  that  a  status 
of  this  kind  would  be  most  undesirable,  if  not  practic- 
ally impossible.  What  other  bonds  of  incorporation 
could  be  established  ?  The  fundamental  difficulty  is 
due  to  the  conflict  between  the  principle  of  centralisa- 
tion, and  the  principle  of  self-government  for  which 
the  people  have  long  been  striving  and  preparing 
themselves.  MM.  Lichtenberger  observe  that,  as 
Upper  and  Lower  Alsace  have  many  affinities  and 
common  interests,  it  would  be  desirable  to  maintain 
the  existing  Alsatian  unity,  and  effect  a  division  into 
two  departments,  Haut-Rhin  and  Bas-Rhin,  to  which 
the  country  would  soon  accommodate  itself.2  The 
advocates  of  reannexation,  whilst  usually  admitting 
the  great  difficulties  involved,  are  too  much  disposed 
to  gloss  them  over  with  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  and  to 
say  glibly  and  in  an  off-hand  manner,  that  a  proper 
political  adjustment  would  soon  be  effected,  that  a 
satisfactory  accommodation  would  soon  be  arrived 
at,  and  so  on. 

The  language  question  is  another  obstacle.  We 
have  already  pointed  out  that  the  great  majority 
of  the  population  speak  a  German  dialect, 
and  that  in  many  parts  of  Alsace-Lorraine  language 
French  is  neither  spoken  nor  even  known.  <Juestlon- 
M.  Wetterle  himself  admits  that  the  working  classes 

1  See  supra,  chap.  x.  2  Op.  cit.,  p.  89. 


244  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

generally,  who  constitute  the  greater  part  of  the 
people,  now  speak  no  other  tongue  but  their  German 
patois—"  en  etaient  arrives  a  ne  plus  parler  que  leur 
savoureux  dialecte."  l  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
France  would  agree  to  adopt  such  a  policy  as  was 
provided  by  Article  V  of  the  Peace  of  Vereeniging, 
May  31,  1902,  whereby  Great  Britain  consented  that 
Dutch  should  be  taught  in  public  schools  in  the 
Transvaal  and  the  Orange  River  Colony,  if  the  children's 
parents  desired  it. 

The  substitution  of  French  law  for  the  existing 
German  legal  system  would  be  attended  by  many 
The  legal  serious  disadvantages.  It  is  obvious  that,  in 
system.  case  0f  reincorporation,  the  German  law  could 
not  remain  permanently  ;  at  most  it  could  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  force  for  a  given  period — for  the  purpose 
of  making  the  transformation  gradual  and  interfering 
as  little  as  possible  with  the  vested  rights,  the  executory 
contracts,  and  the  material  and  moral  interests  in 
general  of  the  population,  just  as  Germany  allowed 
French  legislation  to  continue  for  a  limited  period  after 
the  annexation  in  187 1,  before  introducing  the  imperial 
law.  Owing,  however,  to  the  much  more  developed 
state  of  the  country  at  present,  the  period  permitted 
would  have  to  be  of  very  considerable  length,  during 
which  the  various  intimate  relationships  between 
France  and  the  acquired  territory  would  be  made 
difficult.  With  regard  to  this  change  of  public  institu- 
tions and  law,  MM.  Lichtenberger  remark  that  the 
problems  as  to  when  French  law  should  be  resumed, 
how  far  German  law  should  be  retained  and  necessary 
exceptions  introduced,  or  whether  French  law  should 
be  introduced  with  special  exceptions,  must  all  be 
solved    "  avec    discernement    et    sans    parti-pris"  8  ; 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  292.  2  Op.  cit.,  p.  112. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  245 

that  for  the  law  of  real  property  and  mortgages  a 
transition  stage  is  indispensable  ;  that  the  various 
associations,  such  as  limited  companies,  co-operative 
societies,  commercial  registers,  should  be  preserved  ; 
and  that  throughout  "  il  faut  proceder  avec  tact,  et 
mesure."  l  It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  very  tight 
knots  will  be  met  with  in  all  these  matters.2 

The  industries  of  the  provinces  have  undergone, 
under  the  German  regime,  a  complete  transformation  ; 
and  their  products  go  for  the  most  part  to  The  indus 
German  purchasers  and  consumers.  The  trial  or- 
labour  legislation  has  been  systematic  and  gamsaion- 
comprehensive,  and  either  differs  considerably  from 
or  has  no  counterpart  in  French  legislation.  In  the 
case  of  the  working  classes  German  social  legislation 
is  admittedly  far  more  progressive  than  the  French  3 ; 
they  enjoy  benefits  that  are  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
French  proletariat,  and  great  numbers  of  them  have 
warmly  espoused  the  social  democratic  cause.  The 
insurance  schemes  for  workmen  have  proved  to  be 
most  beneficial,  and,  as  M.  Wetter le  himself  admits, 
they  have  created  rights  ' '  qui  ne  sauraient  etre  ecartes 
d'un  geste  dedaigneux."  4  Nearly  all  the  German 
immigrants,  with  the  exception  of  the  officials  of  the 
country  districts,  are  found  in  the  towns  :  thus  the 
60,000  immigrants  of  Strassburg  form  about  35  per  cent, 
of  the  total  population  of  the  city ;  in  Metz  there  are 
some  36,000  immigrants  as  against  30,000  natives,  that 
is  55  per  cent,  of  the  population  ;  and  in  the  mining 
district  of  Thionville  in  Lorraine  the  immigrants  form 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  113. 

2  For  the  effects  of  annexation,  see  Phillipson,   Termination  of  War  and 
Treaties  of  Peace,  where  several  chapters  are  devoted  to  the  subject. 

3  Cf.  Jean  Longuet  (a  French  deputy),  in  The  Nation,  January  5,  1918  ; 

P-  456- 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  293. 


246  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

60  per  cent,  of  the  total  number.  The  reannexation 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  would  undoubtedly  mean 
the  expulsion  or  withdrawal  of  this  immigrant  popula- 
tion ;  so  that  serious  economic  disturbances  would 
thereby  be  brought  about.  Furthermore,  an  enormous 
amount  of  German  capital  has  come  into  the  territory, 
especially  for  the  purpose  of  developing  the  mining 
and  metallurgical  industries  x  ;  whether  it  remained 
in  the  country  or  were  expropriated  it  would  constitute 
a  disturbing  factor  in  the  existing  economic  system. 

The  business  circles  in  the  towns  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
as  in  the  towns  of  Germany  in  general,  are  always 
c  m  opposed  to  radical  changes.  It  has  already 
merciai  been  pointed  out  that  in  1909  some  80  per 
cent,  of  the  exports  of  the  provinces  went  to 
Germany,  and  80  per  cent,  of  their  imports  came  from 
Germany  ;  and  that  even  in  regard  to  the  remaining 
20  per  cent.  Belgium — and  not  France — took  the 
first  place.  Thus,  if  Alsace-Lorraine  left  the  German 
Ztollverein  its  commerce  would  suffer  a  great  loss. 
The  commercial  organisation  and  methods  are  essen- 
tially German.  Indeed,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
economic  conditions,  Alsace-Lorraine  is  very  closely, 
if  not  inseparably,  bound  up  with  Germany. 

Till  1895  the  French  fiscal  legislation  was  in  force  ; 
after  that  date  a  complete  change  was  effected.  The 
Fiscal  most    vigorous    opponents    of    German    rule 

legislation.  cannot  but  admit  the  great  improvements 
made  in  the  modes  and  incidence  of  taxation,  as  well 
as  in  the  whole  range  of  industrial  and  commercial 
legislation,  and  recognise  that  all  these  reforms  have 
become  part  and  parcel  of  the  life  and  activities  of  the 
people.  "  Toutes  ces  reformes,"  says  M.  Wetterle, 
"  dont  1' opportunity  et  la  justice  etaient  reconnues  par 

1  See  the  next  chapter  on  the  Franco  German  coal  and  iron  problem. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  247 

une  population  intelligente  et  reflechie,  etaient  entrees 
profondement  dans  nos  moeurs."  x 

The  religious  question,  again,  is  one  of  the  greatest 
difficulty.  We  have  already  pointed  out 2  that  the 
great  majority  of  the  population — indeed  The  religious 
about  80  per  cent. — are  Roman  Catholics,  question, 
that  the  regime  of  the  French  Concordat  of  180 1  still 
obtains  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  that  the  elementary 
schools  have  remained  confessional ;  so  that  in  this 
respect  the  attitude  of  the  people,  devoted  as  they  are 
to  their  religion,  is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  French 
separationist  regime  and  anti-clerical  spirit.  The  great 
teaching  and  charitable  Orders  of  the  Roman  Church 
are  recognised  by  law.  As  the  writer  just  referred 
to  observes,  there  is  an  "  antinomie  totale  entre  les 
habitudes  et  coutumes  de  la  France  et  celles  de  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine."  3  The  crisis  of  the  "  Kulturkampf "  has 
long  ago  passed  away,  so  far  as  these  provinces  are 
concerned  ;  they  remain  attached  as  strongly  as  ever 
to  the  old  traditions  of  worship  and  ecclesiastical 
organisation.  The  Protestant  sections  of  the  com- 
munity, too,  would  be  opposed  to  any  changes  tending 
to  break  up  the  collaboration  between  Church  and 
State,  or  to  interfere  substantially  with  the  prevailing 
conditions.  Even  the  most  vigorous  opponents  of 
Germany  are  agreed  that  an  attempt  to  secularise 
education  and  to  substitute  a  lay  staff  for  the  existing 
congreganistes  would  provoke  the  strongest  resistance. 

Apart  from  this  religious  difference  in  elementary 
education,  there  are  striking  discrepancies  The  educa_ 
between  the  French  and  German  systems  of  tionai 

higher  instruction.     For  example,  in  the  case 
of  the  baccalaureat  the  curriculum  and  the  standard 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  294.  2  See  supra,  p.  40. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  297.     Cf.  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  pp.  116  seq. 


248  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

vary  to  a  very  large  extent  ;  and  the  courses,  methods, 
and  requirements  of  university  studies  in  general 
differ  materially.  Moreover,  various  German  qualifica- 
tions and  diplomas,  having  no  equivalent  in  France, 
have  already  been  acquired  by  students  and  continue 
to  be  awarded  at  the  University  of  Strassburg.  Thus, 
M.  Wetterle  points  out  that,  in  case  of  reannexation, 
it  would  be  found  difficult  to  regulate  the  legal  status 
of  doctors,  solicitors,  notaries,  chemists,  fthilologues, 
referendaries,  and  assessors,  who  possess  German 
degrees.  Furthermore,  in  regard  to  education  in 
general,  due  account  must  be  taken  of  the  fact  that 
Alsace  is  "un  pays  de  culture  mixte,"  *  and  that  its 
very  foundations  are  more  Germanic  than  Gallic. 

In  addition  to  all  these  difficulties,  one  must  mention 
that  created  by  the  position  of  the  immigrants  and 
T      .      .    the   vounger   generation,    who   constitute    a 

Immigrants  J  °  ° 

and  younger  considerable  proportion  of  the  population.2 
genera  ion.  ^ore  ^han  12  per  cent,  of  the  marriages  year 
by  year  are  "  mixed  "  ;  and  nearly  30  per  cent,  of  the 
children  born  are  either  entirely  German  or  the  issue 
of  these  mixed  marriages.  If  the  provinces  were 
wrested  back  from  Germany,  no  satisfactory  adjust- 
ment of  the  position  of  these  immigrants  and  their 
families  could  be  effected  ;  indeed,  there  would  inevit- 
ably be  a  repetition  of  the  emigration  and  expulsions 
of  187 1,  and  consequent  perpetuation  of  grievances, 
resentment,  and  hatred  rendering  impossible  an  amicable 
accommodation  between  France  and  Germany. 

Again — and  this  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  con- 
sequence— the  nationalist  movementin  Alsace-Lorraine, 
as  we  have  shown  fully  in  a  previous  chapter,3  has  taken 

1  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 

2  Cf.   the   official   statistics   given   in   Die   Bevdlkerung   Elsass-Lothringens 
(Strassburg,  1908). 

3  See  chap.  x. 


SOLUTIONS:    REANNEXATION  249 

such  a  powerful  hold  of  the  people  that  it  will  certainly 
be  impossible  to  eliminate  it  by  the  union  of  the 
provinces    to   France    with    her   centralised^ 

17  The  previous 

government  and  administration.  The  people  nationalist 
have  firmly  and  definitely  pledged  themselves 
to  autonomy ;  for  nearly  thirty  years  their  strivings 
and  aspirations  have  unswervingly  aimed  at  that 
object  ;  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  object  could  be 
realised  if  the  territory  were  incorporated  within  the 
framework  of  France  ;  whereas  it  is  capable  of  full  and 
complete  realisation  within  the  framework  of  the 
German  Empire.  Another  solution  consonant  to  the 
autonomist  movement  would  be  the  establishment 
of  entire  political  independence  ;  but  this  solution 
likewise  means  no  reannexation  to  France. 

As  to  other  kinds  of  difficulties  and  differences, 
M.  Wetter le  himself  admits  that  "  la  liste  pourrait 
en  etre  considerablement  allongee."  *   For  ex-  other 

ample,  there  would  be  the  expulsion  of  public  dlfficulties- 
officials,  or  the  special  regulation  of  their  position ; 
many  of  these  are  recognised  by  the  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  as  possessing  conspicuous  ability.2  And 
there  would  be  a  great  variety  of  further  questions  and 
claims,  the  adjustment  of  which  would  undoubtedly 
create  difficulties  through  the  clash  of  conflicting 
interests.3 

In  consequence  of  all  these  difficulties  incidental 
to  reannexation,  it  has  been  suggested  that,  after  the 
return  of  the  provinces  to  France  a  sort  of  interregnum 
interregnum,  or  transition  stage,  with  pro-  sugsested- 
visional  legislation,  should  be  allowed  in  them  for  a 
specified  or  indefinite  period,  in  order  that  the  more 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  298. 

2  Cf.  Lichtenberger,  op.  cit.,  p.  ioo. 

3  For  many  other  kinds  of  questions  that  would  have  to  be  solved,  see 
Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  290  seq. 


250  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

striking  differences  introduced  by  the  German  regime 
might  be  smoothed  over,  the  acquired  rights  and 
interests  safeguarded  as  much  as  possible,  and  the 
assimilation  to  France  facilitated.  But  this  suggestion, 
like  the  entire  proposal  of  reannexation,  fails  to  take 
into  account  two  most  vital  considerations  :  first, 
the  autonomist  movement  established  and  developed 
during  a  whole  generation,  and,  secondly,  whether  the 
population  are  in  favour  of  reunion  with  France  (i.e. 
the  question  of  a  plebiscite).  To  disregard  these  im- 
portant considerations  is  to  revert  to  the  old  arbitrary 
proceedings,  which  are  to-day  condemned  by  all  the 
civilised  peoples  of  the  world  as  being  contrary  to  the 
essential  and  inalienable  right  of  national  self-deter- 
mination. 

Accordingly,  a  plebiscite  must  be  the  condition 
precedent  to  the  adoption  of  any  course  that  can  be 
regarded  as  a  satisfactory  solution  in  the  case  of  a 
people  like  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  who  possess  a  national 
consciousness  and  a  national  individuality.  This  ques- 
tion of  a  plebiscite,  the  reasons  for  resorting  to  it,  its 
use  in  previous  cases  of  annexation,  and  the  difficulties 
involved  in  it  will  be  dealt  with  in  our  final  chapter  ; 
in  the  meantime  we  have  to  consider  certain  other 
proposals  that  have  been  advanced  for  solving  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  problem,  e.g.  the  establishment  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  as  an  autonomous  State  within  the 
German  Empire,  the  establishment  of  the  provinces 
as  an  independent  neutralised  State,  and  the  parti- 
tion of  the  disputed  territory  or  other  readjustment 
of  the  existing  frontiers.  But  before  considering 
these  proposals  we  must  deal  very  briefly  with  the 
Franco-German  coal  and  iron  problem  in  reference  to 
retrocession. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

REANNEXATION    AND    THE    FRANCO-GERMAN    COAL    AND 
IRON    PROBLEM 

Commercial  basis  of  the  war — German  declaration  in  191 5  as  to  economic 
needs — Coal  and  iron  in  modern  war — German  need  of  coal  and  iron 
— German  demands  as  to  Briey  and  Longwy — Coal  resources  of  France 
and  Germany — Iron  ore  in  Lorraine — Iron  resources  of  Germany — • 
Effect  of  depriving  Germany  of  the  Lorraine  ore. 

In  this  chapter,  following  on  the  consideration  of  the 
various  difficulties  incidental  to  the  proposed  retro- 
cession of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  we  may  con- 
veniently turn  our  attention  to  the  special  Franco- 
German  coal  and  iron  problem,  which  has  frequently 
been  raised  during  the  last  two  or  three  years.  The 
essential  question  here  is  whether  retrocession  would 
bring  about  a  satisfactory  solution  of  this  problem. 
The  present  war  is  to  a  very  large  extent  commercial 
in  its  origin,  in  its  means,  and  in  its  objects.  In  regard 
to  its  origin,  it  has  been  pointed  out *  that  the  _ 

^  ■*■  Commercial 

intensive  and  continuous  over-production  in  basis  of 
Germany  was  preparing  the  way  for  an 
industrial  cataclysm,  if  she  failed  to  increase  the 
number  and  importance  of  her  outlets,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  her  principal  customers  were  beginning  to 
consider  it  necessary  to  protect  themselves  against 
her  pacific  penetration ;  another  such  revolution 
might  bring  with  it  an  internal  crisis,  because  the  rise 

1  Cf.  M.  Alfassa,  Le  fer  et  le  charbon  terrains  (Paris,   1916).     (Preface  by 
A.  Lebon,  a  former  French  minister.) 

251 


252  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

in  the  cost  of  necessaries  was  far  greater  proportionately 
than  the  rise  in  wages.  In  the  conduct  of  the  war  the 
commercial  aspect  is  obvious — it  is  a  war  of  machines  \ 
and  shells ;  the  nations  are  specially  organised  to  pro-  ) 
mote  and  accelerate  the  output  of  the  essential  indus- 
trial products,  the  practice  of  blockades  is  established 
by  the  belligerents  for  the  very  purpose  of  interfering 
with  their  enemies'  commercial  and  industrial  activity. 
Thus  the  object  of  the  war,  too,  has  a  commercial  basis, 
seen  on  the  one  hand  in  the  resolution  of  the  Allied 
Conference  held  in  Paris,  June  17,  19 16,  to  the  effect 
that  the  Allies  should  ensure  their  commercial  inde- 
pendence with  regard  to  the  Central  Empires,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  the  declarations  contained  in  the 
confidential  memorandum  presented  to  the  German 
Imperial  Chancellor,  May  30,  19 15,  by  the  six  leading 
industrial  and  agricultural  associations  of  Germany. 

The  Germans,  believing  at  the  latter  date  that  they 
were  about  to  secure  a  military  triumph  over  their 
German  adversaries,  declared  in  the  following  manner 
declaration   some  of  their  economic  aims,  and  particularly 

in  1915,  as  .  .  .  *  .    r 

to  economic  their  intentions  as  to  the  necessary  acquisi- 
needs'  tions  of  new  coaland  iron  districts^  "  Nothing 
but  the  economic  and  military  weakening  of  our 
adversaries  will  obtain  for  us  the  peace  we  desire — as 
a  commencement  Belgium,  which  lies  so  near  our 
industrial  centre,  must  in  the  monetary,  financial, 
and  postal  sense  become  subject  to  the  laws  of  the 
Empire.  Her  railways  and  waterways  must  be  closely 
connected  with  our  own  communications.  As  regards 
France,  it  is  of  vital  importance,  both  from  the  point 
of  view  of  our  relations  with  England,  and  from  that 
of  our  maritime  future,  that  we  should  possess  the 
coast  region  to  as  far  as  the  Somme.  The  '  Hinter- 
land '  should  be  of  an  extent  sufficient  to  ensure  their 


S       Petroleum    Potash       Coal        Salt         Iron 


Geological  Sketch-map  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

i.  UpperJjurassic  clays  and  limestones.  2.  Middle  Jurassic  clays  and  limestones  with  the  iron- 
containing  beds  at  their  base7snown  by  the  black  line.  3.  Triassic  marls  and  limestones.  Be- 
tween Cu"eSe~and-  the  Middle  Jurassic  limestones  lies  the  Lias  clay,  left  white  on  the  map.  4. 
Triassic  grits.  5.  Ancient  sedimentary  or  crystalline  rocks  of  the  Vosges,  Black  Forest  and 
Rhine  Highlands.  The  Rhine  Rift  Valley  is  chiefly  floored  by  recent  deposits,  and  is  left 
blank  on  the  map,  but  patches  of  Triassic  and  Jurassic  rocks  occur  at  its  margins.  Scale  about 
1 :  2,000,000.     (In  part  after  Barri.) 


COAL  AND  IRON  PROBLEM     255 

full  importance  to  the  ports  forming  the  outlets  for  the 
canals  behind  them.  In  addition,  it  is  self-evident 
that  the  fortresses  of  Verdun  and  Belfort,  and  the  forts 
west  of  the  Vosges  lying  between  them,  could  not  be  left 
in  French  hands.  By  the  acquisition  of  the  line  of  the 
Meuse  and  of  the  French  coast  the  iron-producing 
district  of  Briey,  as  well  as  the  coalfields  of  the  North 
and  the  Pas  de  Calais,  would  be  acquired."  1 

The v importance  of  coal  and  iron  for  carrying  on  a 
moderri'war  is  emphasised  :  Territorial  annexations, 
_    ,     ,      such  as  those  of  the  mineral  and  coal  regions, 

Coal  and  °  ' 

iron  in        would  not  merely  extend  our  industrial  power. 

modern  war.  ^-i  ,  •-,•.  ... 

fney  represent  military  necessities,  as  is 
proved  by  the  following  consideration.  The  monthly 
production  of  pig-iron  in_Germany .  has  risen  since 
Qmgust  1914  to  about  a  million  tons — in  other  words, 
it  has_aUbut  doubled^  TKe  production  of  steel  exceeds 
one  million  tons  per  month.  It  must  be  added  that 
neither  pig-iron  nor  steel  is  abundant ;  but  if  this  is  true 
of  Germany  it  is  still  more  true  of  neutral  countries. 
The  manufacture  of  shells  requires  a  quality  of  iron 
and  steel  such  as  would  not  formerly  have  been  believed. 
For  cast-iron  shells  alone,  which  are  an  inferior  sub- 
stitute for  those  in  steel,  an  average  production  of 
4,000  tons  of  iron  per  day  has  been  necessary.2  If  our 
production  of  pig-iron  and  steel  had  not  been  doubled, 
the  war  could  not  have  been  continued.  As  the 
material  for  the  manufacture  of  these  quantities  of 
pig-iron  and  steel,  the  minette  of  Lorraine  becomes 
more  and  more  important,  for  this  mineral  is  the  only 
one  that  we  can  produce  in  rapidly  increasing  quanti- 
ties.    At   this   moment    minette   represents    from6o 

Translation  as  given  in  Fortnightly  Review,  November  1917. 
2  In  1916  the  output  increased  enormously  ;    the  monthly  average  of  pig- 
iron  was  1,150,000  tons  ;    and  that  of  steel  was  (towards  the  end  of  the  year) 
between  1,400,000  and  1,500,000  tons. 


256  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

to  80  per  cent,  of  our  manufacture  of  pig-iron  and  steel. 
If  the  production  of  minette  were  imperilled  the  war 
would  be  as  good  as  lost.  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten 
that  the  large  production  of  steel  from  minette  provides 
the  only  source,  when  the  import  of  phosphates  is 
blocked,  from  which  German  agriculture  can  obtain 
the  phosphoric  acid  that  it  requires."  * 

It  is  therefore  urged  that  the  acquisition  by  Germany 
of  further  coal  and  iron  resources  is  imperative  :   ' '  The 

security  of  the  German  Empire  in  a  future 
neecTof1  war  imperiously  requires  the  possession  of  all 
more  coal    the  mines  of  minette,  including  the  fortresses 

of  Longwy  and  Verdun.  The  possession  of 
the  large  quantity  of  coal,  and  especially  of  coal  rich 
in  bitumen,  which  abounds  in  the  northern  basin  of 
France,  is  at  least  as  important  as  that  of  iron  ore  for 
the  decision  of  a  war.  Belgium  and  Northern  France 
produce  together  over  forty  million  tons  a  year.  It 
appears  to  be  true  that  the  systematic  production  of 
coal  from  the  Belgian  mines  has  had  during  the  present 
war  the  greatest  influence  in  inducing  several  of  our 
neighbours  to  preserve  their  neutrality.  Coal,  then, 
is  one  of  the  most  decisive  means  of  political  influence 
in  the  world.  Industrial  neutral  States  are  obliged  to 
obey  the  belligerent  which  can  best  assure  their  needed 
quantity  of  coal.  This  we  are  unable  to  do  of  our  own 
resources,  and  it  is  to  Belgian  coal  that  we  are  looking 
to  prevent  our  neutral  neighbours  from  being  com- 
pletely dependent  on  England."  2 

Professor  Hermann  Schumacher  of  Bonn,  one  of  the 
signatories  of  the  annexationist  manifesto,  holds  that 
it  is  essential  to  modify  the  Franco-German  frontier 
in  such  a  way  as  to  assure  for  Germany  adequate 
supplies  of  coal  and  iron  and  deprive  the  enemy  of 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Nov.  191 7.  2  Ibid. 


COAL    AND    IRON    PROBLEM  257 

them.  "  Without  the  Lorraine  ore,"  he  says,  "  we 
should  not  be  able  to  supply  iron  and  steel  necessary 
for  the  war.  The  Treaty  of  Frankfort  gave  us  all 
Lorraine.  A  mistake  was  committed,  for  the  geologists 
consulted  by  Bismarck  were  mistaken.  It  is  known 
since  1880  that,  as  against  the  previsions  of  Bismarck, 
the  Briey  basin,  which  continues  that  of  Longwy,  is 
one  of  the  richest  parts  of  France.  To-day  we  can 
correct  this  mistake,  since  we  have  occupied  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  and  we  hold  firmly  in  our  hands 
the  second  raw  material  of  war  industry — coal.  Just 
as  we  could  not  prosecute  the  war  if  we  had  not  the 
rich  Lorraine  soil,  so  we  could  not  prosecute  it  vic- 
toriously if  we  had  not  the  rich  coal-fields  of  Belgium 
and  Northern  France.  As  we  know  to-day  what 
signify  munitions  in  a  war,  we  must  tell  ourselves  that 
it  is  necessary  for  the  life  of  our  people,  for  peace  and 
for  war,  to  possess  these  sources  of  war  and  commercial 
power."  l 

Similarly,  in  the  Prussian  Diet,  February  21,  22, 
19 17,  in  the  course  of  a  debate  on  the  importance  of 
completing    the    economic    frontier    by    the 
inclusion  of  Briey  and  Longwy,  it  was  said  demands  as 
that  Germany  could  not  allow  the  French  to to  BTriey  and 

.  .  Longwy. 

be  in  possession  of  these  districts,  that  it 
would  be  fatal  for  her  in  the  next  war,  when  she  would 
be  again  blockaded,  and  must  obtain  the  steel  for  her 
guns.  Nor  could  she  count  on  promptly  occupying 
the  industrial  districts  of  France  and  Belgium  on  the 
declaration  of  war,  as  she  had  done  on  this  occasion, 
for  experience  would  teach  the  English  and  the  French 
to  take  preventive  measures.  Therefore  it  was  a 
question  of  life  and  death  for  Germany.  Prince 
Schonaich  Carolath,  the  leader  of  the  National  Liberal 

1  Le  Temps,  28  aotit  1915. 
17 


258  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

party,  though  an  annexationist,  did  not  support 
these  extravagant  demands,  and  some  of  the  National 
Liberals,  led  by  Professor  Brandenburg,  the  president 
of  the  party  in  Saxony,  declined  to  associate  them- 
selves with  such  an  extremist  policy.  But  Count 
Westarp,  the  leader  of  the  Conservatives,  repeated  the 
demand  for  Briey  and  Longwy  in  the  Reichstag, 
March  27, 19 17.  The  German  Socialists  were  opposed 
to  these  views,  and  the  masses  of  the  German  popula- 
tion paid  little  heed  to  these  annexationist  proposals. 
However  this  may  be,  Germany  has  long  been 
attracted  towards  iron — the  symbol  of  and  key  to 
material  force.  As  a  recent  French  writer 
sources" of  aptly  says :  "  L'AUemagne,  creature  et  ado- 
Germany     ratrice  de  la  force,  ne  pouvait  pas  ne  pas 

and  France.  >  r  xr  r 

etre  attiree  vers  le  fer,  instrument  et  moyen 
de  la  force."  1  She  is  aware  that  she  has  ample  sup- 
plies of  coal— it  has  been  calculated  that  her  resources 
would  suffice  for  about  a  thousand  years.  Besides  her 
rich  Westphalian  coalfields,  she  possesses  the  Sarre 
basin  and  other  coal  regions  which  she  acquired  by 
the  Treaty  of  Paris,  November  18 15,  the  Convention 
of  Frankfort,  18 19,  and  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  187 1. 
The  Sarre  basin  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle 
between  this  river  and  the  Rhine,  and  it  occupies  a 
region  about  100  kilometres  long  by  between  30  and 
35  kilometres  wide — 45  kilometres  being  in  Rhenish 
Prussia  and  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  45  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  10  in  Meurthe-et-Moselle.  We  may 
here  recall  that  in  July  18 15  a  memorandum  was  laid 
before  the  Prussian  plenipotentiaries  on  their  way  to 
the  Paris  Peace  Conference  by  one  Herr  Bocking, 
commissioner  of  the  Sarre  mines.     He  explained  that 

1   F.  Engerand,  Les  FrontUres  lorraines  et  la  force  allemande  (Paris,  1916), 
preface,  p.  i. 


COAL    AND    IRON    PROBLEM  259 

the  cession  of  the  Sarre  coalfield  to  Prussia  would 
compel  France  to  import  her  steel  from  the  latter 
country  and  lower  her  import  duties,  to  the  advantage 
of  German  industries.  Such  turned  out  actually  to 
be  the  result  ;  and  the  French  industries  of  the  Moselle 
region  declined  accordingly.  Indeed,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  importation  of  coal  from  Great  Britain,  France 
would  have  found  herself  in  a  disastrous  condition. 

It  is  thought  in  some  quarters  in  France  that  if 
Germany  retroceded  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  and 
remained  in  possession  of  the  Sarre  coalfields,  iron  ore  of 
Germany  would  continue  to  enjoy  industrial  Lorraine, 
predominance  ;  and  therefore  it  is  urged  that  France 
should  also  regain  the  Sarre  basin,  because  of  the 
proximity  of  this  coalfield  to  the  Lorraine  ironfields, 
and  the  great  distance  of  the  British  coalfields  from 
the  latter.  Such  a  solution  is  obviously  as  inexpedient 
as  it  is  impossible,  for  it  would  reduce  Germany  to  a 
condition  of  economic  ruin — and  such  intention  has 
been  repeatedly  disclaimed  on  the  part  of  the  Allies. 

Even  in  the  case  of  the  mere  retrocession  of  the 
territories  annexed  in  187 1  the  iron  resources  of 
Germany  would  be  so  diminished  that  she  would  not 
have  enough  within  her  own  country  not  only  for 
military  purposes,  but  for  commerce  and  peaceable 
manufactures.  In  addition  to  the  German  pronounce- 
ments given  above  we  may  refer  to  the  statement  of 
Herr  Hermann  Wendel,  the  German  majority  Socialist 
deputy,  to  the  effect  that  to  take  away  the  iron  of 
Lorraine  from  Germany  would  be  "  to  force  the  German 
metal  industry  to  its  knees  "  ;  and  Herr  Hue,  of  the 
German  Miners'  Federation,  observed  in  the  Prussian 
Diet  that  it  would  also  mean  ' '  the  ruin  of  the  German 
coal  industry."  To  obviate  such  contingencies  it 
has  been  suggested  by  certain  French  writers  and 


260  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

publicists  that,  as  Germany  without  Alsace-Lorraine 
would  still  have  more  coal  than  France,  she  would  be 
able  to  exchange  her  surplus  for  French  iron.  It  is 
thought,  too,  that  in  such  a  case  it  will  be  necessary  to 
establish  "  the  economic  exterritoriality  of  the  Thion- 
ville  district,"  i.e.  owing  to  the  inadequacy  of  the 
French  coal  supplies  and  the  fear  of  overproduction, 
the  factories  of  annexed  Lorraine  will  have  to  be 
excluded  from  the  French  market.1  Others  point  out 
that  it  is  only  by  depriving  Germany  of  her  iron  ore 
that  the  military  menace  on  the  Continent  will  be 
removed.  "  Laisser  la  siderurgie  allemande  floris- 
sante,"  says  M.  de  Launay  :  "  c'est  lui  permettre, 
apres  la  guerre,  de  reconquerir  aussitot  le  marche 
mondial  en  ecrasant  la  concurrence  debile  de  nos 
usines  ruinees  et  pillees,  de  nos  flottes  fatiguees  et 
amoindries  ;  c'est  lui  fournir  le  moyen  de  preparer 
une  prompte  revanche."  8 

In  19 10,  at  the  International  Geological  Congress  at 

Stockholm,  in  the  course  of  an  investigation  into  the 

world's  iron  resources,  it  was  calculated  that 

Iron  re- 
sources of  German  Lorraine  contained  1,830  million 
ermany.  bonnes,  to  which  those  responsible  for  the 
report  tacitly  added  270  million  tonnes  of  Luxemburg 
as  forming  part  of  the  Zollverein,  that  the  rest  of 
Germany  had  only  700  million  tonnes,  whilst  the 
amount  of  the  ore  of  French  Lorraine  was  estimated 
at  3,000  million  tonnes.5  Now,  looking  at  the  rate 
of  consumption,  we  find  that  in  the  last  normal 
year,  19 13,  Germany  used  up  42  to  43  million  tonnes, 
comprising  21  million  tonnes  obtained  from  annexed 
Lorraine,  7  million  tonnes  from  the  rest  of  Germany, 

1  Alfassa,  op.  cit.,  p.  38. 

2  L.  de  Launay,  Le   probldme  franco- allemand  du  fer,  in  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  July  15,  1916,  p.  345. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  335. 


COAL    AND    IRON    PROBLEM  261 

and  the  remainder  imported  from  abroad  (e.g.  Sweden 
and  Spain).1  That  is,  the  pre-war  total  resources  of 
Germany,  viz.  2,800  million  tonnes,  would  last  only 
about  sixty-five  years,  assuming  that  there  would  be 
no  annual  increase  in  the  consumption.  In  point  of 
fact,  since  August  19 14  Germany's  production  of  pig- 
iron  and  steel  has  doubled  in  amount  ;  otherwise  she 
would  have  found  it  impossible  to  continue  the  war. 
Had  her  Lorraine  supplies  been  seriously  interfered 
with,  the  war  would  by  now  certainly  have  been  ended. 
Hence — among  other  reasons — her  determination  not 
to  abandon  any  portion  of  the  annexed  provinces,  and 
if  possible  to  add  thereto  other  neighbouring  territory 
rich  in  minerals. 

The  great  metallurgical  development  of  Lorraine, 
like  the  progress  in  the  Alsatian  industries,  is  due 
to  German  brains,  energy,  and  capital ;  and  Effect  o{ 
any  solution  that  deprived  Germany  of  the      depriving 

•  1  i  1   t        7      ,1  •  1  ,      Germany  of 

mmette  would  not  be  to  the  economic  advant-  the  Lorraine 
age  of  Europe  generally,  and  would  inflict  ore- 

on  a  great  industrial  nation  an  unparalleled  economic 
disaster,  whilst  the  interests  of  peace  would  not  thereby 
be  advanced.  Indeed,  the  future  peace  of  Europe 
would  be  more  than  ever  jeopardised  ;  for  it  is  nothing 
more  than  absurd  to  imagine  that  the  potential  labour, 
the  industrial  instincts,  the  business  organisation,  the 
commercial  impulse,  the  economic  progress  of  one  of  the 
greatest  nations  of  the  world. could  be  suppressed  by 
doubtful  military  victories,  by  factitious  combinations 
of  States,  or  by  an  unnatural  policy  of  exclusion. 
The  iron-mines  of  Lorraine  work  in  close  association 
with  the  coalfields  of  the  Rhine  basin  ;  and  the  Prussian 
State  Railways  make  reduced  charges  to  the  Lorraine 
manufacturers   as   a   compensation   for   their   inland 

1  Comite  des  Forges  de  France.     Circulaire  No.  655,  p.  13. 


262  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

position  ;  so  that  to  put  an  end  to  such  desirable  co- 
operation would  entail  great  loss.  The  solution  of 
the  Franco- German  coal  and  iron  problem  can  be 
effected  by  establishing  a  regime  of  free  trade  if  Alsace- 
Lorraine  remains  within  the  German  Empire  (say,  as 
an  autonomous  State) ,  or  by  setting  up  the  provinces 
as  an  independent  State  ;  but  it  is  very  doubtful  indeed 
whether  a  satisfactory  solution  can  be  reached  by 
retroceding  the  territory  to  France,  unless  the  economic 
organisation  and  system  of  commercial  relationships 
of  Western  Europe  be  altered  in  such  a  way  as  to 
ensure  a  supply  of  coal  and  iron  equally  and  impar- 
tially to  those  who  are  in  need  thereof. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

SOLUTIONS    SUGGESTED  :      (b)    AUTONOMY    WITHIN    THE 
GERMAN    EMPIRE 

The  nationalist  ideal — Alsace-Lorraine  can  no  longer  remain  a  Reichsland 
— German  view  in  1898 — Swiss  view — French  views — Recent  German 
opinion — German  Socialist  view,  191 7 — Form  of  autonomous  govern- 
ment— Position  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  an  autonomous  State — Autonomy 
followed  by  plebiscite  suggested. 

As  we  have  already  fully  described  the  autonomist 
movement,  there  is  no  need  to  do  more  here  than  add 
a  few  observations  by  way  of  supplement. 

The  establishment  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  an  autono- 
mous State  within  the  framework  of  the  German 
Empire  would  be  the  fulfilment  of  the  nationa- 
list object,  which  has  been  aimed  at  by  the  nationalist 
great  mass  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  for 
some  thirty  years.  This  would  make  of  the  provinces 
— which  have  hitherto  constituted  only  a  Reichsland, 
that  is,  common  imperial  territory,  as  the  sinister 
symbol  of  conquest — a  new  federal  unit,  empowered  to 
draw  up  its  own  constitution  (subject,  like  every  other 
German  State,  to  certain  limitations  imposed  by  the 
imperial  constitution),  to  choose  its  own  government 
and  administration,  which  would  be  directly  responsible 
to  the  people,  and  to  a  very  great  extent  make  its  own 
law. 

In  a  previous  chapter  l  the  demands  of  authoritative 
Alsace-Lorraine  leaders  have  been  set  forth  ;    and  we 

1  See  chap.  x. 
263 


264  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

have  seen  that  they  have  repeatedly  claimed  autonomy 
within  the  Empire  and  have  asserted  that  that  was 
Alsace-  a^  they  and  the  people  wanted.  Had  the  Ger- 
Lorraine  can  mans  possessed  clearer  foresight  and  greater 
remain  a  political  wisdom  they  would,  even  in  their 
Reichsiand.  Qwn  ^me  interests,  have  paid  regard  to  the 

wishes  thus  expressed  and  to  the  increasing  nationalist 
movement,  and  would  have  set  up  the  regime  and 
political  structure  required.  Such  an  amicable  accom- 
modation may  well  have  facilitated  the  rapprochement 
between  France  and  Germany,  and  so  may  have  done 
much  to  promote  the  public  peace  of  Europe.  How- 
ever this  may  be,  it  is  clear  that  Alsace-Lorraine  can 
no  longer  remain  a  Reichsiand  after  the  conclusion  of 
this  war  ;  and  when  a  solution  is  sought  the  consistent 
and  reiterated  demands  for  autonomy  cannot  be 
eliminated. 

The  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  were  not  alone  in 
demanding  autonomy  for  their  provinces.  They  were 
German  supported  by  writers  and  publicists  in  various 
view  countries.     Only  one  or  two  need  be  men- 

tioned here  as  representative.  Thus,  Moritz 
von  Egidy,  an  officer  of  the  Prussian  Army,  delivered  a 
number  of  lectures  in  several  German  towns,  September- 
December,  1898,  on  the  Tsar's  peace' manifesto,  in  the 
course  of  which  he  urged  that  the  Reichsiand  question 
should  and  could  be  solved  by  applying  the  principle 
'  Alsace-Lorraine  for  the  Alsace-Lorrainers,'  and  con- 
formably thereto  granting  an  autonomous  government 
to  the  people. 

MM.  Lichtenberger,  who  maintain  that  Alsace- 
Swiss  Lorraine  would    have    been    satisfied    with 

view.  autonomy  within  the  German  Empire,  refer1 

to  the  view  expressed  by  a  Swiss  impartial  observer, 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  52. 


SOLUTIONS  :    AUTONOMY  265 

M.  Albert  Bonnard.  In  an  article  in  the  Bibliotheque 
Universelle  of  Lausanne,  the  latter  said  that  a  par- 
ticularist  (or  nationalist)  Alsace,  having  acquired  her 
liberty,  would  be  proud  and  jealous  of  her  status  and 
would  be  contented  with  it,  as  she  would  be  enabled 
to  proceed  in  her  own  way  and  develop  her  own  indi- 
viduality. 

As  to  France,  we  have  already  shown  that  before 
the  recent  revanche  recrudescence  consequent  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  she  would  have  willingly  French 
accepted  the  autonomist  solution  for  Alsace-  views- 
Lorraine,  on  the  ground  that  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  had  made  it  their  definitive 
goal.  The  following  words  have  been  quoted  on  a 
previous  page,  but  they  may  be  recalled  here  on  account 
of  their  special  appropriateness  :  "  Pour  notre  modeste 
part,  nous  croyons  que,  si  1' Alsace-Lorraine  etait 
satisfaite  de  cette  autonomic  restreinte,  nous  aurions 
mauvaise  grace  a  etre  plus  royalist es  que  le  roi.  .  .  . 
Cette  solution,  nous  1' accepterions  done  de  grand 
cceur."  l 

This  view  has  also  found  supporters  recently  among 
leading  German  thinkers.  Thus,  Professor  Wilhelm 
Forster,    the    astronomer  of    Berlin,    whilst 

. '  *  Recent 

justifying  the  annexation  of  the  provinces  German 
on  the  ground  of  frontier  security,  said  in  °Pinion 
19 13,  that  in  his  opinion  the  difficulties  of  Germany 
with  regard  to  France  and  Alsace-Lorraine  could  be 
removed  by  giving  the  latter  as  large  a  measure  of 
independence  as  is  possible  within  the  German  con- 
federation. "  Since  France  in  1866,"  he  observes, 
"  demanded  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  in 
1870  attacked  Germany  by  force  of  arms,  it  became 

1  General  Palat,   L'Alliance  franco- allemande  on   la  guerre   (Paris,    1914), 
pp.  145,  146. 


266  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

clear  that  Germany  must,  for  her  own  security,  extend 
her  borders  across  the  Rhine  and  not  leave  the  powerful 
fortress  of  Metz  on  her  frontier  any  longer  in  French 
hands.  But  Germany  has  throughout  treated  the 
people  of  Elsass-Lothringen  in  embittering  fashion. 
By  this  means  the  painful  influence  of  the  conquest  over 
the  feelings  of  the  French  people  has  been  kept  alive 
and  constantly  renewed.  In  spite  of  this,  a  vote  by 
the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  would  now  (Sept.  19 13) 
probably  show  a  majority  in  favour  of  remaining 
part  of  Germany.  This  would  mainly  be  on  economic 
grounds,  as  the  fruit  and  wine  industry  of  Elsass- 
Lothringen  is  in  closer  relations  to  the  interests  of 
Germany  than  to  those  of  France.  How  can  the 
relations  between  Germany  and  France  be  made 
better  ?  Certainly  through  giving  the  people  of  Elsass- 
Lothringen  the  greatest  possible  independence,  with 
freedom  to  continue  to  use  the  French  language  and 
the  like.  To  this  end,  there  must  rule  between  Germany 
and  France,  and  for  that  matter  through  Europe 
generally,  a  higher  socio-political  relation  than  at 
present.  This  should  begin  with  a  customs-union  and 
with  parliamentary  control.  The  International  Court 
needs  organisation  and  expansion  in  power  until  its 
jurisdiction  includes  the  whole  earth."  * 

Similarly,  Professor  Rudolf  Eucken  of  Jena  observed 
in  September  19 13  :  "  Elsass-Lothringen  is  for  us 
Germans  no  longer  a  question.  The  land,  the  seat  of 
an  old  German  race,  is  a  piece  of  Germany  ;  in  its 
language  and  its  customs,  German.  We  Germans 
are  sensitive  to  all  discussion  of  this  question  by 
foreign  people  as  a  revival  of  the  French  restlessness 
towards  this  problem.  Inside  of  Germany  I  wish 
to  see  granted  to  Elsass-Lothringen  all  possible  inde- 

1   Quoted  by  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  26,  27. 


SOLUTIONS:    AUTONOMY  267 

pendence ;  but  this  is  a  problem  for  ever  and  wholly 
German. "  1 

Further,  quite  recently  the  opinion  in  favour  of 
autonomy  within  the  Empire  has  been  gaining  ground 
in  Germanv.2     At  the  German  Socialist  Con- 

J  German 

ference  at  Wiirzburg,  October  14-17,  19 17,  Socialist 
Herr  Scheidemann  declared  :  "  We  demand  view'  igi7' 
complete  autonomy  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  also 
demand  that  Alsace-Lorraine  shall  remain  part  of  the 
German  Empire."  3 

In  the  event  of  adopting  this  autonomist  solution, 
it  has  been  suggested  that  a  difficulty  would  arise  in 
regard  to  the  kind  of  government  to  be  intro- 

-1  -1    •  1  •  /-.  •  Form  of 

duced  into  the  newly  constituted  State,  i.e.  autonomous 
whether  republican  or  monarchical.  Some  s°vernment- 
writers  think  that  it  could  not  be  republican,  or  even 
monarchical  (failing  the  necessary  traditions).  But 
the  determining  factor  in  this  respect  is,  or  should  be, 
the  will  of  the  people.  In  Alsace-Lorraine,  however, 
public  opinion  has  not  been  unanimous  on  the  point. 
Probably  the  clerical  group,  representing  the  Catholic 
and  the  Lutheran  sections  of  the  population,  would 
prefer  a  monarchical  form  of  government,  for  example, 
like  that  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  ;  whilst  the 
Alsatian  Radicals,  Socialists,  and  other  nationalists 
would  be  in  favour  of  a  republic,  and  regard  the  free 
cities  of  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Lubeck  as  analogous 
precedents.  Indeed,  for  great  numbers  of  Alsatians 
the  very  word  "autonomy"  implies  a  republican 
organisation  within  the  framework  of  the  German 
Empire. 

If  Alsace-Lorraine  becomes  an  autonomous  State — 

1  Quoted  by  Jordan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  27,  28. 

2  Cf.  Deutsche  Revue,   June    19 17,  referred  to  by   Dr.  Dillon,   Fortnightly 
Review,  September  1917,  p.  345,  note. 

3  Daily  Telegraph,  October  17,  1917. 


268  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

either  republican  or  monarchical — what  will  be  its 
position  within  the  confederation  ?  The  latter  now 
Position  of  comPrises  f°ur  kingdoms,  six  grand  duchies, 
Alsace-  five  duchies,  seven  principalities,  three  free 
an  autono-  towns,  and  the  Reichsland.  Sovereignty  is 
mous  state.  ves-f-ed  in  the  imperial  government.1  The 
Bundesrat  (Federal  Council),  which  represents  the 
totality  of  the  co-ordinated  German  States,  is  the  em- 
bodiment of  that  sovereignty.  The  powers  of  govern- 
ment are  divided  between  the  imperial  authorities  and 
those  of  the  State.  In  the  case  of  the  former  they  are 
specifically  limited ;  in  the  case  of  the  latter  they  are 
unlimited  and  residual.  The  legislative  power  of  the 
Empire  takes  precedence  in  regard  to  such  matters 
as  the  rights  of  citizenship,  the  army  and  navy,  cur- 
rency, weights  and  measures,  tariffs,  patents,  copyright, 
fluvial  and  canal  navigation,  etc.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  very  wide  domain  is  reserved  to  the  States  themselves, 
e.g.  the  determination  of  their  own  forms  of  govern- 
ment and  the  laws  of  succession,  the  relations  between 
Church  and  State,  all  questions  relating  to  their  internal 
administration,  the  framing  of  their  budgets,  the 
control  of  public  instruction,  the  making  of  laws  as  to 
land  tenure  and  highways,  the  adoption  of  police 
regulations,  etc.  Justice  is  administered  in  the  name 
of  the  particular  State  concerned  and  not  in  that  of  the 
Empire  ;  and  the  judiciary  is  appointed  by  the  State. 
The  execution  of  imperial  measures,  except  within  the 
restricted  spheres,  devolves  upon  the  officials  of  the 
respective  States. 

Thus,  if  Alsace-Lorraine  were  made  an  autonomous 
State  it  would  enjoy  a  large  measure  of  legislative  and 
administrative  independence,  it  would  be  able  to 
develop  to  a  very  great  extent  its  own  personality,  and 

1  Cf.  F.  A.  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (New  York,  1913),  pp.  205  seq. 


SOLUTIONS:    AUTONOMY  269 

would  at  the  same  time  possess  the  various  advantages 
of  membership  of  a  great  Empire.  Its  traditions  as 
well  as  its  interests  could  be  safeguarded ;  and,  being  of 
a  mixed  Franco-German  culture,  it  would  serve  as  a 
bond  of  union  between  the  two  neighbouring  peoples 
who  have  so  long  been  at  loggerheads.  Sometimes  a 
fear  has  been  expressed  that  the  newly  established 
government  might  not  work  harmoniously  with  the 
Imperial  Government  ;  but  there  is  no  ground  for  such 
apprehension,  and  no  plausible  consideration  has  been 
advanced  in  support  thereof.  The  Reichsland  is  no 
longer  regarded  as  a  guarantee  or  pledge  of  German 
unity  ;  and  to  set  it  up  as  an  autonomous  State  is  not 
necessarily  to  impair  German  security. 

We  have  more  than  once  put  forth  the  contention, 
and  submitted  evidence  for  it,  that  before  the  present 
war  Alsace-Lorraine  would  have  been  fully     .  t 

J       Autonomy 

satisfied  with  autonomy.  Now  it  may  be  followed  by 
thought  that,  in  consequence  of  the  war,  p  e  lsclte" 
various  complications  have  supervened,  rendering 
that  conclusion  less  certain.  In  these  circumstances 
a  plan  suggested  by  Novicow  in  19 13  may  well  be 
adopted  as  a  feasible  expedient,  i.e.  the  establishment 
of  autonomy,  to  be  followed  ten  or  fifteen  years  later 
by  a  plebiscite.1  He  says  that  if  the  population  vote 
then  in  favour  of  France,  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be 
retroceded  ;  but  the  referendum  in  Lorraine  must  be 
distinct  from  that  in  Alsace,  and  the  decision  of  one 
province  is  not  to  be  binding  on  the  other.  If  the 
date  of  the  plebiscite  is  fixed  ten  or  fifteen  years  in 
advance,  the  population  will  remain  conscious  of  a 
period  of  transition  and  hence  they  will  adapt  and 
prepare  themselves  accordingly.  This  arrangement, 
of  course,  assumes  that  no  undue  influence  will  in  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  353. 


270  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

meantime  be  exercised  by  the  German  authorities. 
How  to  ensure  the  prevention  of  such  pressure  is  the 
main  difficulty.  In  the  first  place,  such  pressure  would 
be  minimised  or  promptly  revealed  in  the  case  of  a 
completely  autonomous  State  ;  secondly,  the  Imperial 
Government  might  give  an  earnest  of  its  good  faith 
by  permitting  a  neutral  commission  to  remain  in  the 
territory  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  a  certain  sur- 
veillance until  the  referendum  has  been  completed.1 

1  See  further  the  final  chapter  as  to  the  question  of  plebiscite  generally. 


CHAPTER    XV 

SOLUTIONS    SUGGESTED  :      (c)    ALSACE-LORRAINE    AS    AN 
INDEPENDENT   STATE 

Proposed  neutralisation — Suggested  in  1870 — German  objections — Popula- 
tion to  be  consulted — Resolution  of  League  of  Peace,  1884 — Form  of 
independent  government — Various  matters  for  adjustment — Advantages 
of  creating  an  independent  Alsace-Lorraine  :  Meeting  the  wishes  of 
the  people — Revanche  obviated — Fusion  of  Germanic  and  Gallic  elements 
— Military  service  difficulties  removed — Bond  of  union  between  France 
and  Germany — Would  be  a  "  buffer  "  State.  Future  international 
co-operation  and  treaties. 

It  has  frequently  been  proposed  of  late  that  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  problem  should  be  solved  by  erecting  the 
provinces  into  an  independent  State.     Such 

*  r  Proposed 

a    plan    would    manifestly    necessitate    the   neutraiisa- 

neutralisation  of  the  new  State  under  the 

guarantee  of  the  society  of  States  or  league  of  nations, 

whose  establishment  is  an  indispensable  condition  for 

securing  the  future  peace  of  the  world.     It  may  be 

said,  with  the  example  of  Belgium  before  us,  that  little 

confidence  can  be  placed  in  the  plan  of  neutralisation. 

But  the  flagrant  violation  of  a  law  or  engagement  will 

not  induce  law-abiding  and  honourable  citizens  and 

nations  to  forswear  all  law  and  engagements,  and  to 

consent  to  abandon  themselves  to  a  condition  of  chaos 

and  lawlessness.      Ubi  societas  ibi  ius.     Where  there 

is  human  life,  where  there   are  groupings  of  human 

individuals — be  it  clans,  tribes,  nations,  States — there 

must  inevitably  be  some  governing  law.     The  fact  that 

the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  unconscionably   dis- 

271 


272  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

regarded  in  19 14  by  a  powerful  State  is  no  argument 
that  the  neutralisation  of  small  States  is  useless.  The 
best  answer  is  to  continue  to  neutralise  small  States 
— especially  so  those  situated  between  greater  States — 
and  reinforce  the  underlying  international  engagement 
by  more  potent  sanctions  than  have  hitherto  been 
available — and  the  most  powerful  safeguard  is  the 
formation  of  a  "  partnership  of  nations  "  together  with 
the  creation  of  an  international  court,  empowered  to 
take  cognisance  of  international  claims  and  differences 
and  to  enforce  its  judgments  by  means  of  an  inter- 
national army  or  police,  by  the  imposition  of  economic 
restrictions,  and  similar  measures  that  will  influence 
a  refractory  State.  But  this  regime  implies  a  general 
pacification,  a  considerable  disarmament,  and  an 
alliance  of  the  nations  on  the  basis  of  amicable  co- 
operation and  mutual  good,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of 
bolstering  up  a  precarious  equilibrium.  The  main 
thing  is  to  assure  a  whole-hearted  acceptance  of  the 
fundamental  principle  ;  the  details  necessary  for  its 
application  can  then  be  easily  elaborated  by  negotiation. 
The  present  upheaval  of  the  world,  with  its  unparalleled 
slaughter  and  devastation,  will  surely  serve  as  a  drastic 
katharsis,  a  purgation  for  men  and  States,  and  will 
be  a  perpetual  and  convincing  proof  to  all  of  the 
folly — indeed  of  the  suicidal  policy — of  aggressions,  of 
interfering  with  weaker  neighbours,  and  of  infringing 
the  rules  of  established  law  and  the  dictates  of  public 
morality. 

This  proposal  to  neutralise  Alsace-Lorraine  is  not 
new.  It  was  brought  forward  as  far  back  as  1870  by 
suggested  Count  Agenor  de  Gasparin,  that  zealous 
in  1870.  advocate  of  religious  liberty.  The  view  was 
afterwards  adopted  by  various  writers  and  publicists. 
One  of  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters  was  M.  Tachard, 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  273 

who  was  French  by  birth,  Alsatian  by  adoption,  and 
German  by  education.  During  the  regime  of  Gambetta 
he  was  the  French  ambassador  in  Belgium,  and  in  that 
capacity  advocated  his  proposal  at  many  of  the  Euro- 
pean Courts.  He  was  so  attached  to  the  idea  and  so 
firmly  convinced  of  the  salutary  effect  of  setting  up 
another  buffer  State  between  France  and  Germany, 
that  he  declared  that  his  sole  desire  was  to  have  the 
word  tampon  (buffer)  inscribed  on  his  tombstone. 

We  have  already  referred  to  Bismarck's  speech  in 
the  Reichstag,  May  2,  187 1,  when  he  discussed  the 
policy  of  annexation  and  various  expedients  German 
suggested  as  substitutes  for  it.  Amongst  objections, 
these  was  the  neutralisation  of  the  conquered  provinces  ; 
but  he  rejected  this  plan  on  the  ground  that  the  people 
would  not  be  in  a  position  to  safeguard  and  defend 
their  neutrality,  and  that,  in  the  event  of  a  renewed 
conflict  between  France  and  Germany,  their  French 
sympathies  and  interests  would  lead  them  to  take  the 
side  of  the  former.  Similarly,  Treitschke  repudiated 
the  proposal ;  he  pointed  to  the  "  disgusting  spectacle  " 
of  the  "  Luxemburg  nation,"  and  maintained  that  the 
neutralisation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  would  be  a  certain 
means  for  enabling  France  to  recover  her  lost  territory  l 
Other  German  opponents  recalled  the  territorial  trans- 
formations of  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
periods,  and  asked  their  countrymen  to  remember  the 
conduct  of  France,  who  on  one  occasion  set  up  an 
"  Independent  Rhenish  Republic  "  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  and  afterwards,  when  she  felt  stronger, 
simply  annexed  it,  with  its  three  million  inhabitants. 
But  what  was  difficult  of  achievement  in  187 1  is  much 
easier  nowadays.  During  the  last  half -century  the 
world  has  more  than  ever  become  convinced  of  the 

l8  x  See  supra,  pp.  89,  90. 


274  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

utility  and  necessity  of  small  States,  of  the  illegitimacy 
and  unwisdom  of  conquests,  and  of  the  right  of  peoples 
to  determine  their  own  destiny. 

Whatever  course  be  adopted  as  a  solution  of  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  problem — reannexation  to  France , 
„     ,  ^       establishment  of  autonomy  within  the  German 

Population  .  J 

to  be  con-    Empire,  or  the  creation  of  an  independent 
neutralised    State — the    population    of    the 
provinces   should   first    be   consulted   and   given   an 
opportunity  to  express  their  will  either  by  means  of 
a  referendum  or  by  a  vote  of  their  specially  elected 
representatives.      To    do    so  would   be    to   vindicate 
in  a   triumphant  manner  this  principle   of   national 
self-determination,   and  to  recognise  in  the   form  of 
a  striking  and  exemplary  precedent  this  fundamental 
principle   of  public   right.      It  is  realised,   and  now 
asserted  everywhere,  that  people  are  no  longer  like 
chattels,  liable  to  be  made  the  object  of  transactions 
between  other  contending  nations.     No  one  is  entitled 
to   neutralise   the   provinces   in   spite   of    them   and 
without   their   consent  ;   their   free   consent  is  indis- 
pensable  to  render   the  act   of  neutralisation  valid, 
legitimate,  and  binding.     The  solution  that  is  sought 
is  not  to  be  merely  a  settlement  of  an  industrial  or 
economic  difference  as  between  France  or  Germany, 
nor  is  it  to  be  simply  an  adjustment  of  conflicting 
claims  to  the  possession  of  a  certain  amount  of  terri- 
tory.    The  solution  must  be  such  as  will  satisfy  justice, 
reason,  the  conscience  and  desire  of  a  compact  popu- 
lation, and  the  interests  of  France  and  Germany  and 
Europe  in  general. 

At  the  general  assembly  of  the  members  of  the  Inter- 
national League  of  Peace  and  Liberty,  held  at  Geneva 
September  7,  1884  (at  which,  however,  no  German 
members  appear  to  have  been  present),  a  resolution 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  275 

was  passed  affirming  that  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  pos- 
sessed the  inalienable  right  of  choosing  their  own 
government,  that  the  Franco-German  hostility 
is  due  to  the  annexation  of  187 1,  that  the  „$  League 
consequent  state  of  armed  peace  is  detrimen-  of  p^e- 
tal  to  the  two  nations  and  to  Europe  generally, 
that  the  provinces  during  their  subjection  to  Germany 
(1871-1884)  repeatedly  claimed  the  right  to  dispose  of 
themselves,  that  the  security  of  Germany  (the  princi- 
pal reason  given  by  her  for  the  annexation)  will  be 
attained  by  neutralising  the  annexed  territory  under 
the  sanction  and  guarantee  of  the  European  Powers, 
and  that  all  disputes  arising  out  of  such  arrangement 
shall  be  submitted  to  a  court  of  arbitration.  The 
following  is  the  text  of  the  resolution,  which  is  at 
present  of  great  interest  and  significance  : 

"  1.  Considerant  que  le  droit  des  Alsaciens  et  des 
Lorrains  de  s'appartenir  a  eux-memes  et  par  consequent 
de  choisir  ou  de  constituer  librement  le  gouvernement 
qu'il  leur  convient  de  se  donner,  est  indiscutable, 
inalienable,  et  imprescriptible  ; 

"2.  Considerant  que  la  seule  cause  d'hostilite  qui 
exist e  entre  la  Republique  franc aise  et  1' Empire 
allemand  est  la  situation  faite  a  1'  Alsace  et  a  la  Lor- 
raine par  les  articles  1,  2  et  3  du  traite  signe  a  Francfort 
le  10  mai  187 1  entre  l'Allemagne  et  la  France  ; 

"3.  Que  l'etat  de  paix  armee,  qui  est  la  consequence 
de  cette  situation,  est  egalement  dommageable  pour 
les  deux  nations  et  pour  toute  1' Europe; 

"  4.  Que  la  seule  raison  donnee  par  l'Allemagne 
pour  stipuler  1' annexion  etait  la  necessite  d' assurer  la 
securite  ; 

"  5.  Que  depuis  treize  ans  que  1' Alsace  et  la  Lor- 
raine sont  passe es  sous  la  domination  allemande  la 
manifestation  constante  de  leurs  sentiments,  la  rigueur 


276  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

croissante  des  mesures  administratives  et  politiques 
prises  a  leur  egard,  1' attitude  gardee  par  les  deputes 
qu'elle  envoie  au  Reichstag,  leur  perseverance  a 
reelire  ces  deputes  demontrent  que  leur  volonte  de 
disposer  librement  d'elles-memes  est  aussi  ferme 
qu'elle  l'etait  au  lendemain  de  1' annexion  ; 

"  6.  Que  la  neutralisation  des  territoires  annexes, 
quelle  que  soit  d'ailleurs  la  juridiction  politique  sous 
laquelle  se  rangeraient  leurs  habitants,  donneraient  a. 
l'Allemagne  une  securite  plus  grande  et  plus  reelle  que 
ne  le  peut  faire  une  possession  toujours  precaire  qu'elle 
ne  maintient  que  par  la  force  ; 

"  j.  Qu'il  est  de  1' inter  et  commun  de  la  France,  de 
l'Allemagne,  de  l'Alsace,  de  la  Lorraine,  de  l'Europe 
que  cette  neutralisation  soit  sanctionnee  et  garantie 
par  tous  les  peuples  europeens ; 

Par  ces  motifs : 

"  L'assemblee  emet  le  vceu  suivant : 

"  La  France  et  l'Allemagne  abrogeront  d'un  commun 
accord  les  articles  i,  2,  et  3  du  traite  conclu  a  Francfort 
le  10  mai  187 1. 

"  Le  peuple  alsacien  et  le  peuple  lorrain  seront  mis 
en  situation  de  choisir  librement  l'une  des  trois  solu- 
tions suivantes  : 

"  1.  Annexion  definitive  de  l'Alsace  et  de  la 
Lorraine  a  l'Allemagne. 

"  2.  Retour  de  l'Alsace  et  de  la  Lorraine  a  la 
France. 

"3.  Constitution  de  l'Alsace  et  de  la  Lorraine 
en  un  ou  deux  6 tats  independants  et  autonomes. 

"  Quelle  que  soit  la  decision  du  peuple  alsacien  et  du 
peuple  lorrain,  cette  decision  fera  loi  pour  l'Allemagne 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  277 

et  pour  la  France  et  dans  tous  les  cas  entrainera  la 
neutralisation  des  territoires  alsaciens  et  lorrains. 

"  Le  traite  a  intervenir  entre  la  France,  l'Allemagne 
et  les  autres  Puissances  contiendra  une  clause  en  vertu 
de  laquelle  toutes  le  difficulties  auxquelles  pourrait 
donner  lieu  son  execution,  seront  soumises  en  dernier 
ressort  a  un  tribunal  arbitral.' '  1 

Having  regard  to  the  tendencies,  aptitudes,  and 
traditions  of  the  Alsace-Lorrainers,  we  may  safely 
conclude   that,   if  they   voted  in  favour  of 

.  J  Form  of 

the  independence  and  neutralisation  of  their  independent 
provinces,  they  would  prefer  a  republican  to  governmen  • 
a  monarchical  system  of  government.  In  that  case 
the  name  of  the  newly  constituted  State  might  well 
be  The  Alsace-Lorraine  Republic,  which  is  much  more 
appropriate  than  the  designation,  which  has  been 
suggested,  of  The  Rhenish  Republic.  Under  this 
solution  of  neutralisation,  the  fortresses  of  Strassburg 
and  Metz  would  be  dismantled,  and  no  others  would 
be  permitted  to  be  constructed.  That  is  to  say,  the 
neutralisation  would  imply  disarmament,  as  in  the 
case  of  Luxemburg,  and  would  not  be  like  the  neu- 
tralisation of  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  which  are 
obliged  to  maintain  standing  armies.  We  have  to 
bear  in  mind  that  the  provinces  in  question  are  together 
less  than  the  size  of  Yorkshire.  The  best  way  to 
safeguard  this  disarmament  would  be  for  France  and 
Germany  to  disarm  their  respective  frontier  zones,  to 
an  extent  agreed  upon,  adjacent  to  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Thus  there  would  be  between  the  two  Powers  a  three- 
fold disarmed  sphere,  which  would  minimise,  if  not 

1  ha  neutralite  de  V  Alsace-Lorraine.  Compte  rendu  de  I'Assemblee  Generate 
des  membres  de  la  ligue  international  de  la  paix  et  de  la  liberti.  Tenue  a 
Geneve  le  7  sept.  1884.     (Bale,  1884.) 


278  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

render  impossible,  the  occurrence  of  those  "  inci- 
dents "  that  so  often  prepare  the  way  for  an  open 
rupture. 

The  various  matters  of  adjustment  consequent  on 
the  creation  of  a  new  State  out  of  a  portion  of  another 
„   .  State  could  be  provided  for  by  international 

Various  1 

matters  for  convention  ;   and  if  need  be  an  international 

adjustment.  .  •    i   .    1  •     •     t    1 

commission  might  be  appointed  to  supervise 
their  execution.  Thus  the  right  of  option  of  nation- 
ality would  be  stipulated,  allowing  such  inhabitants 
as  desired  it  to  retain  their  allegiance  to  Germany  or 
to  transfer  it  to  France  instead  of  assuming  the  new 
allegiance  on  the  establishment  of  the  new  State. 
Every  precaution  must  be  taken  to  safeguard  the 
rights  of  the  minority,  and  in  suitable  cases  to  offer 
adequate  compensation  for  the  loss  or  interference 
with  vested  rights  and  interests.  A  certain  pecuniary 
compensation  might  be  paid  to  the  German  Empire  for 
such  property  as  may  be  transferred  with  the  terri- 
tory, and  for  expenditure  on  public  works,  etc.  In 
order  to  avoid  economic  dislocation  the  new  State 
should  be  allowed,  like  Luxemburg,  to  remain  within 
the  Zollverein,  and  a  Franco-German  commercial 
alliance,  including  Alsace-Lorraine,  would  be  one  of  the 
most  satisfactory  means  of  solving  also  the  coal  and 
iron  problem.  To  establish  the  freedom  of  navigation 
of  the  Rhine — which  is  the  direct  route  to  the  Sarre 
coalfields  and  the  Lorraine  ironfields — would  be  in 
the  general  interest,  and  would  promote  the  com- 
mercial intercourse  and  pacific  relationships  generally 
between  France,  Germany,  and  Alsace-Lorraine,  as 
well  as  other  States,  especially  so  when  the  Rhine- 
Danube  canal  becomes  available  for  international 
navigation  ;  and  such  freedom  of  navigation  would  be 
the   better   ensured   by   making   Alsace-Lorraine   an 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  279 

independent  State.  There  are  many  other  questions 
that  would  necessarily  arise  for  settlement  :  for 
example,  those  relating  to  treaties  affecting  the  newly 
established  State ;  public  law  and  administration, 
revenue  laws,  the  official  language  of  the  State,  religion, 
the  position  of  officials,  the  armed  forces,  the  courts  of 
law,  judicial  proceedings  pending,  untried  offenders  ; 
public  property  of  the  State,  charitable  foundations, 
the  state  archives,  the  private  domain  of  the  State, 
unpaid  taxes,  private  property  of  the  German  Emperor 
or  other  German  sovereigns  or  princes  ;  the  contractual 
obligations  of  the  new  State  and  apportionment  of 
debts,  concessions,  and  contracts  other  than  public 
debts ;  deposits,  pensions,  claims  based  on  war  losses  ; 
private  rights  and  private  law.  To  facilitate  the 
solution  of  all  these  questions  regard  may  be  paid  to 
the  various  guiding  precedents  and  established  rules  ; 
it  is  beyond  our  scope  here  to  consider  these  separately  ; 
so  that  it  must  suffice  to  refer  to  a  work  already  cited 
in  which  they  are  fully  and  systematically  dealt  with.1 
That  the  establishment  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  an 
independent  State  would  be  attended  by  many  signal 
advantages  is  obvious.     It  is  highly  probable 

..  r      i  i      •  Advantages 

that  the  great  majority  of  the  population,  of  creating 
including  the  immigrants  who  have  become  pendent 
definitely  settled  in  the  country,  would  now      ,  Aisace- 

*'  J  Lorraine. 

hail  such  a  solution  with  delight.2  Before 
the  present  war  the  desire  of  the  generality  was  for 
autonomy  within  the  German  Empire  ;  but,  what 
with  the  complications  brought  by  the  war,  the  revision 
of  opinions  it  has  occasioned,  the  manifestation  of  the 
democratic  spirit  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  and  the 
universal  assertion  of  the  principle  of  national  self- 

1  See  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  302-34. 

2  Cf.  La  Nation  (an  independent  weekly  paper  of  Geneva),  June  16,  1917. 


280  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

determination,  it  may  well  be  that  the  former  desire 
for  autonomy  has  become  transformed  into  a  desire 
for  complete  independence.  If  this  be  so,  the  first 
and  greatest  advantage  of  such  a  solution  would  be 
that  it  conformed  to  the  wishes  of  the  population,  who 
would  thus  be  enabled  to  give  free  play  to  their  deep 
local  patriotism. 

France,  too,  would  be  satisfied  with  this  arrange- 
ment, assuming — as  we  may  safely  do — that  it  com- 
.,  t.  mended  itself  to  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  ;   and 

Meeting 

wishes  of  the  amour-propre  of  Germany  would  (or 
e  peop  e.  s]10uj(jj  ^e  little  hurt  thereby.  The  creation 
of  an  independent  Alsace-Lorraine  would  partake  of 
the  nature  of  a  compromise  ;  so  that,  in  view  of  the 
inveterate  conflicting  claims  of  France  and  Germany, 
neither  Power  could  be  considered  as  the  vanquished 
Revanche  party  or  as  the  outstanding  victor,  and 
obviated,  hence  neither  party  would  feel  the  sting  of 
humiliation  or  the  need  for  revanche  ;  neither  party 
would  be  in  the  position  to  regard  force  alone  as 
triumphant  or  as  productive  of  good.  As  Dr.  Fried, 
the  distinguished  German  pacifist,  has  recently 
observed  :  "If  we  had  not  lost  every  claim  to  be 
considered  as  reasonable  beings  ...  in  consequence 
of  our  three  years'  fight  for  trenches  and  rubbish-heaps, 
we  should  seek  a  way  out  of  this  fatal  dilemma  by  a 
compromise  which  should  primarily  consider  the 
interests  of  the  population  of  the  provinces,  without 
giving  the  unconditional  possession  of  them  to  either 
party.  That  would  be  a  solution  which  would  entitle 
neither  France  nor  Germany  to  pose  as  conqueror, 
and  would  offer  to  each  of  them  the  possibility  of 
ceasing  to  incur  unspeakable  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of 
a  phantom."  x 

1  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung  (Swiss  independent  paper),  June  24,  1917. 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  281 

Again,  the  fusion  of  the  two  elements — Germanic 
and  Gallic — could  continue  apace  without  any  heart- 
searchings  and  without  any  apprehension  of 
ultimate  difficulties,  e.g.  in  case  of  a  renewed  Germanic 
Franco-German  difference.  The  French  emi-  ^jdGal{ic 
grants  who  left  the  territory  could  freely 
return  along  with  their  families  and  descendants,  and 
would  be  permitted  either  to  retain  their  French 
allegiance  or  to  accept  the  new  citizenship  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  German  immigrants  could  remain  if 
they  thought  fit  to  do  so,  and  would  no  longer  be 
deemed  to  be  usurpers  and  interlopers.  It  is  to  be 
remembered  that,  even  before  187 1,  the  culture  of 
the  provinces  was  neither  purely  French  nor  purely 
German,  but  "  mixed." 

Further,  this  solution  would  remove  the  great  diffi- 
culties in  regard  to  military  service ;  before,  the 
Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  who  were  enrolled  Military 
in  the  German  armies  and  who  had  French  service, 
sympathies  or  relations  and  friends  in  France,  realised 
their  particularly  painful  position  in  the  event  of  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  the  two  Powers.  Such 
a  condition  of  things  encourages  desertion  and  treason  ; 
and  a  Government  adopting  such  a  policy  as  to  make 
this  possible  sows  the  wind  to  reap  the  whirlwind. 

Then,  too,  an  independent  Alsace-Lorraine — with 
its  bilingual  people  and  its  Franco-German  civilisation 
— would,  much  more  than  under  any  other  Bond  of 
solution,  serve  as  a  permanent  and  salutary     ur"°n  ke- 

,",.,,'  tween 

connecting-link  between  France  and  Germany,  France  and 
and  through  its  instrumentality  the  great  Germany- 
rival  nations  would  find  it  easier  to  get  rid  of  their 
inveterate  differences,  to  reach  a  mutual  understanding, 
and  to  inaugurate  an  epoch  of  true  peace  and  amity — 
a   consummation   that   would   prove   an   inestimable 


282  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

blessing  to  themselves,  to  Europe,  and  indeed  to  the 
whole  civilised  world  ;  for,  unless  it  is  brought  about, 
a  league  of  nations  cannot  be  established.  By  virtue 
of  its  position  as  intermediary  and  bond  of  union  it 
would  exert  a  moderating  influence  on  chauvinism 
on  the  one  side  and  pangermanism  on  the  other  ;  and 
through  its  traditions  of  freedom  and  newly  acquired 
liberty  it  might  well  serve  as  a  stimulus  to  the  liberal 
movement  in  Germany,  and  a  warning  to  would-be 
retrogressive  reactionaries  in  France.  Indeed,  the 
country  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  been  a  perennial 
cockpit  of  Europe,  might  appropriately  offer  its 
ancient  city  of  Strassburg  as  the  administrative  seat 
of  the  League  of  Nations. 

We  have  already  mentioned  the  question  of  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Rhine,  and  the  coal  and  iron 
problem  which  has  aroused  so  much  apprehension  in 
Germany  and  such  strong  claims  in  France  :  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Alsace-Lorraine  would 
make  easy  the  settlement  of  both  these  difficulties. 
The  new  State,  amicably  disposed  towards  both 
Powers,  and  having  intercourse  with  both,  would  need 
the  markets  of  both,  would  welcome  the  capital  of 
both,  and  would  freely  export  coal  and  iron  to  both. 

Finally,  a  neutralised  Alsace-Lorraine  would  con- 
stitute a  "  buffer"  State,  and  together  with  Belgium 
Would  be  an<^  Luxemburg  would  form  a  great  neutral 
a "  buffer "  belt  between  France  and  Germany.  The 
two  Powers,  no  longer  remaining  in  contact, 
would  find  it  easier  to  disarm  ;  and  both  would  thus 
be  in  a  position  to  accept  more  readily  the  principle 
of  general  disarmament  if  introduced  into  the  scheme 
of  a  League  of  Nations.  We  may  here  recall  that  in 
1867  war  would  probably  have  broken  out  between 
France  and  Prussia  in  respect  of  the  possession  of  the 


SOLUTIONS:    INDEPENDENCE  283 

fortress  of  Luxemburg,  had  not  Lord  Stanley  inter- 
posed to  suggest  the  neutralisation  of  the  duchy  ;  and 
if  Alsace-Lorraine  had  been  a  neutralised  independent 
State  in  1870  it  is  possible  that  the  Franco -German 
War  might  have  been  prevented.  (The  neutrality  of 
Belgium  in  19 14  was  not  on  the  same  footing  as  Alsace- 
Lorraine  would  have  occupied  in  1870,  had  it  then  been 
a  neutral  country.)  Despite  the  example  of  Belgium 
in  19 14,  the  value  of  buffer  States  has  been  and  will 
continue  to  be  everywhere  recognised.  Persia  has 
been  an  effective  buffer  between  British  and  Russian 
interests,  Afghanistan  between  Russia  and  India,  and 
Tibet  between  India  and  Chinese  Turkestan — although, 
it  is  true,  these  countries  are  in  a  different  position 
geographically  and  economically  from  that  of  such 
territories  as  Belgium  and  Alsace-Lorraine.  But 
Switzerland  is  also  an  independent  and  neutralised 
buffer  State,  and  her  neutrality  has  been  respected 
in  the  present  war.  Those  who  object  to  the  neutra- 
lisation of  Alsace-Lorraine  say,  however,  that  the 
neutrality  of  Switzerland  was  not  violated  by  the  Ger- 
mans simply  because  she  possesses  an  efficient  army, 
which  she  promptly  mobilised  for  self-defence  in  case 
of  attempted  invasion  ;  whereas  Alsace-Lorraine,  being 
so  small  a  territory  and  possessing  so  small  a  popula- 
tion, could  not  be  expected  to  maintain  an  army  that 
would  be  similarly  effective. 

This  view  is  certainly  tenable  if  we  take  it  for  granted 
that  after  the  present  war  a  neutralised  and  inde- 
pendent Alsace-Lorraine  would  be  protected 
by  no  more  than  a  "  scrap  of  paper,"  and   temaSiSi 
would  be  left  isolated  by  Europe  in  the  event  co-°Peration 

J  *  and  treaties. 

of  an  attempted  invasion  on  the  part,  say, 

of  the  Germans  or  the  French.     On  the  contrary,  the 

neutralisation  scheme  necessarily  implies  that  after 


284  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  war  the  civilised  peoples  of  the  world  will  effect  a 
closer  association — be  it  called  league,  society,  or 
partnership  of  nations — that  they  will  create  more 
potent  sanctions  for  international  law,  and  that  they 
will  find  a  means  for  ensuring  the  observance  of  treaties 
and  for  dealing  with  a  violator  thereof.  These  requisite 
sanctions  and  guarantees  are  not  the  figments  of 
theory  ;  they  have  existed  hitherto,  and  they  were 
applied  in  the  present  war.  If  not,  why  is  Great 
Britain  fighting,  and  why  has  the  United  States 
entered  the  war — to  mention  only  two  of  the  belli- 
gerents ?  What  is  needed  is  to  reinforce  these  sanctions 
and  guarantees  in  such  a  way  that  a  State  preparing 
to  violate  international  law  or  treaties  will  be  certain 
that  it  will  have  the  whole  civilised  world  against  it, 
that  if  it  proceeds  in  its  contemplated  act  or  remains 
refractory  it  will  be  ostracised  from  the  family  of 
nations  and  excluded  from  all  commercial  intercourse, 
that  it  will  even  have  to  encounter  the  armed  forces  of 
the  united  world  and  suffer  all  the  consequences  of 
certain  defeat.  The  future  hope  of  mankind,  then,  lies 
in  close  international  co-operation,  which  undoubtedly 
can  be  established  ;  the  lessons  and  results  of  the  war 
make  such  organisation  imperative,  whatever  be  the 
destiny  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  whether  this  or  that 
State  is  to  be  neutralised  or  not. 


CHAPTER    XVI 

SOLUTIONS    SUGGESTED  :      (d)    PARTITION  \     ALTERATION 
OF   BOUNDARIES,   ETC. 

Partition  proposals — Language  as  a  basis — Suggested  union  of  Alsace  with 
Baden — Division  among  German  States — Frontier  rearrangement— 
The  pays  messin  to  France  and  the  rest  neutralised — Alsace-Lorraine 
as  part  of  a  Rhenish- Alpine  Confederation — Boundary  readjustment — • 
Arbitration  of  the  Pope  suggested — Difficulties  in  these  proposals  : 
Division  on  basis  of  speech — Division  on  basis  of  sentiment — Division 
between  German  States — Lorraine  as  an  independent  State — Suggested 
confederation.  The  Rhine  as  a  Franco-German  boundary — Criticism 
of  the  view  as  to  a  Rhine  frontier — Desideratum  in  fixing  frontiers. 

In  addition  to  the  solutions  considered  in  the  preceding 
chapters,  viz.  the  establishment  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
as  an  autonomous  State  within  the  German  Partition 
Empire,  and  the  creation  of  a  neutralised  in-  proposals, 
dependent  State,  various  schemes  have  been  suggested 
which  involve  a  partition  of  the  territory  or  an  altera- 
tion of  its  boundaries. 

Thus  it  has  been  proposed  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
should  be  divided  into  two  parts — the  predominantly 
French-speaking  country,  and  the  predomin-  Language 
antly  German-speaking  country — that  the  asabasis- 
former  should  be  retroceded  to  France,  and  that  the 
latter  should  continue  to  belong  to  the  German  Empire. 
On  one  occasion  Maximilian  Harden  expressed  the 
view  that  such  districts  of  the  Reichsland  as  were 
conspicuously  French  in  character  and  speech  might 
be  restored  to  France  in  exchange  for  an  African 
colony.     And  quite  recently  at  the  German  majority 

285 


286  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Socialist  Conference  held  at  Wiirzburg,  October  14-17, 
19 17,  Herr  Vetters  of  Giessen  remarked  that  if  it 
was  simply  a  matter  of  the  smaller  French-speaking 
frontier  districts,  the  Germans  ought  not  to  insist 
obstinately  on  retaining  possession  of  them,  if  a  great 
number  of  human  lives  could  thereby  be  spared.  Again, 
a  more  definite  plan  has  been  brought  forward  for 
separating  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  they  are  at  present 
situated,  and  returning  Lorraine  to  France,  leaving 
Alsace  to  Germany.  Further,  it  has  been  pointed  out 
that,  as  Alsace  would  before  the  present  war  have 
probably  voted,  if  the  opportunity  were  offered,  for 
inclusion  within  the  German  federation,  and  as  French- 
speaking  Lorraine — comprising  only  some  450  square 
miles — would  probably  have  preferred  to  be  incor- 
porated with  France,  a  division  and  partition  might  be 
effected  accordingly  ;  such  arrangement  would  leave 
the  germanised  part  of  Lorraine,  which  might  have 
preferred  to  be  brought  into  close  association  with 
the  Lower  Rhine  provinces  for  reasons  of  commercial 
intercourse  and  on  the  ground  of  linguistic  affinity. 
Alsace,  too — or  the  greater  part  of  it  that  is  German 
— might  then  have  chosen  to  be  united  to  the  Grand 

Duchy  of  Baden,  with  which  it  has  many 
unfoiTof  points  of  kinship.  Baden  is  one  of  the  best 
Bacfen  with  anc*  most  liberally  governed  of  the  German 

States  ;  it  is  a  cradle  of  German  liberalism  ; 
its  towns  possess  contented  colonies  of  foreigners,  and 
are  becoming  cosmopolitan  in  character  ;  its  arts, 
sciences,  and  social  economy  are  in  a  progressive  state 
of  development.  It  is  thought,  therefore,  that  the 
Alsatians  would  have  been  quite  satisfied  with  a  union 
with  Baden,  and  could  have  lived  at  peace,  especially 
if  many  of  the  Prussian  officials  of  Alsace  were  replaced 
by  Alsatians  and  Badeners. 


SOLUTIONS  :    PARTITION  287 

Other  partition  schemes  have  quite  recently  been 
advanced  in  Berlin  ;  e.g.  that  Alsace  should  be  allotted 
to  Bavaria,  and  Lorraine  to  Prussia  ;  or  that 
a  threefold  division  should  be  made,  assigning  among* 
Lower  Alsace  to  Bavaria,  Upper  Alsace  to  ^SJe" 
Baden,  and  Lorraine  to  Prussia.  In  support 
of  such  plans  it  is  pointed  out  that,  whilst  Alsace  is 
much  more  closely  related  to  Bavaria  or  Baden  than 
it  is  to  Prussia,  German  Lorraine,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  close  commercial  connections  with  Cologne, 
and  better  understands  and  can  more  easily  accom- 
modate itself  to  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  the 
Prussians. 

A  Swiss  writer,1  discussing  in  the  summer  of  19 16 
the  question  of  a  rearrangement  of  the  Franco-German 
frontier,  observes  :  "  The  coral  rag  summits  Frontier 
of  the  [Lorraine]  plateau  are  national  strate-  rearrange- 
gical  points  which  become  doubly  valuable 
by  the  erection  of  forts.  The  eastern  edge  of  the 
Cotes  Lorraine  should  become,  from  natural  causes, 
the  first  defensive  line  of  France  against  Germany." 
He  maintains  that  no  suitable  dividing  line  can  be 
found  in  Lorraine  owing  to  its  geographical  position 
between  two  large  river  basins,  viz.  that  of  south-west 
Germany  and  that  of  the  Seine.  "  The  chalk,  clay, 
and  marl  strata  of  Lorraine  may  be  regarded  as  the 
eastern  edge  "  of  the  latter,  or  as  the  western  edge  of 
the  former.  Now,  as  it  is  this  natural  formation  which 
in  the  past  determined  the  independence  of  this  transi- 
tion territory,  established  formerly  as  the  buffer  State 
of  the  Duchy  of  Lorraine,  he  therefore  recommends 
the  revival  of  such  a  State  to  be  delimited  in  accordance 
with  geographical  exigencies. 

1  Basle  Gazette,   August  27,    1916  ;    referred  to  by  Sir  Thomas  Holdich, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  iio-ii. 


288  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Again,  it  has  been  suggested  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
should  be  set  up  as  an  independent  neutralised  State, 
The  pays  after  giving  Metz  and  the  pays  messin  to 
messin  to  France  and  effecting  certain  boundary  modi- 
the  rest       fications.     The   new   State    would   comprise 

neutralised.    ^   territory   Qn   the   left   bank    of   the    Rhine 

wherein  the  Germanic  dialect  predominated,  and  also 
— for  the  sake  of  securing  territorial  unity — Upper 
Alsace,  where,  however,  the  use  of  French  is  increasing 
amongst  the  bourgeois  classes.  The  boundaries  would 
then  be,  on  the  east,  the  Rhine  ;  on  the  west,  a  line 
coinciding  approximately  with  the  present  frontier, 
subject  to  certain  rectifications,  e.g.  in  regard  to  the 
district  of  the  old  commune  of  Raon-les-Leau,  after 
which  the  line  would  follow  the  course  of  the  Sarre 
Rouge  as  far  as  its  confluence  with  the  Sarre,  and  then 
the  course  of  the  latter  as  far  as  its  confluence  with 
the  Moselle. 

A   remarkable   proposal   was   brought    forward   in 

1884  by  a  Saxon  publicist *  as  a  means  of  solving  the 

widely  felt  difficulties  in  regard  to  the  anoma- 

Rnenish-fa  l°us  position  of  the  conquered  Alsace-Lor- 

Aipine  con-  rame#     Like  many  other  German  writers  and 

federation.  J 

politicians,  he  does  not  look  with  favour  on 
the  existence  and  multiplication  of  small  States, 
and  so  he  suggests  that  Alsace-Lorraine  should  be 
united  to  the  neighbouring  small  States,  Holland, 
Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and  Switzerland,  and  that 
the  whole  should  constitute  a  neutral  Rhenish-Alpine 
Confederation.  In  this  case  the  security  of  the 
frontiers  of  the  German  Empire  might  be  ensured  by 
causing  the  fortresses  of  Metz  and  Strassburg  to  be 
demolished,  and  by  forbidding  the  construction  of 
others. 

1  M.  Maass,  Was  soil  mit  Elsass-Lothringen  werden  (Leipzig,  1884),  p.  45. 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  289 

Writing  in  19 15,  an  English  geographical  authority1 
proposes  such  a  boundary  readjustment  as  amounts  to 
an  entirely  French  solution  of  the  problem.     Bounda 
He  holds  that  the  frontier  should  be  deter-      readjust- 
mined  by  considerations  of  national  sentiment, 
added  to  reasons  of  economic  interests  and  geographical 
configuration.    He  points  out  that,  whereas  the  forested 
Vosges  form  a  real  barrier  in  Alsace,  yet  French  is 
steadily  advancing  towards  the  eastern  slope,  despite 
the  fierce  political  hostility  ;    and  that,  in  view  of  all 
these   circumstances,  the   eastern  frontier   of   Alsace 
should  be  the  Rhine,  and  such  a  reconstituted  Alsace 
should  go  to  France.     In  reference  to  the  geographical 
features  and  the  existence  of  German  sentiment  he 
says  :   "  These  include  the  lowland  area  of  the  Lorraine 
gate  between  the  Hardt  and  the  Vosges,  the  natural 
line   of    least    resistance   marked   by    the   Zorn   and 
the  Kinzig   valleys,  and  its  complementary  economic 
feature   in  the   Rhine-and-Marne   canal.     This  canal 
divides  approximately  the  Alsace  hop- lands  from  the 
Palatinate    tobacco-lands,    as    the    Saar    divides    the 
Lorraine  hop- lands  from  the  Palatinate  grain- lands. 
So  the  frontier  should  run  along  the  canal  to  the  Saar, 
and  then  along  the  Saar  to  the  point  where  the  Moselle 
leaves  the  Luxemburg  frontier.     South  of  the  canal 
and  west  of  the  Rhine  there  is  no  appreciable  per- 
centage  of   Germanic   sentiment — in  a  population  of 
1,800,000  ;    and  it  is  better  that  the  appreciable  per- 
centage   of    Germanic    sentiment    west    of   the    Saar 
should  come  under  a  Power  with  a  genius  for  assimila- 
tion than  that  the  at  least  equally  appreciable  per- 
centage of  French  sentiment  should  remain  under  a 
Power  with  no  such  genius."  2 

1  L.  W.  Lyde,  Some  Frontiers  of  to-morrow  (London,  1915),  pp.  57-8. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  57-8. 

19 


290  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Finally,  as  a  way  out  of  the  seeming  tangle  a  pro- 
posal has  recently  been  brought  forward  by  Herr 
Herzberger's  organ,  the  Swiss  paper  Neue 
of  the  Pope  Zurcher  Nachrichten,  that  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
suggested.  qUestion  should  be  submitted  to  the  arbitra- 
tion of  the  Pope,  who  would  of  course  be  able,  subject 
to  the  limits  of  the  submission,  to  choose  from  among 
the  above-mentioned  solutions. 

That  all  these  proposals  are  attended  by  greater  or 
lesser  advantages  there  can  be  no  doubt  ;  but  it  is 
ffi  equally  certain  that  they  disregard  or  gloss 

in  these  over  many  outstanding  difficulties  and  dis- 
proposas.  a(jvantages,  which  would  prove  to  be  an 
obstacle  to  a  satisfactory,  equitable,  and  permanent 
settlement  from  the  point  of  view  alike  of  the  provinces 
themselves,  the  two  contending  claimants,  and  the 
rest  of  Europe. 

The  division  of  the  provinces  on  the  basis  of  speech 
and  the  assignment  of  the  French-speaking  portions 
^  .  .  to  France  and  the  German- speaking  districts 

Division  on  r  ° 

basis  of  to  Germany  would  be  impossible  because — 
as  we  have  shown  in  an  earlier  chapter — 
there  is  no  clear  line  of  demarcation  between  the  two 
languages  ;  if  such  an  apportionment  were  attempted 
it  would  involve  a  chopping  up  of  the  country  in  such  a 
fantastic  manner  that  the  result  of  the  operation  would 
be  unmanageable  for  practical  purposes.  Moreover, 
great  numbers  of  the  people  speak  the  two  languages 
equally  well ;  and  many  whose  mother-tongue  is  the 
German  dialect  prefer  French  for  cultural,  literary, 
and  social  reasons.  Indeed,  language  cannot  safely 
be  taken  as  the  determining  criterion  for  effecting  a 
territorial  division  ;  it  is  not  necessarily  a  true  in- 
dex of  the  sentiments,  the  sympathies,  the  aspirations, 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  291 

and  the  consciousness  of  national  personality  of  a 
given  population.1  Such  a  partition  would  not  satisfy- 
either  France  or  Germany  ;  and  it  would  be  certainly 
repudiated  by  the  Alsace-Lorrainers.  We  have  em- 
phasised more  than  once  that,  speaking  generally, 
the  Alsace-Lorrainers  are  neither  French  nor  German  ; 
they  are  Alsace-Lorrainers  with  ideals  of  their  own 
the  fulfilment  of  which  the  great  majority  of  them 
seek  neither  in  France  nor  in  Germany,  but  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  There  is  undoubtedly  a  certain  difference 
between  the  Alsatians  and  the  Lorrainers  in  respect 
both  of  physical  and  mental  characteristics;  but  a 
common  unfortunate  destiny  for  well-nigh  half  a 
century — not  to  mention  an  earlier  and  happier 
association — has  brought  them  intimately  together 
and  has  welded  them  into  an  almost  homogeneous 
people ;  the  union  is  quite  as  close  as,  if  not  closer  than, 
the  union  of  the  different  elements  of  Belgium  or  of 
Switzerland.  M.  Heimweh  points  out  that  during  the 
period  of  protest,2  Upper  Alsace,  for  example,  which 
contained  comparatively  few  French  communes,  re- 
turned protesting  deputies  to  the  Reichstag  with  the 
same  persistence  as  Lorraine  did,  where  half  of  the 
population  were  French  ;  that  the  evasion  from 
military  service,  the  enlistments  in  the  foreign  legion, 
the  number  of  the  fallen  at  Tonkin  and  Dahomey, 
were  all  divided  pretty  equally  between  all  parts  of  the 
Reichsland  ;  and  that  the  emigration  statistics  during, 
say,  the  twenty  years  1871-1890,  show  that  there 
were  just  as  many  emigrants  from  the  German-speaking 
districts  as  from  the  French-speaking  localities.3    Thus, 

1  On  the  question  of  language,  see  supra,  chap.  vii. 

2  See  supra,  chap.  x. 

3  J.  Heimweh,  La  Guerre  et  la  frontie're  du  Rhin  (Paris,  1895),  pp.  78-80  ; 
referring  to  the  Statistische  Mittheilungen,  xxiii  and  xxiv  (Strasburg,  1893- 
4),  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 


2Q2  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

a  partition  based  on  language,  or  on  earlier  historical 
association,  or  on  original  nationality  and  race,  whilst 
being  ostensibly  and  superficially  feasible  and  natural, 
would  in  reality  be  impracticable  and  artificial,  and 
would  amount  to  an  arbitrary  dismemberment  of  an 
organic  whole.  Furthermore,  if  a  partition  were 
effected,  what  would  be  the  position  of  the  part  that 
remained  German  ?  Would  it  be  a  diminished  Reichs- 
land,  or  would  it  be  made  an  autonomous  member 
of  the  German  confederation  ?  Both  alternatives  give 
rise  to  difficulties. 

Nor  could  a  practical  scheme  of  partition  be  arrived 

at  on  the  footing  of  national  sentiment  and  preference 

for  France  or  Germany,  for  the  reason — as  in 

Division  on  -,,.■.,. 

basis  of  the  case  of  the  distribution  of  the  two  lan- 
sentiment  g^ggg — that  there  is  no  definite  dividing-line. 
The  suggestion  that  Metz  and  the  pays  messin  should 
be  returned  to  France  on  the  ground  that  this  district 
is  almost  entirely  French  is  weakened  through  the 
incorrectness  of  the  reason  given  :  for,  in  point  of  fact, 
Metz  is  not  now  predominantly  French  ;  the  old 
town  may  still  be  so,  but  the  new  town  is  nearly  all 
German ;  so  that,  speaking  approximately,  three- 
fifths  of  Metz  as  a  whole  may  be  said  to  be  German. 
Besides,  the  French  revanche  sentiment  would 
scarcely  be  satisfied  with  the  acquisition  of  Metz  alone, 
if  the  rest  of  Lorraine  and  the  whole  of  Alsace  remained 
in  the  hands  of  Germany  ;  for  it  is  with  Strassburg 
rather  than  with  Metz  that  the  French  revanche 
sentiment— whatever  there  survived  of  it  before  the 
present  war — had  been  associated. 

The  proposed  division  of  Alsace-Lorraine  between 
Prussia  and  one  or  two  other  German  States  (e.g. 
Bavaria  and  Baden)  raises  not  only  all  the  difficulties 
mentioned  above,  but  the  further  difficulty  in  that  it 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  293 

would  arouse  the  jealousy  and  dissatisfaction  of  the 
South  German  States ;  and  the  provinces,  Division 
which  have  long  been  an  unhappy  object  gSm5 
of  contention  in  European  conflicts,  would  states. 
become  an  unhappy  scrambling-ground  for  German 
States. 

To  set  up  Lorraine  alone  as  an  independent  buffer 
State  also  gives  rise  to  the  various  disadvantages 
incidental  to  separation  ;  besides,  it  creates  Lorraine 
the  further  difficulty  in  reference  to  boundary  ^JJ3£j 
delimitation.     Many  of  the  fatal  defects  of  state. 

the  frontier  established  in  187 1  would  be  con- 
tinued. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  do  away  as  much  as  possible 
with  small  States  altogether  by  combining  Alsace- 
Lorraine  with,  say,  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  gu  ested 
Holland,  and  Switzerland,  and  so  establish-  confedera- 
ing  a  considerable  confederation,  is  such  an 
absurd  proposal  that  it  is  not  worth  discussion.  That 
the  small  nations  have  justified  their  existence  in  the 
world  and  that  it  is  a  supreme  advantage  from  all 
points  of  view — political,  legal,  cultural — to  let  them 
remain  and  protect  them  is  admitted  everywhere, 
except  perhaps  among  certain  sections  in  Germany. 
Writers,  militarists,  and  publicists  such  as  Clausewitz, 
Lasson,  Treitschke,  Bernhardi,  and  so  on,  look  with 
contempt  on  small  States  (as  on  small  armies)  and 
would  readily,  if  permitted,  bring  about  their  extinction. 

Lastly,  the  proposal  to  readjust  the  boundaries  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  the  Rhine  the  dividing-line 
between  France  and  Germany  has  certain  The  Rhine 
important  disadvantages.  It  was  the  fatal  as  a  German 
aim  of  Napoleon  III  to  secure  for  France  boundary, 
the  frontier  of  the  Rhine.  Do  those  who  ad- 
vance this  suggestion  mean  that  only  that  part  of 


294  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  Rhine  which  separates  the  present  Alsace  from 
Baden  shall  be  the  Franco-German  boundary,  or  that 
the  lower  course  of  the  river  shall  also  form  such  a 
boundary  ?  In  the  case  of  the  former  alternative — 
assuming  all  the  benefits  claimed  for  a  river-boundary 
— only  a  comparatively  small  section  of  the  Rhine 
(about  a  hundred  miles)  would  furnish  the  boundary, 
leaving  Lorraine  and  Northern  Alsace  with  the  same 
defective  frontiers  as  existed  before  the  war  of  1870. 
The  latter  alternative  implies  the  annexation  to  France 
of  a  considerable  portion  of  Germany — the  Palatinate 
and  the  Rhine  Provinces — as  well  as  interference  with 
Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  Even  if  Germany  were 
overwhelmingly  defeated  and  found  herself  at  the 
mercy  of  France,  there  would  be  no  valid  reason, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  European  policy,  to  take  all 
this  territory  for  the  purpose  of  rounding  off  France. 
Moreover,  what  good  reason  is  there,  it  has  not  in- 
aptly been  asked,  to  fix  on  the  Rhine  as  the  "  natural" 
frontier  of  France  rather  than,  say,  the  Elbe  or  the  Oder, 
unless  it  be  that  the  demand  for  the  territorial  exten- 
sion of  the  Rhine  is  more  modest  and  less  impossible 
of  realisation.  But  the  fact  that  one  claim  is  less 
extravagant  than  another  does  not  necessarily  make 
it  a  reasonable  and  legitimate  one. 

The  question  of  the  Rhine  as  a  French  boundary 
dominated  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Revolution  and 
the  Empire.  It  was  an  important  feature 
in  eeariiere  of  the  negotiations  of  the  Treaty  of  Bale 
E"iit°i?san  (I795)>  as  we^  as  °^  "those  of  the  Treaty 
of  Campo  Formio  (1797)  and  of  the  Peace 
of  Luneville  (1801),  whereby  France  succeeded  in 
acquiring  the  long-desired  Rhine  frontier.  In  Novem- 
ber 18 13  Metternich  and  Nesselrode  declared  at 
Frankfort  to  De  Saint-Aignan,  the  French  minister, 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  295 

that  in  their  view  the  Rhine  was  one  of  the  natural 
boundaries  of  France  :  "  Que  les  souverains  coalises 
etaient  unanimement  d' accord  sur  la  puissance  et  la 
preponderance  que  la  France  doit  conserver  dans  son 
integrite,  en  se  renfermant  dans  ses  limites  naturelles 
qui  sont  le  Rhin,  les  Alpes,  et  les  Pyrenees,  et  que  si 
ces  principes  etaient  agrees  on  pourrait  neutraliser, 
sur  la  rive  droite  du  Rhin,  tel  lieu  qu'on  jugerait  con- 
venable  ou  les  plenipotentiaires  de  toutes  les  puissances 
belligerantes  se  rendraient  sur-le-champ."  After  the 
defeat  of  Napoleon,  however,  in  18 14  and  again  in 
18 15,  a  territorial  rearrangement  was  effected  in  order 
to  secure  European  political  equilibrium.  Under  the 
Peace  of  Paris,  18 14,  France  was  obliged  to  abandon 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  ;  and  under  the  Treaty  of 
Paris,  November  20,  1815,  she  suffered  further  losses 
of  territory — whereas  Prussia  gained  considerable  ac- 
cessions beyond  the  Rhine,  and,  having  thus  acquired 
the  hegemony  in  Germany,  made  a  bid  for  the  political 
hegemony  on  the  Continent.  A  few  months  before  his 
definitive  downfall  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  remarked 
that  the  Rhine  frontier  is  "un  decret  de  Dieu  "  x  ; 
but,  thanks  to  his  ambition,  Europe  was  compelled  to 
disregard  such  "  decree,"  and  bring  about  a  different 
arrangement. 

Several  recent  writers,  maintaining  that  the  Rhine 
is  a  natural  boundary  necessary  for  the  security  and 
independence  of  European  countries,  point  TheRh- 
to  the  great  part  it  has  repeatedly  played  in  in  national 
national  struggles  from  the  time  of  the  strusees- 
Romans,  and  to  the  menacing  predominance  attained 
by  the  Power  that  took  possession  of  the  course  of  the 
river.    Thus,  a  French  historian  writing  soon  after  the 

1  Letter  to  Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  March  1815  ;  referred  to  by  C  M.  Savarit, 
Frontihre  du  Rhin  (Paris,  1915). 


296  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Franco-German  War,  and  foreseeing  the  approaching 
preponderance  of  Germany,  observes  :   "  Sur  les  rives 
historiques  du  Rhin  et  au  pied  des  montagnes  qui  se 
refletent  dans  ses  eaux,  bien  des  races  humaines,  des 
peuples  europeens  se  sont  heurtes ;   et  il  semble  que 
la   domination,    ou    au   moins   la   preponderance    en 
Europe  soit  attachee  a  la  possession  de  ces  hauts  som- 
mets  d'ou  Ton  descend  partout  et  de  ce  fleuve  qui 
arrose  et  quelquefois  ravage  les, pays  les  plus  divers. 
Quand  les  Romains  atteignirent  le  Rhin  ils  arrivaient 
a  1' apogee  de  leur  puissance,  et  quand  ils  l'abandon- 
nerent,  leur  empire  tomba.     Le  veritable  centre  de 
la  puissance  de  Charlemagne,  qui  s'etendait  de  l'Eyder 
au  Garigliano  et  du  Raab  a  l'Ocean,  etait,  entre  la 
Meuse  et  le  Rhin,  a  Aix-la-Chapelle ;   et  les  empereurs 
allemands,  ses  heritiers  pretendus,  menacerent  souvent 
de    la   l'independance    europeenne.      Louis    XIV,    en 
ramenant  la  France  au  Rhin,  conjura  cette  menace. 
La  premiere  Republique  francaise,  qui   prit  toute  la 
rive  gauche  du  fleuve,  assura  tout  a  fait  cette  independ- 
ance,  et  le  premier  Empire  francais,  en  passant  sur  la 
rive  droite,  la  menaca  de  nouveau  a  son  tour.     Les 
traites  de  1815,  qui  partagerent  plus  ou  moins  equitable- 
ment  les  rives  du  fleuve  entre  plusieurs  peuples,  avaient 
etabli  sur  ce  point  un  equilibre  un  peu  factice,  mais 
qui  dura  longtemps.     La  nouvelle  puissance,  en  repre- 
nant  violemment  presque  tout  le  cours  du  fleuve  sur 
ses  deux  rives,  redevient  la  plus  formidable  puissance 
de  1' Europe.     Pour  l'independance  et  la  securite  des 
peuples,  le  Rhin  doit  etre  une  limit e."  x 

But  this  argument,  to  which  certain  events  of  past 
European  history  certainly  lend  colour,  savours  of  the 
post  hoc  propter  hoc  fallacy.     It  cannot  for  a  moment 

1  J.  Zeller,  Origines  de  I'Allemagne  et  de  V empire  germanique  (Paris,  1872), 
p.  2. 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  297 

be  supposed  when  we  consider  the  course  of  history, 
say,  during  the  last  two  centuries,  that  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Rhine  as  a  boundary  between 

C    Hi    '  f 

France  and  Germany  would  have  ensured  the  Sew  as 
peace  and  arrested  the  territorial  ambitions  t0  f  Rh.ine 

frontier. 

of  this  or  that  Power.  Under  Louis  XIV, 
for  example,  little  importance  was  attached  to  natural 
defences.1  The  cause  of  aggression  is  not  the  absence 
of  a  natural  boundary  like  the  Rhine,  but,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  absence  of  a  properly  constituted  society 
of  nations  governed  by  an  international  law  that  can- 
not be  set  aside  at  discretion,  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  accumulation  of  armaments,  and  the  obtuseness  of 
peoples  in  their  subservience  to  military  fanatics.  In 
these  circumstances  a  natural  boundary,  involving 
a  greater  or  less  obstacle,  is  scarcely  more  effective  than 
a  purely  artificial  boundary  of  stakes  and  stones, 
protected  by  trenches  and  fortifications.  Moreover, 
the  contention  that  the  Rhine  is  the  most  suitable 
Franco-German  boundary  is  disputed  by  an  eminent 
authority  on  boundary  delimitation.  Thus,  Sir  Thomas 
Holdich,  writing  in  19 16,  points  out  that  it  is  the  Rhine- 
land  fortresses,  and  not  the  Rhine  itself,  that  protect 
the  western  frontiers  of  Germany  from  France,2  and 
goes  on  to  say  :  "  Many  people  hope  that  the  Rhine 
will  be  the  new  boundary  between  France  and  Germany. 
But  the  Rhine  is  no  barrier  from  the  military  or 
political  point  of  view.  Its  banks  offer  no  serious 
means  of  defence,  the  population  of  the  Rhine  valley 
on  either  side  the  river  being  of  the  same  ethnical  type 
which  spread  down  originally  from  Alpine  regions. 
The  western  water-parting  of  the  Rhine  basin,  where 

1  Cf.  C  Lecomte,  Les  ingdnieurs  militaires  en  France  pendant  le  regne  de 
Louis  XIV  (Paris  1904). 

2  Political  Frontiers  and  Boundary-making,  p.  129. 


298  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

that  water-parting  is  caused  by  the  Vosges  Mountains, 
lends  itself  far  better  to  the  ideal  of  a  frontier  barrier, 
and  could  readily  be  rendered  impregnable  by  modern 
military  engineering."  1  The  same  writer  has  observed 
more  recently  :  "  The  Rhine  boundary  between  Ger- 
many and  France  was  unsatisfactory  because  the 
Rhine  rift  is  connected  by  easy  lines  of  approach 
from  the  German  side,  whilst  France  possesses  no  such 
easy  approach  lines  from  the  Lorraine  plateau,  where 
the  drainage,  represented  by  the  Meuse  and  Moselle, 
runs  northward,  whilst  the  plateau  is  buttressed  on 
the  east  by  the  Vosges  and  the  Hardt  Mountains, 
which  offer  no  such  facilities.  Thus  the  Rhine  became 
geographically  a  German  river,  and  has  always  been 
claimed  as  such  by  Germany.  The  Meuse-Moselle 
plateau  has,  historically,  been  an  effective  barrier 
between  east  and  west  because  of  this  inaccessibility 
from  the  east,  and  also  because  of  the  character  of  its 
wild,  uncultivated,  and  forest-clad  uplands.  It  has, 
indeed,  proved  almost  as  great  a  barrier  to  French 
expansion  as  to  German  aggression."  2  This  view 
is  supported,  from  another  standpoint,  by  Mr.  J.  W. 
Headlam,  who  states  the  results  of  his  observation  in 
the  following  terms  :  "No  one,  indeed,  who  has  ever 
stood  on  the  slopes  of  the  Black  Forest  and  looked 
across  the  magnificent  valley,  sheltered  by  the  hills 
on  either  side,  through  which  the  Rhine  flows,  can 
doubt  that  this  is  all  one  country,  and  that  the  frontier 
must  be  sought,  not  in  the  river,  which  is  not  a  separa- 
tion, but  the  chief  means  of  communication,  but  on  the 
top  of  the  hills  on  the  further  side."  3 

1  Political  Frontiers  and  Boundary -making ,  p.  290. 

2 Article  in  New  Europe,  February  8,  1917,  p.  no,  entitled  New  Political 
Boundaries  in  Europe  :    Alsace-Lorraine. 

3  J.  W.  Headlam,  Bismarck.  Heroes  of  the  Nations  Series  (New  York  : 
London,  1899),  p.  375. 


BOUNDARY    ADJUSTMENT  301 

The  main  desideratum  in  fixing  the  Franco-German 
boundary,  as  in  adjusting  the  fundamental  issue 
relative  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  is  to  consult  the  _ 

Desideratum 

wishes  and  circumstances  of  the  populations  in  fixing 
directly  concerned,  and  not  to  attempt  to 
settle  these  questions  merely  by  means  of  secret  negotia- 
tions in  a  council-chamber  and  by  the  arbitrary  and 
independent  tracing  of  maps.  A  carefully  and  im- 
partially organised  referendum  is,  then,  a  condition 
indispensable  to  the  eventual  settlement.  This  has 
already  been  emphasised  more  than  once  in  the  pre- 
ceding pages.  A  fuller  consideration  of  the  question 
of  a  plebiscite  may,  therefore,  suitably  conclude  the 
present  work. 


CHAPTER    XVII 

THE    QUESTION   OF   A   PLEBISCITE 

Plebiscite  for  Alsace-Lorraine  necessary — Examples  of  plebiscites — Cases 
of  annexation  without  a  plebiscite — Anglo-American  practice — Juristic 
opinion— Grounds  of  support  of  plebiscite — Grounds  of  objection  to 
plebiscite — Each  case  to  be  considered  on  its  merits — Alsace-Lorraine  a 
suitable  case — Prevailing  views  as  to  self-determination  of  peoples — 
Alsace-Lorraine  desirous  to  decide  its  own  fate — Alsace-Lorraine  ever 
against  war  as  a  solution — Opposition  to  plebiscite  by  France,  Ger- 
many, and  leading  Alsatians — -Criticism  of  objections — A  real  difficulty: 
presence  of  immigrants  and  absence  of  emigrants — Compromise  neces- 
sary— Organisation  of  plebiscite — Persons  who  should  vote — Probable 
result — Essential  condition  for  the  future. 

The  key-note  of  this  question  has  been  expressed  thus 

by  a  French  writer  1  :    "  We  may  admit  that  France 

has  only  mediocre  rights  to  Alsace-Lorraine „ 

Plebiscite 

for  Aisace-  after  having  sold  it  to  obtain  peace.  But 
necessary,  those  who  have  inalienable  rights  and  have 
never  been  consulted,  are  the  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  themselves."  During  the  last  hundred 
years  the  view  has  been  gaining  ground  that  the  annexa- 
tion of  territory  with  a  considerable  population  is 
illegitimate  and  invalid  without  their  consent  expressed 
on  a  plebiscite.  A  few  precedents  may  here  be  recalled. 
An  early  instance  is  that  of  1552,  when  Henry  II 
of  France,  after  taking  from  the  German  Empire 
Examples  of  the  three  Bishoprics,  Metz,  Toul,  and  Verdun, 
plebiscites.  appears  to  have  submitted  their  proposed 
annexation  to  a  vote  of  the  inhabitants.     The  Bishop 

1  C.  Andler,  Le  Prince  de  Bismarck  (Faris,  1899),  p.  308. 

2  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  282  seq. 

302 


PLEBISCITE  303 

of  Verdun  said  to  his  people,  "  que  le  roi  de  France 
etait  venu  comme  liberateur,  qu'il  voulait  traiter  les 
bourgeois  comme  de  bons  Francais  et  que,  bien  eloigne 
d'user  de  mesures  de  rigueur,  il  en  appelait  au  vote  libre 
du  peuple."  x 

The  procedure  was  adopted,  again,  by  the  French 
Revolutionary  Government  in  several  cases.2  Thus, 
during  the  war  between  France  and  Sardinia,  1792, 
General  de  Montesquiou  having  invaded  Savoy  and 
taken  possession  of  Chambery,  September  24,  the 
communes  were  asked  to  elect  delegates  (October  14) 
for  the  purpose  of  discussing  and  voting  on  the  question 
of  annexation.  A  great  majority  having  voted  in 
favour  thereof,  the  Convention  accordingly  decreed, 
November  27,  the  union  of  Savoy  to  the  Republic, 
of  which  it  formed  the  eighty-fourth  department.3 
On  September  29,  1792,  Nice  was  taken  by  General 
Anselme,  who  met  with  no  opposition  from  the  troops 
of  the  King  of  Sardinia  ;  whereupon  a  local  assembly 
was  summoned,  and  it  decided  by  a  large  majority  in 
favour  of  annexation  to  France.4  Similarly,  after 
Mayence  was  entered  by  the  French  troops,  October  21, 
1792,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  territory  now  forming 
Rhenish  Bavaria  was  occupied,  an  assembly  was  con- 
stituted, and  it  resolved  on  union  with  France  ;  accord- 
ingly the  Convention  decreed,  March  30,  1793,  that  the 
towns  and  communes  of  Mayence,  Worms,  etc.,  were 
to  become  part  of  the  French  Republic.5 

1   Cf.  E.  Ollivier,  L'Empire  liberal  (Paris,  1895),  vol.  i.  p.  165. 

a  J.  Heimweh,  Droit  de  conquete  et  plebiscite  (Paris,  1896)  ;  R.  de  Card,  Les 
Annexions  et  les  plebiscites  dans  I'histoire  contemporaine  in  Etudes  de  droit 
international  (Paris,   1890). 

3  Cf.  V.  de  St.  Genis,  Histoire  de  la  Savoie  (Chambery,  1869),  vol.  iii.  pp. 
137  seq. 

4  J.  B.  Toselli,  Precis  historique  de  Nice  depuis  sa  foundation  jusqu'en  i860,. 
4  vols.     (Nice,  1867-9.) 

5  A  Chuquet,  Mayence  (Paris,  1892). 


304  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Napoleon  III,  who  proclaimed  the  right  of  peoples 
to  choose  their  own  masters,  adopted  the  system  of 
plebiscite  in  the  case  of  the  annexation  of  Nice  and 
Savoy  to  France  (treaty  of  March  24,  i860,  Art.  I.),1 
and  in  the  cession  of  Venetia  and  its  incorporation 
with  Italy  (treaty  of  October  3,  1866,  plebiscite, 
October  21,  22).  Other  plebiscites  established  the 
union  of  Parma,  Modena,  Tuscany,  and  Emilia  to 
Piedmont  and  Lombardy,  March  n,  12,  i860  ;  Sicily 
and  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  to  Italy,  October  21,  i860  ; 
Umbria  and  the  Marches,  November  30  ;  Rome  and  its 
territory,  October  1870.  Thus  the  principle  of  volun- 
tary incorporation  played  a  noteworthy  part  in  the 
creation  of  a  new  Power — Italy. 

Under  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  August  10, 1877  (Art.  I.) 
the  island  of  St.  Bartholomew  (Antilles)  was  ceded  by 
Sweden  to  France,  subject  to  the  express  consent  of 
its  population. 

In  the  treaty  of  peace  of  October  20,  1883,  between 
Chile  and  Peru,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  territories  of 
Tacna  and  Arica  should  remain  in  the  possession  of 
Chile  for  a  period  of  ten  years,  and  that  at  the  end  of 
this  term  a  plebiscite  should  decide  whether  they  were 
to  remain  definitively  annexed  to  Chile  or  were  to  be 
restored  to  Peru.  Numerous  difficulties  arose  between 
the  two  States  in  regard  to  the  organisation  of  the 
referendum  ;  negotiations  between  them  were  more 
than  once  commenced  and  then  broken  off.2 

On  the  other  hand,  there  have  been  several  striking 
cases  of  annexations  in  which  the  plebiscitary  pro- 
cedure was  not  adopted  :  e.g.  the  dismemberment  and 

1  G.  Cogordan,  La  nationality  au  point  de  vue  des  rapports  internationaux 
(Paris,  1890),  pp.  344-56  ;    Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  March  i,  1896. 

2  H.  Bonfils,  Droit  international  public  (Paris,  1912),  p.  372  ;  Revue  de  droit 
international  (Bruxelles),  vol.  xxix.  (1897),  pp.  660  seq. 


PLEBISCITE  305 

partition  of  Poland  in  1772,  1793,  and  1795  ;  most 
of  the  treaties  concluded  by  Napoleon,  notably  the 
Peace  of  Tilsit  (July,  1807),  which  deprived 
Prussia  of  an  immense  extent  of  territory  ;  annexation 
the  treaties  of  18 15 — a  counterblast  to  the  witJ\0U*  a 
Napoleonic  conquests — which  effected  a  great 
territorial  readjustment  in  Europe  ;  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort,  187 1.  It  may  be  added  that  in  the 
Treaty  of  Prague,  August  23,  1866,  between  Austria 
and  Prussia,  it  was  stipulated  (Art.  V)  that  Austria 
should  transfer  to  Prussia  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
(the  rights  over  which  having  been  acquired  by  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna,  October  30,  1864),  with  the  condition 
that  the  population  of  the  northern  districts  of  Schles- 
wig should  be  ceded  to  Denmark  if,  by  a  free  vote,  they 
expressed  a  wish  to  that  effect.  But  Prussia  refused 
subsequently  to  carry  out  this  plebiscitary  provision. 
Anglo-American  practice  in  the  past  has  been 
against  the  plebiscite.  The  United  States  has  nearly 
always  refused  to  resort  to  the  procedure  in         A    , 

1  n  •  ...  Anglo- 

the  case  of  her  territorial  acquisitions,  whether  American 
they  were  forcible  annexations  or  were  the  Practice- 
outcome  of  amicable  cessions  by  means  of  negotiation. 
On  one  occasion  the  inhabitants  of  the  Danish  West 
Indies  were  allowed  to  vote  on  the  question  of  annexing 
the  islands  to  the  United  States  ;  but  Mr.  Seward,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  protested  against  this  concession.1 
As  for  Great  Britain,  Lord  Salisbury  once  declared  in 
the  House  of  Lords  that  "  the  plebiscite  is  not  among 
the  traditions  of  this  country."  2 

Thus  the  practice  of  States  has  been  far  from  uni- 
form ;    and  this  divergence   of  practice  is  reflected 

1  Cf.  F.  Bancroft,  Life  of  William  H.  Seward  (New  York  :    London,  1900), 
vol.  ii.  pp.  483-5. 

2  (June  19,  1890).     Hansard,  3rd  series,  vol.  cccxlv.  p.  1311.     (In  regard 
to  the  cession  of  Heligoland.) 

20 


3o6  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

in  the  opinions  of  international  jurists.  There  is 
no  room  here  to  consider  these  in  detail,  but  we  may 
juristic  refer  to  one  or  two  representative  pronounce- 
opinion.  ments.  M.  Acollas,  who  is  a  French  civilian 
as  well  as  a  writer  on  international  law,  emphasises 
that  there  can  be  no  legitimate  dismemberment  or 
annexation  of  a  country  without  the  free  consent 
of  the  people  who  are  to  be  separated  and  of  those  who 
are  to  be  united  thereby  :  "II  ne  peut  y  avoir  de 
demembrement  legitime  que  par  la  volonte  propre  de 
ceux  qui  se  separent  ;  d' annexion  legitime  que  par  la 
volonte  reciproque  de  ceux  qui  s'unissent."  Blunt- 
schli,  who  showed  himself  a  staunch  advocate  of  the 
progressive  law  of  war  as  against  the  extravagant 
pretensions  of  Von  Moltke,2  observes  that  a  cession  of 
territory  presupposes  the  recognition  of  the  act  by  its 
people,  that  such  recognition  need  not  be  express  and 
voluntary, but  may  be  tacit  and  involuntary, manifested 
by  their  submission  and  obedience  to  the  acquiring 
Government  by  reason  of  considerations  of  necessity, 
although  to  secure  voluntary  adhesion  is  undoubtedly 
the  best  policy.  Art.  286  of  his  notable  work  on 
international  law  is  to  this  effect :  "La  validite  d'une 
cession  de  cette  nature  presuppose  pour  le  moins  la 
reconnaissance  par  la  population  jouissant  des  droits 
politiques,  laquelle  habite  le  territoire  cede  et  passe  a 
un  nouvel  Etat.  Observation  :  La  reconnaissance 
pour  la  population  jouissant  des  droits  politiques  est 
indispensable   parce   que   celle-ci  n'est  pas  un   objet 

1  E.  Acollas,  Manuel  du  droit  civil.  Commentaire  philosophique  et  critique 
du  Code  Napoleon  (Paris,  1868)  ;  cf.  the  same  writer's  Le  Droit  de  la  guerre 
Paris,  1888). 

2  Von  Moltke  to  Professor  Bluntschli,  dated  Berlin,  December  11,  1880; 
translated  by  Prof.  Holland,  Letters  to  The  Times  upon  War  and  Neutrality 
(London,  1909),  pp.  24-9  ;  see  also  Phillipson,  International  Law  and  the 
Great  War  (London,  1915),  pp.  138-41. 


PLEBISCITE  307 

prive  de  volonte  et  de  droits  qu'on  puisse  aliener,  mais 
un  element  vivant  de  l'Etat  et  que  1' opposition  de  la 
population  rend  la  prise  de  possession  pacifique  im- 
possible. Mais  la  reconnaissance  de  la  necessite 
suffit,  et  1' adhesion  libre  et  joyeuse  de  la  population, 
bien  que  desirable,  n'est  pas  necessaire.  La  necessite 
a  laquelle  on  se  soumet  contre  sa  volonte  et  en  mau- 
greant,  mais  en  reconnaissant  qu'on  ne  peut  faire 
autrement,  fonde  elle  aussi  dans  la  vie  politique  un 
nouveau  droit  ;  cette  reconnaissance  est  deja  impli- 
quee  par  l'obeissance,  qu'on  montre  envers  le  nouveau 
gouvernement  et  dans  la  cessation  de  toute  resistance. 
Par  contre,  1' adhesion  libre  const itue  une  approbation 
active  de  la  cession.  Sans  aucun  doute,  il  vaut  mieux 
que  l'Etat  qui  acquiert  un  nouveau  territoire  obtienne 
cette  adhesion  et  qu'il  ne  soit  pas  oblige  de  se  con  tenter 
provisoirement  de  la  reconnaissance  par  necessite."  " 
Those  who  support  the  practice  of  plebiscite  maintain 
that  the  mere  might  of  the  stronger  ought  not  to  be 
allowed  to  prevail,  that  the  circumstances  in    _       .     , 

r  Grounds  of 

which  we  now  live  are  different  from  those  of     support  of 

i  •  i  ■    1   ,  -1  -ijt  plebiscite. 

earlier  ages  when  might  was  deemed  to  be 
right,  that  the  public  opinion  of  the  civilised  world 
has  manifestly  changed,  that  the  general  democratic 
movement  may  not  be  disregarded,  that  popular 
suffrage  is  now  almost  everywhere  the  fount  of  political 
authority,  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  now 
the  governing  factor  in  the  political  and  social  life  of 
nearly  all  civilised  States,  and  that  it  is  now  being 
strikingly  asserted  in  countries  that  were  hitherto 
subjected  to  an  autocratic  or  oligarchical  government. 
Those  who  object  to  the  practice  hold  that  it  is  not 
likely  to  become  a  recognised  part  of  international 

1  J.  C.  Bluntschli,  Das  moderm  Volherrecht  (French  trans. — Le  Droit  inter- 
national codifig),  §  286. 


308  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

usage,  in  that  it  is  not  capable  of  acquiring  universal 

applicability,  that  in  some  cases  it  may  produce  more 

.    ,   evils  than  it  is  intended  to  avoid,  that  in  a 

Grounds  of 

objection  to  forcible  annexation  a  powerful  State  will  re- 
p  e  xscite.  pU(jja-j:e  the  procedure  if  it  suspects  that  a  vote 
of  the  people  will  be  unfavourable,  and  will  be  disposed 
to  resume  hostilities  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  a 
complete  subjugation  of  the  recalcitrant  parties,  that 
the  vote  of  a  majority  is  not  necessarily  the  best,  that 
such  a  vote  would  force  the  minority — which  might  be 
almost  equal  in  numbers  to  the  majority — to  accept  a 
destiny  contrary  to  its  will  (a  condition  of  things  which 
the  very  procedure  is  meant  to  obviate) ,  and  that  there 
is  no  certainty  that  the  people  would  give  their  votes 
freely,  uninfluenced  by  malpractices  and  sinister 
motives.  The  opponents  point  further  to  the  case  of 
the  American  secession,  as  being  analogous  to  a  case 
of  cession  in  regard  to  the  will  of  the  population  ; 
they  say  that  had  the  plebiscite  been  resorted  to  in 
1861,  there  would,  indeed,  have  been  no  American  civil 
war,  but  also  there  would  have  been  no  United  States — 
for  a  majority  in  the  Confederate  States  of  the  South 
would  undoubtedly  have  voted  in  favour  of  separation. 
However  this  may  be,  even  if  the  universal  applica- 
bility of  the  practice  be  doubtful,  each  case  must  be 
taken  on  its  merits — for  there  certainly  are 
^fbecon!  cases  in  which  the  plebiscitary  procedure 
sideredon    WOuld  be   eminently  fitting,   desirable,    and 

its  merits.  .11  ■»»■  1 

practicable.  Moreover,  the  present  war  has 
had  a  great  influence  on  the  world's  opinion,  and 
particularly  on  the  conception  of  the  interrelation  and 
interdependence  of  States.  Some  of  the  objections  to 
the  plebiscite  become  untenable  in  view  of  the  now 
accepted  principle,  which  has  in  these  days  so  strikingly 
been  put  into  practice,  that  third  Powers  have  the  right 


PLEBISCITE  309 

to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  two  given  States,  when 
one  of  the  latter  violates  the  law  of  nations  or  is  about 
to  take  an  unconscionable  advantage  of  the  other, 
contrary  to  what  is  manifestly  right  and  just.  Other 
objections  will  lose  their  force  if  the  contemplated 
league  of  nations  becomes  a  reality. 

Whatever  cases  may  be  cited  as  being  unsuitable  for 
the  application  of  a  plebiscite,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Alsace-Lorraine  is  a  suitable  case.  On  the 
one  hand,  there  are  two  parties  contending  Lorraine 
for  its  possession  ;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  suitable 
a  territory  with  a  highly  civilised  population 
possessing  a  distinctive  soul  and  personality  and  a  view 
of  their  own.  What  is,  therefore,  necessary  is  to  make 
their  will  known,  and  to  give  them  an  opportunity  of 
formally  registering  it  in  favour  of  one  of  various  courses: 
to  remain  within  the  German  Empire  as  an  autonomous 
State,  to  return  to  France,  to  become  a  neutralised 
independent  State,  or  some  other  preferred  solution. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  various  pronounce- 
ments of  governments,  ministers,  and  other  publicists 
as  to  the  necessity  of  the  principle  of  self-  Prevailing 
determination   of  peoples — and   the   Alsace-  views  as  to 

self-deter- 

Lorrainers  undeniably  constitute  a  "  people  "  mination 
in  every  rational  sense  of  the  term.  These  of  Peoples- 
pronouncements  are  supported  by  other  views  repre- 
sentative of  increasing  elements  in  democracy  :  e.g. 
by  the  British  Labour  Party,1  by  the  French  Socialist 
Party,  and  also  by  German  Socialist  circles — Herr 
Katzenstein  (of  Stralsund),  supported  by  Herr  Glatt- 
bach  (of  Miilhausen),  brought  forward  a  motion  at 
the  Socialist  Conference  held  at  Wurzburg,  October  14, 
19 17,  on  behalf  of  the  Socialists  of  Nuremberg,  Wurz- 
burg,  and  the  sixth  division  of  the  Palatinate  (repre- 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  October  31,  191 7. 


3io  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

senting  the  most  moderate  section  of  the  Majority 
Party)  in  favour  of  allowing  a  referendum  to  the 
people  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  American  declaration 
of  policy  on  this  point  announced  on  October  19,  19 17, 
is  to  this  effect  :  "  President  Wilson  is  determined  to 
uphold  the  rights  of  small  peoples,  and  adhere  to  the 
general  principle  that  no  people  shall  be  forced  to  live 
under  a  ruler  under  whom  they  do  not  wish  to  live. 
Just  how  far  this  idealistic  rule  will  be  enforced  depends 
entirely  upon  the  conditions  existing  at  the  close  of 
the  war." 

Alsace-Lorraine  has  throughout  been  desirous  of 
deciding  its  own  fate.  Alike  during  the  period  of 
Alsace-  protest  and  during  the  national  movement 
Lorraine      its  people   have   time  and   again   called  for 

desirous  of  i    ■>  •      • ,  Tir   .    .  ,  ..  . 

deciding  its  a  plebiscite.  Writing  at  a  date  midway  be- 
own  fate,  -j-ween  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870  and 
the  great  war  of  19 14,  one  of  Alsace-Lorraine's  stoutest 
defenders  repudiated  the  various  proposals  that  had 
from  time  to  time  been  advanced  by  friends  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  for  settling  the  question,  without  consulting 
the  people  themselves.  He  observed  that  to  suggest 
neutralisation,  exchange  for  a  French  colony,  purchase, 
or  even  pure  and  simple  retrocession  to  France  is  to 
dispose  arbitrarily,  once  more,  of  two  provinces  con- 
taining a  million  and  a  half  of  human  beings  ;  that  to 
proceed  in  this  measure  is  to  adopt  the  way  of  the 
Germans,  who  also  thought  they  were  doing  the  popula- 
tion a  service  by  annexing  them  without  letting  them 
express  their  view.  He  asks  the  friends  of  his  country 
to  deny  themselves  the  pleasure  of  thus  giving  happi- 
ness to  the  people,  who,  having  learned  by  experience, 
desire  to  pronounce  themselves  on  their  own  destiny. 
"  Que  nos  amis  veuillent  done  bien  renoncer  a  la  satis- 
faction de  nous  octroyer  le  bonheur.     Instruits  par 


PLEBISCITE  311 

V experience,  nous  demandons  a  pouvoir  prononcer 
nous-memes  sur  notre  propre  destinee."  x  Similarly, 
some  twenty  years  later,  and  before  the  present  war, 
M.  Auguste  Lalance,  of  Mulhausen,  a  former  deputy  of 
the  Reichstag,  urged  that  the  people  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine should  be  permitted  by  means  of  a  free  vote  to 
decide  their  own  fate.2  And  so  on  with  other  repre- 
sentative views. 

Indeed,  Alsace-Lorraine  has  all  along  been  most 
anxious  that  the  question  should  be  settled  by  pacific 
means,  and  that  war  on  its  account  should  Aisace- 
be  avoided.     Mr.  Jordan,  who  conducted  a      Lorraine 

.    .  .  .  t  .     .  ever  against 

personal  inquiry  on  the  spot  in  19 13,  says  war  as  a 
that  in  all  Alsace  he  found  only  two  persons  solutlon- 
who  thought  that  the  ultimate  solution  was  to  be 
found  in  war.  He  writes  in  the  following  terms  as 
expressing  the  views  of  leading  Alsatians  and  the 
attitude  of  the  majority  of  the  population  :  "  War  is 
the  worst  possible  solution  of  our  problems,  because 
war  is  no  solution.  With  war  there  is  never  a  solution 
of  any  question.  Alsace  has  been  part  of  Germany, 
of  Austria,  of  France,  and  now  of  Germany  again. 
If  France  should  gain  Alsace  by  war,  it  would  be  only 
the  beginning  of  another  war,  and  so  on  without  end. 
.  .  .  Every  solution  implying  war  is  to  be  rejected. 
No  definite  solution  could  result  from  a  Franco- 
German  war,  by  which  Alsace  would  find  herself  cut 
into  two  parts,  each  to  destroy  the  other.  A  war, 
whatever  its  result,  provokes  always  the  desire  of 
revenge,  and  leads  to  indefinite  international  disorder, 
in  which  the  antagonism  among  different  elements 
would  be  greatly  intensified.  ...  A  Franco-German 
entente  would  necessitate  for  Alsace-Lorraine  a  govern- 

1  J.  Heimweh,  Triple  Alliance  et  Alsace-Lorraine  (Paris,  1892),  p.  131. 

2  Cf.  Bourdon,  L'Enigme  allemande,  p.  471  ;    Eng.  trans.,  p.  357. 


312  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

merit  according  to  its  own  will.  It  would  thus  destroy 
the  worst  obstacle  to  the  pacification  of  Europe,  and 
open  to  civilisation  new  lines  of  progress."  x 

The  only  way  to  ensure  the  pacification  of  Europe,  so 
far  as  it  depends  on  the  solution  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
problem,  is  to  give  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  an  oppor- 
tunity of  deciding  their  destiny  definitively  and  formally 
by  means  of  a  plebiscite. 

Now  we  have  already  seen  that  Germany  is  opposed 

to  a  plebiscite,  not  necessarily  because  she  fears  an 

adverse  vote,  but  on  the  ground  that  there  is 

Opposition        .  .  r         t  i  t  >> 

to  plebiscites  legally  no  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
Germany!'  and  that  there  is  no  lawful  justification  for 
and  leading  ;a  referendum,  seeing  that  the  provinces  were 
transferred  to  her  in  perpetuity  by  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and  that  they  could  no  longer, 
after  that  act,  concern  any  other  Power  but  herself. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  French,  as  well  as  certain 
leading  Alsatians,  object  to  a  plebiscite  for  different 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  they  hold  that  the  return 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  would  be  merely  a 
recovery  or  reunion,  and  not  a  cession  or  annexation  : 
France  is  to  regain  her  property  just  as  stolen  goods 
are  taken  from  a  thief  and  restored  to  the  true  owner. 
"  La  France,"  says  M.  Helmer,  "  reprend  son  bien, 
qu'elle  retrouve  dans  la  main  du  possesseur  de  mau- 
vaise  foi,  comme  je  puis  reprendre  ma  bourse  a  celui 
qui  m'en  a  depouille."  2  Similarly,  M.  Wetterle  ob- 
serves :  "  Who  to-day  would  wish  to  sanction  that 
insult  should  be  added  to  injury  in  proposing  to  sur- 
round with  ridiculous  formalities  the  restoration  to 
France  of  her  property,  the  return  of  the  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  to  the  true  mother-country  ?   .  .  .  I   am 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  96-8.  2  France- Alsace,  pp.  158,  159. 


PLEBISCITE  313 

not  in  doubt  as  to  the  result  of  a  referendum  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  if  one  were  to  be  organised.  By  a  crushing 
majority  my  compatriots  would  affirm  their  desire  to- 
be  relieved  for  ever  from  those  masters  who  have  so 
cruelly  tortured  them.  But  it  would  be  an  attack  on 
the  honour  of  France  to  force  her  to  make  an  electoral 
bid  to  regain  the  heart  of  her  children,  and  on  the 
honour  of  Alsace-Lorrainers  to  make  them  to  put  up 
their  heart  for  public  sale."  l  The  republican  news- 
paper of  Paris,  Le  Temps,  condemned,  in  its  issue  of 
August  11,  19 17,  the  submission  of  the  majority  to 
the  minority  French  Socialists  in  accepting  a  plebiscite 
in  their  reply  to  the  Stockholm  questionnaire,  on  the 
ground  that  recourse  thereto  ' '  would  mean  the  casting 
of  an  odious  doubt  on  the  patriotic  conscience  of  the 
Alsace-Lorrainers."  The  radical  paper,  Le  Matin „ 
of  August  22,  19 17,  likewise  rejects  a  plebiscite,  and 
says  that  the  people  of  the  annexed  provinces  cannot 
admit  that  their  character  of  Frenchmen  should  be 
questioned. 

Again,  it  is  contended  that  the  protests  of  the 
Alsatian  and  Lorraine  representatives  made  in  187 1 
do  not  now  need  confirmation,  and  that  they  are  still 
applicable  and  valid.8  "  We  will  have,"  says  M. 
Georges  Weill,  ex-deputy  for  Metz  in  the  Reichstags 
"  no  preliminary  plebiscite,  since  that  would  be  an 
abjuration  of  the  protests  of  the  past,  an  insult  to  our 
feelings,  and  a  sanction  of  the  greatest  outrage  of 
modern  times."  3  A  similar  view  is  expressed  by  MM. 
Lichtenberger.4  And  M.  Helmer  holds  that  to  agree 
to  a  plebiscite  would  be  an  admission  that  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  might  to-day  deny  the  solemn  and  unani- 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  November  1917,  pp.  799,  800. 

2  Le  Matin,  August  22,  1917. 

3  The  Observer,  February  3,  1918. 
*  Op.  cit.,  p.  83. 


314  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

mous  declaration  of  their  deputies  in  187 1.1  "  La 
seule  base  certaine  de  la  reunion  de  1' Alsace-Lorraine 
a  la  France  doit  etre  la  manifestation  de  Bordeaux."  8 

Next,  it  is  urged  that  the  acceptance  of  a  plebiscite 
would  be  a  tacit  recognition  of  the  effects  of  violence.3 

This  would,  too,  assume  the  validity  of  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort,  which  is  considered  by  many  Frenchmen 
and  Alsatians  to  be  null  and  void  ab  initio,  and  by 
others  to  have  been  abrogated  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war.4 

There  is  really  no  need  to  examine  these  objections 
in  detail.  The  untenability  of  most  of  them  has 
criticism  of  already  been  shown.  It  will  be  sufficient  to 
objections.    say  -j-]-^  Qermany  acquired  a  legally  valid 

title  to  the  provinces  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  which 
remains  binding  until  it  is  superseded  or  modified 
by  another  treaty ;  that  the  declarations  of  1871, 
whatever  moral  weight  they  had,  had  no  such  legal 
force  as  could  invalidate  the  transaction  solemnly  and 
voluntarily  effected  by  the  declarants'  recognised 
Government  ;  that  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to 
France  would  not  bea"  recovery  "  or  "  restoration  " 
in  the  sense  alleged,  but  an  annexation — to  claim 
otherwise  is  to  prevaricate  just  as  much  as  the  Germans 
did  in  1870  when  they  attempted  to  justify  the  dis- 
memberment of  France  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
necessary  as  a  "  protective  guarantee  "  ;  that  the 
violence  of  187 1  would  be  repeated  if  Alsace-Lorraine 
were  annexed  to  France  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the 
population  ;  and  that  the  only  way  to  find  out  what 
their  true  wishes  are  is  to  ask  them,  and  to  ask  them 
cannot  surely  be  an  "  impiety  "  or  an  "  insult,"  when 

1  France- Alsace,  p.  156. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  164.  3  Ibid. 

u    w  *  Ibid.,  and  also  the  view  of  M.  Barr£s,  in  the  preface,  p.  ix. 


PLEBISCITE  315 

the  object  of  asking  them  is  merely  to  settle  a  disputed 
or  doubtful  point. 

There  is,  however,  another  objection  that  has  more 
force,  viz.  that  a  plebiscite  would  not  be  fair  owing 
to  the  presence  of  German  immigrants  and 
the  absence  of  Alsatian  and  Lorraine  emi-  difficulty- 
grants.  In  187 1  the  population  of  Alsace-  fmrnlgSnts 
Lorraine  was  about  1,500,000.  Under  the  and  absence 
Treaty  of  Frankfort  the  practice  of  option 
was  adopted *  ;  the  native  inhabitants  (excluding 
women  and  minors)  had  to  choose  between  French  and 
German  nationality  by  September  30,  1872.  There 
were  about  160,000  options,  of  which  more  than  a  half 
were  annulled  because  they  were  not  followed  by 
effective  departure  within  a  reasonable  time.  The 
emigration  of  natives  and  the  immigration  of  Germans 
began  in  187 1  and  continued  in  the  subsequent  years. 
We  may  quote  some  figures  from  the  Official  Manual 
of  Statistics  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  show  the  loss  in 
population  during  the  first  twenty-five  years  after  the 
annexation  : 

From    187 1    to    1875    the    number    of    emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  70,970. 
From    1875    to    1880    the    number    of    emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  35,835. 
From    1880    to    1885    the    number    of    emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  59,312. 
From    1885    to    1890    the    number    of    emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  37,991. 
From    1890    to    1895    the    number    of    emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  34,534. 
Thus,  from  187 1  to  1895  the  number  of  emigrants 

exceeded  the  number  of  immigrants  by  238,642. 

1  See  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  pp.  296  sea. 


316  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

As  these  figures  show  only  the  difference  between 
the  number  of  emigrants  and  that  of  immigrants,  it 
is  clear  that  the  actual  number  of  emigrants  was  much 
greater  than  the  numbers  shown  in  the  above  table. 
It  is  roughly  estimated  that  down  to  the  year  1900 
there  were  about  500,000  emigrants  and  about  300,000 
German  immigrants ;  and  during  the  subsequent 
period  the  numbers  on  both  sides  increased  to  some 
extent,  though  not  proportionately — perhaps  600,000 
represents  the  approximate  number  of  emigrants  up  to 
date  (though  a  much  larger  number,  even  as  high  as 
a  million,  has  been  stated  by  M.  Georges  Weill1). 
In  any  event,  allowing  for  errors  in  the  estimate,  it  is 
contended  that,  to  determine  the  true  voice  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  we  must  not  confine  ourselves  to  its  present 
population,  but  we  should  also  take  into  account  the 
emigrants  and  their  descendants.  Furthermore,  it  is 
thought  that  it  would  be  unfair  and  unjust  to  ask  the 
large  contingent  of  German  immigrants  to  say  whether 
the  country  in  which  they  have  settled  should  be 
French  or  German. 

Thus  the  principal  difficulties  that  arise  relate,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  the  classes  of  persons  who  should  be 
compromise  permitted  to  vote,  and  on  the  other  to  the 
necessary,  organisation  and  supervision  of  the  plebiscite 
machinery.  A  compromise  appears  to  be  the  only  way 
to  overcome  these  obstacles  ;  and  such  a  scheme  as 
the  following  would  be  an  equitable  one,  and  by  its 
means  a  fair  expression  of  Alsace-Lorraine  opinion 
could  be  ensured. 

First,  the  entire  organisation  of  the  voting  should 
be  entrusted  to  a  mixed  commission  including  neutral 

1  The  Observer,  November  18,  1917  ;  February  3,  1918.  With  the  estimate 
of  M.  Weill  we  may  compare  that  of  MM.  Lichtenberger,  who  give  the  number  of 
emigrants,  down  to  the  year  1910,  as  500,000  ;    op.  cit.,  p.  17. 


PLEBISCITE  317 

members,  or  to  an  entirely  neutral  commission  guaran- 
teeing  liberty   and   secrecy  of  the  poll  and 
protection  from  bribery,  duress,   and   other         tion  of 
irregular  practices.  plebiscite. 

Secondly,  we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  population  are  Alsace- 
Lorrainers,  and  not  German  immigrants ;  and  so, 
having  regard  to  their  solidarity,  their  consciousness 
of  national  personality,  and  their  common  destiny  for 
nearly  half  a  century,  we  must  conclude  that  it  would 
be  better  to  poll  the  votes  of  the  qualified  population  as 
a  whole,  rather  than  divide  up  the  country  into  a 
number  of  territorial  units  and  take  the  poll  of  each  of 
these  separately.1  Subject  to  slight  frontier  emenda- 
tions that  may  be  shown  to  be  imperative,  Alsace- 
Lorraine  should  not  be  chopped  up,  but  should  stand 
or  fall  together — an  inference  that  presents  itself  irre- 
sistibly from  our  previous  exposition  of  the  entire 
problem  and  its  various  implications. 

Thirdly,  the  persons  qualified  to  vote  might  in- 
clude the  following  :  (1)  the  domiciled  native  male 
inhabitants  who  are  of  legal  age  ;  (2)  the  Persons  who 
domiciled  native  unmarried  women  or  widows  should  vote- 
who  are  of  age  (since  the  nationality  of  a  wife  is  that 
of  her  husband,  it  would  be  either  supererogatory 
or  impolitic  to  give  them  separate  votes)  ;  (3)  the 
domiciled  native  male  orphans  who  have  reached 
military  age,  if  this  is  lower  than  the  ordinary  legal  age  * 
(4)  the  domiciled  naturalised  inhabitants  of  age  who 
are  neither  of  French  nor  German  origin  ;  (5)  German 
immigrants — men,  unmarried  women,  and  widows — 
who  have  established,  say,  a  ten  years'  domicile  ; 
(6)  Alsatian  and  Lorraine  emigrants — men,  unmarried 

1  A  division  into  small  areas  is  suggeted   by  A.    J.  Toynbee,  Nationality 
and  the  War  (London,  1915),  pp.  42  seq. 


318  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

women,  and  widows — who  have  emigrated,  say,  within 
the  last  ten  years.  The  claim  sometimes  advanced 
that  all  the  German  immigrants  should  be  disqualified, 
and  that  all  the  Alsace-Lorraine  emigrants,  and  their 
descendants,  should  be  qualified,  is  unfair,  irrational, 
and  inexpedient  ;  for  we  have  to  determine  the  will 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  it  is  at  the  date  of  the  plebiscite, 
and  not  as  it  was  in  187 1.  We  know  that  in  187 1  it 
went  over  to  Germany  most  reluctantly  ;  but  in  the 
period  between  then  and  now  the  country  has  in  many 
respects  been  revolutionised  ;  and  it  is  its  present 
view  and  feeling  that  we  have  to  ascertain. 

Fourthly,  before  resorting  to  this  plebiscitary  pro- 
cedure it  would  be  well  to  wait,  say,  two  or  three  years, 
until  the  passions  aroused  by  the  war  have  been  cooled 
a  little,  and  the  thoughts  of  the  people  have  been 
collected  sufficiently  to  allow  of  an  undisturbed  con- 
sideration of  the  choice  to  be  made. 

It  is  audacious  at  all  times  to  indulge  in  prophecies, 
and  especially  so  in  the  case  of  the  present  complicated 
Probable  problem,  which  the  war  has  rendered  all  the 
result.  more  difficult.  None  the  less,  mindful  of  the 
facts,  considerations,  and  conclusions  presented  in  the 
foregoing  chapters,  we  venture  to  express  our  belief 
that  a  plebiscite  organised  before  the  present  war  on 
the  lines  suggested  would  have  resulted  in  favour  of 
autonomy  within  the  German  Empire,  and  if  organised 
now  will  result  in  favour  of  neutralised  independence. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  whatever  result  is  arrived  at 
it  will  be  only  a  dangerous,  patched-up  solution  unless 
there  be  a  general  reconciliation  of  the 
condition  warring  peoples,  and  such  a  change  in  the 
futuhe  position  and  relationships  of  the  society  of 
States  as  will  mere  effectively  safeguard 
international  law  and  minimise  the  possibility  of  war. 


INDEX 


Abwehrgesetze  163 

Acollas,  plebiscite,  on  306 

Agenor  de   Gasparin,    neutralisation 

of  Alsace-Lorraine  272 
Agriculture  43,  44 
Albert,  King  of  the  Romans  115 
Alfonso  XII  163,  217 
Alsace.     See    also   heads  for   various 
topics 
French  Revolution,   at  59-60 
Middle  Ages,  in  55,  117 
part  of  Germany  till  seventeenth 

century  56 
Thirty  Years  War,  in  56 
union  with  France  60 
'  Alsace  for  the  Alsatians  '  163,  173, 
184,  264 
significance  of  188 
Alsace-Lorraine.    See  also  headings  re- 
lating to  the  various  topics 
annexation  in  1871,  20,  61  seq. 

See  Annexation  in  1871 
area  of,  in  earlier  history  19,  20 
when  annexed  by  Germany 

34 
attitude  of,  outbreak  of  the  war, 
at  207  seq. 
towards  France  before  the 

war  199  seq. 
See  also  Nationalist  move- 
ment 
bone  of  contention,  long  a  19 
'  challenge-cup  of  Europe, '  as  30 
claims  of  Germany  to  112  seq. 
See    Claims    of    Germany    to 
Alsace-Lorraine 
cockpit  of  Europe,  as  a  30 
declaration  of  the  two  Chambers 

(1917),  209  seq. 
description  of  34  seq. 
French  attitude  towards  214  seq. 
See   French  attitude  towards 
Alsace-Lorraine 
history  49  seq.     See  History 
nationalist  movement  184  seq. 

See  Nationalist  movement 
new  generation,  attitude  of  203 
personality  of  202 


Alsace-Lorraine — continued 

position  of,  in  earlier  history  19 
problem  of 

See  Problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
proposals   as   to   its   fate   after 

annexation  86  seq. 
protest  of  1 87 1  against  annexa- 
tion 98  seq. 
protest  of  deputies  (1874)  184  seq. 
regime  in  155  seq. 

See  Regime  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
status  of  155  seq. 
views  and  aspirations  of  184  seq. 

See  Nationalist  movement 
views    and    feelings    of    people, 
doubtful    indications     of 
203-7 
Althoff,  quoted  183 
Amnesty  83 

Annexation  in  1871,  61  seq. 
amnesty  83 
announcement  of  63 
boundary  commission  80-81 
canalisation  of  the  Moselle  84 
ecclesiastical  authority  83 
effects  of  20  seq.,  no 
German  attitude  as  to  79-80 
grounds  for 

See    Claims    of    Germany    to 
Alsace-Lorraine 
imperial  province,  made  an  94 
navigation  on  rivers  and  canals. 

84 
option  of  French  subjects  82 
pecuniary  deposits  83 
proposals  as  to  fate  of  provinces 

86  seq. 
protests  against  65 

Alsace-Lorraine  deputies  in 

1871,  of  98  seq. 
Germany,  in  86 
various  other  103  seq. 
public  records  83 
rights   of  inhabitants   of   ceded 

territory  81 
territorial  lust  of  Germany  141 

seq. 
various  matters  regulated  84-5 


319 


320 


INDEX 


Area  34 

Arendt  153 

Argyll,  Duke  of  147 

Asquith,     Mr.,     Alsace-Lorraine     as 
cause  of  the  war,  on  29 
reannexation  to  France,  on  236 

Austria,  aim  in  1815,  60 

Autonomy  for   Alsace-Lorraine,   de- 
mand of  194-7 
French  views  265 
government,  form  of  267 
movement  for 

See  Nationalist  movement 
nationalist  ideal  263-4 
plebiscite  following  269-70 
position    as    autonomous    State 

268-9 
recent  German  opinion  265-7 
refusal  of,  reasons  for  172-4 
suggested  in  1871  93-4 

Baden,    suggested    union    of    Alsace 

with  286 
Bale,  treaty  of  294 
Ballon  d'Alsace  37 
Barres  202,  205,  206,  215 

quoted  234 
Bar  thou  230 
Bebel  86 

Beer,  manufacture  of  44 
Belfort  77,  78,  79 

gap  of  37 
Benedetti  62 
Berckheim  130 
Bernhard  of  Saxe- Weimar  56 
Bernhardi  141 

Bethmann-Hollweg  169,  172,  211 
Beust,  Count  von  66 
Bismarck,  Belfort,  concession  as  to 
70 
dictatorial    regime     in     Alsace- 
Lorraine,  on  158-9 
doubt  as  to  territorial  demands 

67 
effects  of  annexation  of  1871,  on 

no 
European     intervention     feared 

by  65 
Ferrieres,  at  63 

germanisation,  view  as  to  95-6 
indemnity,  concession  as  to  70 
Metz,  doubts  about  97 
neutralisation,  on  273 
policy  as  to  annexed  provinces 

88  seq.,  95 
political    necessity    of    annexa- 
tion, on  137 
proposed  treaty  with  Benedetti 
published  62 


Bismarck — continued 

Russian  support  secured  by  66 
Schnaebele  incident,  on  217 
territorial  ambition  of   Prussia, 

on  142,  143 
Versailles,  demands  made  at  68 
interview  with  Favre  at  64 
Blanc  105 

Blind,  attitude  of  mass  of  Alsatians 
to  Germany  200—1 
official  classes  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
178 
Blumenthal  208 
Bluntschli,  plebiscite,  on  306-7 
Bocking,  Sarre  mines  256-7 
Bodley,  change  of  French  policy,  on 
222-3 
Franco-German      conflict     in 
Morocco,  on  218 
Boll,     desideratum    in     solution    of 

problem,  on,  31 
Bonnard  265 

Bordeaux,  National  Assembly  at  64 
Boulanger  217 
Boulangist   movement  163,   217-18, 

221 
Boundaries  34 

See  also  Frontier 
Bourgeois,  French  national  policy,  on 

223-4 
Brandenburg,  Prof.  258 
Bray,  Count  von  92 
Briey,  German  demands  as  to  257 
Bruno,  Archbishop  of  Cologne  51 
Brussels,  negotiations  at  73-5 
Bucer  56 
Budget  45,  46 

Buffer   State,    Alsace-Lorraine   as   a 
273,  282-3,  284-5 
value  of  283 
Bulach,  Baron  de  168 
Billow,  Prince  von  183 

French  temper,  on  the  224-6 

Campo  Formio,  treaty  of  294 

Caprivi,  passport  system  in  Alsace  164 

Cateau-Cambresis,  treaty  of  53 

Catholic  party  190 

anti-clerical  campaign  190 
Democrats  leave  the  191 

Censorship,  imposition  of  164 

Chamberlain,  Houston  183 

Chanzy  106 

Charlemagne  50 

Charles  IV  55 

Charles  V  53 

Charles  the  Bald  5 1 

Church  and  State,  relation  between 
40,  41,  247 


INDEX 


321 


Claims     of     Germany     to     Alsace- 
Lorraine  112  seq. 
conquest  147.     See  Conquest 
economic  necessity  132  seq. 
historical  grounds  113  seq. 
difficulties  in  1 17-18 
early  treaties  115 
Holy    Roman    Empire    ap- 
pealed to  116 
Mommsen's  view  114 
Ranke's  view  113 
Treitscfike's  view  114- 15 
language,  on  ground  of  123  seq. 

difficulties  involved  127 
military  necessity  137  seq. 
nationality,  question  of  127  seq. 
political  necessity  135  seq. 

criticism  135-7 
public  right,  principle  of  130-31 
racial  grounds  118  seq. 

difficulties  involved  120,  121 
names  as  criterion  119 
self-contradiction   121 
territorial  lust  141  seq. 
Treaty    of    Frankfort,    binding 
force  of  151 
Clausewitz  141 
Clemenceau  230 
Climate  37 
Clovis  50 
Coal  42 

See  also  Coal  and  iron 
resources  of  Germany  and  France 
258 
Coal   and  iron,    effect   of   depriving 
Germany  of  261-2 
German     declaration     in     1915 

252-6 

problem  of  251  seq. 

war,  in  251-2,  255-6 

Communication,  means  of  44 

Concordat  40 

Conde  57 

Configuration  of  surface  34,  35 
Conquest,  claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine 
based  on  147 
German  view  as  to  143 
illegitimacy  of  145 
recent  growth  of  opinion  as  to 

144 
right  of  186 

treaty,  as  recognised  by  149 
Von  Sybel  on  91 
Conrad  the  Red  5 1 

Dallwitz  von  Roedern  174 
Debt  45 

Delbriick,   reannexation    to  France, 
on  237-9 

21 


Democrats  191 

Deroulede,  quoted  166,  215 

Dreyfus  affair  221-2 

Eckhart  56 

Economic  position  41  seq. 

Education  46,  47 

Egidy  264 

Emigrants,  Germany,  from  133 

plebiscite,  in  case  of  315 
Ems  telegram  61,  149 
Entwelschung  176,  199 
Eucken,  autonomy,  on  266 
Expenditure  45 
Exports  44 

Fabert  53 

Favre,  Ferrieres,  at  63 

Frankfort,  at  75 

Preliminaries  of  Versailles,  after 

7i 
Versailles,    interview   with   Bis- 
marck at  64 
Ferrieres,     interview    between    Bis- 
marck and  Favre  at  63 
Ferry  217 

Fiore,  conquest,  on  149 
Fischart  117 
Foreign  labour  133 
Forster,  autonomy,  on  265-6 
France.     For     various     matters     see 

separate  heads 
Francis  III  54 
Francis  Joseph  141 
Franco- German  War  61  seq. 
Frankfort,  Convention  of  (18 19)  258 
negotiations  at  75-7 
treaty  of,  65,  185,  187,  232 
binding  force  of  151,  233 
provisions  of  77  seq. 
Von  Billow  on  225,  226 
whether  abrogated   by  the 
war  151,  233 
Franzos  204 
Franzosen-fresserei  113 
Franzosling  180 
Frederick  I  129 
Frederick  the  Great  142 
Free  Imperial  towns  55 
French     attitude     towards     Alsace- 
Lorraine  214  seq. 
disturbing    currents   in    France 

since  1871  221-2 
Great   War,    after   outbreak    of 

227  seq. 
nationalities,  question  of  222-3 
pacific  policy  of  French  demo- 
cracy 219—20 
phases  of  French  feeling  214 


322 


INDEX 


French  attitude — continued 

recent  national  policy  223—4 
revanche  ideal  214  seq. 

evanescence     of     216     seq., 
220  seq.,  224 
French  Revolution,  Alsace  at  59 

fusion     between     France     and 
Alsace  129 
Fried,    Alsace-Lorraine  as   cause   of 
the  war,  on  29 
compromise  preferable  to  slaugh- 
ter 32,  280 
Froelich,  pan-Germanism  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  181 
Frontier,  desideratum  in  fixing  301 
former,  untenable  242 
rearrangement  suggested  287,  289 
security  of  138  seq. 
Fustel  de  Coulanges,  nationality,  on 
128 
nationality  of  Alsace,  on  130 

Gaede,  General,  proclamation  of  209 

Gambetta  194,  214,  216 

assumes  dictatorship  63 

George,  Lloyd,  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  231 

Germany,  aggressiveness  of  28 

For  various  matters  see  separate 
heads 

Gladstone,     annexation    of    Alsace- 
Lorraine,  on  24,  147-8 
liberty,  on  174 

Glattbach  309 

Gobat,  repressive  measures  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  166-7 

Goltz,  Von  der  141 

Gortchakoff,  circular  of  67 

'  Gottesfreunde,'  the  56 

Gottfried  117 

Grafenstaden  affair  165 

Granville,   concludes  treaties  (1870) 
to  protect  Belgium  62 

Great  War,  attitude  of  Alsace-Lorraine 

on  outbreak  of  207  seq. 

attitude  of  German  authorities 

towards     Alsace-Lorraine 

on  outbreak  of  209 

precautions     of     Germany     in 

Alsace-Lorraine  175-6 
Treaty  of  Frankfort  not  abro- 
gated by  151,  233 

Grevy,  98,  104,  217 

Grosjean  107 

Guester,  Abbe  158 

Gustavus  Adolphus  57 

Gutenberg  56 

Hanotaux,  protests  in  1871,  109 

Thiers's  efforts  in  negotiation  69 


Hansi  168 

Harden,  partition,  on  285 

restoration    of    Alsace-Lorraine 
239-40 
Hartmann,  109 

Headlam,  Rhine  frontier,  on  298 
Heligoland  150 

Helmer,  Manteuffel's  regime  162 
mediaeval  Alsace  117 
plebiscite,  on  312 
position  of  Alsatians  in  France 
after  outbreak  of  the  war, 
on  233-4 
Hengel  130 
Henry  I  55 
Henry  V  51 
Herve,  progress  under  German  rule, 

on  47,  48 
Herzberger  290 
History  49  seq. 

Alsace,  French  Revolution  59 
Middle  Ages  55 
part  of  Germany  till  seven- 
teenth century  56 
Thirty  Years  War  56 
union  with  France  60 
Charlemagne  50 
Germanic  invasions  49 
Lorraine,  of  51  seq. 

annexations  to  France  52 
cession  to  France  54,  55 
French  invasion  54 
Middle  Ages,  in  51,  52 
sixteenth  century  52,  53 
Merovingian  period  50 
Roman  period  49 
union  with  German  Empire  5 1 
Hoeffel,  declaration  in  First  Cham- 
ber 210,  211 
Hohenlohe  Schillingsf  urst,  Prince  von 

162 
Holdich,  German  characteristics  179 

Rhine  frontier,  on  297 
Holy  Roman  Empire  1 16-17 
Home  Rule 

See    Autonomy ;     Nationalist 
movement 
Hue  259 

Hugo,  protest  against  annexation  in 
1871  104,  105 


Immigrants,  attitude  of  178 
fusion  with  natives  202-3 
number  of  179 
plebiscite,  in  case  of  315 
younger  generation,  position  of 
248 

Imports  44 


INDEX 


323 


Independence    for     Alsace-Lorraine, 
advantages  279  seq. 
bond  of  union  between  France 

and  Germany  281-2 
buffer  State,  would  be  a  282-3 
fusion   of   Germanic  and   Gallic 

elements  281 
government,  form  of  277 
matters  for  adjustment  278-9 
military    service    difficulty    re- 
moved 281 
neutralisation  proposed  271  seq. 
revanche  obviated  280 
Industries  41  seq. 
International  law,  in  1871  148 
International  League  of  Peace  and 

Liberty  274-7 
Iron 

See  also  Coal  and  iron 
effect  of  depriving  Germany  of 

261-2 
German  resources  260-61 
Lorraine,  in  42,  259 

Jagow,    attitude  of   Alsace-Lorraine 

i75»  199 

Jahns 141 

Joffre,  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
228 

Jolly,   suggested  division  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  in  1 87 1,  92 

Jordan,  Alsace-Lorraine  against  war 
as  solution  311 
Alsatian  names,  character  of  119 

Julius  Caesar  49 

Katzenstein  309 

Keller  98,  103,  106 

Kellermann  130 

Kiel,  treaty  of  150 

Kleber  130 

Koeller,  regime  under  167-8 

Kuhlmann,   Alsace-Lorraine  in  rela- 
tion to  the  war,  on  29 
reannexation     to     France,     on 
236-7 

Labour  Party  309 

Lalance  311 

Lamberty,  attachment  of  Alsace  to 

France  129 
Landesausschuss  159 

See  Territorial  Delegacy 
Language  38-40 

division  on  basis  of  290-92 
index  of  feelings  and  desires  of 

the  people,  as  204-5 
partition,  in  regard  to  285-6 
question  of  123  seq. 
reannexation,  in  case  of  243-4 


Lasson  90,  141 

conquest,  on  143 
Launay,  German  coal  and  iron  sup- 
plies, on  260 
Laussedat,      boundary     commission 
80-81 
negotiations  with  Bismarck,  on 
76-77 
League  of  Free  Cities  55 
Lefebvre  130 
Leopold  54 

Liberal  democratic  party  190 
Lichtenberger,  attitude  of  Alsatians, 
on  200 
autonomy,  on  264 
education,  on  47 
law  in  case  of  reannexation  244 
new  generation,  attitude  of  203 
plebiscite,  on  313 
unity  of  Alsace,  on  243 
Liebknecht,  protest  against  annexa- 
tion in  1871,  86 
Ligue  Patriotique  200,  208 
'  Lois  d'exception  '  164 
Longwy,  German  demands  as  to  257 
Lorraine.     See    heads   for    particular 
topics 
cession  to  France  54-5 
Middle  Ages,  in  51 
sixteenth  century,  in  52 
Lothair  50 

Louis    XIV,    annexation    of    Strass- 
burg  59 
natural  defences  under  297 
Louis  the  German  51 
Luneville,  Peace  of  294 
Lyde,     boundary   readjustment,    on 


Maass,  Rhenish  Alpine  Confedera- 
tion suggested  288 

Machiavelli  141 

Macmahon  221 

Malon  109 

Mandel  168 

Manteuffel,  regime  under  159,  161-2, 
163 

Manufactures  41  seq. 

Marseillaise,  the  60,  128,  168,  198 

Mehemet  Ali  113 

Merlin  of  Douai  60 

Metternich,     Rhine     boundary,     on 

294-5 

Metz.     See  also  Pays  messin 

annexation     of,     Mommsen     on 

T39-4° 
Bismarck's  doubts  about  97 
German  element  in  133 


324 


INDEX 


Military     service,     introduction     in 
Alsace-Lorraine  156 

Minerals  37,  42,  43 

Minette  255,  256 

Moltke  143 

Mommsen,    claims    of    Germany    to 
Alsace-Lorraine,  on  114 
conquest,  on  146 
language,  claim  on  ground  of  123 
Metz,  annexation  of  126,  139-40 

Monod  138 

Morocco  218 

Munster,  treaty  of  57,  60 

Napoleon,  Rhine  frontier,  on  295 
Napoleon  III  145,  147,  149 

plebiscite,  adoption  of  304 
Rhine  frontier,  aim  as  to  293 
National  Assembly,  debates  on  ces- 
sion 104  seq. 
National  Union,  formation  of  191 
manifesto  against  the  Constitu- 
tion of  191 1,  193 
programme  of  191 -3 
Nationalist  movement  184  seq. 

attitude    towards    France    and 

Germany  199  seq. 
autonomists  and  protesters  dis- 
tinguished 189-90 
autonomy  demanded  194-7 
efforts  against  169 
method  adopted  189 
National  Union  191-3 
parties  in  189-92 
why  began  188 
Nationality,  option  of  82 
principle  of  127  seq. 
Naumann,      German     attitude     to- 
wards Alsace-Lorraine  177 
Near  Eastern  Question,  distinguished 
from  Alsace-Lorraine 

question  21 
Nesselrode  294 

Neutralisation     of     Alsace-Lorraine 
271  seq. 
Bismarck's  view  89-90 
German  objections  to  273-4 
Treitschke's  view  90 
Newspapers,  suppression  of  164 
Nimeguen,  treaty  of  58,  153 
Noisseville  affair  198 
Novicow,     constitution     of     Alsace- 
Lorraine  172 
German  unity  and  Alsace-Lor- 
raine 135 
plebiscite    following    autonomy 
269 

Oberprasident,  appointment  of  156 
office  abolished  159 


Oncken,  effects  of  annexation  of  1871, 
no 
frontier  security  138-9 
Option  of  nationality  82 
Otto  the  Great  51 

Painleve,  restoration  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine demanded  229,  237 
Palat,  Alsatian  demand  of  autonomy 

219 
Panama  affair  221 
Pangermanism  31,  180-1 
Paris,  Peace  of  (18 14)  295 
Treaty  of  (1815)  258 
(1856)  66 
(1877)   304 
Partition  of  Alsace-Lorraine  285  seq. 
difficulties  290  seq. 
language  as  basis  285-6 
suggested  in  1871,  92 
various  forms  of  286  seq. 
Passport  system  164 
Paulsen,     no     question     of     Alsace- 
Lorraine  25 
Pays  messin  126,  146 
See  also  Metz 
Petroleum  43 
Pichon  140 
Plebiscite,   Anglo-American  practice 

305 

appropriateness   of,   for   Alsace- 
Lorraine  309 
autonomy  followed  by  269-70 
compromise  necessary  316 
condition    of   annexation,    as    a 

145 
demand  by  Alsace-Lorraine  310- 

11 
difficulty  in  315 
examples  of  302-4 
juristic  opinion  on  306-7 
necessity  for  250,  274,  302 
omission  of,  cases  of  305 
opposition  to  312  seq. 
grounds  of  30S 
validity  of  314 
organisation  of  317 
persons  who  should  vote  317 
support  of,  grounds  of  307 
Treitschke's  view  90,  91-2 
Poehlmann  190 
Poincare    (President),    reannexation 

228 
Population  37,  3S 

characteristics  of  38 
Postal  service  45 
Potash  43 
Pouquet 187 
Pouyer-Quertier  75 


INDEX 


325 


Prague,  treaty  of  305 
Preiss  195 

repressive    measures  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  167 
Problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine  19  seq. 

aspects  of  24 

French  view  as  to  26 

German  denial  of  25 

Great  War,  as  cause  of  27 

Near    Eastern   Question   distin- 
guished from  2 1 

origin  of  2 1 

solution  of  30  seq. 

See  Solution  of  problem 

solutions  suggested  235  seq. 
See  Solutions  suggested 

third  States  concerned  in  22 
Public  right  130-31 
Public  works  45 
Pyat 109 

Quinet,   cession    of    Alsace-Lorraine 
in  1871,  105 

Raess,  Mgr.  186 

Ranc 109 

Ranke,  historical  claims  of  Germany 

113.  139 
Rapp  130 

Ratisbon,  treaty  of  58 
Reannexation   to   France,    coal   and 
iron  problem  251  seq. 

commercial  system  246 

difficulties  involved  24O  seq. 

educational  system  247-8 

fiscal  legislation  246 

German  attitude  236  seq. 

Great  War,  attitude  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  before  197  seq. 

industrial  organisation  245 

interregnum  suggested  249 

language  question  243 

legal  system  244-5 

mixed  population  248 

modes  of  effecting  235 

nationalist  movement  as  affect- 
ing 249 

plebiscite  following  235-6 

political  grouping  243 

religious  question  40,  41,  247 
Reason  of  State  143 
Referendum.     See  Plebiscite 
Regime  in   Alsace-Lorraine,    Bulach 
(Baron  de),  under  168-9 

censorship  164 

Council  of  State  established  160 

Dallwitz  von  Roedern,  under  174 

dictatorship  (1871-3)  156 

economic  pressure  165 


Regime  in  Alsace-Lorraine — continued 
educational  measures  165-6 
'  exceptional  '  laws  164 
exclusion  of  natives  from  public 

functions  165 
failure,  reasons  for  177  seq. 
germanisation   not   effected  176 

seq. 
Government  Bill  (1910)  169 
Great  War,  precautions  on  out- 
break of  175-6 
Hohenlohe  Schillingsfurst,  under 

162 
imperial     constitution     applied 

(1874)  157 
Koeller,  under  167-8 
language,  conflict  as  to  166 
legislation,  methods  of  160-61 
Manteuffel,  under  161-2 
military  occupation  (1870-1)  155 
nationalist     movement,     efforts 
against  169 
See  also  Autonomy  ;    Nation- 
alist movement 
new  constitution  (191 1)  170  seq. 
newspapers  suppressed  164 
official  classes  167,  178 
passport  system  164 
progress  in  many  respects  47 
repressive  measures  163  seq. 
societies  dissolved  164 
Statthalter  appointed  159 
status   from   February   1871    to 

June  1871  155 

suspicion  and  espionage  165 

Territorial  Delegacy  159-61 

See  Territorial  Delegacy 

Religion  40 

Religious  question  40,  41,  247 
Renan,  racial  claims  of  Germany  121 
Revanche  21,  31,  32,  33,  176,  214  seq., 
239,  265 
See  also   French  attitude  to- 
wards Alsace-Lorraine 
Revanchegeliist  152 
Reyle  206 
Rhine  as  a  boundary  293  seq. 

difficulties  297-8 
Ribot,  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine 

229-30 
Ricklin  209,  211 
Rochefort  109 
Rudolf  III  55 

Russia,  e nte nte  with  France  ( 1 89 1 )  218 
Ryswick,  treaty  of  54,  59,  153 

Saint- Aignan  294 
St.  Odilia  50 
Saint- Vallier  no 


326 


INDEX 


Salisbury,  Lord,  plebiscite,  on  305 

Saverne  affair  175,  198 

Scheidemann,  autonomy,  on  267 

Schmettau  129 

Schnaebele  incident  163,  217-18 

Schonaich  Carolath  257 

Schongauer  56 

Schucking,  German  agressiveness,  on 

28 
Schumacher,    German   need   of   coal 

and  iron  256-7 
Schwab  180 

Sembat,  attitude  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
201,  203 
autonomy,  refusal  of  172 
French  feeling  after  annexation 
in  1871,  on  215-16 
Seward,  plebiscite,  on  305 
Sirhanun  130 

Socialists,  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  190 
Congress   (1914)    194 
France,  in  230 

self-determination,  on  309 
Germany,    in,    annexation    pro- 
posals 258 
autonomy,  on  267 
Conference     at     Wiirzburg 

(1917)  286 
self-determination,  on  309 
Societies,  dissolution  of  164 
Solution   of   problem,    desiderata   in 

3°.  3i.  33 
difficulties  in  31 
justice  the  fundamental  point  in 

33 
Solutions    suggested,    arbitration    of 
the  Pope  290 

autonomy    within    the    German 
Empire  263  seq. 
See     Autonomy    for     Alsace- 
Lorraine 

Confederation,  to  form  part  of  a 
new  288 

division  among  German  States 
287 

frontier  rearrangement  287,  289 

independence     for     Alsace-Lor- 
raine 271  seq. 
See  Independence  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine 

partition   between    France    and 
Germany  285  seq. 
See    Partition   of   Alsace-Lor- 
raine 

pays  messin  to  France  and  rest 
neutralised  288 

plebiscite  in  302  seq. 
See  Plebiscite 

reannexation  to  France  235  seq. 


Solutions  suggested — continued 

See  Reannexation  to  France 

Rhine  as  boundary  293  seq. 

union  of  Alsace  with  Baden  286 
Spiess  190 

Stanislaus  Leszczynski  54 
Statthalter  159 
Stowell,  conquest,  on  149-50 
Straits  Convention  (1856)  66 
Strassburg,  German  element  in  133 

seventeenth  century,  in  58 

University  of  47 

germanisation  of  165 
Streams  in  Alsace-Lorraine  37 
Sturm  von  Sturmeck  56 
Sybel,  conquest,  on  91 

Tachard,  Alsace-Lorraine  as  a  buffer 

State  272 
Talleyrand,  Prussian  ambition,  on  142 
Tauler  56 

Telegraph  service  45 
Telephone  service  45 
Territorial  Delegacy,  composition  of 
159,  160 
establishment  of  159 
functions  enlarged  159 
legislation,  part  in  160-61 
political  alliances  in  189 
rupture  with  ministry  168 
Territory,  German  lust  for  141  seq. 
Teutsch  184 
Thibaudin  217 

Thiers,  head  of  the  executive  64,  103 
interview     with     Bismarck     at 

Versailles  68 
interview  with  German  Emperor 

and  Crown  Prince  69 
mission  to  European  Powers  63 
Preliminaries  of  Versailles  sub- 
mitted to  Assembly  104 
Thirty  Years  War  56 
Three  Bishoprics,  the  51 
Tilsit,  Peace  of  305 
Tirard  106 

Transport,  means  of  44 
Treaties,  binding  force  of  151-3 

future    international     co-opera- 
tion and  283-4 
Treitschke,  autonomy,  on  94 

claims   of   Germany  to   Alsace- 
Lorraine,  on  114 
conquest,  on  146 
military  necessity  of  annexation, 

on  137-8 
military   service  in    Alsace,    on 

156-7 
natural  deficiencies  of  Germany, 
on  134 


INDEX 


327 


Treitschke — continued 

neutralisation,  on  90,  273 
partition,  on  92—3 
plebiscite,  on  90,  91-2 
political  necessity  of  annexation 

135 

pretensions  of  122 
Trouee  de  Belfort  37 
Turenne  57 

'  Ubi  societas  ibi  ius  '271 
Utrecht,  treaty  of  153 

Vaucouleurs,  treaty  of  115 
Verdun,  treaty  of  50,  115 
Vereeniging,  Peace  of  244 
Versailles,  Preliminaries  of  65,  70 

debate  on  104  seq. 

provisions  of  71-3 

vote  on  107 
Vienna  Congress  142 
Vienna,  treaty  of  (1755)  54 

(1815)   153 

(1864)  305 
Vincennes,  treaty  of  54 
Viviani,     reannexation     of     Alsace- 
Lorraine  227,  228 
Vosges,  as  frontier  298 

Wagner,  plebiscite,  on  92 
Wedel,  Count  von  169 
Wedelpissdorf,  Alsatian  demand  for 

autonomy  173 
Weill,  Alsatian  desertions  from  Ger- 
man army  209 
autonomy  demanded  in  Reichs- 
tag 194 
plebiscite,  on  313 


Welsche  180 

Welschinger,  protest  in  1871,  103,  108 

Wendel  259 

Westarp  258 

Westphalia,  treaty  of  57,  153 

Wetterle,   autonomy  as  a  stepping- 
stone,  on  197,  208 
Constitution  of  191 1,  171-2 
Dallwitz  von  Roedern's  regime 

174 
declarations  of  the  two  Chambers 

in  1917,  on  210-11 
difficulties  of  reannexation  249 
industrial  organisation  in  case  of 

reannexation  245 
plebiscite,  on  312 
reassimilation     to     France,     on 

241-2 
religious  question,  on  247 
William  I  137,  237 

reason  for  annexation,  on  140 
William  II  175,  218 
Wilson     (President),      '  reconsidera- 
tion '   of   Alsace-Lorraine 
question  232 
self-determination  of  nations  310 
Wine,  manufacture  of  43 
Winterer,  Abbe  158 
Wittich  204 

'  Young  Alsace  '  219 

See  Nationalist  movement 

Zabern.     See  Saverne 
Zeppelin  176,  198 
Zislin  168 
Zollverein  278 


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